Date of the Judgment: 29 July 2019
Citation: [Not Available in the source]
Judges: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J and Indira Banerjee, J
Can a private agreement between parties restrict the constitutional power of a High Court to issue writs? The Supreme Court of India addressed this crucial question in a case involving the Maharashtra Chess Association and the All India Chess Federation. The court clarified that while parties can choose a specific court for civil disputes, they cannot use private contracts to remove the High Court’s power to review cases under Article 226 of the Constitution. This judgment underscores the importance of the High Court’s role in upholding the rule of law. The majority opinion was authored by Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J.
Case Background
The Maharashtra Chess Association (Appellant) and the All India Chess Federation (second Respondent) were in a dispute. The All India Chess Federation, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860, is the central body for chess in India. The Appellant was a member since 1978. On December 25, 2016, the Federation decided to remove the Appellant as a member. Following this, the Appellant filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court. The Federation argued that because of Clause 21 of their agreement, only the courts in Chennai could hear the case.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1978 | The Maharashtra Chess Association became an affiliated member of the All India Chess Federation. |
| 25 December 2016 | The Central Council of the All India Chess Federation passed a resolution to disaffiliate the Maharashtra Chess Association. |
| [Not specified in the source] | The Maharashtra Chess Association filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court. |
| 25 September 2018 | The Bombay High Court held that Clause 21 of the Constitution and Bye Laws ousted the jurisdiction of all other courts except the courts at Chennai. |
| 29 July 2019 | The Supreme Court of India set aside the Bombay High Court’s judgment. |
Course of Proceedings
The Bombay High Court initially ruled that Clause 21 of the agreement between the parties meant that only courts in Chennai could hear the case. This clause, according to the High Court, removed the ability of all other courts to hear the matter. The Bombay High Court held that:
“…In the facts of the present case when there is existence of Clause 21 which we have adverted to herein above, in our view, the jurisdiction of the other Courts except the Courts at Chennai in respect of any Suits/Legal action which are brought against Respondent No. 2 are ousted…”
Legal Framework
The case revolves around the interpretation of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which grants High Courts the power to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights and “for any other purpose.” The Supreme Court also considered Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, which deals with agreements that restrict legal proceedings. Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act 1872 states:
“Every agreement,-
(a) by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals, or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights; or
(b) which extinguishes the rights of any party thereto, or discharges any party thereto, from any liability, under or in respect of any contract on the expiry of a specified period so as to restrict any party from enforcing his rights, is void to the extent.”
Additionally, the Court discussed the principle established in A B C Laminart (P) Limited v A P Agencies, Salem, which allows parties to choose one court among several with jurisdiction, but not to completely exclude all courts.
Arguments
The Appellant argued that:
- Article 226 provides a constitutional remedy when fundamental or legal rights are violated.
- Parties cannot, through a private agreement, remove the High Court’s writ jurisdiction.
- The High Court must decide whether to use its writ jurisdiction based on the specific facts of each case.
- The Bombay High Court was wrong to conclude that Clause 21 created an absolute bar on its writ jurisdiction.
The Union of India argued that:
- Public law remedies like Article 226 cannot be ousted by private agreements.
- Clause 21 is a non-statutory contract that the Bombay High Court should have considered.
- Judicial review is a basic part of the Constitution and cannot be limited or removed.
The second Respondent argued that:
- The High Court did not deny its jurisdiction but chose not to use it in this case.
- The parties had agreed to resolve disputes in Chennai, and the High Court respected this agreement.
