Matrimonial Home Rights: Supreme Court Directs Accommodation in Redeveloped Property in Aishwarya Atul Pusalkar vs. Maharashtra Housing & Area Development Authority (27 April 2020)

Date of the Judgment: 27 April 2020
Citation: Civil Appeal No. 7231 of 2012
Judges: Deepak Gupta, J., Aniruddha Bose, J. (authored the judgment).
Can a wife claim a right to reside in a specific property, particularly when that property has been redeveloped under a statutory scheme? This question was at the heart of a complex legal battle before the Supreme Court of India. The case involved a woman seeking to enforce her right to reside in what she considered her matrimonial home, which was part of a redeveloped property under the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976. The Supreme Court, while acknowledging her right to a matrimonial home, ultimately directed her to approach the appropriate family or civil court for the enforcement of such rights, while providing interim relief.

Case Background

The appellant, Aishwarya Atul Pusalkar, sought to enforce her right to reside in her matrimonial home, which was located in two flats (nos. 601 and 602) in a building on plot No.118, Dr. M.B. Raut Road, Shivaji Park, Dadar, Mumbai. The property was originally owned by the family of her husband, Atul Shivram Pusalkar (respondent no. 8). The building, known as “Usha,” was owned by three branches of the Pusalkar family. The branch of the respondent no. 8 had a 1/3rd share, which was approximately 1100 sq.ft. The building was redeveloped by BUILDARCH after obtaining a no-objection certificate from the Mumbai Building Reforms and Reconstruction Board under the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (1976 Act). During the redevelopment, occupants were required to shift to temporary accommodations. The appellant’s family shifted to a temporary accommodation in 2000, but the appellant remained in the original building with her two minor sons.

The MHADA authorities issued a notice to the appellant under Section 95-A of the 1976 Act, which mandates that occupants vacate premises when a building is being redeveloped with the consent of 70% of the occupants. The appellant then shifted to a temporary accommodation as directed by the Bombay High Court. After the redevelopment, the new building was named “Om Apartment”.

The family of the appellant’s husband had an agreement with the builder, where they were to receive 1100 sq. ft. of space in the new building. However, the mother and sister of the respondent no. 8 assigned their share of 733 sq. ft. to the builder, leaving the respondent no. 8 with a flat of 379 sq. ft. (flat no. 101). The appellant claimed that her husband’s family was entitled to 1816.61 sq. ft., and her husband’s share was 605.53 sq. ft. in the new building, consisting of flats 601 and 602. The builder claimed that the plan was amended and the family was allocated only 1100 sq. ft. The respondent no. 8 wanted the appellant to shift to flat no. 101, while she claimed her right to reside in flats 601 and 602.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The Family Court had initially granted a decree of judicial separation in 1997 to the husband, Atul Shivram Pusalkar. However, the Bombay High Court, in a common judgment on 2nd July, 2001, set aside the decree of judicial separation and dismissed the husband’s appeal for divorce. This decision was delivered after the appellant had shifted to temporary accommodation. The appellant claimed that after the decree of judicial separation was invalidated, her husband and his family did not allow her to reside in the flats allocated to them in the redeveloped building.

The appellant then filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court, seeking a direction upon MHADA authorities to rehouse her in the said two flats (601 and 602). The Bombay High Court dismissed the writ petition, stating that it was not the appropriate remedy for the appellant to enforce her claim. The High Court held that the appellant should seek relief in the Family Court or civil court. The present appeal before the Supreme Court arose from this dismissal by the Bombay High Court.

Legal Framework

The case primarily revolves around the interpretation and application of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (1976 Act), particularly Section 95-A, which deals with the reconstruction of buildings. Section 95-A of the 1976 Act stipulates:

“95-A. (1) Where the owner of a building or the members of the proposed co-operative housing society of the occupiers of the said building, submits a proposal to the Board for reconstruction of the building, after obtaining the written consent of not less than 70 per cent of the total occupiers of the building and a No Objection Certificate for such reconstruction of the building is issued by the Board to the owner or to the proposed co-operative housing society of the occupiers, as the case may be, then it shall be binding on all the occupiers to vacate the premises: Provided that, it shall be incumbent upon the holder of such No Objection Certificate to make available to all the occupants of such building alternate temporary accommodation.”

This provision allows for the redevelopment of buildings with the consent of a majority of occupants, making it binding on all occupants to vacate. It also requires the provision of temporary alternate accommodation. The appellant was issued a notice under this section to vacate her premises.

