Supreme Court Clarifies Adultery Ruling’s Impact on Armed Forces: Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2023)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 31 January 2023
Citation: Miscellaneous Application No. 2204 of 2020 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 194 of 2017
Judges: K.M. Joseph, J., Ajay Rastogi, J., Aniruddha Bose, J., Hrishikesh Roy, J., C.T. Ravikumar, J.

Does the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which criminalized adultery, also prevent the Armed Forces from taking disciplinary action against officers for similar conduct? This question led the Union of India to seek clarification from the Supreme Court regarding the implications of its 2019 judgment in Joseph Shine v. Union of India. The core issue revolves around whether the unique disciplinary needs of the Armed Forces, governed by specific acts, are affected by the decriminalization of adultery under general criminal law.

The Supreme Court, in this order, clarifies that its previous judgment, which decriminalized adultery, does not restrict the disciplinary actions that can be taken by the Armed Forces under their respective acts. The Court emphasizes that the Armed Forces are governed by specific laws and regulations, distinct from the general criminal law, and that maintaining discipline within the forces is paramount.

Case Background

The Union of India filed a miscellaneous application seeking clarification on the 2019 Supreme Court judgment in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, which decriminalized adultery by striking down Section 497 of the IPC. The Union of India’s concern stemmed from the fact that members of the Armed Forces are governed by specific statutes—the Army Act, 1950, the Navy Act, 1957, and the Air Force Act, 1950—which contain provisions for disciplinary actions against officers for “unbecoming conduct” and acts prejudicial to good order and military discipline.

The Union of India argued that the judgment striking down Section 497 of the IPC could be interpreted to mean that the Armed Forces cannot take action against officers for adulterous or promiscuous acts under their respective Acts. This, they contended, would undermine the discipline and morale of the Armed Forces. The applicant sought clarification to ensure that actions taken under Sections 45 and 63 of the Army Act, and similar provisions in the Navy and Air Force Acts, would not be deemed invalid due to the decriminalization of adultery.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Union of India, as the applicant, sought clarification on the impact of the Joseph Shine judgment on the disciplinary actions that can be taken against members of the Armed Forces. The applicant argued that the judgment decriminalizing adultery could be interpreted as a bar to disciplinary actions under the Army Act, Navy Act, and Air Force Act.

Intervenors opposed the application for clarification, arguing that each case should be decided on its own merits and that an omnibus clarification was not necessary. Mr. Kaleeswaran Raj, the counsel for the original petitioner in Joseph Shine, agreed with the Union of India that the issues raised in the clarification application were not considered in the original judgment. He also conceded that the striking down of Section 497 IPC may not prevent authorities from proceeding against officers under Section 45 of the Army Act.

Legal Framework

The legal framework relevant to this case includes:

• Article 33 of the Constitution of India: This article empowers Parliament to modify the fundamental rights of members of the Armed Forces to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline. It states:
  
  “33. Power of Parliament to modify the rights conferred by this Part in their application to Forces, etc.— Parliament may, by law, determine to what extent any of the rights conferred by this Part shall, in their application to,— (a) the members of the Armed Forces; or (b) the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order; or (c) persons employed in any bureau or other organisation established by the State for purposes of intelligence or counter intelligence; or (d) person employed in, or in connection with, the telecommunication systems set up for the purposes of any Force, bureau or organisation referred to in clauses (a)to (c), be restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline among them.”
• Section 45 of the Army Act, 1950: This section deals with “unbecoming conduct” by officers, junior commissioned officers, or warrant officers. It states:
  
  “45. Unbecoming conduct. Any officer, junior commissioned officer or warrant officer who behaves in a manner unbecoming his position and the character expected of him shall, on conviction by court-martial, if he is an officer, be liable to be cashiered or to suffer such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned; and, if he is a junior commissioned officer or a warrant officer, be liable to be dismissed or to suffer such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned.”
• Section 63 of the Army Act, 1950: This section addresses acts or omissions prejudicial to good order and military discipline. It states:
  
  “63. Violation of good order and discipline. Any person subject to this Act who is guilty of any act or omission which, though not specified in this Act, is prejudicial to good order and military discipline shall, on conviction by court-martial, be liable to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years or such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned.”
• Section 69 of the Army Act, 1950: This section deals with civil offences committed by persons subject to the Army Act. It states:
  
  “69.Civil offences. Subject to the provisions of section 70, any person subject to this Act who at any place in or beyond India commits any civil offence shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence against this Act and, if charged therewith under this section, shall be liable to be tried by a court-martial and, on conviction, be punishable as follows, that is to say,- (a) if the offence is one which would be punishable under any law in force in India with death or with transportation, he shall be liable to suffer any punishment, other than whipping, assigned for the offence, by the aforesaid law and such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned; and (b) in any other case, he shall be liable to suffer any punishment, other than whipping, assigned for the offence by the law in force in India, or imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned.”