| Main Submission | Sub-Submissions | Party |
|---|---|---|
| Ouster of Writ Jurisdiction | Parties cannot by a privately negotiated agreement oust the writ jurisdiction of the High Court | Appellant |
| There can be no ouster of a public law remedy as is embodied in Article 226 | Union of India | |
| The High Court did not hold that there was an ouster of its jurisdiction but that in the facts and circumstances, it was not appropriate to exercise the writ jurisdiction when parties had agreed to submit their disputes for resolution before the courts at Chennai. | Second Respondent | |
| Exercise of Writ Jurisdiction | Whether the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should be exercised in the facts of a given case has to be determined by the High Court | Appellant |
| Clause 21 of the Constitution and Bye Laws of the second Respondent is a non-statutory contract, the impact of which has to be considered by the Bombay High Court, which it failed to do | Union of India | |
| In essence by the impugned judgment, the High Court has in its discretion, declined to entertain the Writ Petition. | Second Respondent | |
| Constitutional Remedy | Article 226 provides a constitutional remedy where fundamental rights or other legal rights are violated or are under a threat of violation | Appellant |
| Judicial review is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution and can neither be confined nor abrogated. | Union of India |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The main issue before the Supreme Court was:
- Whether a private agreement between the Appellant and the second Respondent, specifically Clause 21 of their Constitution and Bye Laws, could remove the writ jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
| Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
|---|---|---|
| Whether a private agreement can oust the writ jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 | No, a private agreement cannot oust the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. | The writ jurisdiction of the High Court is a constitutional power that cannot be restricted by private contracts. The High Court must consider all facts and circumstances before deciding whether to exercise its writ jurisdiction. |
Authorities
The Court considered the following authorities:
| Authority | Court | How it was used |
|---|---|---|
| A B C Laminart (P) Limited v A P Agencies, Salem (1989) 2 SCC 163 | Supreme Court of India | Established that parties can choose one court among several with jurisdiction, but cannot completely exclude all courts. |
| Rajasthan State Electricity Board v Universal Petrol Chemicals Limited (2009) 3 SCC 107 | Supreme Court of India | Followed the principle laid down in A B C Laminart. |
| Interglobe Aviation Limited v N Satchidanand (2011) 7 SCC 463 | Supreme Court of India | Followed the principle laid down in A B C Laminart. |
| James Bagg’s Case (1572) 77 ER 1271 | Court of King’s Bench (England) | Cited to emphasize the broad powers of courts to correct errors and misgovernment. |
| Uttar Pradesh State Sugar Corporation Limited v Kamal Swaroop Tondon (2008) 2 SCC 41 | Supreme Court of India | Affirmed that the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 is equitable and discretionary. |
| A V Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani (1962) 1 SCR 753 | Supreme Court of India | Held that the High Court’s power under its writ jurisdiction depends on the threat to the rule of law. |
| Minerva Mills v Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625 | Supreme Court of India | Affirmed that judicial review is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. |
| L Chandra Kumar v Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 | Supreme Court of India | Affirmed that judicial review is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. |
| State of Uttar Pradesh v Indian Hume Pipe Co. Limited (1977) 2 SCC 724 | Supreme Court of India | Observed that the High Court’s decision to exercise its writ jurisdiction is discretionary. |
| Sangram Singh v Election Tribunal, Kotah (1955) 2 SCR 1 | Supreme Court of India | Highlighted the discretionary nature of the High Court’s writ jurisdiction and self-imposed constraints. |
| Uttar Pradesh State Spinning Co Limited v R S Pandey (2005) 8 SCC 264 | Supreme Court of India | Held that the power relating to alternative remedy is a rule of self-imposed limitation and not a rule of law. |
| State of Uttar Pradesh v Mohammad Nooh (1958) SCR 595 | Supreme Court of India | Held that the existence of an alternative remedy does not bar the High Court from issuing a writ of certiorari. |
| Aligarh Muslim University v Vinay Engineering (1994) 4 SCC 710 | Supreme Court of India | Discussed the importance of considering all facts when determining jurisdiction, including contractual agreements. |
Judgment
| Submission | How the Court Treated It |
|---|---|
| Article 226 provides a constitutional remedy where fundamental rights or other legal rights are violated or are under a threat of violation. | Accepted. The Court emphasized the importance of Article 226 as a constitutional remedy. |
| Parties cannot by a privately negotiated agreement oust the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. | Accepted. The Court held that private agreements cannot restrict the High Court’s writ jurisdiction. |
| Whether the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should be exercised in the facts of a given case has to be determined by the High Court. | Accepted. The Court affirmed that the High Court has discretion in exercising its writ jurisdiction. |
| Clause 21 of the Constitution and Bye Laws of the second Respondent created an absolute bar on the exercise of the writ jurisdiction by the High Court. | Rejected. The Court held that Clause 21 cannot create an absolute bar on the High Court’s writ jurisdiction. |
| There can be no ouster of a public law remedy as is embodied in Article 226. | Accepted. The Court agreed that public law remedies cannot be ousted. |
| Clause 21 of the Constitution and Bye Laws of the second Respondent is a non-statutory contract, the impact of which has to be considered by the Bombay High Court, which it failed to do. | Accepted. The Court stated that the High Court failed to consider the impact of Clause 21. |
| Judicial review is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution and can neither be confined nor abrogated. | Accepted. The Court reiterated that judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution. |
| In essence by the impugned judgment, the High Court has in its discretion, declined to entertain the Writ Petition. | Rejected. The Court held that the High Court did not exercise its discretion properly by solely relying on Clause 21. |
The Court held that the Bombay High Court erred by relying solely on Clause 21 to deny its jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is a constitutional power that cannot be restricted by private agreements. The High Court must consider all facts and circumstances before deciding whether to exercise its writ jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court referenced the case of Aligarh Muslim University v Vinay Engineering [CITATION: (1994) 4 SCC 710], where the court looked at the facts holistically and not just the clause conferring jurisdiction. The Supreme Court stated that the Bombay High Court should have done the same.
