LEGAL ISSUE: Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to appeals against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
CASE TYPE: Criminal Appeal
Case Name: Mohd Abaad Ali & Anr. vs. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence
Judgment Date: 20 February 2024
Date of the Judgment: 20 February 2024
Citation: 2024 INSC 125
Judges: Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale
Can a delay in filing an appeal against acquittal be condoned? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this crucial question in a criminal appeal. The core issue revolved around whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which allows for the condonation of delay, apply to appeals against acquittal filed under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. This judgment clarifies the interplay between these two important legal provisions. The judgment was delivered by a division bench comprising Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale, with Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia authoring the opinion.
Case Background
The appellant, Mohd Abaad Ali, was initially an accused in a case under Section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962. After facing trial, he was acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge, North, Delhi, on 6 October 2012. The Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) challenged this acquittal by filing an appeal before the Delhi High Court on 27 June 2013. This appeal was filed with a delay of 72 days, and a delay condonation application was also submitted. The Delhi High Court allowed the delay condonation application on 18 May 2016. Subsequently, Mohd Abaad Ali filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking a recall of the order condoning the delay. His argument was that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, does not apply to appeals against acquittal, as the limitation period is specifically prescribed under Section 378(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, without any provision for condonation of delay. The High Court dismissed this application on 20 January 2017, without providing specific reasons. This led to the appeal before the Supreme Court.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 06 October 2012 | Mohd Abaad Ali acquitted by Additional Sessions Judge, North, Delhi. |
| 27 June 2013 | Directorate of Revenue Intelligence files appeal against acquittal in Delhi High Court with a delay of 72 days. |
| 18 May 2016 | Delhi High Court allows the delay condonation application. |
| 20 January 2017 | Delhi High Court dismisses Mohd Abaad Ali’s application for recall under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. |
| 20 February 2024 | Supreme Court dismisses the appeal. |
Course of Proceedings
The Additional Sessions Judge, North, Delhi, acquitted Mohd Abaad Ali on 6 October 2012. The Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) appealed this acquittal in the Delhi High Court, but the appeal was delayed by 72 days. The High Court condoned this delay. Subsequently, Mohd Abaad Ali filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking a recall of the order condoning the delay. The High Court dismissed this application without providing reasons. This dismissal led to the appeal before the Supreme Court.
Legal Framework
The case primarily revolves around the interpretation of several key legal provisions:
- Section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962: This provision pertains to offenses related to the evasion of customs duties. The appellant was initially charged under this section.
- Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: This section deals with appeals in cases of acquittal. Specifically, sub-section (5) prescribes the limitation period for filing such appeals.
- Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963: This section empowers courts to condone delays in filing appeals if sufficient cause is shown.
- Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963: This section addresses the applicability of the Limitation Act to special or local laws, stating that Sections 4 to 24 apply unless expressly excluded by the special law.
The interplay between Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is central to the dispute. The question is whether the specific limitation period under Section 378(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, excludes the general power to condone delays under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Arguments
Appellant’s Arguments:
- The appellant argued that the High Court erred in allowing the belated appeal against acquittal.
- It was contended that Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is a self-contained code regarding limitation for appeals against acquittal.
- The appellant relied on the judgment in Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh (1964) 4 SCR 982, which held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, does not apply to appeals against acquittal under the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, due to the specific limitation period.
- The appellant argued that the principle in Kaushalya Rani should apply to the present case, as Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, also prescribes a specific limitation period without any provision for condonation of delay.
Respondent’s Arguments:
- The respondent contended that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is applicable to appeals against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, unless expressly excluded by the special law.
- The respondent distinguished the case of Kaushalya Rani, arguing that it was decided under the old Limitation Act of 1908, which had different provisions.
- The respondent relied on the judgment in Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1976) 1 SCC 392, which held that the new Limitation Act of 1963 makes Section 5 applicable even in special laws, unless expressly excluded.
The core of the appellant’s argument was that Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, by prescribing a specific limitation period for appeals against acquittal, implicitly excludes the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the new Limitation Act of 1963, unlike its predecessor, allows for the application of Section 5 unless a special law expressly excludes it.
