Date of the Judgment: May 3, 2023
Citation: 2023 INSC 412
Judges: B.R. Gavai, J., Vikram Nath, J., Sanjay Karol, J.
Can the Supreme Court intervene when there is a significant delay in deciding a mercy petition? This question was at the heart of a recent case where the petitioner sought commutation of his death sentence due to a prolonged delay in the decision of his mercy petition. The Supreme Court of India, in this judgment, addressed the issue of whether it could order the commutation of a death sentence based on the grounds of delay in deciding a mercy petition. The judgment was delivered by a three-judge bench comprising Justices B.R. Gavai, Vikram Nath, and Sanjay Karol, with the majority opinion authored by Justice Vikram Nath.

Case Background

The case originates from a 1995 bomb blast in which the then Chief Minister of Punjab, along with 16 others, lost their lives. The petitioner, Balwant Singh, was arrested on January 27, 1996, for his involvement in the conspiracy and execution of the blast. The Trial Court convicted Balwant Singh on July 27, 2007, under Sections 120-B, 302, and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and under Sections 3(b), 4(b), and 5(b) read with Section 6 of the Explosives Substances Act, 1908, and sentenced him to death. The High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence on December 10, 2010. While other co-accused appealed, Balwant Singh did not. According to the petitioner, a Mercy Petition was filed on his behalf on March 25, 2012, by the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC). However, the Union of India stated that the petitioner himself did not file any Mercy Petition. The petitioner then sought commutation of his death sentence to life imprisonment due to the delay in deciding his mercy petition.

Timeline

Date Event
August 31, 1995 Bomb blast in Punjab resulting in the death of the Chief Minister and 16 others.
January 27, 1996 Balwant Singh was arrested in connection with the bomb blast.
July 27, 2007 Trial Court convicted Balwant Singh and others, sentencing him to death.
December 10, 2010 High Court confirmed Balwant Singh’s conviction and death sentence.
March 25, 2012 Mercy Petition allegedly filed by SGPC on behalf of Balwant Singh.
September 27, 2019 Ministry of Home Affairs letter recommending consideration of commutation of Balwant Singh’s death sentence.
December 4, 2020 Supreme Court directs proposal for commutation to be sent for processing under Article 72 of the Constitution of India.
May 2, 2022 Supreme Court directs that the mercy petition be considered, irrespective of pending appeals of co-accused.
May 3, 2023 Supreme Court disposes of the writ petition, stating that the decision to defer the mercy petition is within the executive’s domain.

Course of Proceedings

The Trial Court convicted Balwant Singh and sentenced him to death. The High Court confirmed the conviction and death sentence. Balwant Singh did not appeal the High Court’s decision. However, other co-accused persons filed appeals. The petitioner filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court seeking commutation of his death sentence due to the delay in deciding his Mercy Petition. The Supreme Court passed orders on December 4, 2020, and May 2, 2022, directing the authorities to consider the mercy petition.

Legal Framework

This case primarily involves the interpretation and application of Article 72 of the Constitution of India, which deals with the power of the President of India to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit, or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offense. The court also refers to Article 161 of the Constitution of India, which grants similar powers to the Governor of a State. The relevant provisions are:

  • Article 72 of the Constitution of India:
    “Power of President to grant pardons, etc., and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases.—(1) The President shall have the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence— (a) in all cases where the punishment or sentence is by a Court Martial; (b) in all cases where the punishment or sentence is for an offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends; (c) in all cases where the sentence is a sentence of death.”
  • Article 161 of the Constitution of India:
    “Power of Governor to grant pardons, etc., and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases.—The Governor of a State shall have the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends.”
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Arguments

The petitioner, represented by Shri Mukul Rohtagi, argued that the delay of over 10 years in deciding his mercy petition warranted the commutation of his death sentence to life imprisonment. He relied on the letter from the Ministry of Home Affairs dated September 27, 2019, which indicated that his case for commutation was to be processed under Article 72 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner cited the judgments in Shatrughan Chauhan and anr. v Union of India & Ors. [(2014) 3 SCC 1], V. Sriharan alias Murugan v. Union of India & Ors. [(2014) 4 SCC 242], and Navneet Kaur v. State (NCT of Delhi) and anr. [(2014) 7 SCC 264], where the Supreme Court had commuted death sentences due to inordinate delays in deciding mercy petitions.

