Supreme Court Allows Exclusion of Time for Execution Petition: Purni Devi vs. Babu Ram (2024)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: April 02, 2024
Citation: 2024 INSC 259
Judges: Sanjay Karol, J. and Aravind Kumar, J.

Can a party be penalized for pursuing a legal remedy in a court that ultimately lacks the jurisdiction to grant it? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case concerning the execution of a civil decree. The core issue revolved around whether the time spent pursuing an execution petition before a Tehsildar, who lacked jurisdiction, could be excluded when calculating the limitation period for filing the same petition in a court with proper jurisdiction. This judgment clarifies the application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which allows for the exclusion of time spent in the wrong court under certain conditions. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Aravind Kumar.

Case Background

The case began on June 1, 1984, when the predecessors of the Appellants (Plaintiffs) filed a suit for possession against the Respondents (Defendants). On December 10, 1986, the Munsiff Court, First Class Hiranagar, decreed the suit in favor of the Plaintiffs, ordering the Defendants to hand over vacant possession of the property. The Defendants challenged this decree, first before the District Judge, Kathua, which was dismissed on February 9, 1990, and then before the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, which was also dismissed on November 9, 2000. Thus, the decree of the Munsiff Court attained finality on November 9, 2000.

The present dispute arose from an execution application filed by the Plaintiff’s predecessor on December 18, 2000, before the Tehsildar (Settlement), Hiranagar. This application was rejected on January 29, 2005, because the Tehsildar lacked jurisdiction. Subsequently, the Plaintiff filed a fresh execution application before the Munsiff Court, Hiranagar, on October 3, 2005. This application was dismissed on November 28, 2007, as being barred by limitation. This order was upheld by the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir on April 9, 2018, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The Munsiff Court framed the issue of whether the execution petition was filed within the limitation period. It noted that Article 182 of the J&K Limitation Act provides a 3-year limitation period for filing an execution application for the first time, while Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) provides a 12-year limit for subsequent applications. The Munsiff Court held that the application was time-barred as it was filed more than 3 years after the dismissal of the second appeal.

The High Court, in its revision, also framed the issue of whether the application had to be filed within 12 years under Section 48 of the CPC or within 3 years under Article 182 of the J&K Limitation Act. It relied on the judgment of the High Court in J&K Bank Limited etc. v. Amar Poultry Farm and the Supreme Court in Prem Lata Agarwal v. Lakshman Prasad Gupta and others, observing that Article 182 governs the limitation for the first execution application. The High Court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument for excluding the time spent before the Tehsildar.

Legal Framework

The primary legal provisions at play in this case are:

• Article 182 of the J&K Limitation Act: This provision stipulates a 3-year limitation period for filing an execution application to enforce a decree for the first time.
• Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC): This section provides a 12-year outer limit for execution of a decree but does not specify the period within which each application for execution must be made.
• Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963: This section allows for the exclusion of time spent in a court that lacks jurisdiction, provided certain conditions are met. Specifically, Section 14(2) states:
  
  “In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.”

Arguments

Submissions on behalf of the Appellant/ Plaintiff:

• The Plaintiff argued that the High Court erred in not excluding the time spent pursuing the execution before the Tehsildar. They contended that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is meant to grant relief when a person makes a mistake and should be applied broadly.
• The Plaintiff relied on Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principle Secy, Irrigation Department and M.P. Steel Corporation v. CCE, arguing that Section 14 should advance justice, not abort proceedings.
• The Plaintiff argued that they pursued the remedy before the Tehsildar in good faith, believing the Tehsildar had jurisdiction to execute decrees of a Civil Court.
• The Plaintiff submitted that the Tehsildar’s court has the trappings of a court and falls within the definition of “Court” under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
• The Plaintiff argued that they should not be deprived of the fruits of the decree due to mere technicalities.

Submissions on behalf of the Respondent:

• The Respondent argued that the Plaintiff raised the plea of Section 14 of the Limitation Act for the first time before the Supreme Court, and it should have been raised before the lower courts.
• The Respondent argued that the Plaintiff’s actions were deliberate and not in good faith.
• The Respondent contended that the Plaintiff did not approach the Court with clean hands, concealing that they did not appear in the Second Appeal initially.
• The Respondent argued that “due diligence” and “good faith” under Section 14 mean that the party should not be guilty of negligence, lapse, or inaction.