[TABLE] of Submissions
| Main Submission | Sub-Submissions | Party |
|---|---|---|
| Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 | Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is a self-contained code regarding limitation and excludes the application of Section 5. | Appellant |
| Reliance on Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh (1964) 4 SCR 982, where Section 5 of the old Limitation Act was held not applicable to appeals against acquittal. | Appellant | |
| Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies unless expressly excluded by special law. | Respondent | |
| Distinction between old and new Limitation Acts | Kaushalya Rani was decided under the old Limitation Act of 1908, which had different provisions. | Respondent |
| Reliance on Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1976) 1 SCC 392, where Section 5 of the new Limitation Act was held applicable to special laws unless expressly excluded. | Respondent |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The primary issue before the Supreme Court was:
- Whether the High Court has the power to condone the delay in filing an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, by applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues
| Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
|---|---|---|
| Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies to appeals against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. | Yes, Section 5 applies. | The Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is applicable unless expressly excluded by the special law. Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, does not expressly exclude the application of Section 5. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered several key authorities in its decision:
Cases:
- Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh (1964) 4 SCR 982 (Supreme Court of India): This case, decided under the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and the old Limitation Act, 1908, held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply to appeals against acquittal due to the specific limitation period under Section 417 of the old Code. The Court in the present case distinguished this case.
- Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1976) 1 SCC 392 (Supreme Court of India): This case distinguished Kaushalya Rani and held that Section 5 of the new Limitation Act, 1963, applies to special laws unless expressly excluded. The Court followed this case.
- Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra [AIR 1974 SC 480] (Supreme Court of India): This case dealt with election matters under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, where the statute expressly barred condonation of delay. The Court distinguished this case.
- Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar [2004 (4) SCC 252] (Supreme Court of India): This case dealt with the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, and held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply to the initiation of proceedings under Section 8 of that Act. The Court distinguished this case.
Legal Provisions:
- Section 417 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898: This section dealt with appeals against acquittal under the old Code, prescribing a limitation period of 60 days.
- Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: This section deals with appeals against acquittal under the current Code.
- Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963: This section allows for the condonation of delay in filing appeals if sufficient cause is shown.
- Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963: This section addresses the applicability of the Limitation Act to special or local laws.
- Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951: This section prescribes a limitation period of 45 days for filing an election petition.
- Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955: This section gives a right of pre-emption to a “raiyat” which has to be exercised within 4 months of the date of cause of action.
[TABLE] of Authorities Considered by the Court
| Authority | Court | How Considered |
|---|---|---|
| Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh (1964) 4 SCR 982 | Supreme Court of India | Distinguished: The Court distinguished this case, stating that it was decided under the old Limitation Act of 1908, which had different provisions. |
| Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1976) 1 SCC 392 | Supreme Court of India | Followed: The Court followed this case, which held that Section 5 of the new Limitation Act, 1963, applies to special laws unless expressly excluded. |
| Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra [AIR 1974 SC 480] | Supreme Court of India | Distinguished: The Court distinguished this case, noting that it dealt with election matters where the statute expressly barred condonation of delay. |
| Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar [2004 (4) SCC 252] | Supreme Court of India | Distinguished: The Court distinguished this case, stating that it dealt with a special law where Section 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply to the initiation of proceedings. |
| Section 417 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 | Legislative Provision | Discussed: The Court discussed this provision in the context of the Kaushalya Rani case. |
| Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 | Legislative Provision | Interpreted: The Court interpreted this provision in relation to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. |
| Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 | Legislative Provision | Applied: The Court applied this provision, holding that it is applicable to appeals against acquittal unless expressly excluded. |
| Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 | Legislative Provision | Interpreted: The Court interpreted this provision to determine the applicability of Section 5 to special laws. |
| Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 | Legislative Provision | Discussed: The Court discussed this provision in the context of the Hukumdev Narain Yadav case. |
| Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 | Legislative Provision | Discussed: The Court discussed this provision in the context of the Gopal Sardar case. |
Judgment
The Supreme Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies to appeals against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court reasoned that while Section 378 prescribes a limitation period, it does not expressly exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Court emphasized the difference between the old Limitation Act of 1908 and the new Limitation Act of 1963. The old Act expressly excluded the application of Section 5 in cases with special limitation periods, whereas the new Act makes Section 5 applicable unless expressly excluded by a special law.