The Union of India, represented by Shri K.M. Natraj, argued that the petitioner did not deserve any mercy because he had expressed a lack of faith in the Indian judiciary and had shown no remorse for his crime. The Union also contended that the mercy petition was filed by the SGPC and not by the petitioner himself. Further, they argued that the appeals of the co-accused were pending before the Supreme Court, and any decision on the mercy petition should be deferred until those appeals were decided. The Union relied on the judgment of the Guwahati High Court in Kusumbala Tarun Das v. Union of India [(2011) SCC Online Gau 370].

The innovativeness of the argument of the petitioner was that he sought commutation of his death sentence based on the inordinate delay in deciding his mercy petition, relying on previous judgments of the Supreme Court where such relief was granted. The Union of India’s argument was innovative in the sense that it contended that the petitioner himself has not filed the mercy petition and that the pendency of the appeals of the co-accused should be a factor in deciding the mercy petition.

Main Submission Sub-Submissions
Petitioner’s Submission: Delay in deciding mercy petition warrants commutation
  • Mercy petition pending for over 10 years.
  • Reliance on Ministry of Home Affairs letter dated September 27, 2019.
  • Citing judgments where commutation was granted due to delay.
Union of India’s Submission: No merit for commutation
  • Petitioner’s lack of faith in the judiciary and lack of remorse.
  • Mercy petition filed by SGPC, not the petitioner.
  • Pendency of co-accused’s appeals in Supreme Court.
  • Reliance on Guwahati High Court judgment.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not frame specific issues but addressed the following points:

  • Whether the delay in deciding the mercy petition warrants commutation of the death sentence.
  • Whether the fact that the mercy petition was filed by SGPC and not by the petitioner himself is a valid ground to deny relief.
  • Whether the pendency of co-accused appeals is a valid reason to defer the decision on the mercy petition.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Issue Court’s Treatment
Whether the delay in deciding the mercy petition warrants commutation of the death sentence. The Court held that the delay was not inordinate as the process started after the Ministry of Home Affairs’ communication in 2019 and was deferred due to security concerns. The court did not find sufficient grounds to order commutation based on delay.
Whether the fact that the mercy petition was filed by SGPC and not by the petitioner himself is a valid ground to deny relief. The Court observed that the communications on record indicated that the mercy petition was under consideration and that the petitioner had also filed the writ petition, so there was no embargo in considering the matter.
Whether the pendency of co-accused appeals is a valid reason to defer the decision on the mercy petition. The Court stated that the pendency of appeals of co-accused has no relevance to the proposal intended to be sent for consideration under Article 72 of the Constitution of India.

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Authority Court How it was considered Legal Point
Shatrughan Chauhan and anr. v Union of India & Ors. [(2014) 3 SCC 1] Supreme Court of India Distinguished Cases where commutation was granted due to delay in deciding mercy petitions.
V. Sriharan alias Murugan v. Union of India & Ors. [(2014) 4 SCC 242] Supreme Court of India Distinguished Cases where commutation was granted due to delay in deciding mercy petitions.
Navneet Kaur v. State (NCT of Delhi) and anr. [(2014) 7 SCC 264] Supreme Court of India Distinguished Cases where commutation was granted due to delay in deciding mercy petitions.
Kusumbala Tarun Das v. Union of India [(2011) SCC Online Gau 370] Guwahati High Court Cited by the Union of India Relevance of the conduct of the petitioner in deciding the mercy petition.
Harbans Singh v. State of U.P. [(1982) 2 SCC 101] Supreme Court of India Cited by the Union of India Relevance of pending appeals of co-accused in deciding mercy petitions.
Article 72 of the Constitution of India Constitution of India Explained Power of the President to grant pardons, etc.
Article 161 of the Constitution of India Constitution of India Explained Power of the Governor to grant pardons, etc.
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Judgment