The innovativeness of the argument by the Plaintiff lies in their reliance on Section 14 of the Limitation Act, arguing that the time spent pursuing the execution before the Tehsildar should be excluded due to a bona fide mistake regarding jurisdiction. This argument is innovative as it seeks to extend the benefit of Section 14 to a situation where the party approached a revenue authority for execution, believing it to be a competent court.

Submissions of the Parties

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issue for consideration:

1. Whether the period from 18.12.2000 to 29.01.2005, during which the execution petition was pursued before the Tehsildar, should be excluded for computing the limitation period.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

• J&K Bank Limited etc. v. Amar Poultry Farm, AIR 2007 J&K 56 – High Court of Jammu and Kashmir: This case was cited by the High Court to support the view that the limitation for the first execution application is governed by Article 182 of the J&K Limitation Act.
• Prem Lata Agarwal v. Lakshman Prasad Gupta and others, (1970) 3 SCC 440 – Supreme Court of India: This case was cited by the High Court to support the view that Section 48 of the CPC provides a maximum time limit but does not prescribe the period within which each application for execution is to be made.
• Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principle Secy, Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169 – Supreme Court of India: This case was relied upon to explain the principles of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and to emphasize that the provision should be interpreted to advance the cause of justice. The Court held that the conditions for invoking Section 14 are:
  • Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party.
  • The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith.
  • The failure of the prior proceeding was due to a defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature.
  • The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue.
  • Both the proceedings are in a court.
• M.P. Steel Corporation v. CCE, (2015) 7 SCC 58 – Supreme Court of India: This case was relied upon to explain the meaning of “due diligence” and “good faith” under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It was held that a party invoking Section 14 should not be guilty of negligence, lapse, or inaction.
• Sesh Nath Singh v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Coop. Bank Ltd., (2021) 7 SCC 313 – Supreme Court of India: This case was cited to reiterate that Section 14 should be read as a whole and that an applicant who has prosecuted another civil proceeding with due diligence before a forum that is unable to entertain it due to a defect of jurisdiction is entitled to exclusion of the time.
• Laxmi Srinivasa R and P Boiled Rice Mill v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr., 2022 SCC Online SC 1790 – Supreme Court of India: This case was cited to show that the court has consistently followed the principles laid down in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises and M.P. Steel to exclude time spent pursuing a remedy in the wrong court.

Authorities Considered by the Court

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

The Court considered the authorities as follows:

• J&K Bank Limited etc. v. Amar Poultry Farm [AIR 2007 J&K 56]: The High Court’s reliance on this case was acknowledged, but the Supreme Court’s focus was on the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which was not addressed in this case.
• Prem Lata Agarwal v. Lakshman Prasad Gupta and others [(1970) 3 SCC 440]: The Supreme Court acknowledged the High Court’s reliance on this case, but distinguished it by focusing on the specific issue of exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
• Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principle Secy, Irrigation Department [(2008) 7 SCC 169]: The Court heavily relied on this case, reiterating the principles for the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
• M.P. Steel Corporation v. CCE [(2015) 7 SCC 58]: The Court relied on this case to explain the meaning of “due diligence” and “good faith,” emphasizing that the party should not be guilty of negligence.
• Sesh Nath Singh v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Coop. Bank Ltd. [(2021) 7 SCC 313]: The Court followed this case to reiterate that Section 14 should be read as a whole and that the exclusion of time is available even if the earlier proceedings have not been terminated.
• Laxmi Srinivasa R and P Boiled Rice Mill v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. [2022 SCC Online SC 1790]: The Court followed this case as a precedent, applying the principles of Section 14 to exclude time spent pursuing a remedy in the wrong court.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court was primarily influenced by the principles of justice and equity. The Court emphasized that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is intended to provide relief to parties who have diligently pursued their remedies in the wrong forum due to a bona fide mistake. The Court’s reasoning focused on ensuring that technicalities do not impede the administration of justice. The key points that weighed in the mind of the Court include:

• The Plaintiff’s bona fide belief that the Tehsildar had jurisdiction to execute the decree.
• The need to interpret Section 14 of the Limitation Act in a manner that advances the cause of justice.
• The consistent application of the principles of Section 14 by the Supreme Court in previous cases.
• The fact that all conditions for the applicability of Section 14 were met in the present case.
• The absence of any evidence of mala fide intention on the part of the Plaintiff.

