LEGAL ISSUE: Classification of medicated talcum powder under sales tax laws.

CASE TYPE: Tax Law

Case Name: HEINZ INDIA LIMITED vs. THE STATE OF KERELA and M/s Glaxo Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd vs. The State of Tamil Nadu

Judgment Date: May 4, 2023

Date of the Judgment: May 4, 2023
Citation: 2023 INSC 488
Judges: S. Ravindra Bhat, J., Dipankar Datta, J.
Can a product with medicinal properties be classified as a cosmetic for tax purposes? The Supreme Court of India addressed this complex question in a recent judgment, concerning the classification of medicated talcum powder under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (KGST Act) and the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (TNGST Act). The court had to determine whether products like “Nycil Prickly Heat Powder” should be taxed as medicines or as cosmetics. This judgment, authored by Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, clarifies the interpretation of specific entries in tax statutes, particularly when dealing with hybrid products that have both cosmetic and medicinal attributes.

Case Background

The appeals before the Supreme Court arose from two separate cases concerning the classification of “Nycil Prickly Heat Powder” for sales tax purposes. In the first case, Heinz India Limited (hereafter “Heinz”) contested the Kerala High Court’s decision, which classified their product as “medicated talcum powder” rather than a medicine. The second case involved Glaxo Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd (“GSK”), which appealed against the Madras High Court’s judgment, which classified the same product as a toilet powder instead of a medicinal formulation.

The core issue was whether “Nycil Prickly Heat Powder,” which contains medicinal ingredients like chlorphenesin, zinc oxide, and boric acid, should be classified as a medicine or a cosmetic under the respective state sales tax laws. Heinz argued that the product’s medicinal properties and its use in treating prickly heat should classify it as a medicine. In contrast, the tax authorities contended that the product fell under the category of “medicated talcum powder” or “toilet powder,” which are taxed at a higher rate.

Timeline

Date Event
1999-2000 Heinz files annual return in Kerala, treating Nycil as medicine under Entry 79 of KGST Act.
18-11-2005 Assessing officer accepts Heinz’s return for 1999-2000.
1999-2000 and 2000-2001 Assessment years under consideration in Kerala case.
1993-94 and 1994-95 Assessment years under consideration in Tamil Nadu case.
16-2-2006 Revisional authority in Kerala sets aside assessment for 1999-2000, reclassifying Nycil as medicated talcum powder.
14.11.2006 Appellate Tribunal in Kerala affirms revisional order.
29 September 2008 Kerala High Court rejects Heinz’s revisions.
19.02.2001 Appellate Assistant Commissioner in Tamil Nadu affirms assessing officer’s view.
30.08.2001 Appellate Tribunal in Tamil Nadu accepts Heinz’s plea, classifying Nycil as medicine.
01.03.2012 Madras High Court reverses the Appellate Tribunal’s decision, classifying Nycil as toilet powder.
01.04.1994 Amendment to TNGST Act adding explanation to Entry I (iii), Part F.

Course of Proceedings

In the Kerala case, the assessing officer initially accepted Heinz’s classification of “Nycil Prickly Heat Powder” as a medicine, taxable at 8%. However, the revisional authority, believing this to be prejudicial to revenue interests, reclassified it as “medicated talcum powder,” taxable at 20%. The Kerala Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld this reclassification. The Kerala High Court concurred with the revenue’s classification, noting that while the product had medicinal value, the specific entry for “medicated talcum powder” should prevail over the general entry for medicines.

In the Tamil Nadu case, the assessing officer initially taxed “Nycil” as a toilet powder. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner affirmed this view. However, the Appellate Tribunal sided with Heinz, classifying the product as a medicine. The Madras High Court reversed this decision, holding that the explanation to the relevant entry in the TNGST Act specifically included medicated items, even if licensed under the Drugs Act, under the category of toilet powders.

Legal Framework

The core legal issue revolved around the interpretation of specific entries in the KGST Act and the TNGST Act.

Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (KGST Act):

  • Entry 79: “Medicines and Drugs including allopathic, ayurvedic, homeopathic, siddha and unani preparations and glucose IP.”
  • Entry 127: “Shampoo, Talcum Powder including medicated talcum powder, Sandalwood Oil, Ramacham Oil, Cinnamon Oil, other perfumeries and cosmetics not falling under any other entry in this Schedule”.

Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (TNGST Act):

  • Entry 20(A) of Part C: “Any medicinal formulation or preparation ready for use internally or externally for treatment or mitigation or prevention of diseases or disorders in human being or animals (excluding products capable of being used as creams, hair oils, tooth pastes, tooth powders, cosmetics, toilet articles, soaps and shampoos), but including (i) Allopathic medicine. (ii) Other medicines and drugs including ayurvedic, homeopathic, siddha and unani preparations. (iii) Medicinal mixtures or compounds, the components of which have not already suffered tax. (iv) Surgical dressing which expression shall include adhesive plasters, adhesive plaster dressing, gypsona plaster of paris and bandages, velroc pop bandages, elastro crape bandages, gauze, wadding gauze, lint and cotton wool poultices and similar articles impregnated or coated with pharmaceutical substances put up in forms or packing for surgical purposes which have been sterilized and conform to the accepted standards of the medical profession. (v) Pharmaceutical and surgical products of plastic and rubber including gloves, aprons and caps.”
  • Entry 1(iii) of Part F: “Lipsticks, lip-salve, nail polishes, nail varnishes, nail brushes, beauty boxes, face powders, toilet powders, baby powders, talcum powders, powder compacts, powder pads and puffs, toilet sets made of all materials (with or without contents) toilet sponges, scent spray, depilatories, blemish removers, eye liners all sorts, eye shadow, eyebrow pencils, eyelash brushes, eau de cologne, solid colognes, lavender water, snows, face creams, all purpose creams, cold creams, cleaning creams, make-up creams, beauty creams, beauty milk, cleaning milk, hair foods, skin tonics, complexion rouge, nail cutters, sanitary towels and napkins, astringent lotions, pre-shave and aftershave lotions and creams, moisturisers of all sorts and personal (body) deodorant.”
  • Explanation to Entry 1(iii) of Part F: “Any of the items listed above even if medicated or as defined in section 3 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (Central Act XXIII of 1940) or manufactured on the licence issued under the said Act will fall under this item.”

The court also considered the definitions of “drug” and “cosmetic” under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.

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Arguments

Arguments by Heinz and GSK:

  • Medicinal Properties: Nycil powder contains chlorphenesin, zinc oxide, and boric acid, which have antifungal, antibacterial, and antiseptic properties. These ingredients are effective in treating skin conditions like prickly heat, dhobie itch, and athlete’s foot.
  • Treatment, Not Care: Nycil powder is not a daily-use cosmetic but is used specifically to treat skin ailments. Its use is discontinued once the ailment is cured, indicating its primary function is treatment rather than care.
  • Common Parlance Test: Relying on the common parlance test, Nycil should be considered a medicine because it is understood by consumers as a product for treating specific skin conditions.
  • Reliance on Precedents: They cited cases such as Puma Ayurvedic Herbal Pvt Ltd v Collector of Central Excise, B.P.L Pharmaceuticals v. Collector of Central Excise, and Muller & Phipps (India) Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise, where products with medicinal ingredients were classified as medicaments.
  • Interpretation of Explanation: The explanation in the TNGST Act should not override the essential character of the product as a medicine.

Arguments by the State of Kerala and Tamil Nadu:

  • Specific Entry: The KGST Act has a specific entry (Entry 127) for “medicated talcum powder,” which includes Nycil, regardless of its medicinal properties.
  • Inclusive Definition: The term “including” in Entry 127 of the KGST Act broadens the scope to include medicated talcum powder within the category of cosmetics.
  • Explanation in TNGST Act: The explanation to Entry 1(iii) of Part F of the TNGST Act explicitly states that items listed, even if medicated or licensed under the Drugs Act, fall under this entry, which includes toilet powders.
  • Legislative Intent: The legislature intended to classify medicated talcum powder as a cosmetic, irrespective of its medicinal ingredients.
  • Hybrid Nature: While Nycil has medicinal properties, it also functions as a cosmetic. The specific inclusion of “medicated talcum powder” in the cosmetic category is intentional.

