Sabarimala Temple Entry: Supreme Court Upholds Women’s Rights in Review Petitions (2019)

LEGAL ISSUE: Whether the exclusion of women of menstruating age from the Sabarimala Temple is constitutional.

CASE TYPE: Religious Rights/Constitutional Law

Case Name: Kantaru Rajeevaru vs. Indian Young Lawyers Association

[Judgment Date]: November 14, 2019

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: November 14, 2019

Citation: Not Available in the source

Judges: Ranjan Gogoi, CJI, A.M. Khanwilkar, J., R.F. Nariman, J., D.Y. Chandrachud, J., Indu Malhotra, J. (Majority opinion by Ranjan Gogoi, CJI, A.M. Khanwilkar, J., R.F. Nariman, J., D.Y. Chandrachud, J. and dissenting opinion by Indu Malhotra, J.)

Can religious practices that exclude women be justified under the Indian Constitution? The Supreme Court of India grappled with this complex question in a series of review petitions concerning the Sabarimala Temple. These petitions challenged the Court’s earlier judgment that allowed women of all ages to enter the temple, sparking a debate about the intersection of religious freedom and gender equality. This post summarizes the Supreme Court’s decision in these review petitions, highlighting the key arguments and the Court’s reasoning.

The Supreme Court, in this judgment, addressed review petitions against its earlier decision that had permitted women of all ages to enter the Sabarimala Temple. The core issue revolved around whether the exclusion of women of menstruating age (10-50 years) was an essential religious practice protected by the Constitution. The court also examined the scope of religious freedom under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, and the extent to which courts can intervene in religious matters.

Case Background

The case originated from a writ petition filed by the Indian Young Lawyers Association, challenging the age-old custom of the Sabarimala Temple that prohibited women between the ages of 10 and 50 from entering the temple. The petitioners argued that this practice violated the fundamental rights of women, specifically their right to religious freedom and equality. The respondents, including the temple authorities, contended that the restriction was an essential religious practice integral to the deity’s celibate nature. The Supreme Court had previously ruled in favor of the petitioners, allowing women of all ages to enter the temple. This decision led to widespread protests and the filing of numerous review petitions.

The review petitions sought to re-examine the earlier judgment, arguing that the Court had not adequately considered the religious customs and beliefs associated with the Sabarimala Temple. The petitioners also raised concerns about the Court’s interpretation of constitutional morality and its intervention in religious matters.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The Supreme Court heard the review petitions along with several fresh writ petitions that had been filed as a result of the original judgment. The court noted that similar issues regarding the entry of women into places of worship were also pending in other cases, including those involving Muslim women in mosques, Parsi women married to non-Parsis in fire temples, and female genital mutilation in the Dawoodi Bohra community.

The Court decided that it was necessary to refer the matter to a larger bench of not less than seven judges to provide an authoritative enunciation of the constitutional principles involved. This decision was based on the need for judicial discipline and propriety, as well as the importance of ensuring public confidence in the Court’s rulings on matters of religious freedom.

Legal Framework

The judgment primarily revolves around the interpretation of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. Article 25(1) guarantees to all persons the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality, and health, and other provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Article 25(2)(b) allows the state to make laws for social welfare and reform, including throwing open Hindu religious institutions to all classes and sections of Hindus. Article 26 grants religious denominations the right to manage their own affairs in matters of religion.

The Court also considered the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965, and the rules framed thereunder, which aimed to ensure that all sections of Hindus have the right to enter and worship in public temples.

The relevant provisions are:

• Article 25(1) of the Constitution of India: “Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.”
• Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution of India: “Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law—… (b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.”
• Article 26 of the Constitution of India: “Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right—(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law.”

Arguments

The petitioners argued that the exclusion of women of menstruating age was an essential religious practice, protected under Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution. They contended that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa at Sabarimala constitute a distinct religious denomination with unique customs and beliefs. They also argued that the Court should not interfere in matters of religious faith and practice, and that the concept of “constitutional morality” should not override religious beliefs. The petitioners also argued that the earlier judgment did not address the issue of Article 17 of the Constitution, which deals with untouchability.

The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the exclusion of women was discriminatory and violated their fundamental rights under Article 25(1). They contended that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a separate religious denomination and that the practice of excluding women was not an essential part of the Hindu religion. They also argued that the concept of public morality in Article 25 should be understood as constitutional morality, which includes gender equality.

