Date of the Judgment: January 19, 2021
Citation: (2021) INSC 14
Judges: Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J., Hrishikesh Roy, J.
Can young offenders, who have committed a serious crime, be given the benefit of probation, even if the law prescribes a minimum sentence? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in a case involving two young men convicted under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Court allowed the release of the appellants on probation, despite the minimum sentence of 7 years prescribed under the law. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice Hrishikesh Roy.

Case Background

On February 14, 2003, at approximately 7:30 PM, the appellants, Lakhvir Singh and Jagdeep Singh, aged 20 and 19 respectively, along with a co-accused, Gurpreet Singh, approached the complainant, Amrik Singh (PW1), to hire his taxi. En route, at the behest of the accused, the car was stopped. Gurpreet Singh restrained the complainant while Jagdeep Singh inflicted 6-7 injuries on his forehead with a dagger. Lakhvir Singh then inflicted 2-3 injuries on the complainant’s abdomen and 1 injury on his neck using a knife. The complainant was thrown out of the taxi, and the three individuals fled with the vehicle.

Following the incident, an FIR was registered on February 15, 2003, under Section 382 (theft after preparation made for causing death, hurt or restraint in order to the committing of the theft), and Section 307 (attempt to murder) read with Section 34 (acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. A knife and dagger were recovered along with the taxi. The trial court framed charges under Section 397 (robbery, or dacoity, with attempt to cause death or grievous hurt) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The trial court convicted the appellants and sentenced them to seven years of rigorous imprisonment each on January 8, 2005.

Timeline

Date Event
February 14, 2003 Incident occurred; complainant was attacked and robbed of his taxi.
February 15, 2003 FIR registered under Sections 382 and 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
January 8, 2005 Trial Court convicted the appellants under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced them to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment each.
October 24, 2019 The appeal preferred by the appellants was dismissed by the High Court.
December 3, 2020 Supreme Court issued notice on the Special Leave Petition (SLP) and on the prayer for interim relief of bail.
December 18, 2020 Counsel for the State and respondent no. 2 (complainant) appeared; dispute was confirmed to be amicably resolved.
January 11, 2021 Supreme Court granted leave and reserved the judgment.
January 19, 2021 Supreme Court delivered the judgment.

Course of Proceedings

The trial court convicted the appellants on January 8, 2005, and sentenced them to seven years of rigorous imprisonment each. The appellants then appealed this decision, but the appeal was dismissed by the High Court on October 24, 2019. Subsequently, the appellants approached the Supreme Court by way of a special leave petition. During the proceedings, it was brought to the Court’s attention that the complainant and the appellants had reached a compromise, with the complainant stating that he did not wish to pursue any further action against the appellants and had no objection to their release.

Legal Framework

The case primarily revolves around the interpretation and application of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, particularly Sections 4 and 6, in conjunction with Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, deals with robbery or dacoity with an attempt to cause death or grievous hurt, and it prescribes a minimum sentence of 7 years of rigorous imprisonment.

Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, titled “Restrictions on imprisonment of offenders under twenty-one years of age,” states:

“(1) When any person under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life), the court by which the person is found guilty shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it would not be desirable to deal with him under section 3 or section 4, and if the court passes any sentence of imprisonment on the offender, it shall record its reasons for doing so.
(2) For the purpose of satisfying itself whether it would not be desirable to deal under section 3 or section 4 with an offender referred to in sub-section (1), the court shall call for a report from the probation officer and consider the report, if any, and any other information available to it relating to the character and physical and mental condition of the offender.”

Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, titled “Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct,” states:

“(1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:
Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond.
(2) Before making any order under sub-section (1), the court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case.”

The interplay between these provisions is crucial in determining whether the benefit of probation can be granted to the appellants despite the minimum sentence prescribed under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

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Arguments

The arguments presented before the Supreme Court can be summarized as follows:

Arguments on behalf of the Appellants:

  • The appellants argued that they were young when the offense was committed, being under 21 years of age at the time of the offense.
  • They sought the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, emphasizing its reformative purpose.
  • The appellants highlighted that they had already served approximately 50% of their sentence.
  • They also pointed out that the complainant had amicably resolved the dispute and did not object to their release.

