LEGAL ISSUE: Whether a police officer can be held liable for failing to prevent a crime and apprehend criminals when they were part of a larger police force at the scene of the crime.

CASE TYPE: Criminal

Case Name: V. Rajaram vs. State Represented by the Inspector of Police CBI/SCB

Judgment Date: 26 November 2019

Date of the Judgment: 26 November 2019

Citation: 2019 INSC 1234

Judges: R. Banumathi, J., A.S. Bopanna, J.

Can a police officer be convicted for failing to prevent a crime when they were part of a larger police force at the scene? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case involving the arson of the Dinakaran newspaper office. The court examined whether a Deputy Superintendent of Police could be held liable for not preventing the attack and apprehending the criminals, ultimately acquitting him. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice R. Banumathi and Justice A.S. Bopanna, with the opinion authored by Justice R. Banumathi.

Case Background

On May 9, 2007, the Dinakaran newspaper published an opinion poll suggesting that M.K. Stalin was more favored as M. Karunanidhi’s political successor than his elder brother, M.K. Alagiri. This led to protests by M.K. Alagiri’s supporters outside the Dinakaran office. Initially, a group of protesters damaged the office, but the police, including the appellant V. Rajaram, dispersed them. Later, another group, led by V.P. Pandi, trespassed into the office, set fire to vehicles, and vandalized the premises, resulting in the deaths of three employees.

Following the incident, a First Information Report (FIR) was registered, and the case was later transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The appellant, V. Rajaram, who was the Deputy Superintendent of Police at the time, was charged under Section 217 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), for disobeying the law with the intent to save the accused, and Section 221 of the IPC, for intentionally omitting to apprehend the offenders.

Timeline

Date Event
May 9, 2007 Dinakaran newspaper publishes opinion poll regarding M. Karunanidhi’s political successor.
Morning of May 9, 2007 First group of protesters damages the Dinakaran office. Police, including the appellant, disperse them.
11:45 AM, May 9, 2007 Second group led by V.P. Pandi attacks Dinakaran office, sets fire to vehicles, and vandalizes the premises. Three employees die in the fire.
1:00 PM, May 9, 2007 FIR registered at Othakadai Police Station.
May 10, 2007 Case transferred to CBI.
May 15, 2007 Appellant arrested accused No. 1 (V.P. Pandi @ Attack Pandi).
May 16, 2007 Appellant arrested accused No. 2 (M. Thiruchelvam).
August 6, 2007 Charge sheet filed against seventeen accused persons.
March 21, 2019 High Court of Madras at Madurai Bench reverses the acquittal of the appellant by the Principal Sessions Judge, Madurai.
March 25, 2019 High Court of Madras at Madurai Bench sentences the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment.
November 26, 2019 Supreme Court acquits the appellant.

Course of Proceedings

The trial court acquitted the appellant, V. Rajaram, stating that the evidence was insufficient to prove charges under Section 217 of the IPC and Section 221 of the IPC. The court noted that the appellant was not the senior-most officer at the scene, and the prosecution failed to prove that he intentionally disobeyed the law. The High Court of Judicature at Madras, however, reversed the trial court’s decision, convicting the appellant under both sections. The High Court relied on photographs and video footage showing the appellant’s presence at the scene and his failure to prevent the crime. The High Court also noted that the failure of the CBI to prosecute the Additional Superintendent of Police did not absolve the appellant from liability.

Legal Framework

The case revolves around Section 217 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 221 of the IPC.

  • Section 217 of the IPC states:

    “Public servant disobeying direction of law with intent to save person from punishment or property from forfeiture.—Whoever, being a public servant, knowingly disobeys any direction of the law as to the way in which he is to conduct himself as such public servant, intending thereby to save, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby save, any person from legal punishment, or subject him to a less punishment, or with intent to save, or knowing that he is likely thereby to save, any property from forfeiture or any charge to which it is liable by law, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”

    This section deals with a public servant intentionally disobeying a direction of law to save a person from punishment or property from forfeiture.

  • Section 221 of the IPC states:

    “Intentional omission to apprehend on the part of public servant bound to apprehend.—Whoever, being a public servant, legally bound as such public servant to apprehend or to keep in confinement any person charged with or liable to be apprehended for any offence, intentionally omits to apprehend such person, or intentionally suffers such person to escape, or intentionally aids such person in escaping, or attempting to escape, from such confinement, shall be punished as follows, that is to say,— with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”

    This section concerns a public servant intentionally omitting to apprehend a person who is charged with an offense or is liable to be apprehended.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

  • The appellant argued that he could not be held liable for not preventing the crime because senior police officers, such as the Superintendent of Police (PW-29) and Additional Superintendent of Police (PW-30), were regulating the police bandobust and giving directions.
  • The appellant contended that the High Court erred in relying on Compact Discs (CDs) as evidence without proper certification under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • The appellant pointed out that key witnesses, the photographer (PW-27) and news reporter (PW-28) from Nakkeeran Bi-weekly Magazine, turned hostile and did not support the prosecution’s case.
  • The appellant argued that the High Court should not have reversed the trial court’s acquittal order unless there was an erroneous appreciation of evidence or the trial court’s judgment was perverse.

