Introduction
Date of the Judgment: 22 April 2025
Citation: 2025 INSC 688
Judges: Abhay S. Oka, J., Ujjal Bhuyan, J.
When can the Chairman of a school’s managing committee be held liable for an incident involving a child’s safety on school premises? The Supreme Court addressed this critical question in S.C. Narang vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., a case arising from an unfortunate incident at a New Delhi school. The court clarified the scope and applicability of Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, particularly concerning the terms “actual charge” or “control” over a child.
The case involves allegations of a sexual assault on a four-year-old nursery student by a classmate. The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Chairman of the school’s Managing Committee could be held liable under Section 75 of the JJ Act for the alleged incident. The bench, comprising Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, delivered the judgment.
Case Background
The case stems from an incident that occurred on 17th November 2017 at Maxfort School, Dwarka, New Delhi. A four-year-old girl, a student in the nursery class, reported pain in her private parts, indicating a possible sexual assault by a classmate. Following this, a First Information Report (FIR) was registered.
Initially, the FIR was filed under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Section 21 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). However, because the alleged perpetrator was under seven years of age, the police filed a charge sheet only under Section 21 of the POCSO Act, along with Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.
The charge sheet named four individuals: the Principal of the School, two teachers, and the Vice-Chairman/officiating Chairman of the Managing Committee. Subsequently, based on a second protest petition, the Special Judge issued a summons to the appellant, S.C. Narang, who is the Chairman of the Managing Committee. This order was then challenged by the appellant through a Revision Application, which was ultimately dismissed by the High Court.
Timeline
Date | Event |
---|---|
November 17, 2017 | Alleged sexual assault incident at Maxfort School, Dwarka, New Delhi. |
After November 17, 2017 | FIR registered under Section 376 of the IPC and Section 21 of the POCSO Act. |
Post Investigation | Police filed a charge sheet against the Principal, two teachers, and the Vice-Chairman/officiating Chairman of the Managing Committee under Section 21 of the POCSO Act and Section 75 of the JJ Act. |
After Charge Sheet | Second protest petition filed by the complainant (mother of the victim). |
December 24, 2020 | The Special Court issued a summons to the appellant, S.C. Narang, Chairman of the Managing Committee. |
Prior to November 18, 2022 | S.C. Narang challenged the summons by filing a Revision Application. |
November 18, 2022 | The High Court dismissed the Revision Application. |
April 22, 2025 | The Supreme Court delivered the judgment, setting aside the orders of the Special Court and the High Court, and allowed the appeal. |
Course of Proceedings
The Special Court initially observed that S.C. Narang, as the Chairman of the Managing Committee, was responsible for implementing the guidelines issued by the Directorate of Education on 15th September 2017. These guidelines mandated the installation of CCTV cameras in classrooms, labs, corridors, parking areas, and outside washrooms. The Special Court found fault with the appellant for not installing the CCTV cameras according to these guidelines, attributing negligence to him.
The High Court dismissed the Revision Application filed by S.C. Narang, upholding the Special Court’s order to issue summons. This led to the appeal before the Supreme Court.
Legal Framework
The central legal provision in this case is Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. This section deals with the punishment for cruelty to a child. For clarity, the section is quoted verbatim from the judgment:
“Section 75: Punishment for cruelty to Child:- Whoever, having the actual charge of, or control over, a child, assaults, abandons, abuses, exposes or willfully neglects the child or causes or procures the child to be assaulted, abandoned abused, exposed or neglected in a manner likely to cause such child unnecessary mental or physical suffering, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine of one lakh rupees or with both: Provided that in case it is found that such abandonment of the child by the biological parents is due to circumstances beyond their control, it shall be presumed that such abandonment is not wilful and the penal provisions of this section shall not apply in such cases: Provided further that if such offence is committed by any person employed by or managing an organisation, which is entrusted with the care and protection of the child, he shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment which may extend up to five years, and fine which may extend up to five lakhs rupees: Provided also that on account of the aforesaid cruelty, if the child is physically incapacitated or develops a mental illness or is rendered mentally unfit to perform regular tasks or has risk to life or limb, such person shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment, not less than three years but which may be extended up to ten years and shall also be liable to fine of five lakhs rupees.”
The key aspect of Section 75 is that it applies to individuals who have “actual charge” or “control” over the child. The provision aims to protect children from cruelty by those directly responsible for their care and well-being.
