Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act: Supreme Court Clarifies Witness Protection in Criminal Cases (2024) INSC 681 (10 September 2024)

LEGAL ISSUE: The extent of protection granted to a witness under Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, specifically whether it provides complete immunity from prosecution if other evidence exists.

CASE TYPE: Criminal Law

Case Name: Raghuveer Sharan vs. District Sahakari Krishi Gramin Vikas Bank & Anr.

Judgment Date: 10 September 2024

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 10 September 2024

Citation: 2024 INSC 681

Judges: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale

Can a witness who makes a self-incriminating statement be prosecuted if there is other evidence against them? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this crucial question concerning the interpretation of Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. This case clarifies whether the protection offered to witnesses under this provision provides complete immunity from prosecution, even when additional evidence suggests their involvement in a crime. The bench comprised Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, who authored the judgment, and Justice Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale.

Case Background

In 1998, Rajendra Bharti, then President of the District Sahakari Krishi Gramin Vikas Bank (the respondent bank), was involved in a case where his mother, Savitri Shyam, applied for a fixed deposit of ₹10,00,000 for three years. The deposit was made in two parts: ₹8.5 lakhs and ₹1.5 lakhs. Raghuveer Sharan, the appellant, who was working as a cashier at the bank, allegedly altered the deposit documents. The three-year fixed deposit was changed to a ten-year deposit and later to a fifteen-year deposit by interpolating and forging the bank ledger with the appellant’s initials.
During the initial stages of the criminal complaint, Raghuveer Sharan was examined as a witness for the respondent bank where he admitted to changing the tenure of the fixed deposit. However, during the trial, another witness, Narendra Singh Parmar (PW-1), stated that it was Raghuveer Sharan who made the interpolations on the fixed deposit documents. Based on this, the respondent bank applied under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) to include Raghuveer Sharan as an additional accused. The trial court accepted this application, leading to charges being framed against Raghuveer Sharan.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The trial court allowed the application under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C., summoning Raghuveer Sharan as an additional accused, while rejecting the application against Rakesh Bharti. Charges were framed against Raghuveer Sharan on 15.06.2023. Raghuveer Sharan challenged the trial court’s order before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, which dismissed his revision application on 09.11.2023.

Legal Framework

The primary legal provision under consideration is Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which states:

“132. Witness not excused from answering on ground that answer will criminate. – A witness shall not be excused from answering any question, as to any matter relevant to the matter in issue in any suit or in any civil or criminal proceeding, upon the ground that the answer to such question will criminate, or may tend directly or indirectly to criminate, such witness, or that it will expose, or tend directly or indirectly to expose, such witness to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind:

Proviso: – Provided that no such answer, which a witness shall be compelled to give, shall subject him to any arrest or prosecution, or be proved against him, in any criminal proceeding, except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer.”

The proviso to Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is based on the principle of *nemo tenetur prodere seipsum*, meaning no one is bound to incriminate themselves. This is also an extension of the protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, which states that “no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.”

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that he was entitled to protection under Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
• He contended that his pre-summoning statement, where he admitted to changing the tenure of the fixed deposit, should not be used against him.
• The appellant further submitted that there was no prima facie case against him for summoning him as an accused under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C.
• He relied on the case of R. Dinesh Kumar alias Deena v. State represented by Inspector of Police and another (2015) 7 SCC 497, to support the argument that the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. should only be exercised when there is grave suspicion of the commission of an offence.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The respondent argued that Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, does not apply as the appellant was made an accused based on the statement of PW-1/Narendra Singh Parmar during the trial, and not on his pre-summoning statement.
• They contended that the pre-summoning statement is not admissible as evidence, citing Sashi Jena and Others v. Khadal Swain and another (2004) 4 SCC 236.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The main issue framed by the Supreme Court was:

1. Whether, in the given circumstances, the appellant is entitled to protection under Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, because his statement was recorded earlier at the pre-summoning stage as a witness for the complainant/respondent bank.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

Cases:

• R. Dinesh Kumar alias Deena v. State represented by Inspector of Police and another (2015) 7 SCC 497 – Supreme Court of India: The court discussed the policy under Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, to secure evidence for justice. The court agreed with the view that no prosecution can be launched against the maker of a statement falling within the sweep of Section 132 of the Act on the basis of the “answer” given by a person while deposing as a “witness” before a Court.
• Sashi Jena and Others v. Khadal Swain and another (2004) 4 SCC 236 – Supreme Court of India: The court held that statements recorded at the pre-summoning stage are not admissible as evidence.
• Laxmipat Choraria v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1968 SC 938 – Supreme Court of India: The court stated that the proviso to Section 132 of the Act is a necessary corollary to the principle enshrined under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.
• The Queen vs. Gopal Doss & Anr. ILR 3 Mad 271 – Madras High Court: The court discussed the policy under Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, to secure evidence for justice.