Submissions of Parties

Main Submission Sub-Submissions by Heinz/GSK Sub-Submissions by Revenue
Classification of Nycil Powder
  • Nycil is primarily a medicine due to its medicinal ingredients and therapeutic use.
  • It is not a cosmetic because it is used for treatment, not daily care or beauty.
  • The common parlance test supports its classification as a medicine.
  • The explanation in the TNGST Act should not override the essential medicinal character of the product.
  • Nycil is specifically a “medicated talcum powder” under Entry 127 of KGST Act.
  • The term “including” in Entry 127 broadens the scope to include medicated talcum powder as a cosmetic.
  • The explanation to Entry 1(iii) of Part F of TNGST Act explicitly includes medicated items under toilet powders.
  • The legislature intended to classify medicated talcum powder as a cosmetic.
  • Nycil has a dual use but is classified as a cosmetic based on the specific entry.
Interpretation of Legal Provisions
  • Entries related to medicine should be interpreted broadly to include products with medicinal properties.
  • The explanation in TNGST Act should be interpreted in the context of the main provision and not as an overriding clause.
  • Specific entries for “medicated talcum powder” should be given their plain meaning.
  • The term “includes” broadens the scope of the entry and includes medicated talcum powder.
  • The explanation in the TNGST Act is clear and unambiguous, including medicated items under toilet powders.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues but addressed the core question:

  1. Whether “Nycil Prickly Heat Powder” should be classified as a medicine or a cosmetic under the KGST Act and the TNGST Act.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Issue Court’s Decision Brief Reasons
Classification of Nycil Powder Classified as a cosmetic under both KGST and TNGST Acts. The specific entries for “medicated talcum powder” in the KGST Act and the explanation in the TNGST Act clearly included medicated talcum powders within the category of cosmetics. The court emphasized the plain meaning of the statutes.
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Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Authority Court How it was considered Legal Point
Puma Ayurvedic Herbal Pvt Ltd v Collector of Central Excise [2006] 2 SCR 1120 Supreme Court of India Discussed the twin test for classifying an item as a drug, medicament, or cosmetic. Classification of products as drugs or cosmetics
Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Deputy Commissioner 2007 (5) SCR 873 Supreme Court of India Discussed the extensive meaning of the word “includes” in interpretation clauses. Interpretation of the word “includes”
Ponds India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Trade Tax 2008 (9) SCR 496 Supreme Court of India Discussed the interpretation of entries in taxing statutes. Interpretation of entries in taxing statutes
Muller & Phipps (India) Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise 2004 Supp (2) SCR 395 Supreme Court of India Discussed the classification of “Johnson Prickly Heat Powder” as a medicament. Classification of prickly heat powder as a medicament
B.Shah & Company v State of Gujarat (1971) 28 STC 5 Gujarat High Court Discussed the properties and composition of Nycil powder. Composition and properties of Nycil powder
B.P.L Pharmaceuticals v. Collector of Central Excise (1995) 3 SCR 1235 Supreme Court of India Discussed the classification of “Selsun Shampoo” as a medicament. Classification of medicated shampoo as a medicament
Union of India v Vicco Laboratories 2007 (12) SCR 534 Supreme Court of India Discussed the classification of “Vicco Vajrudanti” and “Vicco Termeric” as ayurvedic medicines. Classification of ayurvedic products as medicines
Commissioner of Central Excise v Hindustan Lever Ltd 2015 (10) SCC 742 Supreme Court of India Discussed the classification of “Vaseline Intensive Care Heel Guard” as a medicament. Classification of skin care products as medicaments
Collector of Central Excise v Wockhardt Life Sciences Ltd (2012) 5 SCC 585 Supreme Court of India Discussed the “common parlance test” for classification. Application of the common parlance test
S. Sundaram Pillai v V. R. Pattabiraman [1985] 2 SCR 643 Supreme Court of India Discussed the interpretation of explanations in statutes. Interpretation of explanations in statutes
Share Medical Care v Union of India 2007 (3) SCR 44 Supreme Court of India Discussed that if two interpretations are possible, that favouring the assessee should be adopted. Interpretation of tax laws
Pappu Sweets and Biscuits v. Commr. Of Trade Tax, U.P 1998 (Suppl) (2) SCR 119 Supreme Court of India Discussed the interpretation of words in the context of ordinary parlance. Interpretation of words in ordinary parlance
Collector of Excise v. M/s Parle Exports (P) Ltd 1988 (Suppl) (3) SCR 933 Supreme Court of India Discussed the interpretation of words in the context of ordinary parlance. Interpretation of words in ordinary parlance
Collector of Central Excise v CIENS Laboratories 2013 (14) SCR 38 Supreme Court of India Discussed the test for determining if a product is a medicament. Test for determining a medicament
Union of India (UOI) & Ors v Leukoplast Private Limited & Ors 1994 (1) SCR 343 Supreme Court of India Discussed the significance of “medicated” in the context of a surgical pad. Significance of “medicated” in products
N.D.P. Namboodripad (Dead) by LRs. v. Union of India 2007 (3) SCR 769 Supreme Court of India Discussed the meaning of the word “includes” in interpretation clauses. Interpretation of the word “includes”
Dattatraya Govind Mahajan & Ors v. State of Maharashtra & Anr 1977 (2) SCR 790 Supreme Court of India Discussed that the court must construe it according to its plain language, to give effect to legislative intent. Interpretation of explanations
Mrs. Zakiya Begum & Ors v. Mrs. Shanaz Ali & Ors 2010 (9) SCR 692 Supreme Court of India Discussed that the court must construe it according to its plain language, to give effect to legislative intent. Interpretation of explanations
Collector of Central Excise v. Wood Crafts Products Ltd. (1995) 3 SCC 454 Supreme Court of India Discussed that Central Excise Tariffs are based on internationally accepted nomenclature in HSN. Central Excise Tariffs and HSN
Meghdoot Gramodyog Sewa Sansthan, UP. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Lucknow [2005] 4 SCC 15 Supreme Court of India Discussed that products cannot be classified as cosmetics solely on the basis of their outward packing. Classification based on packing
Amrutanjan Ltd. v. Collector Central Excise [1996] 9 SCC 413 Supreme Court of India Discussed that Mixing medical ingredients with other products, or preservatives, does not alter its character as a medicament. Impact of mixing ingredients on classification
A.V. Fernandez v. State of Kerala 1957 (1) SCR 837 Supreme Court of India Discussed the principle of strict interpretation in construing a taxing statute. Strict interpretation of taxing statutes
Oblum Electrical Industries Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad v Collector of Customs, Bombay 1997 Supp (3) SCR 68 Supreme Court of India Discussed the function of an explanation in a statute. Function of explanations
Union of India (UOI) and Ors. vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. 1985 Supp (3) SCR 123 Supreme Court of India Discussed that explanations are also used to widen terms. Use of explanations to widen terms

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

Submission by Parties Court’s Treatment
Heinz and GSK argued that Nycil is a medicine due to its medicinal ingredients and therapeutic use. The Court rejected this argument, emphasizing that the specific entries for “medicated talcum powder” in the KGST Act and the explanation in the TNGST Act clearly included medicated talcum powders within the category of cosmetics.
Heinz and GSK contended that the common parlance test supports classifying Nycil as a medicine. The Court did not accept this argument, holding that the specific legislative intent, as expressed in the entries, was decisive.
The Revenue argued that Nycil is a “medicated talcum powder” under Entry 127 of the KGST Act. The Court upheld this argument, stating that the term “including” in Entry 127 broadens the scope to include medicated talcum powder as a cosmetic.
The Revenue argued that the explanation to Entry 1(iii) of Part F of the TNGST Act explicitly includes medicated items under toilet powders. The Court accepted this argument, noting that the explanation clearly brought medicated talcum powder within the fold of Entry 1, Part F.
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How each authority was viewed by the Court?

