“Shared Household” Under the Domestic Violence Act: Supreme Court Overrules S.R. Batra in Landmark Judgment (October 15, 2020)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: October 15, 2020

Citation: 2020 INSC 713

Judges: Ashok Bhushan, J., R. Subhash Reddy, J., and M.R. Shah, J.

Can a woman claim the right to reside in a house owned by her in-laws, even if her husband has no ownership stake in the property? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question, clarifying the definition of “shared household” under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act). This judgment significantly expands the scope of protection available to women facing domestic violence. The three-judge bench, consisting of Justices Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy, and M.R. Shah, delivered the judgment.

Case Background

The appellant, Satish Chander Ahuja, purchased a property in Delhi in 1983. His son, Raveen Ahuja, married Sneha Ahuja, the respondent, in 1995. After the marriage, Sneha began residing on the first floor of the property with her husband. Due to marital discord, Raveen moved to the ground floor in 2014. In 2015, after Raveen filed for divorce, Sneha filed a complaint under the DV Act against her husband and in-laws, alleging emotional and mental abuse. She sought several orders under the DV Act.

Subsequently, Satish Chander Ahuja filed a suit seeking a mandatory and permanent injunction to remove Sneha from the property, claiming she had no right to reside there and that she had subjected him and his wife to domestic violence. The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of Satish. Sneha appealed to the Delhi High Court, which set aside the Trial Court’s decree and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication. Aggrieved, Satish Chander Ahuja appealed to the Supreme Court.

Timeline

Legal Framework

The judgment primarily revolves around the interpretation of key sections of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, specifically:

• Section 2(a): Defines “aggrieved person” as any woman in a domestic relationship subjected to domestic violence.
• Section 2(f): Defines “domestic relationship” as a relationship between two persons who live or have lived together in a shared household, related by consanguinity, marriage, or a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption, or family members living together as a joint family.
• Section 2(q): Defines “respondent” as any adult male person in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person against whom relief is sought, also including a relative of the husband or male partner.
• Section 2(s): Defines “shared household” as a household where the aggrieved person lives or has lived in a domestic relationship, including households owned or tenanted by either party or a joint family household, regardless of ownership.
  
  “shared household” means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household;
  
• Section 17: Grants every woman in a domestic relationship the right to reside in a shared household, regardless of ownership, unless evicted by due process of law.
  
  (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same.
  
  (2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law.
• Section 19: Deals with residence orders that a Magistrate can pass, including restraining dispossession and providing alternate accommodation.
• Section 26: Allows for reliefs under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 to be sought in any legal proceeding before a civil, family, or criminal court.
  
  (1) Any relief available under sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act.
  

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments (Satish Chander Ahuja):

• The suit property is exclusively owned by the appellant and is not a shared household.
• The son of the appellant has no right in the property, and the respondent is merely a gratuitous licensee.
• The respondent can only claim a right to reside in a house that is either a joint family property or where her husband has a share.
• The complaint under the DV Act was a counterblast to the divorce petition filed by her husband.
• Sections 17 and 19 of the DV Act do not grant proprietary rights in the shared household.
• Alternate accommodation can be claimed only from the husband, not the father-in-law.
• Relied on the judgment of S.R. Batra and Anr. Vs. Taruna Batra, (2007) 3 SCC 169, where it was held that a wife is entitled to residence only in a house belonging to her husband or the joint family of which the husband is a member.

Respondent’s Arguments (Sneha Ahuja):

• The respondent was in a domestic relationship with the appellant and was subjected to domestic violence.
• The suit property is a shared household as per Section 2(s) of the DV Act.
• The definition of “shared household” is extensive and includes properties where the aggrieved person has resided, regardless of ownership.
• Protection under Section 17 is available in all legal proceedings, including the civil suit filed by the appellant.
• The plea taken by the respondent in her pleadings constitutes a counter-claim under Section 26 of the DV Act.
• The judgment in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra is distinguishable on facts and does not lay down the correct law.
• Relied on Hiral P. Harsora and others Vs. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora and others, (2016) 10 SCC 165 and Vaishali Abhimanyu Joshi Vs. Nanasaheb Gopal Joshi, (2017) 14 SCC 373, which have taken a view contrary to S.R. Batra.

Submissions of Parties

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following key issues for determination:

1. Whether the definition of “shared household” under Section 2(s) of the DV Act means it can only be a household of a joint family or one in which the husband has a share.
2. Whether the judgment in S.R. Batra and Anr. Vs. Taruna Batra correctly interpreted Section 2(s) of the DV Act.
3. Whether the High Court rightly concluded that the suit could not be decreed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
4. Whether the Trial Court could have decreed the suit without deciding the defendant’s claim that the suit property was her shared household, as permitted by Section 26 of the DV Act.
5. Whether the plaintiff in the suit can be considered a “respondent” under Section 2(q) of the DV Act.
6. What is the meaning and extent of the expression “save in accordance with the procedure established by law” in Section 17(2) of the DV Act.
7. Whether the husband of the aggrieved party is a necessary party in a suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendant.
8. What is the effect of orders passed under Section 19 of the DV Act in civil court proceedings?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Court considered the following authorities while reaching its decision:

Cases:

Statutes:

• Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005: Sections 2(a), 2(f), 2(q), 2(s), 17, 19, 26
• Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Section 145
• Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Sections 40, 41, 42, 43