The arguments were broadly categorized as follows:

• Petitioners:
  • The Sabarimala Temple devotees are a distinct religious denomination with unique practices.
  • Exclusion of women is an essential religious practice protected by Articles 25 and 26.
  • Courts should not interfere in religious matters.
  • Constitutional morality should not override religious beliefs.
  • The previous judgment did not address Article 17 (untouchability).
• Respondents:
  • Devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a separate religious denomination.
  • Exclusion of women is discriminatory and violates Article 25(1).
  • The practice is not an essential part of Hindu religion.
  • Public morality in Article 25 means constitutional morality, including gender equality.

The innovativeness of the arguments was in the petitioners attempting to reframe the issue by emphasizing the rights of a specific religious group and the idea that constitutional morality should not override religious beliefs. The respondents innovatively argued that excluding women based on menstruation was a form of untouchability and thus unconstitutional.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court identified the following key issues for consideration:

1. Regarding the interplay between the freedom of religion under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution and other provisions in Part III, particularly Article 14.
2. What is the sweep of expression ‘public order, morality and health’ occurring in Article 25(1) of the Constitution.
3. The expression ‘morality’ or ‘constitutional morality’ has not been defined in the Constitution. Is it over arching morality in reference to preamble or limited to religious beliefs or faith. There is need to delineate the contours of that expression, lest it becomes subjective.
4. The extent to which the court can enquire into the issue of a particular practice is an integral part of the religion or religious practice of a particular religious denomination or should that be left exclusively to be determined by the head of the section of the religious group.
5. What is the meaning of the expression ‘sections of Hindus’ appearing in Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution.
6. Whether the “essential religious practices” of a religious denomination, or even a section thereof are afforded constitutional protection under Article 26.
7. What would be the permissible extent of judicial recognition to PILs in matters calling into question religious practices of a denomination or a section thereof at the instance of persons who do not belong to such religious denomination?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:

Authorities

The Court considered several authorities to come to a conclusion.

The following cases and legal provisions were considered by the court:

The Court also considered the following legal provisions:

• Article 12 of the Constitution of India (Definition of State)
• Article 14 of the Constitution of India (Equality before law)
• Article 15 of the Constitution of India (Prohibition of discrimination)
• Article 17 of the Constitution of India (Abolition of Untouchability)
• Article 25 of the Constitution of India (Freedom of religion)
• Article 26 of the Constitution of India (Freedom to manage religious affairs)
• Article 73(2) of the Constitution of India (Extent of executive power of the Union)
• Article 75(4) of the Constitution of India (Oath of Ministers)
• Article 99 of the Constitution of India (Oath of members of Parliament)
• Article 129 of the Constitution of India (Supreme Court as a court of record)
• Article 136 of the Constitution of India (Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court)
• Article 140 of the Constitution of India (Parliament’s power to confer supplemental powers on the Supreme Court)
• Article 141 of the Constitution of India (Law declared by the Supreme Court to be binding)
• Article 142 of the Constitution of India (Enforcement of decrees and orders of the Supreme Court)
• Article 144 of the Constitution of India (Civil and judicial authorities to act in aid of the Supreme Court)
• Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India (Minimum number of judges for constitutional interpretation)
• Article 154(2)(a) of the Constitution of India (Executive power of the State)
• Article 162 of the Constitution of India (Extent of executive power of State)
• Article 164(3) of the Constitution of India (Oath of Ministers)
• Article 188 of the Constitution of India (Oath of members of State Legislatures)
• Article 226 of the Constitution of India (High Court’s writ jurisdiction)
• Article 258(2) of the Constitution of India (Power of the Union to confer powers on States)
• Article 277 of the Constitution of India (Savings of existing laws)
• Article 307 of the Constitution of India (Appointment of Authority for trade and commerce)
• Article 329(b) of the Constitution of India (Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters)
• Article 353(b) of the Constitution of India (Effect of Proclamation of Emergency)
• Article 356(1)(a) of the Constitution of India (Provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in States)
• Article 357(1)(b) of the Constitution of India (Exercise of legislative powers under Proclamation of Emergency)
• Article 366(29-A) of the Constitution of India (Definition of Sale of Goods)
• Article 372(1) of the Constitution of India (Continuance in force of existing laws)
• Article 51A of the Constitution of India (Fundamental Duties)

Judgment

The Supreme Court, while acknowledging the various arguments presented, did not find sufficient grounds to review its earlier judgment. The Court emphasized that the review jurisdiction is limited and that the grounds for review must be within the parameters of Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013.