Fact:Law Ratio

The Court’s reasoning was primarily driven by legal considerations, with a focus on the interpretation and application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and the precedents set by the Supreme Court. While the factual aspects of the case were considered, the legal framework and principles played a more significant role in the Court’s decision.

Logical Reasoning

Analysis of the Judgment

The Supreme Court’s decision is rooted in a purposive interpretation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The Court emphasized that the provision is intended to provide relief to litigants who have made a genuine mistake in choosing the appropriate forum. The Court reasoned that:

• The Plaintiff’s pursuit of the execution before the Tehsildar was a bona fide mistake, and they cannot be penalized for it.
• Excluding the time spent before the Tehsildar aligns with the principles of justice and equity.
• The conditions for the applicability of Section 14 were clearly met in the present case.

The Court rejected the Respondent’s argument that the plea under Section 14 was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court, noting that the High Court had recorded the Plaintiff’s submission on the exclusion of time. The Court also rejected the argument that the Plaintiff’s actions were deliberate and not in good faith, finding no evidence of mala fides or negligence.

The Court’s decision underscores the importance of ensuring that technicalities do not hinder the administration of justice. The Court observed that:

“the expression “the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding” needs to be construed in a manner which advances the object sought to be achieved, thereby advancing the cause of justice.”

The Court also reiterated that:

“Section 14 of the Limitation Act is to be read as a whole. A conjoint and careful reading of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 14 makes it clear that an applicant who has prosecuted another civil proceeding with due diligence, before a forum which is unable to entertain the same on account of defect of jurisdiction or any other cause of like nature, is entitled to exclusion of the time during which the applicant had been prosecuting such proceeding, in computing the period of limitation.”

The Court further observed that:

“No substantial averment has come on record to substantiate the claim that the predecessor in interest of the Plaintiff approached the Tehsildar with any mala fide intention, in the absence of good faith or with the knowledge that it was not the Court having competent jurisdiction to execute the decree. The object to advance the cause of justice, as well must be kept in mind.”

The Court’s decision is unanimous, with both judges concurring on the judgment. There were no dissenting opinions.

Key Takeaways

The practical implications of this judgment are:

• Litigants who mistakenly pursue remedies in the wrong court can claim exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, provided they acted diligently and in good faith.
• The courts will adopt a purposive interpretation of Section 14, ensuring that it advances the cause of justice and does not allow technicalities to defeat the rights of litigants.
• The definition of “court” under Section 14 is broad enough to include quasi-judicial bodies like the Tehsildar’s office, provided they have the trappings of a court.
• This judgment reinforces the principle that a party should not be penalized for a bona fide mistake in choosing the correct forum.

The judgment is likely to have a significant impact on future cases involving limitation issues, particularly in cases where litigants have pursued remedies in the wrong forum. It clarifies the scope and application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, ensuring that it is used as a tool to advance justice rather than to create technical hurdles for litigants.

Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court and the Munsiff Court and restored the execution application to the file of the Munsiff Court, Hiranagar, for fresh consideration, in consonance with the view on limitation decided by the Supreme Court.

Specific Amendments Analysis

There is no specific amendment discussed in the judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the time spent pursuing an execution petition before a court lacking jurisdiction can be excluded when calculating the limitation period for filing the same petition in a court with proper jurisdiction, provided the conditions under Section 14 of the Limitation Act are met. This judgment reinforces the purposive interpretation of Section 14, ensuring it advances justice and does not allow technicalities to defeat the rights of litigants. There is no change in the previous position of the law but this case clarifies the scope and applicability of Section 14 in the context of execution proceedings.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the time spent pursuing the execution petition before the Tehsildar should be excluded when computing the limitation period. The Court emphasized that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is intended to provide relief to litigants who have made a genuine mistake in choosing the appropriate forum, provided they acted diligently and in good faith. The judgment reinforces the principle that technicalities should not impede the administration of justice and that the courts should adopt a purposive interpretation of legal provisions to ensure that justice is served.