Supreme Court Acquits Accused in Rape Case: Naim Ahamed vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (30 January 2023)

Date of the Judgment: 30 January 2023
Citation: 2023 INSC 75
Judges: Justice Ajay Rastogi and Justice Bela M. Trivedi
Can a long-term consensual relationship be considered rape if a promise of marriage is not fulfilled? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this complex issue, examining the nuances of consent and deception in cases of alleged rape. This case involved a man accused of rape after a prolonged relationship with a woman who claimed he had promised to marry her. The Supreme Court, in this judgment, acquitted the accused, emphasizing the importance of distinguishing between a false promise and a breach of promise, and the need to assess the maturity and understanding of the prosecutrix in such cases. The judgment was authored by Justice Bela M. Trivedi.

Case Background

In 2009, the prosecutrix lived in a rented house in Delhi with her husband and three children. The accused, Naim Ahamed, lived in a rented house opposite hers. The prosecutrix alleged that Naim persuaded her by saying her husband did not earn enough and that he would take care of her, promising to marry her. According to her complaint, Naim called her to various places, and she became pregnant in 2011. He assured her that he was unmarried and would marry her after the child’s birth and take her to his native place. In 2012, he took her to another rented place and continued their relationship. He then left, falsely claiming his parents were ill, and told her to stay in a shelter home with their child. He also allegedly forced her to divorce her husband. She later found out that he was already married with children. Despite this, he continued to assure her of marriage but did not marry her. She filed a complaint on 21 March 2015, leading to the FIR.

The prosecutrix lodged a complaint against the accused on 21.03.2015, alleging that the accused had persuaded her to have a sexual relationship with him by promising to marry her. She further alleged that she was impregnated in the year 2011 and that the accused had assured her that he was not a married man and would marry her after the delivery of the child. She also alleged that the accused had taken her to another rented premises in 2012 and continued to have a relationship with her. She stated that the accused had vacated the premises with a false excuse that his parents were ill and had told her to take shelter in a shelter home along with their minor child. She also stated that she came to know in 2012 that the accused was already married and had children. The prosecutrix stated that the accused had continued to assure her of marriage but did not marry her, leading to her filing the complaint.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The Sessions Court found the appellant guilty under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), sentencing him to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 50,000, with an additional year of imprisonment for default. The court also ordered the appellant to pay Rs. 5,00,000 as compensation to the prosecutrix for her maintenance and that of the minor child. The High Court of Delhi modified the Sessions Court’s order, reducing the imprisonment to 7 years and the fine to Rs. 5,000, while upholding the compensation order. The appellant had already paid the compensation to the prosecutrix as directed by the High Court.

Legal Framework

The case revolves around the interpretation of consent under Section 90 and the definition of rape under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Section 90 of the IPC states that consent is not valid if given under fear or misconception of fact. Section 375 of the IPC defines rape and includes circumstances where consent is not considered valid, such as when it is obtained under a misconception of fact or by putting the woman in fear of death or hurt.

The relevant provisions of law are:

• Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC):

  “Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.—A consent is not such a consent as it intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or Consent of insane person.—if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or Consent of child.—unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.”

• Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC):

  “Rape.- A man is said to commit “rape” if he-
  (a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
  (b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
  (c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
  (d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person,
  under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:-
  First- Against her will.
  Secondly- Without her consent.
  Thirdly- With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt.
  Fourthly- With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married.
  Fifthly- With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent.
  Sixthly- With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age.
  Seventhly- when she is unable to communicate consent.
  Explanation 1- For the purposes of this section, “vagina” shall also include labia majora.
  Explanation 2.- Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act:
  Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity.
  Exception1. A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape.
  Exception 2.- Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.”

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that the prosecutrix was a consenting party to the sexual relationship since 2009-2010, which continued even after the birth of the child in 2011 until the complaint in 2015.
• The appellant contended that the prosecutrix lodged the complaint in March 2015 after she gave birth to the child in November 2011, and after she visited his native place in 2012, which reflected her intention to misuse the process of law by making false allegations against him to grab money.
• The appellant stated that he did not disown the responsibility of the child and that the prosecutrix continued to have a relationship with him for about four years after the birth of the child.
• The appellant submitted that it was only when he refused to fulfill her demand of paying a large sum of money that she filed the complaint.
• The appellant relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Deelip Singh alias Dilip Kumar vs. State of Bihar [2005] 1 SCC 88, Prashant Bharti vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [2013] 9 SCC 293, and Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra and Others [2019] 18 SCC 191 to argue that a consensual sexual relationship that continues for a long time cannot be considered to have occurred under a misconception of fact under Section 90 of the IPC and cannot be termed as rape under Section 375 of the IPC.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The respondent argued that the Sessions Court and the High Court had concurrently recorded findings of facts against the appellant, holding him guilty under Section 376 of the IPC.
• The respondent contended that the prosecution had proved beyond doubt that the appellant had lured the prosecutrix into having a sexual relationship by giving her a false promise that he would marry her.
• The respondent submitted that the appellant had committed a breach of the promise after the prosecutrix delivered the child, which proved that her consent was obtained by the appellant under a misconception of fact.