Respondent’s (CBI) Arguments:

  • The CBI argued that the appellant was in charge of bandobust duty at the Dinakaran Newspaper Building and deliberately failed to take action to prevent the crime.
  • The CBI contended that the appellant could have easily prevented the attack and arrested the accused, including “Attack Pandi.”
  • The CBI submitted that the CDs and photographs were sent to the Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL), and the expert’s (PW-77) testimony proved that the evidence was not tampered with.
  • The CBI argued that the High Court had the power to review the entire evidence and reverse the acquittal to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
Main Submission Sub-Submissions (Appellant) Sub-Submissions (CBI)
Liability for Preventing Crime ✓ Senior officers were in charge of bandobust.
✓ Appellant was following orders.
✓ Appellant was in-charge of bandobust.
✓ Appellant failed to act to prevent the crime.
Admissibility of Evidence ✓ CDs not certified under Section 65B of the Evidence Act. ✓ Expert testimony proves authenticity of CDs.
Hostile Witnesses ✓ Key witnesses did not support prosecution.
Reversal of Acquittal ✓ High Court should not reverse acquittal without perversity. ✓ High Court has power to reverse acquittal to prevent injustice.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issue for consideration:

  1. Whether the judgment of the trial court qua the appellant was perverse, and whether there were substantial grounds for the High Court to reverse the order of acquittal of the appellant recorded by the trial court and convict the appellant for the offences punishable under Section 217 of the IPC and Section 221 of the IPC.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Issue Court’s Decision Brief Reason
Whether the High Court was right in reversing the acquittal of the appellant under Section 217 of the IPC and Section 221 of the IPC. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not right in reversing the acquittal. The Court found that the appellant was not the senior-most officer at the scene, and there was no evidence to show that he disobeyed any law or the orders of his superiors. The Court noted that the appellant had acted to chase away the agitators and had responded to requests for help.

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Authority Court How it was Considered
Section 217 of the Indian Penal Code Indian Parliament The court analyzed the ingredients of the provision to determine if the appellant’s actions met the criteria for conviction.
Section 221 of the Indian Penal Code Indian Parliament The court analyzed the ingredients of the provision to determine if the appellant’s actions met the criteria for conviction.
Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer and Others (2014) 10 SCC 473 Supreme Court of India The court discussed the ruling regarding the admissibility of electronic evidence under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act.
Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2018) 2 SCC 801 Supreme Court of India The court referred to the case that discussed the mandatory nature of a certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act.
Sonu alias Amar v. State of Haryana (2017) 8 SCC 570 Supreme Court of India The court noted the ruling that objections regarding the admissibility of evidence should be raised during the trial.

Judgment

Submission by Parties How the Court Treated the Submission
Appellant was not the senior-most officer and was following orders. The Court agreed that the appellant was not the senior-most officer and was acting under the direction of PW-30.
Compact Discs (CDs) were not admissible without Section 65-B certification. The Court did not make a conclusive finding on the admissibility of the CDs, as other appeals were pending.
Key witnesses turned hostile. The Court acknowledged that key witnesses did not support the prosecution’s case.
High Court should not have reversed acquittal without perversity. The Court agreed that the High Court should not have substituted its views with the trial court’s plausible view.
Appellant was in charge of bandobust and failed to act. The Court found that the appellant was not solely in charge and had responded to requests for help.
Appellant could have prevented the attack and arrested the accused. The Court found that the appellant was part of a larger police force and was not solely responsible for preventing the attack.
Expert testimony proved authenticity of CDs. The Court did not make a conclusive finding on the authenticity of the CDs.
High Court has power to reverse acquittal to prevent injustice. The Court acknowledged the High Court’s power but found that it was not applicable in this case.

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

  • The Supreme Court analyzed the ingredients of Section 217 of the IPC and Section 221 of the IPC and found that the prosecution had not proven the charges against the appellant.
  • The Court discussed the ruling in Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer and Others (2014) 10 SCC 473 regarding the admissibility of electronic evidence but did not make a conclusive finding due to pending appeals.
  • The Court referred to Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2018) 2 SCC 801, which discussed the mandatory nature of a certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, but did not apply it conclusively.
  • The Court cited Sonu alias Amar v. State of Haryana (2017) 8 SCC 570, noting that objections regarding the admissibility of evidence should be raised during the trial.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision to acquit the appellant was primarily influenced by the following factors:

  • Chain of Command: The Court emphasized that the appellant was not the senior-most officer at the scene of the crime. PW-30, the Additional Superintendent of Police, was the superior officer in charge of the bandobust duty. The appellant was expected to act under the directions of his superior.
  • Lack of Intentional Disobedience: The Court found no evidence to suggest that the appellant intentionally disobeyed any law or the directions of his superior. The prosecution failed to prove that the appellant acted with the intention to save the accused from legal punishment.
  • Actions Taken by the Appellant: The Court noted that the appellant had taken action to chase away the agitators and had responded to requests for help from the Dinakaran office. This indicated that there was no inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.
  • Trial Court’s Plausible View: The Supreme Court observed that the trial court’s acquittal of the appellant was a plausible view based on the evidence. The High Court should not have substituted its view unless the trial court’s judgment was perverse.
Sentiment Percentage
Chain of Command 30%
Lack of Intentional Disobedience 35%
Actions Taken by the Appellant 20%
Trial Court’s Plausible View 15%
Ratio Percentage
Fact 60%
Law 40%

The Court’s reasoning was influenced by a combination of factual considerations, such as the chain of command and the actions taken by the appellant, and legal considerations, such as the interpretation of Section 217 of the IPC and Section 221 of the IPC.

Issue: Was the Appellant Liable?
Was the Appellant the Senior Officer?
No, PW-30 was the Senior Officer.
Did the Appellant Disobey Orders?
No Evidence of Disobedience.
Did the Appellant Intentionally Aid Escape?
No Evidence of Intentional Omission.
Appellant is Acquitted.

The court considered alternative interpretations but rejected them because the evidence did not support the charges against the appellant. The court emphasized that the appellant was part of a larger police force and was not solely responsible for preventing the crime. The court also noted that the appellant had taken action to chase away the agitators and had responded to requests for help.

The court’s decision was based on a careful analysis of the evidence and the legal provisions. The court concluded that the appellant could not be held liable for the offenses under Section 217 of the IPC and Section 221 of the IPC.

The Supreme Court’s decision was based on the following reasons:

  • The appellant was not the senior-most officer at the scene of the crime.
  • There was no evidence to show that the appellant disobeyed any law or the orders of his superiors.
  • The appellant had taken action to chase away the agitators and had responded to requests for help.
  • The trial court’s acquittal of the appellant was a plausible view based on the evidence.

The following direct quotes from the judgment support the court’s decision:

  • “As per Ex.-P82 and from the evidence of PW-1, it is seen that thus the appellant was not the senior most officer present at the scene of occurrence to issue directions; PW-30-Additional Superintendent of Police was the higher officer present there who was to issue directions and the appellant was to act under the direction and guidance of PW-30-Additional Superintendent of Police.”
  • “In order to attract the ingredients of Section 217 IPC, there should have been disobedience of the direction of law with intention to save the accused. The prosecution has not adduced any evidence to show that the appellant-accused has disobeyed the direction of law or the direction of the superior officer-PW-30 or acted with the intention of saving the accused.”
  • “There is no evidence to show that the appellant intentionally omitted to apprehend the accused on the spot to sustain the conviction under Section 221 IPC.”

There were no dissenting opinions in this case.

Key Takeaways

  • A police officer cannot be held liable for failing to prevent a crime if they were not the senior-most officer at the scene and were acting under the direction of their superiors.
  • To convict a public servant under Section 217 of the IPC, there must be evidence of intentional disobedience of the law with the aim to save a person from legal punishment.
  • To convict a public servant under Section 221 of the IPC, there must be evidence of intentional omission to apprehend a person or intentionally aiding their escape.
  • The prosecution must prove that the public servant had the intent to disobey the law or to omit to apprehend the accused.
  • The Supreme Court will not interfere with the trial court’s order of acquittal if it is a plausible view based on the evidence.

This judgment clarifies the responsibilities of police officers in a bandobust situation and emphasizes the importance of the chain of command. It also highlights the necessity of proving intent when charging a public servant with offenses under Section 217 of the IPC and Section 221 of the IPC. This ruling could impact future cases involving public servants and their liability for actions or inactions during their duty.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed that since the conviction of the appellant is set aside and he is acquitted of the charges, the appellant is at liberty to work out his remedy in accordance with law. The concerned authorities shall take note of the acquittal of the appellant.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of the case is that a public servant cannot be convicted under Section 217 of the IPC and Section 221 of the IPC without proving the intention to disobey the law or to omit to apprehend the accused, and that the chain of command must be considered when determining liability. This case reinforces the principle that a subordinate officer is not liable for the actions of their superior and that the prosecution must prove the intent of the accused to commit the offense.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court acquitted V. Rajaram, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, of charges under Section 217 of the IPC and Section 221 of the IPC. The court found that the prosecution failed to prove the necessary intent and that the appellant was not the senior-most officer at the scene. This judgment emphasizes the importance of the chain of command and the need to prove intent when charging public servants with offenses related to their duty.