Submission by Parties Treatment by the Court
Petitioner’s submission that delay warrants commutation. Rejected. The Court held that the delay was not inordinate and was due to administrative reasons and security concerns.
Union’s submission that the mercy petition was not filed by the petitioner himself. Not accepted. The Court noted that the mercy petition was under consideration and the petitioner had also filed the writ petition.
Union’s submission that the pendency of co-accused appeals should defer the decision on the mercy petition. Rejected. The Court stated that the pendency of co-accused appeals has no relevance to the proposal intended to be sent for consideration under Article 72 of the Constitution of India.

The Court held that the decisions relied upon by the petitioner in Shatrughan Chauhan [(2014) 3 SCC 1], V. Sriharan [(2014) 4 SCC 242], and Navneet Kaur [(2014) 7 SCC 264] were not applicable to the present case because the facts and circumstances were different. The Court noted that the Ministry of Home Affairs had deferred the decision on the mercy petition due to security concerns, and it was within the executive’s domain to take such a decision. The Court quoted from the affidavit filed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, which stated that the decision to defer the consideration of the mercy petition was taken after considering various reports from its different branches and that the decision was taken as it could have an impact on compromising the security of the nation or creating a law and order situation.

The Court stated that the stand of the Ministry of Home Affairs to defer the decision on the Mercy Petition of the petitioner is also a decision for the reasons given thereunder. It actually amounts to a decision declining to grant the same for the present. The Court directed that the competent authority would again deal with the Mercy Petition as and when it is deemed necessary and take a further decision.

The Court did not find any inordinate delay in the disposal of the Mercy Petition. The Court noted that the petitioner himself never submitted any Mercy Petition. The alleged Mercy Petition of year 2012 was filed by SGPC. Further, after the communication of the Ministry of Home Affairs dated 27.09.2019, the proposal for considering the commutation of the death sentence of the petitioner was started and a decision was taken to keep the same pending till disposal of the pending appeals before this Court, filed by the co-accused as well as by CBI.

Authority How it was viewed by the Court
Shatrughan Chauhan and anr. v Union of India & Ors. [(2014) 3 SCC 1] Distinguished. The Court held that the facts of the present case were different and the ratio of this case was not applicable.
V. Sriharan alias Murugan v. Union of India & Ors. [(2014) 4 SCC 242] Distinguished. The Court held that the facts of the present case were different and the ratio of this case was not applicable.
Navneet Kaur v. State (NCT of Delhi) and anr. [(2014) 7 SCC 264] Distinguished. The Court held that the facts of the present case were different and the ratio of this case was not applicable.
Kusumbala Tarun Das v. Union of India [(2011) SCC Online Gau 370] The Court did not comment on the ratio of this case.
Harbans Singh v. State of U.P. [(1982) 2 SCC 101] The Court did not comment on the ratio of this case.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the executive’s prerogative in matters of national security and law and order. The Court emphasized that it is within the domain of the executive to take a call on sensitive issues such as the commutation of death sentences, especially when there are potential security implications. The Court also considered the fact that the petitioner himself had not filed a mercy petition and that the delay was not inordinate, given the administrative processes and the need to consider security concerns.