The Court also considered the following legal provisions:

• Section 2(25) of the 1976 Act: Defines “occupier.” The appellant was considered an occupier due to her residence in the original building.
• Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956: Implicitly recognizes a wife’s right to reside with her husband and family.
• Section 2(s) and Section 19 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005: Recognizes the concept of “shared household” and empowers a Magistrate to pass a residence order to protect a victim of domestic violence.
• Section 3(iv) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005: Defines “economic abuse” as a form of domestic violence.
• Section 177 of the 1976 Act: States that disputes arising out of the said Act cannot be adjudicated upon by a Civil Court.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that she was removed from her matrimonial home through the statutory mechanism under Section 95A of the 1976 Act, which included threats of penal measures and summary eviction.
• She contended that her “dishousing” was due to a notice dated 10th July 2000 issued by the Board under the 1976 Act.
• She argued that it was a composite statutory obligation of MHADA, the builder, and her husband to rehouse her in her matrimonial home, as they all functioned under a statutory scheme.
• She claimed that she had a right to be rehoused in flats 601 and 602 as part of the statutory rehabilitation measure, as she had vacated the original residential unit based on a statutory notice.
• She asserted that her right to reside in her matrimonial home is linked to the statutory right of her husband to be rehoused in the new building.
• She argued that the builder and the husband have to rehouse her in her matrimonial home.
• She claimed that she was an occupier under Section 2(25) of the 1976 Act and had a right to be rehoused in her matrimonial home.

Respondents’ Arguments:

• The respondents argued that the right the appellant was seeking to establish could not be enforced under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
• They contended that the appellant’s claim was based on her contention that she was entitled to occupy flats 601 and 602 as her matrimonial home, but this could not be addressed in a writ petition.
• The respondents argued that the builder had discharged his obligation by accommodating the original owners in the redeveloped portion as per the scheme, and a lady married into that family would not be entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction.
• They stated that the appellant did not have any independent claim on title or interest to the property based on the statute.
• They argued that the appellant’s right to reside in her matrimonial home is independent of the statutory scheme and her right to reside in her matrimonial home does not flow from the 1976 Act.
• The builder and the husband stated that flat no. 101 was available to accommodate the appellant.

Submissions by Parties

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in a separate section but the following issues were considered by the Court:

1. Whether the appellant can enforce her right to reside in her matrimonial home through a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
2. Whether the appellant’s right to reside in her matrimonial home is linked to the statutory scheme under the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976.
3. Whether the appellant can be directed to reside in Flat No. 101 as an interim measure.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Court considered various legal provisions and principles but did not cite any specific cases or books in this judgment. The legal provisions considered are:

• Section 95-A of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976: This section was discussed in the context of the redevelopment of the building and the appellant’s eviction from the original premises. The court noted that while the appellant was evicted under this provision, her claim to rehousing was not based on this Act but on her status as a wife.
• Section 2(25) of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976: The court recognized the appellant as an “occupier” under this definition. However, the court clarified that her right to reside in her matrimonial home did not stem from this status but from her marital status.
• Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956: The court acknowledged that this section implicitly recognizes a wife’s right to reside with her husband and family. This provision was used to support the appellant’s claim to a matrimonial home.
• Section 2(s) and Section 19 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005: The court noted the concept of “shared household” and the power of a magistrate to pass residence orders under this act. This was used to support the appellant’s right to a matrimonial home.
• Section 3(iv) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005: The court mentioned that alienating an immovable asset to defeat the right of a victim lady under the said Act can constitute domestic violence, coming within the ambit of the expression “economic abuse”.
• Section 177 of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976: The court noted that this section bars civil courts from adjudicating disputes arising out of this Act. However, the court clarified that the appellant’s dispute did not arise from the 1976 Act but from her marital status.

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• Section 95-A of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976: The Court acknowledged that the appellant was evicted under this provision but clarified that her claim for rehousing was not based on this Act but on her status as a wife.
• Section 2(25) of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976: The Court recognized the appellant as an “occupier” under this definition. However, the court clarified that her right to reside in her matrimonial home did not stem from this status but from her marital status.
• Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956: The Court acknowledged that this section implicitly recognizes a wife’s right to reside with her husband and family. This provision was used to support the appellant’s claim to a matrimonial home.
• Section 2(s) and Section 19 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005: The Court noted the concept of “shared household” and the power of a magistrate to pass residence orders under this act. This was used to support the appellant’s right to a matrimonial home.
• Section 3(iv) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005: The Court mentioned that alienating an immovable asset to defeat the right of a victim lady under the said Act can constitute domestic violence, coming within the ambit of the expression “economic abuse”.
• Section 177 of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976: The Court noted that this section bars civil courts from adjudicating disputes arising out of this Act. However, the court clarified that the appellant’s dispute did not arise from the 1976 Act but from her marital status.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following:

• Distinction between Statutory Rights and Matrimonial Rights: The Court emphasized that while the appellant was an occupier under the 1976 Act, her right to reside in her matrimonial home stemmed from her marital status and not from the statutory scheme. This distinction was crucial in determining that a writ petition was not the appropriate remedy.
• Appropriate Forum for Matrimonial Disputes: The Court held that disputes relating to matrimonial rights, such as the right to reside in a matrimonial home, should be adjudicated by family courts or civil courts, which have the necessary jurisdiction and mechanisms for fact-finding.
• Interim Relief: Despite finding that the writ petition was not the correct forum, the Court exercised its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to provide interim relief to the appellant by giving her the option to reside in Flat No. 101. This was done to conclude the long-standing dispute and provide immediate relief.
• Recognition of Matrimonial Rights: The Court recognized the appellant’s right to reside in her matrimonial home, citing the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. This acknowledgment underscored the importance of protecting a wife’s right to a matrimonial home.
• Practical Considerations: The Court considered that the original building was demolished and the redeveloped building had been partly disposed of. It also took into account that the husband had offered Flat No. 101 as an alternative. These practical considerations influenced the Court’s decision to offer the appellant the option of residing in Flat No. 101.

