Supreme Court Clarifies Cognizance of Offences under MMDR Act and IPC: Jayant vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2020)

Arguments of the Private Appellants:

• The initiation of criminal proceedings and FIRs against the private appellants are barred by Sections 22 and 23A of the MMDR Act, and Rule 53 of the 1996 Rules.

• Section 22 of the MMDR Act requires a written complaint by a Mining Officer or authorized officer for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offense, which was not done in this case.

• The MMDR Act does not allow for suo motu cognizance by a Magistrate. The Magistrate lacks jurisdiction to direct the registration of an FIR under the penal provisions of the MMDR Act.

• Section 23A of the MMDR Act allows for compounding of offenses. Once the offenses were compounded under Rule 53 of the 1996 Rules, no further proceedings can be initiated due to the bar under Section 23A(2) of the MMDR Act.

Arguments of the State of Madhya Pradesh:

• The State supported the private appellants, arguing that the Magistrate’s order to register FIRs was unsustainable. The State also contended that the order impinged on the powers of the authorized person to compound the offense under Rule 18 of the 2006 Rules.

The Supreme Court addressed the following key issues:

1. Whether the Magistrate’s order to register FIRs under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) was sustainable in light of Section 22 of the MMDR Act.
2. When and at what stage the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act would be attracted.
3. Whether the compounding of offenses under Rule 53 of the 1996 Rules and Section 23A of the MMDR Act bars further criminal proceedings for the same violations under the IPC.

Cases Relied Upon by the Court:

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

The Court relied on State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772* to emphasize the distinction between offences under the MMDR Act and the IPC. The Court used Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 (Supp) SCC 121* and A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500* to clarify the meaning of ‘taking cognizance’, stating that it is different from filing a complaint and occurs when the court decides to initiate proceedings. The Court cited Manohar M. Galani v. Ashok N. Advani (1999) 8 SCC 737* to support the view that the bar under Section 195 CrPC can be considered at the stage of cognizance. The Court referred to S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Limited, (2008) 2 SCC 492* to explain the meaning of ‘cognizance’ and to differentiate between initiation and commencement of proceedings. The Court also relied on R.R. Chari v. State of U.P. AIR 1951 SC 207*, Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Abani Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1950 Cal. 437*, Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. State of W.B. AIR 1959 SC 1118*, Gopal Das Sindhi v. State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 986*, Ajit Kumar Palit v. State of W.B. AIR 1963 SC 765*, M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur, AIR 1967 SC 528*, Hareram Satpathy v. Tikaram Agarwala, (1978) 4 SCC 58*, Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of W.B., (1973) 3 SCC 753*, Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra (1971) 2 SCC 654*, Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy (1976) 3 SCC 252*, Fakhruddin Ahmad v. State of Uttaranchal, (2008) 17 SCC 157*, Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64*, State of W.B. v. Mohd. Khalid (1995) 1 SCC 684*, State of Karnataka v. Pastor P. Raju (2006) 6 SCC 728* and Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa (2013) 10 SCC 705* to further clarify what constitutes ‘taking cognizance’ and when the bar under the MMDR Act is attracted.

The Supreme Court emphasized the need to balance environmental protection with the legal framework. The Court recognized the serious ecological damage caused by illegal mining, as highlighted in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772. The Court noted that while compounding of offenses under the MMDR Act is permitted, it should not allow violators to escape prosecution for offenses under the IPC, which are distinct and separate. The Court also highlighted the State’s role as custodian of public property and the need for stringent measures against environmental violators. The Court also noted that the State was wrong in appealing against the High Court order when it had supported the Magistrate’s order before the High Court.

Logical Reasoning:

The Court’s reasoning was as follows:

• The Court clarified that an order under Section 156(3) CrPC to register an FIR is not equivalent to taking cognizance of an offence. The bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act is only attracted when the Magistrate takes cognizance of offences under the MMDR Act and Rules and orders the issuance of process.

• The Court emphasized that offences under the MMDR Act and the IPC are distinct. Compounding of offences under the MMDR Act only bars further proceedings for the same offences under the MMDR Act and Rules, but not for offences under the IPC.

• The Court noted that while compounding of offenses under the MMDR Act is permitted, it should not allow violators to escape prosecution for offences under the IPC, which are distinct and separate.

• The Court observed that the State, as the custodian of public property, must take stringent action against those causing ecological damage and that the State should not have appealed against the High Court’s order.

The court quoted from the judgment:

“…the policy and object of MMDR Act and Rules are the result of an increasing awareness of the compelling need to restore the serious ecological imbalance and to stop the damages being caused to the nature…”

“…excessive in­stream sand­and­gravel mining from river beds and like resources causes the degradation of rivers…”

“…sand mining transforms the riverbeds into large and deep pits, as a result, the groundwater table drops leaving the drinking water wells on the embankments of these rivers dry…”

• A Magistrate’s order to register an FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC is not considered “taking cognizance” of an offense under the MMDR Act, and thus the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act does not apply at this stage.

• The bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act is only triggered when a Magistrate takes cognizance of offences under the MMDR Act and Rules and orders the issuance of process.

• Compounding of offenses under the MMDR Act, as per Section 23A, only bars further proceedings under the MMDR Act and its rules, and does not bar proceedings under the IPC for offences like theft of minerals.

• The State has a duty to protect the environment and take stringent action against illegal mining, and should not prioritize revenue collection over environmental protection.

The Supreme Court directed that:

• The proceedings for offences under the MMDR Act (Sections 4/21) are quashed due to compounding.
• The proceedings for offences under the IPC (Sections 379 and 414) can continue.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act is not attracted when a Magistrate orders an investigation under Section 156(3) of the CrPC. The bar is only attracted when the Magistrate takes cognizance of offences under the MMDR Act and Rules and orders the issuance of process. The Court also clarified that compounding of offences under the MMDR Act does not bar proceedings under the IPC for distinct offences. This judgment clarifies the interplay between the MMDR Act and the IPC, and the stages at which proceedings can be initiated.

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Jayant vs. State of Madhya Pradesh clarifies the procedure for initiating proceedings in cases of illegal mining. It confirms that while the MMDR Act provides for compounding of offenses, this does not bar proceedings under the IPC for distinct offences like theft. The judgment also emphasizes the importance of environmental protection and the need for stringent action against illegal mining, reinforcing the principle that the State is the custodian of public property and must act to protect it.