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• S.R. Batra and Anr. Vs. Taruna Batra, (2007) 3 SCC 169: Overruled. The Court held that the interpretation of the definition of shared household in Section 2(s) was not correct.
• Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. Vs. Coop. Bank Employees Union, (2007) 4 SCC 685: Relied upon to explain the use of “means” and “includes” in legal definitions.
• Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Limited and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Ors., (2019) 8 SCC 416: Relied upon to further explain the interpretation of “means and includes” in legal definitions.
• The South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Association and Anr. Vs. The State of Gujarat and Anr., (1976) 4 SCC 601: Relied upon regarding the interpretation of “includes” in a legal context.
• Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation and Anr. Vs. Ashok Iron Works Private Limited, (2009) 3 SCC 240: Relied upon regarding the interpretation of “includes” in a legal context.
• Kunapareddy Alias NookalaShanka Balaji Vs. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and Anr., (2016) 11 SCC 774: Relied upon to explain the purpose of enacting the DV Act.
• Manmohan Attavar Vs. Neelam Manmohan Attavar, (2017) 8 SCC 550: Relied upon to emphasize the right of residence created by the DV Act.
• Hiral P. Harsora and Ors. Vs. Kusum narottamdas Harsora and Ors., (2016) 10 SCC 165: Relied upon to highlight that the definition of “respondent” includes females.
• Vaishali Abhimanyu Joshi Vs. Nanasaheb Gopal Joshi, (2017) 14 SCC 373: Relied upon to highlight that relief under the DV Act can be sought in civil proceedings.
• Himani Alloys Limited Vs. Tata Steel Limited, (2011) 15 SCC 273: Relied upon to explain the scope of judgment on admission under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
• S.M. Asif Vs. Virender Kumar Bajaj, (2015) 9 SCC 287: Relied upon to further explain the scope of judgment on admission under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
• Shanti Kumar Panda Vs. Shakuntala Devi, (2004) 1 SCC 438: Relied upon to explain the meaning of “until evicted therefrom in due course of law” in Section 145 CrPC.
• M.S. Sheriff and Anr. Vs. State of Madras and Ors., AIR 1954 SC 397: Relied upon to highlight that criminal matters should be given precedence over civil matters.
• K.G. Premshankar Vs. Inspector of Police and Anr., (2002) 8 SCC 87: Relied upon to highlight that civil court decisions are not binding on criminal proceedings.
• Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. Vs. Meenakshi Marwah and Anr., (2005) 4 SCC 370: Relied upon to highlight that findings in civil and criminal proceedings are independent.
• Seth Ramdayal Jat Vs. Laxmi Prasad, (2009) 11 SCC 545: Relied upon tohighlight that criminal court judgments are admissible for limited purposes in civil proceedings.
• Vishnu Dutt Sharma Vs. Daya Sapra, (2009) 13 SCC 729: Relied upon to highlight that criminal court judgments are admissible for limited purposes in civil proceedings.
• Kishan Singh (Dead) Through LRs. Vs. Gurpal Singh and Ors., (2010) 8 SCC 775: Relied upon to highlight that findings in civil and criminal proceedings are independent.
• Eveneet Singh Vs. Prashant Chaudhri, 2010 SCC online Delhi 4507: Relied upon to support the interpretation of “shared household” under the DV Act.
• Eveneet Singh Vs. Prashant Chaudhari, 2011 SCC online Delhi 4651: Relied upon to support the interpretation of “shared household” under the DV Act.
• Preeti Satija Vs. Raj Kumari and Anr., 2014 SCC online Delhi 188: Relied upon to support the interpretation of “shared household” under the DV Act.
• Navneet Arora Vs. Surender Kaur and Ors., 2014 SCC Online Del 7617: Relied upon to support the interpretation of “shared household” under the DV Act.
• K. Subramani Vs. Director of Animal Husbandry, Chennai, (2009) 1 MLJ 363: Relied upon to highlight that criminal court judgments are admissible for limited purposes in civil proceedings.

Decision

The Supreme Court, in a landmark judgment, has significantly expanded the scope of protection available to women under the Domestic Violence Act. The Court held that:

• The definition of “shared household” under Section 2(s) of the DV Act is exhaustive and not limited to a joint family household or a household where the husband has a share. It includes any household where the aggrieved person has resided in a domestic relationship.
• The judgment in S.R. Batra and Anr. Vs. Taruna Batra does not lay down the correct law and is overruled.
• The Trial Court erred in passing a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC without considering the defendant’s claim that the suit property was her shared household.
• The right to reside in a shared household is available in all legal proceedings, including civil suits.
• The plaintiff in a civil suit can be considered a “respondent” under Section 2(q) of the DV Act, if they are a respondent in the DV proceedings.
• The expression “save in accordance with the procedure established by law” in Section 17(2) of the DV Act contemplates proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction.
• The husband of the aggrieved party is a proper party, but not a necessary party, in a suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendant.
• Orders passed under Section 19 of the DV Act are relevant but not binding on civil courts.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and the Delhi High Court and remanded the matter back to the Trial Court to be decided in accordance with the law and the observations made in this judgment.

Flowchart: Determining a Shared Household

Ratio of the Judgment

Implications

This judgment has far-reaching implications for women facing domestic violence in India. By overruling the narrow interpretation of “shared household” in the S.R. Batra case, the Supreme Court has:

• Expanded the scope of protection available to women under the DV Act.
• Ensured that women are not denied their right to reside in a shared household simply because the property is not owned by their husband or the joint family.
• Clarified that the right to reside is a substantive right and not merely a procedural one.
• Strengthened the legal framework for protecting women from domestic violence.
• Provided clarity on the interplay between civil and criminal proceedings in cases of domestic violence.

This judgment reaffirms the commitment of the Indian judiciary to protect the rights of women and to provide them with effective remedies against domestic violence. It is a significant step towards ensuring that women are not rendered homeless due to marital disputes.