The Supreme Court stated that the High Court may decline to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 invoking the principle of forum non conveniens in an appropriate case.
The Supreme Court stated that it is not open to a High Court to abdicate this responsibility merely due to the existence of a privately negotiated document ousting its jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court stated that the sole and absolute reliance by the Bombay High Court on Clause 21 of the Constitution and Bye Laws to determine that its jurisdiction under Article 226 is ousted is erroneous.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily driven by the need to uphold the constitutional authority of High Courts under Article 226. The Court emphasized that the writ jurisdiction is a crucial safeguard for the rule of law and cannot be limited by private agreements. The Court’s reasoning focused on the discretionary nature of the High Court’s writ jurisdiction, the importance of judicial review, and the need for a holistic assessment of each case. The court also noted that while the High Court can consider the agreement between the parties as a factor, it cannot be the sole basis for denying its jurisdiction.
| Sentiment | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Constitutional Authority of High Courts | 40% |
| Discretionary Nature of Writ Jurisdiction | 30% |
| Importance of Judicial Review | 20% |
| Holistic Assessment of Cases | 10% |
| Category | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 20% |
| Law | 80% |
The Court quoted Lord Coke, stating:
“The Court of King’s Bench hath not only the authority to correct errors in judicial proceedings, but other errors and misdemeanours […] tending to the breach of peace, or oppression of the subjects, or raising of faction, controversy, debate or any other manner of misgovernment; so that no wrong or injury, public or private, can be done, but that this shall be reformed or punished by due course of law….”
The Court also quoted from Uttar Pradesh State Sugar Corporation Limited v Kamal Swaroop Tondon, stating:
“35…It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is equitable and discretionary. The power under that Article can be exercised by the High Court “to reach injustice wherever it is found.”
The Court also quoted from Sangram Singh v Election Tribunal, Kotah, stating:
“14… The High Courts do not, and should not, act as courts of appeal under Article 226. Their powers are purely discretionary and though no limits can be placed upon that discretion it must be exercised along recognized lines and not arbitrarily; and one of the limitations imposed by the courts on themselves is that they will not exercise jurisdiction in this class of case unless substantial injustice has ensued, or is likely to ensue. They will not allow themselves to be turned into courts of appeal or revision to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice in a broad and general sense, for, though no legislature can impose limitations on these constitutional powers it is a sound exercise of discretion to bear in mind the policy of the legislature to have disputes about these special rights decided as speedily as may be.”
Key Takeaways
- Private agreements cannot remove the High Court’s power to issue writs under Article 226 of the Constitution.
- High Courts have the discretion to decide whether to exercise their writ jurisdiction based on the facts of each case.
- The existence of an alternative remedy does not create a legal bar on a High Court to exercise its writ jurisdiction.
- High Courts must consider all relevant factors, including private agreements, when deciding whether to exercise their writ jurisdiction.
- This judgment reinforces the High Court’s role as a crucial safeguard for the rule of law.
Directions
The Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court’s judgment and restored the writ petition to the High Court for fresh consideration.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that a private agreement cannot oust the writ jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. This clarifies that while parties can agree on a specific court for civil disputes, they cannot restrict the constitutional power of the High Court to issue writs. This judgment reinforces the High Court’s role in upholding the rule of law and ensures that its writ jurisdiction is not undermined by private contracts. There is no change in the previous position of law, but it has been clarified.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Maharashtra Chess Association vs. Union of India clarifies that private agreements cannot restrict the constitutional power of High Courts to issue writs under Article 226. The judgment emphasizes the discretionary nature of the High Court’s writ jurisdiction and its crucial role in upholding the rule of law. This ruling ensures that High Courts can review cases based on their merits, without being bound by private contracts that seek to limit their constitutional authority.