Arguments on behalf of the State:

  • The State contended that Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, prescribes a minimum sentence of 7 years, which cannot be reduced.
  • The State relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vikram Das [(2019) 4 SCC 125], which held that courts cannot impose less than the minimum sentence prescribed by the statute.
  • The State argued that the appellants should complete their remaining sentence.

The appellants’ arguments focused on the reformative aspect of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, and their young age at the time of the offense. The State’s argument was based on the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The innovativeness of the argument by the appellants lies in their plea to invoke the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, despite the mandatory minimum sentence under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. They tried to distinguish the case from State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vikram Das [(2019) 4 SCC 125], which held that courts cannot impose less than the minimum sentence prescribed by the statute.

Main Submission Sub-Submissions
Appellants seeking benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
  • Young age at the time of the offense.
  • Already served a significant portion of the sentence.
  • Complainant has resolved the dispute and does not oppose their release.
State opposing release, citing mandatory minimum sentence
  • Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, mandates a minimum sentence of 7 years.
  • Reliance on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vikram Das [(2019) 4 SCC 125], which held that courts cannot impose less than the minimum sentence prescribed by the statute.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The primary issue before the Supreme Court was:

  1. Whether the benefit of probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, can be extended to the appellants, considering the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Issue Court’s Decision
Whether the benefit of probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, can be extended to the appellants, considering the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Court held that the benefit of probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, is not excluded by the provisions of the mandatory minimum sentence under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Court allowed the release of the appellants on probation under Section 4 of the said Act.

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Authority Court How Considered Legal Point
Ramji Missar vs. State of Bihar [AIR 1963 SC 1088] Supreme Court of India Cited Applied Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, to offenders under 21 years of age on the date of sentencing.
Masarullah v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1982) 3 SCC 458] Supreme Court of India Cited Observed that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, should ordinarily be given to offenders under 21 years of age at the time of the offense.
Sudesh Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand [(2008) 3 SCC 111] Supreme Court of India Cited Clarified that the age of the offender should be considered as on the date of the offense, not the date of sentencing, as per Ramji Missar vs. State of Bihar [AIR 1963 SC 1088].
Satyabhan Kishore v. State of Bihar [(1972) 3 SCC 350] Supreme Court of India Cited Distinguished between Section 6 (mandatory) and Sections 3 and 4 (discretionary) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
Ishar Das vs. State of Punjab [(1973) 2 SCC 65] Supreme Court of India Cited Held that the non-obstante clause in Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, reflects the legislative intent that the provisions of the Act have effect notwithstanding any other law in force.
CCE vs. Bahubali [(1979) 2 SCC 279] Supreme Court of India Cited Opined that the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, may not apply in cases where a specific law enacted after 1958 prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence and contains a non-obstante clause.
State vs. Ratan Lal Arora [(2004) 4 SCC 590] Supreme Court of India Cited Stated that the benefits of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, did not apply in case of mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by special legislation enacted after the Act.
State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Vikram Das [(2019) 4 SCC 125] Supreme Court of India Distinguished Held that the court cannot award a sentence less than the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by the statute. The present case distinguished on the ground that the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, is not excluded by the mandatory minimum sentence under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Joginder Singh vs. State of Punjab [ILR (1981) P&H 1] Punjab & Haryana High Court Cited Observed that the benefit of probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, is not excluded by the provisions of the mandatory minimum sentence under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
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Judgment

