LEGAL ISSUE: Whether the accused Savitaben was guilty of murder and house trespass along with her husband.
CASE TYPE: Criminal
Case Name: Savitaben vs. The State of Gujarat
[Judgment Date]: 11 March 2019
Date of the Judgment: 11 March 2019
Citation: (2019) INSC 191
Judges: Justice R. Banumathi and Justice R. Subhash Reddy.
Can a person be convicted of murder based on the testimony of a single witness when the earliest dying declaration of the deceased does not implicate that person? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in a recent case, overturning the conviction of a woman accused of murder and house trespass. The court found that the prosecution failed to establish her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, especially considering the lack of corroboration for the key witness’s testimony. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice R. Banumathi and Justice R. Subhash Reddy, with Justice Banumathi authoring the opinion.
Case Background
The case revolves around the death of Narmadaben, who was allegedly set on fire by her neighbors, Manaharbhai Ambalal Rohit and his wife, Savitaben. The incident occurred on June 4, 2005, at around 2:30 PM. Narmadaben was at her home when she had a verbal altercation with Savitaben, which escalated when Manaharbhai joined in. According to the prosecution, Manaharbhai chased Narmadaben with a stick, and she ran inside her house. Manaharbhai and Savitaben then allegedly broke the door, dragged Narmadaben, and Manaharbhai poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze with a matchstick, after which both of them ran away. Narmadaben sustained severe burn injuries and died later that day at the hospital. The complainant, Bhikhabhai Mithabhai Rohit (PW-4), Narmadaben’s husband, filed a complaint, leading to the registration of a case against Manaharbhai and Savitaben under Sections 302 (murder) and 452 (house-trespass) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) read with Section 114 (abettor present when the offence is committed) of the IPC.
Timeline
Date | Event |
---|---|
04 June 2005, 12:00 PM | Complainant-Bhikhabhai Mithabhai Rohit (PW-4) went to his field. |
04 June 2005, 02:30 PM | Verbal quarrel between Narmadaben and Savitaben. Manaharbhai and Savitaben allegedly abused Narmadaben. |
04 June 2005, 02:30 PM | Manaharbhai chased Narmadaben with a stick, and she went inside her house. |
04 June 2005, 02:30 PM | Manaharbhai and Savitaben allegedly broke the door, dragged Narmadaben, and Manaharbhai poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. |
04 June 2005, 05:15 PM | Narmadaben was brought to the hospital. |
04 June 2005, 07:00 PM | Narmadaben succumbed to her injuries. |
04 June 2005 | Complaint was lodged by Bhikhabhai Mithabhai Rohit (PW-4). |
24 June 2014 | High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad affirmed the conviction of accused No.1-Manaharbhai Ambalal Rohit and accused No.2-Savitaben. |
03 December 2018 | The special leave petition qua accused-Manaharbhai Ambalal Rohit was dismissed by the Supreme Court of India. |
11 March 2019 | Supreme Court of India allowed the appeal of Savitaben and acquitted her. |
Course of Proceedings
The Trial Court convicted both Manaharbhai and Savitaben under Sections 302 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) read with Section 114 of the IPC. The High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad upheld this conviction. Manaharbhai’s special leave petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court on December 3, 2018. However, the Supreme Court issued notice regarding Savitaben’s appeal.
Legal Framework
The case involves the application of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860:
- Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section defines the punishment for murder.
“Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.” - Section 452, Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section addresses house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault, or wrongful restraint.
“Whoever commits house-trespass, having made preparation for causing hurt to any person or for assaulting any person, or for wrongfully restraining any person, or for putting any person in fear of hurt, or of assault, or of wrongful restraint, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” - Section 114, Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section deals with abettor present when offence is committed.
“Whenever any person, who if absent would be liable to be punished as an abettor, is present when the act or offence for which he would be punishable in consequence of the abetment is committed, he shall be deemed to have committed such act or offence.”
Arguments
Appellant’s (Savitaben’s) Arguments:
- The primary argument was that the evidence against Savitaben was weak and lacked corroboration.
- It was contended that the main witness, Bharat (PW-12), attributed the act of bringing kerosene to Savitaben, but this was not supported by other evidence.
- The earliest dying declaration of the deceased, made to Dr. Chandrakant (PW-3), did not mention Savitaben’s involvement.
- The prosecution did not examine the other son of the deceased, Mehul, who was also present at the scene.
- There was a delay of six hours in registering the FIR, raising questions about the reliability of the prosecution’s case.
Respondent’s (State of Gujarat) Arguments:
- The State argued that the evidence of Bharat (PW-12), the son of the deceased, was sufficient to prove Savitaben’s involvement.
- The State contended that Savitaben’s act of bringing the kerosene can was a crucial part of the crime, making her equally culpable.
- The State maintained that the lower courts had correctly convicted Savitaben based on the available evidence.