The Court held that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a separate religious denomination and that the exclusion of women of menstruating age was not an essential religious practice. The Court also reiterated that the concept of “constitutional morality” is paramount and that the fundamental rights of women cannot be subordinated to religious practices. The Court also observed that the interpretation of Article 15 and Article 17 of the Constitution were not treated as central issues in the present case by at least three learned Judges, namely, Dipak Misra, C.J., Khanwilkar, J., and Nariman, J.

The Court also addressed the issue of res judicata, stating that an erroneous interpretation of the Constitution by a High Court cannot stand in the way of a judgment of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. The Court also clarified that the majority view of four Judges on the aspect of religious denomination is contained in paragraphs 110 to 122 of the S.P. Mittal v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 51 case.

The Court dismissed the review petitions and also dismissed all writ petitions that had been filed directly attacking the majority judgments dated 28.09.2018. The Court also reiterated the importance of Article 144 of the Constitution, which mandates all authorities to act in aid of the Supreme Court.

The Court also made it clear that the freedom to criticise the judgments of this Court is not being interfered with.

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Indu Malhotra dissented from the majority opinion. She argued that the Court should not interfere in matters of religious faith and practice and that the concept of “constitutional morality” should not override religious beliefs. She also argued that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa constitute a distinct religious denomination with unique customs and beliefs.

Justice Malhotra’s dissenting opinion highlighted the complexities of balancing religious freedom and gender equality. She emphasized the importance of protecting the rights of religious minorities and respecting their unique practices. She also raised concerns about the potential for judicial overreach in matters of religious faith.

The main points of the dissenting opinion were:

• The devotees of Lord Ayyappa constitute a distinct religious denomination.
• The exclusion of women is an essential religious practice.
• Courts should not interfere in religious matters.
• Constitutional morality should not override religious beliefs.

Ratio Decidendi

The ratio decidendi of the judgment is that the exclusion of women of menstruating age from the Sabarimala Temple is not an essential religious practice protected by the Constitution, and that the concept of “constitutional morality” is paramount. The Court also held that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a separate religious denomination.

The court also held that the review jurisdiction is limited and that the grounds for review must be within the parameters of Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013.

The ratio was derived from the following key findings:

• The devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a separate religious denomination.
• The exclusion of women is not an essential religious practice.
• Constitutional morality should take precedence over religious practices.
• Review jurisdiction is limited.

Obiter Dicta

The obiter dicta in the judgment include the Court’s observations on the need to delineate the contours of “constitutional morality” and the extent to which courts can intervene in religious matters. The Court also made observations about the importance of judicial discipline and propriety.

The obiter dicta included:

• The need to define “constitutional morality” to prevent subjectivity.
• The extent to which courts should inquire into essential religious practices.
• The importance of judicial discipline and propriety.
• The importance of Article 144 of the Constitution.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in the Sabarimala review petitions is a significant ruling that reaffirms the importance of gender equality and the supremacy of constitutional morality. While the Court acknowledged the complexities of the issues involved, it ultimately upheld its earlier decision allowing women of all ages to enter the Sabarimala Temple.

The decision to refer the matter to a larger bench reflects the Court’s commitment to ensuring that its rulings on matters of religious freedom are authoritative and command public confidence. The judgment also underscores the Court’s role as the final arbiter of constitutional disputes and its duty to protect the fundamental rights of all citizens.

The judgment has had a significant impact on Indian society, sparking debates about the role of religion in public life and the need to balance religious freedom with other fundamental rights. The case also highlights the ongoing tension between tradition and modernity in India and the challenges of reconciling diverse religious and cultural practices with the principles of equality and justice.

The key takeaways from the judgment are:

• The Supreme Court upheld its earlier decision allowing women of all ages to enter the Sabarimala Temple.
• The Court emphasized the supremacy of constitutional morality.
• The Court referred the matter to a larger bench for further consideration.
• The judgment has sparked significant social and political debate.

Flowchart of the Case

Ratio of Judges

Sentiment Analysis of the Case