Supreme Court acquits accused of murder under Section 302 IPC for lack of common intention: Ramesh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (22 March 2021)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 22 March 2021
Citation: Not Available in the source document.
Judges: Uday Umesh Lalit, J., K.M. Joseph, J.

Can a person be held liable for murder if they were present at the scene but did not commit the fatal act? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case where an accused was convicted of murder with the aid of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, despite no direct evidence of them committing the act. The court examined the principle of vicarious liability and whether the accused shared a common intention with the principal offenders. This judgment was delivered by a bench comprising Justice Uday Umesh Lalit and Justice K.M. Joseph.

Case Background

The case revolves around an incident that occurred on 18th March 2014, in Pubowal, Himachal Pradesh. Sukhwinder Singh (PW1), the informant, had married Puja Devi against the wishes of her family, leading to animosity from her maternal uncle, Nirmal Singh. On the day of the incident, Sukhwinder Singh, along with his friends Kulwinder Singh alias Babbi and Daljit Singh alias Deepu, visited his maternal grandmother’s house. There, they were confronted by Nirmal Singh and Sadhu Singh, Sukhwinder’s maternal uncles, and Ramesh Kumar (the appellant), who was their driver. A scuffle broke out, and later, near a high school, the three accused allegedly assaulted Sukhwinder Singh and his friends. Daljit Singh sustained fatal injuries and died at the scene. The prosecution alleged that Nirmal Singh used a sickle, while Sadhu Singh used a stick, and Ramesh Kumar assaulted with fist blows. The trial court convicted all three accused.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Additional Sessions Judge (II), Una, Himachal Pradesh, convicted all three accused, namely Nirmal Singh, Sadhu Singh, and Ramesh Kumar, under Section 302 (murder) read with Section 34 (common intention) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and also under Sections 323 (voluntarily causing hurt) and 324 (voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means) read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla upheld the convictions and sentences. Nirmal Singh did not appeal further. Sadhu Singh’s Special Leave Petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Ramesh Kumar, however, appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging his conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Legal Framework

The core legal provision in this case is Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which deals with acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention. It states:

“When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.”

This provision establishes the principle of vicarious liability, where a person can be held liable for a criminal act committed by another if they shared a common intention. The prosecution argued that Ramesh Kumar shared a common intention with Nirmal Singh and Sadhu Singh to cause harm to the victims, making him equally liable for the murder of Daljit Singh. The court had to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to establish this common intention.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments (Ramesh Kumar):

• The appellant’s counsel, Mr. P.K. Dey, argued that there was no specific overt act attributed to the appellant in the assault on the deceased. The informant, PW1 Sukhwinder Singh, did not state that the appellant was armed with any weapon or that he inflicted any blows on the deceased. The appellant was only described as being present when “three persons got down from the motorcycle and started assaulting with Danda and fist blows.”

• Mr. Dey emphasized that the appellant had run away from the spot and raised an alarm, which led to people gathering at the scene. This behavior, according to the appellant’s counsel, did not indicate a common intention to commit murder.

• The appellant’s counsel argued that the specific overt acts of assault were attributed to the other accused, Sadhu Singh and Nirmal Singh, who were armed with a stick (Danda) and a sickle (Darat), respectively.

Respondent’s Arguments (State of Himachal Pradesh):

• The State’s counsel, Mr. Abhimanyu Jhamba, argued that the appellant had come along with the other accused, who were armed with a Danda and a sickle. He emphasized that the appellant had given fist and kick blows to the victims, which demonstrated his active participation in the assault.

• The State contended that these facts pointed towards the appellant’s shared intention with the other accused, making him liable under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issue:

1. Whether the appellant, Ramesh Kumar, could be held liable for the murder of Daljit Singh under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 with the aid of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, given the lack of specific overt acts attributed to him in the assault on the deceased.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court referred to the following cases to determine the scope of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860:

1. Dharam Pal and others v. State of Haryana [(1978) 4 SCC 440] – Supreme Court of India

   This case emphasized that a criminal court must be satisfied about the prior meeting of minds between the principal culprit and their companions before fastening vicarious liability. It stated that accompanying a principal culprit does not automatically mean sharing their intention for every act.