Similar provisions exist in the Navy Act, 1957 and the Air Force Act, 1950. These provisions allow the Armed Forces to maintain discipline and order among their personnel, which is crucial for their effective functioning.

Arguments

The arguments presented by the parties are as follows:

• Union of India (Applicant):
  • The Union of India argued that while the Supreme Court struck down Section 497 of the IPC, the Armed Forces are governed by specific laws that require a high degree of discipline. They contended that the judgment should not be interpreted to restrict the disciplinary powers of the Armed Forces under the Army Act, Navy Act, and Air Force Act.
  • The applicant emphasized that Sections 45 and 63 of the Army Act, along with similar provisions in the other Acts, are designed to maintain good order and military discipline. They argued that these provisions should not be rendered ineffective due to the decriminalization of adultery under the IPC.
  • The Union of India submitted that the words ‘adulterous’ and ‘promiscuous’ should be interpreted as per their dictionary meaning and not integrally connected with Section 497 of the IPC.
  • The applicant also argued that the Armed Forces operate in a unique workplace setting where discipline is indispensable, and that actions under Sections 45 and 63 are gender-neutral and do not suffer from the same vices that led to the striking down of Section 497 IPC.
  • The Union of India also submitted that the judgment in Joseph Shine was rendered in the context of the institution of marriage and not in the context of a workplace like the Armed Forces.
  • The applicant stated that the judgment has led to a situation where actions taken under Sections 45 and 63 are being challenged, leading to chaos and indiscipline within the Armed Forces.
• Intervenors:
  • The intervenors argued that there was no need for clarification and that each case should be decided on its own facts. They contended that the application for clarification was not the solution to the problems projected by the applicant.
  • They submitted that the applicant should work out its remedies in individual cases and that the Court should not issue an omnibus clarification.
• Counsel for the original petitioner (Joseph Shine):
  • The counsel agreed with the Union of India that the questions raised in the clarification application were not considered in the original judgment. He also conceded that the striking down of Section 497 IPC may not prevent authorities from proceeding against officers under Section 45 of the Army Act.
  • He submitted that the decision must finally depend upon the play of facts.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in the order. However, the core issue before the Court was:

1. Whether the judgment in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, which struck down Section 497 of the IPC, affects the disciplinary powers of the Armed Forces under the Army Act, Navy Act, and Air Force Act, specifically concerning actions taken under provisions like Section 45 and Section 63 of the Army Act.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:

Authorities

The Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39: The Court clarified that this judgment was solely concerned with the validity of Section 497 IPC and did not address the disciplinary provisions of the Armed Forces Acts.
• Article 33 of the Constitution of India: The Court emphasized that this article gives Parliament the power to modify the fundamental rights of members of the Armed Forces to ensure discipline.
• Sections 45, 63 and 69 of the Army Act, 1950: The Court referred to these sections to highlight the disciplinary powers of the Armed Forces, stating that these provisions are not affected by the decriminalization of adultery.
• Sections 45 or 65 of the Air Force Act and Sections 54(2) or 74 of the Navy Act: The Court referred to these sections to highlight the disciplinary powers of the Armed Forces, stating that these provisions are not affected by the decriminalization of adultery.
• Supertech Limited v. Emerald Court Owner Resident Welfare Association and Others (Miscellaneous Application No. 1572 of 2021 in Civil Appeal No. 5041 of 2021): The Court cited this case to emphasize that miscellaneous applications should not seek substantive modifications to a judgment.
• Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Others (2000) 7 SCC 296: The Court cited this case to underscore that applications for clarification or modification should not be used as a guise for review.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the need to maintain discipline within the Armed Forces and the recognition that the Armed Forces are governed by specific laws distinct from the general criminal law. The Court emphasized that the Joseph Shine judgment was limited to the validity of Section 497 IPC and did not extend to the disciplinary provisions of the Armed Forces Acts. The Court also considered the unique nature of the Armed Forces as a workplace where discipline is indispensable.

Logical Reasoning:

The Court did not consider any alternative interpretations, as the primary focus was to clarify that the previous judgment did not extend to the Armed Forces. The Court’s decision was based on the clear distinction between general criminal law and the specific laws governing the Armed Forces.

