Supreme Court Acquits Accused in Murder Case: Taijuddin vs. State of Assam (2021)

Date of the Judgment: 1 December 2021
Citation: 2021 INSC 753
Judges: Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J. and M.M. Sundresh, J.
Can merely pointing out the location of a victim to a mob make a person part of an unlawful assembly and liable for murder? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this crucial question in a case where a man was accused of being part of a mob that killed another person. The Court examined whether the accused’s action of revealing the victim’s hiding place was sufficient to establish his involvement in the crime. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice M.M. Sundresh, with Justice Kaul authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The case arose from a land dispute that led to the death of Abdul Wahab. A house was being constructed on land claimed by the victim and others. A mob of armed individuals approached the house, leading to a violent assault on Abdul Wahab. The victim attempted to seek refuge in a nearby house, but the mob surrounded it, broke down the walls, and attacked him. The victim’s body was then disposed of in the Brahmaputra River.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The trial court, the Sessions Judge, convicted all 32 accused and sentenced them to life imprisonment on 8 May 2015. The convicted individuals appealed to the Gauhati High Court. During the pendency of the appeal, four of the accused passed away. The High Court, on 15 March 2019, upheld the conviction of some while acquitting others. The unsuccessful appellants then approached the Supreme Court, which dismissed their appeals on 6 September 2019. However, the Supreme Court issued notice in the appeal filed by Taijuddin, the present appellant, because the role attributed to him was limited to pointing out the house where the victim was hiding.

Legal Framework

The case involves several sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC):

• Section 147, IPC: Punishment for rioting.
• Section 148, IPC: Rioting, armed with deadly weapon.
• Section 149, IPC: Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object.
• Section 302, IPC: Punishment for murder.
• Section 201, IPC: Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender.
• Section 324, IPC: Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means.
• Section 326, IPC: Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means.

The core legal issue revolves around Section 149 of the IPC, which deals with constructive liability in cases of unlawful assembly. It states that if an offense is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in the prosecution of the common object of that assembly, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offense, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offense.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant’s counsel argued that the appellant’s role was limited to pointing out the location of the deceased.
• The appellant’s counsel highlighted that several key witnesses, including the victim’s wife, daughter, and sons, did not mention the appellant at all.
• The appellant was present at the scene because his house was adjacent to where the victim was hiding.
• The testimony of PW-8, who claimed to have seen the appellant chasing the victim, was unreliable as he admitted to not witnessing the incident but only hearing about it from others.
• The appellant’s counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Subal Ghorai v. State of West Bengal [(2013) 4 SCC 607], arguing that constructive liability under Section 149 of the IPC should not be stretched to implicate innocent bystanders.
• The appellant’s counsel also cited Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors. [(2013) 16 SCC 752] and C. Magesh and Ors. v. State of Karnataka [(2010) 5 SCC 645], emphasizing the need for careful scrutiny of witness testimonies, especially in cases involving large mobs and faction-ridden communities.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The prosecution argued that the appellant’s act of pointing out the victim’s location was a crucial part of the mob’s plan to attack and kill the victim.
• The prosecution relied on the testimony of PW-1, PW-4, PW-5, and PW-7, who stated that the appellant pointed out where the victim was hiding.
• The prosecution also relied on the testimony of PW-8, who claimed to have seen the appellant chasing the victim.
• The prosecution contended that the appellant’s actions demonstrated a common intention with the other members of the unlawful assembly.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issue:

1. Whether the appellant’s act of pointing out the location of the victim to the mob was sufficient to establish his membership in the unlawful assembly with the common intention to commit murder, thus making him liable under Section 149 of the IPC.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court relied on Subal Ghorai v. State of West Bengal [(2013) 4 SCC 607]* to emphasize that constructive liability under Section 149 of the IPC should not be stretched to implicate innocent bystanders.
• The Court relied on Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors. [(2013) 16 SCC 752]* to highlight the need for careful scrutiny of witness testimonies in cases involving large mobs.
• The Court relied on C. Magesh and Ors. v. State of Karnataka [(2010) 5 SCC 645]* to emphasize the importance of evaluating evidence on the touchstone of consistency and credibility of eye-witnesses.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision to acquit the appellant was primarily influenced by the following factors:

• Limited Role: The Court emphasized that the appellant’s role was limited to pointing out the victim’s location, which, in itself, did not demonstrate a shared common intention to commit murder.
• Lack of Evidence: The Court noted that key witnesses did not mention the appellant, and the testimony of the witnesses who did mention him only assigned the role of pointing out the victim’s location.
• Presence at Site: The Court acknowledged that the appellant’s presence at the scene was natural, given that his house was adjacent to where the victim was hiding.
• Unreliable Witness: The Court found the testimony of PW-8, who claimed to have seen the appellant chasing the victim, unreliable as he admitted to not witnessing the incident but only hearing about it from others.
• No Weapon: The appellant was not carrying any weapon and did not assault anyone.
• Constructive Liability: The Court was careful not to stretch the concept of constructive liability under Section 149 of the IPC to implicate the appellant, who was essentially a passive bystander.

Logical Reasoning

Judgment

The Supreme Court, after examining the evidence and arguments, concluded that the appellant’s actions did not meet the threshold for establishing his membership in the unlawful assembly with the common intention to commit murder. The Court emphasized that merely pointing out the location of the victim, without any further involvement in the assault, did not make him liable under Section 149 of the IPC.

The Court observed, “Given that a murderous mob fully armed was hunting for him, the appellant at best can be said not to be brave enough to conceal the deceased or even to have not pointed out where he was, but that by itself cannot rope in the appellant under Section 149 of the IPC.”

The Court further stated, “The aforesaid testimony leaves us in no manner of doubt that PW-8 was not a witness who had seen the incident but he believed what others said and narrated the same. Thus, the reliance placed in the impugned judgment on the testimony of PW-8 to rope in the appellant under Section 149 of the IPC cannot be sustained.”

The Court also noted, “On the touchstone of the aforesaid judgments, taking into consideration the inconsistency in the testimonies – inasmuch as the family members never even pointed a finger at the appellant as also some of the other witnesses, while the witnesses who did point a finger only assigned the role of pointing out the place where the victim was hiding, coupled with his natural presence at site, we cannot, thus, say that by any stretch of imagination the case against the appellant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt or for that matter really no case seems to have been proved against the appellant given the role assigned to him in the testimony of the witnesses.”

The Court set aside the appellant’s conviction under Sections 147/148/302/201/149 of the IPC and ordered his immediate release if he was not required in any other case.

Key Takeaways

• Limited Role: Merely pointing out the location of a victim to a mob does not automatically make a person part of an unlawful assembly with a common intention to commit murder.
• Constructive Liability: Courts must be cautious in applying constructive liability under Section 149 of the IPC and should not implicate passive bystanders.
• Evidence Scrutiny: Witness testimonies, especially in cases involving large mobs, must be carefully scrutinized for consistency and credibility.
• Burden of Proof: The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person shared the common intention of the unlawful assembly to be held liable under Section 149 of the IPC.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed that the appellant be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of the case is that merely pointing out the location of a victim to a mob does not automatically make a person part of an unlawful assembly with a common intention to commit murder. This case reinforces the principle that constructive liability under Section 149 of the IPC should not be stretched to implicate passive bystanders and that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person shared the common intention of the unlawful assembly to be held liable.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Taijuddin vs. State of Assam & Ors. provides a significant clarification on the application of Section 149 of the IPC. The Court emphasized that mere presence at the scene of a crime or even pointing out the location of a victim does not automatically make a person part of an unlawful assembly. This judgment underscores the importance of scrutinizing evidence carefully and ensuring that the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a person shared the common intention of the unlawful assembly to be held liable.