The Supreme Court held that the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, is a beneficial legislation aimed at reforming offenders, especially young ones. The Court noted that Section 4 of the Act contains a non-obstante clause, which gives it overriding effect over other laws, including the mandatory minimum sentence under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Court distinguished the case from State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Vikram Das [(2019) 4 SCC 125], stating that the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, is not excluded by the mandatory minimum sentence under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Submission by Parties Treatment by the Court
Appellants sought benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, citing their young age and the complainant’s forgiveness. The Court accepted this submission, noting the reformative purpose of the Act and the circumstances of the case.
The State argued that the mandatory minimum sentence under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, cannot be reduced. The Court held that the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, is not excluded by the mandatory minimum sentence under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, due to the non-obstante clause in Section 4 of the Act.
Authority How Viewed by the Court
Ramji Missar vs. State of Bihar [AIR 1963 SC 1088] Cited to support the view that the age of the offender should be considered as on the date of the offense.
Masarullah v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1982) 3 SCC 458] Cited to emphasize the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, should ordinarily be given to offenders under 21 years of age at the time of the offense.
Sudesh Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand [(2008) 3 SCC 111] Cited to clarify that the age of the offender should be considered as on the date of the offense, not the date of sentencing.
Satyabhan Kishore v. State of Bihar [(1972) 3 SCC 350] Cited to distinguish between Section 6 (mandatory) and Sections 3 and 4 (discretionary) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
Ishar Das vs. State of Punjab [(1973) 2 SCC 65] Cited to support the view that the non-obstante clause in Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, gives it overriding effect.
CCE vs. Bahubali [(1979) 2 SCC 279] Cited to explain that the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, may not apply in cases where a specific law enacted after 1958 prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence and contains a non-obstante clause.
State vs. Ratan Lal Arora [(2004) 4 SCC 590] Cited to state that the benefits of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, did not apply in case of mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by special legislation enacted after the Act.
State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Vikram Das [(2019) 4 SCC 125] Distinguished, stating that the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, is not excluded by the mandatory minimum sentence under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Joginder Singh vs. State of Punjab [ILR (1981) P&H 1] Cited to reaffirm that the benefit of probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, is not excluded by the mandatory minimum sentence under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The Court observed, “The redeeming feature in their case is that the person who suffered, appears to have forgiven them, possibly with the passage of time.”

The Court also noted, “There is no adverse report against them about their conduct in jail otherwise the same would have been brought to our notice by learned counsel for the State.”

The Court concluded, “Faced with the aforesaid legal position, this is a fit case that the benefit of probation can be extended to the appellants under the said act in view of the provisions of Section 4 of the said Act on completion of half the sentence.”

The Supreme Court released the appellants on probation of good conduct under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, on their completion of half of their sentence. The appellants were required to enter into a bond with two sureties each to ensure they maintain peace and good behavior for the remaining part of their sentence.

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What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:

  • The reformative purpose of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, especially for young offenders.
  • The non-obstante clause in Section 4 of the Act, which gives it overriding effect over other laws.
  • The fact that the appellants were young at the time of the offense.
  • The complainant’s forgiveness and amicable resolution of the dispute.
  • The absence of any adverse reports regarding the appellants’ conduct in jail.
Sentiment Percentage
Reformative Justice 30%
Overriding Effect of Probation Act 25%
Youth of Offenders 20%
Complainant’s Forgiveness 15%
Good Conduct in Jail 10%
Category Percentage
Fact 40%
Law 60%
Issue: Can probation be granted despite a minimum sentence?
↓
Consideration: Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (Section 4)
↓
Analysis: Non-obstante clause in Section 4 overrides other laws
↓
Distinction: Mandatory minimum sentence under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, does not exclude Probation Act
↓
Factors: Youth of offenders, complainant’s forgiveness, good conduct in jail
↓
Conclusion: Probation granted

Key Takeaways

  • The Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, is a beneficial legislation that can be applied even when a minimum sentence is prescribed under other laws.
  • The non-obstante clause in Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, gives it overriding effect over other laws.
  • The age of the offender at the time of the offense is a crucial factor in determining whether probation can be granted.
  • The courts may consider the reformative aspect of justice, especially for young offenders.
  • The amicable resolution of a dispute between the parties can be a relevant factor in deciding whether to grant probation.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed that the appellants be released on probation of good conduct under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, on their completion of half of their sentence. They were required to enter into a bond with two sureties each to ensure they maintain peace and good behavior for the remaining part of their sentence, failing which they can be called upon to serve that part of the sentence.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, can be applied even when a minimum sentence is prescribed under other laws, such as Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, due to the non-obstante clause in Section 4 of the Act. This judgment clarifies the scope and applicability of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, and reinforces its reformative purpose, especially for young offenders. The judgment also clarifies that the mandatory minimum sentence under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, does not exclude the application of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

Conclusion

In Lakhvir Singh vs. State of Punjab (2021) INSC 14, the Supreme Court allowed the release of the appellants on probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, despite the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Court emphasized the reformative purpose of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, and the non-obstante clause in Section 4, which gives it overriding effect over other laws. This judgment reinforces the principle that young offenders can be given a chance at rehabilitation, even in cases involving serious crimes.

Source: Lakhvir Singh vs. State of Punjab