Reason Percentage
Executive’s prerogative on national security and law and order 40%
No inordinate delay in the process 30%
Petitioner not filing the mercy petition himself 20%
Administrative process and security concerns 10%
Category Percentage
Fact (percentage of the consideration of the factual aspects of the case) 30%
Law (percentage of legal considerations) 70%
Issue: Delay in deciding mercy petition
Court’s Consideration: Ministry of Home Affairs deferred due to security concerns
Court’s Reasoning: Executive has prerogative on security matters
Court’s Conclusion: No intervention, matter within executive’s domain

The Court considered the alternative interpretation that the delay in deciding the mercy petition should warrant commutation of the death sentence, as was done in previous cases. However, the Court rejected this interpretation because it found that the facts and circumstances in the present case were different. The Court also considered the argument that the mercy petition was not filed by the petitioner himself, but it noted that the petitioner had filed the writ petition and that the mercy petition was under consideration. The Court ultimately decided to defer to the executive’s decision to defer the commutation, as it was based on security concerns.

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The Court’s decision was based on the reasoning that it is not within the domain of the judiciary to delve into the decision of the competent authority to defer the decision on the mercy petition, especially when it is based on security concerns. The Court also noted that the Ministry of Home Affairs had taken a decision to defer the commutation, which amounted to a decision declining to grant the same for the present.

The majority opinion was delivered by Justice Vikram Nath, with Justices B.R. Gavai and Sanjay Karol concurring. There were no dissenting opinions.

The Court quoted the following from the judgment:

  • “It would not be within the domain of this Court to delve upon the decision of the competent authority to defer taking of any decision at present. It is within the domain of the executive to take a call on such sensitive issues.”
  • “The stand of the Ministry of Home Affairs to defer the decision on the Mercy Petition of the petitioner is also a decision for the reasons given thereunder. It actually amounts to a decision declining to grant the same for the present.”
  • “It is, however, directed that the competent authority, in due course of time, would again as and when it is deemed necessary, may deal with the Mercy Petition, and take a further decision.”

Key Takeaways

  • The Supreme Court will not intervene in matters of mercy petitions if the executive has deferred a decision based on valid security concerns.
  • The executive has the prerogative to decide on sensitive issues such as the commutation of death sentences, especially when there are potential security implications.
  • The delay in deciding mercy petitions will not automatically lead to commutation of death sentences if the delay is justified by administrative or security reasons.
  • The pendency of appeals of co-accused should not be a factor in deciding mercy petitions of other convicts.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed that the competent authority, in due course of time, would again as and when it is deemed necessary, may deal with the Mercy Petition, and take a further decision.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the executive’s decision to defer the consideration of a mercy petition if such a decision is based on valid security concerns. This case clarifies that the executive has the prerogative to make decisions on sensitive issues like commutation of death sentences, especially when there are potential security implications. There is no change in the previous position of law, but this judgment emphasizes the executive’s powers in matters of national security and law and order.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court disposed of the writ petition filed by Balwant Singh, seeking commutation of his death sentence due to the delay in deciding his mercy petition. The Court held that the delay was not inordinate and that the executive had the authority to defer the decision on the mercy petition due to security concerns. The Court directed the competent authority to reconsider the mercy petition in due course.

Category

Parent Category: Constitution of India
Child Category: Article 72, Constitution of India
Child Category: Article 161, Constitution of India
Parent Category: Criminal Law
Child Category: Mercy Petition
Child Category: Death Sentence
Child Category: Commutation of Sentence

FAQ

Q: Can a delay in deciding a mercy petition lead to commutation of a death sentence?
A: Not automatically. The Supreme Court has clarified that while inordinate delays can be a factor, if the delay is justified by administrative or security reasons, the Court may not order commutation.

Q: What is the role of the President or Governor in deciding mercy petitions?
A: The President of India (under Article 72) and the Governor of a State (under Article 161) have the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions of punishment.

Q: What factors does the executive consider when deciding a mercy petition?
A: The executive considers various factors, including the nature of the crime, the conduct of the convict, and any security concerns.

Q: Can the Supreme Court intervene if the executive delays a decision on a mercy petition?
A: The Supreme Court may intervene if there is an inordinate and unjustified delay. However, if the delay is due to valid reasons, such as security concerns, the Court may not interfere.