Main Submission | Sub-Submissions by Appellant (Savitaben) | Sub-Submissions by Respondent (State of Gujarat) |
---|---|---|
Lack of Evidence |
|
|
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The primary issue before the Supreme Court was:
- Whether the High Court was right in upholding the conviction of the appellant-Savitaben under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) read with Section 114 of the IPC and Section 452 of the IPC read with Section 114 of the IPC.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues
Issue | Court’s Decision and Reasoning |
---|---|
Whether the High Court was right in upholding the conviction of the appellant-Savitaben under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) read with Section 114 of the IPC and Section 452 of the IPC read with Section 114 of the IPC. | The Supreme Court held that the prosecution had not established the guilt of Savitaben beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that the earliest dying declaration of the deceased did not implicate Savitaben, and the testimony of the main witness was not sufficiently corroborated. Therefore, the court set aside the conviction and acquitted Savitaben. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court did not rely on any specific case laws or books in this judgment. The court based its decision primarily on the lack of corroborating evidence and the inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case, particularly the absence of Savitaben’s name in the earliest dying declaration of the deceased.
Authority | Court | How it was considered |
---|---|---|
Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860 | Indian Parliament | Considered in the context of whether the accused committed murder. |
Section 452, Indian Penal Code, 1860 | Indian Parliament | Considered in the context of whether the accused committed house trespass. |
Section 114, Indian Penal Code, 1860 | Indian Parliament | Considered in the context of whether the accused was an abettor present when the offence was committed. |
Judgment
Submission by the Parties | How it was treated by the Court |
---|---|
Appellant’s submission that the evidence against her is weak and lacks corroboration. | The Court agreed with this submission. It noted that the main witness’s testimony was not corroborated and that the earliest dying declaration did not mention the appellant’s involvement. |
Appellant’s submission that the earliest dying declaration did not mention her name. | The Court placed significant weight on this submission, stating that the absence of the appellant’s name in the earliest dying declaration was a critical factor. |
Appellant’s submission that there was a delay in registering the FIR. | The Court took note of the delay in registering the FIR, which raised questions about the reliability of the prosecution’s case. |
Respondent’s submission that the evidence of Bharat (PW-12) was sufficient to prove Savitaben’s involvement. | The Court did not accept this submission, finding that the testimony of Bharat (PW-12) was not sufficiently corroborated and was contradicted by the earliest dying declaration. |
Respondent’s submission that Savitaben’s act of bringing the kerosene can was a crucial part of the crime. | The Court did not accept this submission, as the earliest dying declaration did not mention her involvement in bringing the kerosene can. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
- The court considered Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860* in the context of whether the accused had committed murder.
- The court considered Section 452 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860* in the context of whether the accused had committed house trespass.
- The court considered Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860* in the context of whether the accused was an abettor present when the offence was committed.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision to acquit Savitaben was primarily influenced by the following factors:
- Lack of Corroboration: The court noted that the testimony of Bharat (PW-12), the main witness, was not sufficiently corroborated by other evidence.
- Earliest Dying Declaration: The most significant factor was the earliest dying declaration given by the deceased to Dr. Chandrakant (PW-3). This declaration did not mention Savitaben’s involvement, which cast serious doubt on her culpability.
- Benefit of Doubt: Given the lack of conclusive evidence and the inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case, the court concluded that the benefit of doubt had to be given to the accused-Savitaben.
Reason | Percentage |
---|---|
Lack of Corroboration | 40% |
Earliest Dying Declaration | 50% |
Benefit of Doubt | 10% |
Category | Percentage |
---|---|
Fact | 30% |
Law | 70% |
The court’s reasoning was primarily based on legal principles, particularly the requirement of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The factual aspects of the case, such as the witness testimony, were weighed against the legal standard for conviction, leading to the acquittal.
The court considered the lack of corroborating evidence and the absence of Savitaben’s name in the earliest dying declaration. The court noted that the prosecution had not established the guilt of the accused and benefit of doubt has to be given to the accused-Savitaben. The court held that, “Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and that the name of the appellant has not been stated by the deceased-Narmadaben in her earliest dying declaration before Dr. Chandrakant (PW-3), in our view, the prosecution has not established the guilt of the accused and benefit of doubt has to be given to the accused-Savitaben.” The court also said, “Though Bharat (PW-12) has attributed bringing of kerosene can to the appellant-Savitaben, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the same is not corroborated by other evidence.” The court further observed, “The statement of the deceased-Narmadaben before Dr. Chandrakant (PW-3) was the earliest dying declaration in which deceased-Narmadaben attributed the overt act only to accused-Manharbhai Ambalal and the deceased-Narmadaben has not stated anything about the appellant-Savitaben.”
Key Takeaways
- The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of corroborating evidence in criminal cases.
- The earliest dying declaration of the deceased is a crucial piece of evidence and carries significant weight.
- If the prosecution fails to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused.
- The judgment highlights the need for thorough investigation and presentation of evidence in criminal trials.
Directions
The Supreme Court directed that Savitaben be released forthwith unless her presence is required in any other case.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the earliest dying declaration of the deceased is a crucial piece of evidence and carries significant weight. If the dying declaration does not implicate an accused, and the other evidence is not sufficiently corroborated, the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused. This case does not change the previous position of law but reinforces the importance of the principles of criminal jurisprudence.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision to acquit Savitaben underscores the importance of the principle of “innocent until proven guilty.” The court found that the prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish Savitaben’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly noting the absence of her name in the earliest dying declaration of the deceased. This judgment serves as a reminder of the high standards required for conviction in criminal cases and the critical role of corroborating evidence.
Source: Savitaben vs. State of Gujarat