The Supreme Court clarified that its previous judgment on adultery was not intended to interfere with the disciplinary powers of the Armed Forces. The Court emphasized that the Armed Forces have their own set of rules and regulations, and that maintaining discipline is crucial for their effective functioning. The Court stated that the judgment in Joseph Shine was concerned only with the validity of Section 497 IPC and had no bearing on the provisions of the Army Act, Navy Act, and Air Force Act.

The Court’s reasoning can be summarized as follows:

• The Joseph Shine judgment was specifically about the constitutionality of Section 497 IPC and did not address the disciplinary provisions of the Armed Forces Acts.
• Article 33 of the Constitution empowers Parliament to modify the fundamental rights of members of the Armed Forces to ensure discipline.
• Sections 45 and 63 of the Army Act, and similar provisions in the Navy and Air Force Acts, are designed to maintain good order and military discipline.
• The Armed Forces operate in a unique workplace setting where discipline is indispensable.

The Court quoted the following from the judgment:

• “In this case, this Court had no occasion, whatsoever, to consider the effect of the provisions of the Acts in question.”
• “In view of the fact that the scheme of the Acts in the context, in particular, of Article 33 of the Constitution did not fall for the consideration of this Court, we must necessarily observe and clarify that the judgment of this Court in Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39 was not at all concerned with the effect and operation of the relevant provisions in the Acts which have been placed before us by the applicant.”
• “In other words, this Court was neither called upon nor has it ventured to pronounce on the effect of Sections 45 and 63 of the 1950 Act as also the corresponding provisions in other Acts or any other provisions of the Acts.”

There were no majority or minority opinions in this order, as it was a clarification of a previous judgment. All the judges on the bench concurred with the clarification.

The analysis of the reasoning, legal interpretation, and application to the facts is straightforward. The Court clarified that its previous judgment was not intended to interfere with the disciplinary powers of the Armed Forces. The Court interpreted the relevant legal provisions, including Article 33 of the Constitution and the relevant sections of the Army Act, Navy Act, and Air Force Act, to conclude that the disciplinary powers of the Armed Forces remain intact.

The potential implications for future cases are that disciplinary actions taken by the Armed Forces under their respective Acts will not be challenged on the basis of the decriminalization of adultery under the IPC. This clarification ensures that the Armed Forces can maintain discipline without legal ambiguity.

No new doctrines or legal principles were introduced. The Court simply clarified the scope of its previous judgment and emphasized the distinct legal framework governing the Armed Forces.

Key Takeaways

• The Supreme Court’s judgment in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, which decriminalized adultery, does not affect the disciplinary powers of the Armed Forces.
• The Armed Forces can still take disciplinary action against officers for “unbecoming conduct” and acts prejudicial to good order and military discipline under their respective Acts.
• Article 33 of the Constitution empowers Parliament to modify the fundamental rights of members of the Armed Forces to ensure discipline.
• The Armed Forces operate under a distinct legal framework, and their disciplinary actions are not governed by the general criminal law.
• The decision ensures that the Armed Forces can maintain discipline without legal ambiguity.

Directions

The Supreme Court did not issue any specific directions in this order. It simply clarified the legal position and disposed of the miscellaneous application.

Specific Amendments Analysis

There were no specific amendments discussed in this judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Supreme Court’s judgment in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, which decriminalized adultery, does not affect the disciplinary powers of the Armed Forces under their respective Acts. This clarification reinforces the principle that the Armed Forces are governed by a distinct legal framework designed to maintain discipline and good order. There is no change in the previous position of law, but a clarification of the scope of a previous judgment.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Supreme Court clarified that its 2019 judgment decriminalizing adultery does not prevent the Armed Forces from taking disciplinary action against officers for similar conduct under their respective Acts. The Court emphasized the unique disciplinary needs of the Armed Forces and their distinct legal framework. This clarification ensures that the Armed Forces can maintain discipline without legal ambiguity, upholding the principle that the Armed Forces are governed by specific laws and regulations.

Category

• Constitutional Law
  • Article 33, Constitution of India
• Armed Forces Law
  • Army Act, 1950
  • Section 45, Army Act, 1950
  • Section 63, Army Act, 1950
  • Section 69, Army Act, 1950
  • Navy Act, 1957
  • Air Force Act, 1950
• Criminal Law
  • Indian Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 497,Indian Penal Code, 1860
• Supreme Court Judgments
  • Joseph Shine v. Union of India