How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?
| Submission | Party | Court’s Treatment |
|---|---|---|
| Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is a self-contained code regarding limitation and excludes the application of Section 5. | Appellant | Rejected: The Court held that Section 378 does not expressly exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. |
| Reliance on Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh | Appellant | Distinguished: The Court distinguished this case, stating that it was decided under the old Limitation Act of 1908, which had different provisions. |
| Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies unless expressly excluded by special law. | Respondent | Accepted: The Court accepted this submission, holding that Section 5 is applicable unless expressly excluded. |
| Kaushalya Rani was decided under the old Limitation Act of 1908, which had different provisions. | Respondent | Accepted: The Court accepted this submission and distinguished the case. |
| Reliance on Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi | Respondent | Accepted: The Court relied on this case, which held that Section 5 of the new Limitation Act was applicable unless expressly excluded. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
- The Court distinguished Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh (1964) 4 SCR 982, stating that it was decided under the old Limitation Act of 1908, which had different provisions.
- The Court followed Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1976) 1 SCC 392, which held that Section 5 of the new Limitation Act, 1963, applies to special laws unless expressly excluded.
- The Court distinguished Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra [AIR 1974 SC 480], noting that it dealt with election matters where the statute expressly barred condonation of delay.
- The Court distinguished Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar [2004 (4) SCC 252], stating that it dealt with a special law where Section 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply to the initiation of proceedings.
The Court emphasized that the language of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, is crucial. It states that Sections 4 to 24, which include Section 5, apply to special laws unless expressly excluded. Since Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, does not expressly exclude the application of Section 5, the benefit of Section 5 can be availed in an appeal against acquittal.
The Supreme Court stated, “The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that in a case where an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is filed after the coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 would be available to the applicant and if he can show that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time limit… the High Court would have the power to entertain it.”
The Court further clarified, “Mere provision of a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5.”
The Court also observed, “The language prescribing a period of limitation is an important factor as well.”
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Court’s reasoning was primarily influenced by the following points:
- The crucial difference between the old Limitation Act of 1908 and the new Limitation Act of 1963 regarding the applicability of Section 5 to special laws.
- The language of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which states that Sections 4 to 24 apply unless expressly excluded.
- The absence of any express exclusion of Section 5 in Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- The need to ensure that sufficient cause for delay can be considered in appeals against acquittal, aligning with the principles of justice.
[TABLE] of Sentiment Analysis of Reasons Given by the Supreme Court
| Reason | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, unless expressly excluded | 40% |
| Distinction between old and new Limitation Acts | 30% |
| Absence of express exclusion in Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 | 20% |
| Need to ensure consideration of sufficient cause for delay | 10% |
“Fact:Law” Ratio Table
| Category | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact (Consideration of the factual aspects of the case) | 20% |
| Law (Consideration of legal provisions and precedents) | 80% |
The Court’s decision was primarily driven by legal considerations, focusing on the interpretation of the Limitation Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The factual aspects of the case were secondary to the legal analysis.
Logical Reasoning:
Key Takeaways
- Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is applicable to appeals against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- The High Court has the power to condone delays in filing appeals against acquittal if sufficient cause is shown.
- Special laws prescribing limitation periods do not automatically exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, unless they expressly do so.
- This judgment clarifies the interplay between the Limitation Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, ensuring that delays can be condoned in appropriate cases.
Directions
The Supreme Court vacated the interim order dated 20 March 2017, and directed the Registry to apprise the Delhi High Court of these proceedings so that the matter may continue.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies to appeals against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, unless expressly excluded by the special law. This clarifies the legal position and ensures that delays in filing appeals against acquittal can be condoned if sufficient cause is shown. This judgment reinforces the principle that the new Limitation Act of 1963 has a broader scope for the application of Section 5 compared to the old Limitation Act of 1908.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in this case clarifies that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is applicable to appeals against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, unless expressly excluded by the special law. This ruling ensures that delays in filing such appeals can be condoned if sufficient cause is demonstrated, aligning with the principles of justice and fairness. The Court distinguished previous cases decidedunder the old Limitation Act and emphasized the broader scope of the new Limitation Act. The judgment provides a clear legal framework for the condonation of delay in appeals against acquittal, ensuring that meritorious cases are not dismissed solely on the grounds of limitation.