The court considered various authorities, particularly those related to the classification of products as medicines or cosmetics. However, the court distinguished the present case due to the specific entries in the KGST and TNGST Acts, particularly the inclusion of “medicated talcum powder” in the cosmetic category.

  • The Court noted that cases like Puma Ayurvedic Herbal, B.P.L Pharmaceuticals, and Muller & Phipps, which classified products with medicinal ingredients as medicaments, were decided in the context of the Central Excise Tariff Act (CETA) which has elaborate notes and rules for interpretation. The KGST and TNGST Acts lack such detailed guidance.
  • The Court relied heavily on Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories and N.D.P. Namboodripad, which emphasized that the word “includes” in a definition clause is meant to be extensive.
  • The Court also cited A.V. Fernandez v. State of Kerala, highlighting the principle of strict interpretation in construing a taxing statute.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the specific wording of the entries in the KGST and TNGST Acts. The inclusion of “medicated talcum powder” in the cosmetic category, especially with the use of the word “including,” indicated a clear legislative intent to classify such products as cosmetics, regardless of their medicinal properties. The Court emphasized the principle of strict interpretation of tax laws, stating that the plain meaning of the words must be followed.

The Court also noted that while Nycil powder has medicinal ingredients, the specific legislative intent to include medicated talcum powder under cosmetics could not be ignored. The explanation in the TNGST Act further solidified this position, explicitly stating that medicated items, even those licensed under the Drugs Act, would fall under the cosmetic category.

The court observed that the legislature had consciously used specific language to classify medicated talcum powder as a cosmetic, and the court could not substitute its interpretation for the clear intent of the legislature.

Sentiment Percentage
Legislative Intent 40%
Specific Wording of Entries 30%
Strict Interpretation of Tax Laws 20%
Rejection of Common Parlance Test 10%

Fact:Law Ratio

Category Percentage
Fact 30%
Law 70%

The court’s reasoning was predominantly based on the legal interpretation of the statutes (70%), with a lesser emphasis on the factual aspects of the product itself (30%).

Logical Reasoning

Start: Is Nycil a medicine or a cosmetic?
Does KGST Act have a specific entry for medicated talcum powder?
Yes: Entry 127 includes “talcum powder including medicated talcum powder”
Does the TNGST Act have an explanation for medicated items?
Yes: Explanation to Entry 1(iii) includes medicated items under toilet powders
Legislative intent is clear: classify medicated talcum powder as a cosmetic
Conclusion: Nycil is classified as a cosmetic under both acts

Key Takeaways

  • Specific Entries Prevail: When a tax statute has a specific entry for a product, it takes precedence over a general entry, even if the product has characteristics that might place it under the general entry.
  • “Includes” Expands Scope: The word “includes” in a definition clause is meant to broaden the scope of the definition, bringing within its ambit items that might not ordinarily be included.
  • Plain Meaning Rule: Tax laws must be interpreted strictly, and the plain meaning of the words used by the legislature must be followed.
  • Legislative Intent: The court’s primary focus is to give effect to the legislative intent, as expressed in the plain language of the statute.
  • Hybrid Products: Products with both medicinal and cosmetic properties can be classified based on specific entries in the statute, even if they have therapeutic uses.

Directions

No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court. The appeals were dismissed.

Development of Law

The Supreme Court’s decision clarifies that when a tax statute has a specific entry, particularly one that includes a sub-category (like “medicated talcum powder”), that entry will prevail over a general category (like “medicines”). This reinforces the principle of strict interpretation of tax laws and emphasizes the importance of legislative intent as expressed in the plain language of the statute.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the specific inclusion of “medicated talcum powder” within the cosmetic category in both the KGST and TNGST Acts, through explicit wording and explanations, was decisive in classifying Nycil as a cosmetic rather than a medicine. This decision highlights that even if a product has medicinal properties, itsclassification for tax purposes is determined by the specific entries in the tax statutes.