Legal Provisions:

• Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: This section deals with the protection of witnesses from self-incrimination.
• Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: This section deals with the power of the court to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of an offense during the trial.
• Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India: This article protects individuals from being compelled to be a witness against themselves.

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The court agreed with the view in R. Dinesh Kumar alias Deena v. State represented by Inspector of Police and another (2015) 7 SCC 497*, that no prosecution can be launched against the maker of a statement falling within the sweep of Section 132 of the Act on the basis of the “answer” given by a person while deposing as a “witness” before a Court, but clarified that the facts of the present case compel the court to consider the matter in a different perspective.
• The court cited Sashi Jena and Others v. Khadal Swain and another (2004) 4 SCC 236* to support the argument that pre-summoning statements are not admissible as evidence.
• The court referred to Laxmipat Choraria v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1968 SC 938* to highlight that the proviso to Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is an extension of the protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.
• The court referred to Justice Muttusami Ayyar’s opinion in The Queen vs. Gopal Doss & Anr. ILR 3 Mad 271* to discuss the policy under Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court emphasized that the primary objective of the Evidence Act is to ensure all relevant material is available to the court for a just conclusion. The court reasoned that the protection under Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, should not be interpreted to grant complete immunity to a witness, especially when other evidence points to their involvement in a crime. The court was also concerned about the potential for misuse of this provision by dishonest investigating officers or individuals attempting to shield themselves from prosecution. The court highlighted that the proviso to Section 132 aims to protect witnesses from self-incrimination but not to provide a blanket immunity in the face of other incriminating evidence. The court also stressed that the order under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was based on the statement of PW-1/Narendra Singh Parmar and not solely on the appellant’s pre-summoning statement.

Logical Reasoning:

The court rejected the argument that the appellant was entitled to complete immunity under Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The court clarified that the proviso to Section 132 only protects a witness from being prosecuted based on their self-incriminating statement but does not provide a blanket immunity from prosecution if other evidence is available. The court emphasized that the order under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was based on the statement of PW-1/Narendra Singh Parmar, and not solely on the appellant’s pre-summoning statement. The court also noted that if the appellant were to be summoned based on his own statement, he would have been summoned immediately after his pre-summoning statement was recorded.

The court also considered the potential for misuse of the protection under Section 132 by dishonest investigating officers or individuals trying to shield themselves from prosecution. The court reasoned that the primary objective of the Evidence Act is to ensure that all relevant material is available to the court for a just conclusion, and this objective should not be undermined by granting complete immunity to a witness even when other evidence exists.

The court explicitly stated, “Thus, the only protection available is, a witness cannot be subjected to prosecution on the basis of his own statement. It nowhere provides that there is complete and unfettered immunity to a person even if there is other substantial evidence or material against him proving his prima facie involvement.” The court also mentioned, “There cannot be an absolute embargo on the Trial Court to initiate process under Section 319 Cr.P.C., merely because a person, who though appears to be complicit has deposed as a witness. The finding to invoke Section 319 Cr.P.C., must be based on the evidence that has come up during the course of Trial. There must be additional, cogent material before the Trial Court apart from the statement of the witness.” The court further added, “In the case at hand, the appellant has been summoned as an additional accused under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. not only on the basis of his pre-summoning statement but on the basis of the statement of PW-1/Narendra Singh Parmar who was examined as a witness on 31.03.2022.”

Key Takeaways

✓ Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, does not provide complete immunity from prosecution to a witness if other evidence exists.

✓ A witness’s self-incriminating statement cannot be used against them, but they can still be prosecuted based on other evidence.

✓ The power under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. can be exercised against a witness if there is additional, cogent material apart from their own statement.

✓ The court’s interpretation aims to prevent the misuse of Section 132 by dishonest individuals or investigating officers.

Directions

The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal appeal. The Contempt Petition was closed, and the interim order passed therein was vacated.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the protection under Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, does not grant complete immunity to a witness from prosecution if there is other evidence available against them, clarifying the scope of the provision. This ruling clarifies the interpretation of Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and ensures that the provision is not misused to shield individuals from prosecution when other evidence points to their involvement in a crime.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment clarifies that while Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, protects witnesses from self-incrimination, it does not grant them complete immunity from prosecution if other evidence exists. This ruling ensures that the provision is not misused and that justice is served by considering all available evidence.