Arguments
Appellant’s Arguments (S.C. Narang)
- Lack of Actual Charge or Control: The appellant’s counsel argued that Section 75 of the JJ Act requires the person to have actual charge or control over the victim child. As the Chairman of the Managing Committee, the appellant did not have direct charge or control over individual students.
- Timing of Guidelines: The incident occurred shortly after the issuance of guidelines mandating CCTV installation. While the cameras were not yet installed at the time, this did not imply direct control or charge over the child.
- Other Accused: The Principal, teachers, and Vice-Chairman were already accused under Section 75 of the JJ Act, indicating that responsibility was attributed to those in direct contact with the students.
Respondent’s Arguments (State and Complainant)
- Responsibility as Chairman: The respondents argued that as the Chairman of the institution running the school, the appellant was fully responsible for the care and safety of the children enrolled.
- Control over School: As Chairman, the appellant had overall control over the school’s operations and was therefore responsible for ensuring a safe environment.
- Moral Responsibility: The respondents emphasized the moral responsibility of the appellant to ensure that such incidents do not occur in the school.
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
- Whether the appellant, being the Chairman of the Managing Committee of the school, can be said to have “actual charge” or “control” over the victim child within the meaning of Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
---|---|---|
Whether the Chairman of the Managing Committee had “actual charge” or “control” over the victim child under Section 75 of the JJ Act. | No | The Court held that the Chairman, in his capacity, does not have direct charge or control over individual children in the school. Section 75 requires direct responsibility for the child’s care. |
Authorities
The court primarily considered the following legal provision:
- Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015: This section pertains to the punishment for cruelty to a child and is central to determining whether the appellant had the requisite charge or control over the victim.
Judgment
How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?
Party | Submission | Court’s Treatment |
---|---|---|
Appellant (S.C. Narang) | Lacked “actual charge” or “control” over the child under Section 75 of the JJ Act. | Accepted. The Court agreed that being the Chairman of the Managing Committee does not equate to having direct charge or control over individual students. |
Respondent (State and Complainant) | As Chairman, the appellant was responsible for the safety and care of all children in the school. | Rejected. The Court held that general responsibility for the school’s management does not translate to direct control over each child, which is required under Section 75 of the JJ Act. |
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision in S.C. Narang vs. State was primarily influenced by a strict interpretation of Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. The Court emphasized that for a person to be held liable under this section, they must have “actual charge” or “control” over the child. The Court reasoned that the Chairman of a Managing Committee, while responsible for the overall management of the school, does not have direct control over individual students. This distinction was crucial in the Court’s decision to set aside the orders of the lower courts.
Factor | Percentage |
---|---|
Strict Interpretation of “Actual Charge” or “Control” | 60% |
Distinction between Overall Management and Direct Control | 40% |
Fact:Law Ratio
Category | Percentage |
---|---|
Factual Aspects (Consideration of the Chairman’s role and responsibilities) | 30% |
Legal Considerations (Interpretation and application of Section 75 of the JJ Act) | 70% |
Logical Reasoning
Key Takeaways
- ✓ Clarification of “Actual Charge” or “Control”: The judgment clarifies that the terms “actual charge” or “control” in Section 75 of the JJ Act require a direct and immediate responsibility for the child’s welfare, not merely a supervisory or managerial role.
- ✓ Liability of School Management: School management, including members of managing committees, will not be held liable under Section 75 of the JJ Act unless they have direct charge or control over the child.
- ✓ Importance of Direct Responsibility: The ruling emphasizes the importance of identifying individuals with direct responsibility for children’s safety and well-being in cases of alleged cruelty or negligence.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, requires that the person held liable for cruelty to a child must have “actual charge” or “control” over that child. This means a direct and immediate responsibility, not merely a supervisory or managerial role. This judgment clarifies the scope of liability under Section 75, ensuring that responsibility is attributed to those directly involved in the child’s care.
Conclusion
In S.C. Narang vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., the Supreme Court set aside the orders of the lower courts, clarifying that the Chairman of a school’s Managing Committee cannot be held liable under Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, unless they have direct “actual charge” or “control” over the child. This judgment underscores the importance of direct responsibility in child protection laws and provides clarity on the scope of liability for school management in cases of alleged cruelty or negligence.
Source: S.C. Narang vs. State