Sentiment Analysis of Reasons Given by the Supreme Court:

Fact:Law Ratio:

Logical Reasoning

Issue 1: Whether the appellant can enforce her right to reside in her matrimonial home through a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Issue 2: Whether the appellant’s right to reside in her matrimonial home is linked to the statutory scheme under the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976.

Issue 3: Whether the appellant can be directed to reside in Flat No. 101 as an interim measure.

Judgment

The Supreme Court held that the appellant’s writ petition seeking to enforce her right to reside in her matrimonial home was not maintainable. The Court reasoned that while the appellant had a right to reside in her matrimonial home, this right stemmed from her marital status and not from the statutory scheme under the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976. The Court emphasized that such matrimonial disputes should be adjudicated by family courts or civil courts, which are better equipped to handle fact-finding and provide appropriate remedies.

The Court observed that:

“But in our opinion, when a builder has discharged his obligation by accommodating the original owners in the redeveloped portion as per such a scheme, a lady married into that family would not be entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court to enforce her right to matrimonial home citing the provisions of the said statute, if her husband does not permit her to reside in the allocated portion.”

The Court further clarified that:

“Her claim of right to reside in her matrimonial home is sought to be projected by her as collateral to the statutory right of her husband to be rehoused or rehabilitated in the new building. But her right to reside in her matrimonial home stands detached from and is independent of the statutory scheme under the said Act.”

Despite dismissing the writ petition, the Court, using its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, provided interim relief by directing that the appellant be given the choice of occupying Flat No. 101 in the redeveloped building. This was done to conclude the long-standing dispute and provide immediate relief to the appellant. The Court also laid down specific conditions for this interim arrangement, including disclosure from MHADA authorities and the husband’s undertaking not to disturb her possession.

The Court stated:

“Considering the fact that the dispute is pending for a very long time, we shall be giving certain directions in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India which we hope will conclude the dispute.”

The Court also clarified that if the appellant wished to establish her right to reside in her matrimonial home with her husband, she was at liberty to approach the Family Court or any other competent forum. The Court also noted that the appellant was at liberty to seek such remedies as are available to her in law, including seeking a residence order under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Principles Laid Down

The Supreme Court laid down several important legal principles in this case:

• Distinction between Statutory and Matrimonial Rights: The Court clearly distinguished between rights arising from a statutory scheme (like the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976) and rights arising from marital status. It held that a wife’s right to reside in her matrimonial home is based on her marital status and is independent of any statutory scheme for housing redevelopment.
• Appropriate Forum for Matrimonial Disputes: The Court emphasized that disputes relating to matrimonial rights, such as the right to reside in a matrimonial home, should be adjudicated by family courts or civil courts, which are better equipped to handle fact-finding and provide appropriate remedies. Writ jurisdiction is not the appropriate forum for such disputes.
• Interim Relief: The Court used its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to provide interim relief to the appellant, despite dismissing her writ petition. This demonstrates the Court’s willingness to provide immediate relief in cases where justice requires it, even when the formal legal route is not appropriate.
• Recognition of Matrimonial Rights: The Court recognized the appellant’s right to reside in her matrimonial home, citing the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. This underscores the importance of protecting a wife’s right to a matrimonial home.
• Limitations of Writ Jurisdiction: The Court clarified that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not meant to enforce private rights, especially those stemming from family law. Writ jurisdiction is primarily for enforcing public duties and statutory obligations.

Summary

In the case of Aishwarya Atul Pusalkar vs. Maharashtra Housing & Area Development Authority & Ors., the Supreme Court addressed the complex issue of a wife’s right to reside in her matrimonial home when the property was part of a redevelopment project under the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976. The appellant, Aishwarya Atul Pusalkar, sought to enforce her right to reside in what she considered her matrimonial home (flats 601 and 602) in the redeveloped building. The original building was owned by the family of her husband, Atul Shivram Pusalkar, and was redeveloped by a builder under the 1976 Act.

The Court held that the appellant’s right to reside in her matrimonial home was not a statutory right under the 1976 Act, but a right based on her marital status. Therefore, a writ petition was not the appropriate remedy for enforcing this right. The Court directed the appellant to approach the Family Court or any other competent forum to establish her right to reside in her matrimonial home. However, using its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court provided interim relief by giving the appellant the option to occupy Flat No. 101 in the redeveloped building, subject to certain conditions and undertakings from the respondents.

The Supreme Court laid down important legal principles, distinguishing between statutory rights and matrimonial rights, emphasizing the appropriate forum for matrimonial disputes, and recognizing the importance of protecting a wife’s right to a matrimonial home. The case highlights the intersection of family law and housing law and underscores the limitations of writ jurisdiction in enforcing private rights.