Amicus Curiae’s Arguments:

• The Amicus Curiae, Ms. Indira Jaising, submitted that there was a clear distinction between ‘rape’ and ‘consensual sex.’
• She argued that the Court was required to carefully examine whether the accused had made a false promise of marriage with malafide motives or whether it was a mere breach of promise.
• She contended that the courts below had rightly appreciated the evidence of the prosecutrix and concluded that her consent was obtained under a misconception of fact under Section 90 of the IPC, thus falling under Clause Secondly of Section 375 of the IPC.
• Ms. Jaising also relied on various decisions of the Supreme Court to support her submissions.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame specific issues in a dedicated section. However, the core issue that the court addressed was:

• Whether the consent given by the prosecutrix for sexual intercourse was under a misconception of fact as defined under Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code, and whether the act of the accused would amount to rape as defined under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court distinguished Uday vs. State of Karnataka [2003] 4 SCC 46, explaining that while a promise to marry may not be a misconception of fact, a false promise from the beginning would vitiate consent.
• The Court explained Deelip Singh alias Dilip Kumar vs. State of Bihar [2005] 1 SCC 88, stating that a representation made with no intention to marry would vitiate consent.
• The Court distinguished Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana [2013] 7 SCC 675, highlighting the need to examine the accused’s motives and whether there was a false promise from the outset.
• The Court considered Prashant Bharti vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [2013] 9 SCC 293, to support the view that a long-term consensual relationship cannot be considered to have occurred under a misconception of fact.
• The Court distinguished Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra and Others [2019] 18 SCC 191, emphasizing the distinction between rape and consensual sex and the need to examine the accused’s motives.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision to acquit the accused was primarily influenced by the following factors:

• Maturity and Understanding of the Prosecutrix: The court emphasized that the prosecutrix was a married woman with three children, making her mature and intelligent enough to understand the implications of her actions.
• Prolonged Consensual Relationship: The relationship between the prosecutrix and the accused lasted for about five years, during which she continued to have sexual relations with him even after knowing that he was married.
• Distinction between False Promise and Breach of Promise: The court differentiated between a false promise made with no intention to marry and a breach of promise due to unforeseen circumstances, finding that the accused did not have a malafide intention from the beginning.
• Lack of Evidence of Initial Deception: The court found no evidence to suggest that the accused had made a false promise to marry her from the beginning to satisfy his lust.
• Prosecutrix’s Conduct: The court noted that the prosecutrix had left her husband and children to live with the accused, indicating her willingness and understanding of the relationship.

Logical Reasoning:

The court’s reasoning was based on a careful evaluation of the facts and circumstances of the case, emphasizing the need to distinguish between a false promise and a breach of promise. The court also considered the maturity and understanding of the prosecutrix, as well as the prolonged nature of the relationship.

The Supreme Court held that the prosecutrix’s consent was not given under a misconception of fact. The court emphasized that the prosecutrix was a mature, married woman who was aware of the implications of her actions. The court observed that the relationship was consensual and that the accused did not have a malafide intention from the beginning. The court distinguished between a false promise made with no intention to marry and a breach of promise due to unforeseen circumstances. The court also noted that the prosecutrix had continued the relationship even after knowing that the accused was married. The court concluded that the accused was not guilty of rape under Section 375 of the IPC.

“In the instant case, the prosecutrix who herself was a married woman having three children, could not be said to have acted under the alleged false promise given by the appellant or under the misconception of fact while giving the consent to have sexual relationship with the appellant.”

“Even if the allegations made by her in her deposition before the court, are taken on their face value, then also to construe such allegations as ‘rape’ by the appellant, would be stretching the case too far.”

“Thus, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix had given her consent for the sexual relationship with the appellant under the misconception of fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty of having committed rape within the meaning of Section 375 of IPC.”

There was no minority opinion in this judgment.

Key Takeaways

• A long-term consensual sexual relationship, even if it involves a promise of marriage, may not constitute rape if the consent is not given under a misconception of fact.
• The courts must distinguish between a false promise made with no intention to marry and a breach of promise due to unforeseen circumstances.
• The maturity, understanding, and conduct of the prosecutrix are crucial factors in determining whether consent was valid.
• The prosecution must prove that the accused had a malafide intention from the beginning to deceive the prosecutrix with a false promise of marriage.
• Recording of evidence must be done in the language of the court, or the language of the witness, and translated to the language of the court, as per Section 277 of Cr.P.C.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed all courts to comply with the provisions of Section 277 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) while recording the evidence of witnesses. The court emphasized that the evidence of a witness should be recorded in the language of the court or in the language of the witness, and a true translation should be prepared if necessary.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a long-term consensual relationship, even if it involves a promise of marriage, does not constitute rape if the consent is not given under a misconception of fact. The court emphasized that the maturity, understanding, and conduct of the prosecutrix are crucial factors in determining whether consent was valid. This judgment clarifies the distinction between a false promise made with no intention to marry and a breach of promise due to unforeseen circumstances. It reinforces the principle that the prosecution must prove that the accused had a malafide intention from the beginning to deceive the prosecutrix with a false promise of marriage. This judgment does not change the previous position of law but clarifies the interpretation of Section 90 and Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Conclusion

The Supreme Court acquitted the appellant, Naim Ahamed, of rape charges, emphasizing that the prosecutrix’s consent was not given under a misconception of fact. The court’s decision underscores the importance of distinguishing between a false promise and a breach of promise, and the need to assess the maturity and understanding of the prosecutrix in such cases. The judgment also directs all courts to ensure compliance with Section 277 of the Cr.P.C. while recording evidence.