Supreme Court Acquits Accused in Double Homicide Case Citing Weak Evidence (27 May 2022)

Date of the Judgment: 27 May 2022

Citation: (2022) INSC 507

Judges: Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J. and Bela M. Trivedi, J.

Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence, an extra-judicial confession of a co-accused, and the “last seen together” theory, especially when the cause of death is not definitively proven to be homicidal? The Supreme Court of India addressed this critical question in a recent judgment, ultimately acquitting the accused due to insufficient evidence. The bench, comprising Justices Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud and Bela M. Trivedi, delivered the judgment, with Justice Bela M. Trivedi authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The case revolves around the deaths of Kumari Brindabai and Kanhaiya Siddar. Brindabai, belonging to the Kumhar caste, and Kanhaiya, from the Siddar (Gaur) caste, were reportedly in a love affair that was disapproved of by Brindabai’s family, specifically her father Bhagirathi Kumhar and her uncle Chandrapal (the appellant). On December 2, 1994, both Brindabai and Kanhaiya went missing. A search was conducted, but no missing person report was filed. On December 11, 1994, their bodies were discovered hanging from a cashew tree in a decomposed state. The appellant, Chandrapal, identified the bodies. Initially, the post-mortem reports suggested that the cause of death was asphyxia due to hanging, with the nature of death being suicidal. However, the prosecution later alleged that the accused, including Chandrapal, had murdered both Brindabai and Kanhaiya and then staged their deaths as suicides.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The Sessions Court convicted all four accused—Bhagirathi, Chandrapal, Mangal Singh, and Videshi—under Section 302 (murder) and Section 201 (causing disappearance of evidence) read with Section 34 (common intention) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, but acquitted them of charges under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The High Court of Chhattisgarh upheld the conviction of Chandrapal under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Section 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, but acquitted the other three accused of the murder charges, while confirming their conviction under Section 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Chandrapal then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The judgment primarily deals with the following legal provisions:

• Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section defines the punishment for murder. The court must first establish that a homicidal death occurred before convicting an accused under this section.
• Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section deals with causing the disappearance of evidence of an offense or giving false information to screen an offender.
• Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section addresses acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention. It states that when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.
• Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: This section allows the court to consider a confession made by one of the accused jointly tried for the same offense, affecting himself and others, as evidence against the others. However, the court has consistently held that an extra-judicial confession is a weak kind of evidence.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that there were major contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding the alleged extra-judicial confession made by the co-accused, Videshi.
• The appellant contended that an extra-judicial confession of a co-accused is a weak piece of evidence and cannot be the sole basis for conviction.
• The appellant refuted the “last seen together” theory, pointing out that the witness who claimed to have last seen Kanhaiya with the appellant testified four months after the incident, and that there was a significant time gap between when Kanhaiya was last seen with the appellant and when his body was found.
• The appellant highlighted that the post-mortem reports initially indicated the cause of death as asphyxia due to hanging, with the nature of death being suicidal.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The respondent argued that there were concurrent findings by the Sessions Court and the High Court regarding the appellant’s guilt, and therefore the Supreme Court should not interfere.
• The respondent agreed that an extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence, but argued that there was other corroborative evidence that proved the appellant’s guilt.
• The respondent argued that the witness who had last seen Kanhaiya with the appellant should be believed, as the deceased were not seen in the village after the alleged incident.
• The respondent contended that the doctor who conducted the post-mortem had stated that the deaths could be homicidal as well.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issues:

1. Whether the High Court was justified in convicting the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, based on the evidence on record.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court cited Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra [ (1973) 2 SCC 793 ] to emphasize that the circumstances must be fully established and not just probable.
• The Court relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra [ (1984) 4 SCC 116 ] to reiterate the conditions for establishing guilt based on circumstantial evidence.
• The Court referred to State of M.P. Through CBI & Ors. Vs. Paltan Mallah & Ors. [ (2005) 3 SCC 169 ], Sahadevan & Anr. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu [ (2012) 6 SCC 403 ], Jagroop Singh Vs. State of Punjab [ (2012) 11 SCC 768 ], S.K. Yusuf Vs. State of West Bengal [ (2011) 11 SCC 754 ] and Pancho Vs. State of Haryana [ (2011) 10 SCC 165 ] to highlight that an extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence and requires corroboration.
• The Court cited Bodhraj & Ors. Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir [ (2002) 8 SCC 45 ], Jaswant Gir Vs. State of Punjab [ (2005) 12 SCC 438 ], and Arjun Marik & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar [ 1994 Supp (2) SCC 372 ] to explain the limitations of the “last seen together” theory.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the lack of conclusive evidence to prove that the deaths were homicidal. The Court found the extra-judicial confession of the co-accused to be weak and unreliable, and the “last seen together” theory inapplicable due to the significant time gap. The initial post-mortem reports suggested that the deaths were suicidal, and the prosecution failed to establish a clear chain of circumstances to prove that the appellant was guilty of murder. The Court emphasized that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof.

The Court noted that the prosecution’s case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, which required a complete chain of circumstances to be established. The Court also observed that the prosecution had failed to prove that the deaths were homicidal, and the possibility of suicide could not be ruled out. The Court stated, “The suspicion howsoever strong cannot take place of proof.” The Court further stated, “It is also significant to note that no evidence worth the name as to how and by whom the deceased Brinda was allegedly murdered was produced by the prosecution.” The Court also stated, “The time gap between the two incidents i.e., the day when Dhansingh saw Chandrapal calling Kanhaiya at his house and the day Kanhaiya’s dead body was found being quite big, it is difficult to connect the present appellant with the alleged crime, more particularly when there is no other clinching and cogent evidence produced by the prosecution.”

Key Takeaways

• A conviction for murder cannot be based solely on circumstantial evidence if the factum of homicidal death is not conclusively proven.
• Extra-judicial confessions of co-accused are considered weak evidence and require strong corroboration.
• The “last seen together” theory is not applicable when there is a significant time gap between the accused and the deceased being last seen together and the discovery of the deceased’s body.
• The prosecution must establish a complete chain of circumstances to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute proof.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed that the appellant-accused Chandrapal be set free forthwith and ordered the office to send a copy of the order to the concerned jail authority at the earliest.

Development of Law

The Supreme Court reiterated the established principles of law regarding circumstantial evidence, extra-judicial confessions, and the “last seen together” theory. The judgment reinforces the requirement for the prosecution to prove homicidal death beyond reasonable doubt before a conviction for murder can be sustained. The ratio decidendi of the case is that a conviction cannot be based on weak circumstantial evidence, an unreliable extra-judicial confession, and an inapplicable “last seen together” theory when the factum of homicidal death is not conclusively proven.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, acquitting Chandrapal of the charges under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove the homicidal nature of the deaths beyond reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized that the extra-judicial confession of the co-accused was a weak piece of evidence, and the “last seen together” theory was not applicable due to the significant time gap. The Court concluded that the prosecution had not established a complete chain of circumstances to prove the appellant’s guilt and that suspicion cannot take the place of proof.