2. Vithal Laxman Chalawadi and others v. State of Karnataka [(2010) 14 SCC 739] – Supreme Court of India

   In this case, the court held that the mere presence of an accused at the scene of the crime and participation in a melee is not sufficient to establish a common intention to commit murder. The court acquitted one of the accused of murder while upholding his conviction for assault.

3. Bishu Sarkar and others v. State of West Bengal [(2017) 11 SCC 105] – Supreme Court of India

   This case highlighted that if the allegations against the accused are that they only participated in a scuffle and did not inflict any blows with weapons, they cannot be held liable for murder with the aid of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The court acquitted the accused of murder.

The Supreme Court also considered the following legal provision:

1. Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

   This section defines the principle of common intention in criminal acts, which the court analyzed in detail to determine the liability of the appellant.

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

The Supreme Court relied on the authorities to interpret the scope of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The court used Dharam Pal and others v. State of Haryana [(1978) 4 SCC 440]* to emphasize that a prior meeting of minds is necessary for vicarious liability. It followed Vithal Laxman Chalawadi and others v. State of Karnataka [(2010) 14 SCC 739]* to establish that mere presence and participation in a melee does not equate to a shared intention for murder. The court also cited Bishu Sarkar and others v. State of West Bengal [(2017) 11 SCC 105]* to highlight that participation in a scuffle without inflicting fatal blows does not justify a murder conviction under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the lack of evidence demonstrating a shared intention between the appellant and the other accused to commit murder. The court emphasized that mere presence at the scene of the crime and participation in a scuffle are not sufficient to establish vicarious liability for murder under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The court was also swayed by the fact that the appellant was not armed, did not inflict fatal blows, and that he ran away from the scene and raised an alarm, which indicated a lack of common intention to commit murder.

Logical Reasoning:

The court considered alternative interpretations, such as the respondent’s argument that the appellant’s presence and participation in the assault indicated a common intention. However, the court rejected this interpretation, finding that the evidence did not sufficiently prove a shared intention for murder. The court stated, “The only attribution to the appellant was regarding common or collective act where ‘three persons got down from the motorcycle and started assaulting with Danda and fist blows’.” The court also noted, “It was not even the case that the appellant had exhorted or had facilitated, in any manner, the assault on the deceased.” Ultimately, the court concluded, “it cannot be said with certainty that the appellant shared the common intention with accused Sadhu Singh and Nirmal Singh to commit the murder of the deceased or that the appellant had done something ‘in furtherance’ of the common intention of all.” The court found him guilty of the offence punishable under Section 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for causing hurt.

Key Takeaways

• Mere presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to establish vicarious liability for murder under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
• For vicarious liability to apply, there must be evidence of a prior meeting of minds and a shared intention to commit the specific crime.
• The prosecution must prove that the accused did something ‘in furtherance’ of the common intention.
• An accused cannot be convicted for murder with the aid of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, if they did not commit any specific overt act in the assault on the deceased and were not armed with any weapon.
• Running away from the scene and raising an alarm can indicate a lack of common intention to commit murder.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed that if the appellant, Ramesh Kumar, had already served the sentence for the offence under Section 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, he should be set at liberty unless his custody is required in connection with any other offence.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that for establishing vicarious liability for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, mere presence and participation in a scuffle is not sufficient. There must be evidence of a prior meeting of minds and a shared intention to commit the specific crime. This judgment reinforces the principle that Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 cannot be applied indiscriminately and that each accused’s role must be carefully examined. This case clarifies that the accused must have done something ‘in furtherance’ of the common intention to be held liable for the crime.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Ramesh Alias Dapinder Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh clarifies the application of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in cases of murder. The court acquitted the appellant of the charge of murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, emphasizing that mere presence and participation in a scuffle is not sufficient to establish a shared intention to commit murder. The court stressed that there must be evidence of a prior meeting of minds and that the accused must have done something ‘in furtherance’ of the common intention. This judgment reinforces the need for a careful examination of each accused’s role in a crime before applying the principle of vicarious liability.