Supreme Court Clarifies Condonation of Delay in Divorce Appeals Under Special Marriage Act: Arunoday Singh vs. Lee Anne Elton (2021)

Date of the Judgment: 23 July 2021
Citation: 2021 INSC 484
Judges: Indira Banerjee, J. and V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Can a delay in filing an appeal against a divorce decree be excused? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case concerning a divorce granted under the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The core issue was whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, which generally allow for the condonation of delays, apply to appeals filed in Family Courts under the Special Marriage Act. The Supreme Court, in this case, clarified the interplay between the Family Courts Act, 1984, the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and the Limitation Act, 1963. The judgment was delivered by a bench comprising Justice Indira Banerjee and Justice V. Ramasubramanian.

Case Background

The case involves a dispute arising from a divorce decree passed by the Family Court in Bhopal. The Family Court had dissolved the marriage between the Petitioner, Arunoday Singh, and the Respondent, Lee Anne Elton, on 18th December 2019, under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. Aggrieved by this decision, the Respondent filed an appeal, First Appeal No. 445 of 2020, before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. This appeal was filed on 1st March 2020. The Respondent also filed an application to condone the delay in filing the appeal. The High Court allowed the application for condonation of delay, which led to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur Bench, allowed I.A. No. 5526 of 2020, which was an application for condonation of delay in filing First Appeal No. 445 of 2020. The High Court condoned the delay, being satisfied that there was sufficient cause for the delay. The First Appeal was filed against an ex-parte judgment and decree of divorce dated 18th December 2019, passed by the First Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Bhopal, in Regular Civil Suit No. 89-A/2019, filed by the Petitioner.

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court considered the following legal provisions:

• Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act, 1963: “Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law.” This provision generally excludes the application of the Limitation Act to proceedings related to marriage and divorce, unless the specific law provides otherwise.
• Section 19(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1984: “Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgement or order of a Family Court.” This provision mandates that appeals from a Family Court’s judgment must be filed within 30 days.
• Section 20 of the Family Courts Act, 1984: “The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.” This section gives the Family Courts Act an overriding effect over other laws.
• Section 39(4) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954: “Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of the decree or order.” This provision specifies a 90-day period for filing appeals under the Special Marriage Act.
• Section 40 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954: “Subject to the other provisions contained in the Act, and to such rules as the High Court may make in this behalf, all proceedings under this Act shall be regulated, as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).” This section makes the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings under this Act.
• Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963: “Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.” This provision allows for the condonation of delay if sufficient cause is shown.

Arguments

Petitioner’s Arguments (Arunoday Singh):

• The Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, argued that the High Court erred in condoning the delay.
• He contended that Section 19(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, mandates that appeals from a Family Court must be filed within 30 days.
• He further argued that Section 20 of the Family Courts Act gives it overriding effect, thus the 30-day limit should prevail over the 90-day limit in Section 39(4) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954.
• Relying on Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act, 1963, he argued that the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings related to marriage and divorce unless the specific law makes an exception, which the Special Marriage Act does not. Therefore, the delay should not be condoned.

Respondent’s Arguments (Lee Anne Elton):

• The Respondent argued that the delay in filing the appeal was due to a mistaken belief by her lawyer that the limitation period was 90 days as prescribed under the Special Marriage Act.
• The Respondent contended that the delay was not intentional and there was sufficient cause for the delay.

Submissions by Parties

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issue for determination:

1. Whether the delay in filing an appeal from a decree passed by a Family Court under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court agreed with the observation in Kunnarath Yesoda v. Manathanath Narayanan [AIR 1985 Ker 220]* that Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act is restricted to suits and proceedings in the suit.
• The Court fully agreed with the view taken in Smt. Sipra Dey v. Ajit Kumar Dey [AIR 1988 Cal 28]* that the term “proceeding” in Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act refers to original proceedings and not appeals.
• The Court referred to Debi Bhaduri v. Kumarjib Bhaduri [(1980) 1 Cal LJ 309]* to support the view that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to matrimonial appeals.
• The Court cited with approval Shri Chander Dev Chadha v. Smt. Rani Bala [AIR 1979 Delhi 22]*, which held that the provisions of the Limitation Act were inapplicable to suits and original proceedings and not to appeals.

The Supreme Court held that Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act, 1963, does not bar the application of Section 5 of the same Act to appeals filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, from a decree of divorce under the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The Court clarified that Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act only excludes original proceedings related to marriage and divorce, not appeals. The Court emphasized that the Family Courts Act does not expressly exclude the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, which includes Section 5, allowing for the condonation of delay. The Court also noted that the lawyer’s mistaken belief about the limitation period constituted sufficient cause for the delay.

The Court observed, “The proceedings in the Family Court relating to marriage and divorce are not proceedings under the Family Courts Act even though the procedure prescribed under the Family Courts Act may be followed.” The Court further stated, “Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act clearly provides that where any special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” The Court also noted, “It is well settled that when rejection of an apparently meritorious appeal on the ground of limitation is pitted against deciding the appeal on merits, the Courts are entitled to take a liberal approach in deciding an application for condonation of delay.”

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the interpretation of Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act, 1963, and its interplay with the Family Courts Act, 1984, and the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The Court emphasized that the exclusion under Section 29(3) applies only to original proceedings and not to appeals. The Court also considered the fact that the Family Courts Act does not expressly exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which allows for condonation of delay. The Court was also influenced by the principle that meritorious appeals should not be rejected solely on the ground of limitation, especially when there is sufficient cause for the delay.

Fact:Law Ratio

Logical Reasoning

Key Takeaways

• The Limitation Act’s provisions for condonation of delay (Section 5) apply to appeals filed in Family Courts, even in cases related to divorce under the Special Marriage Act.
• Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act only excludes original suits and proceedings related to marriage and divorce, not appeals.
• A lawyer’s mistaken belief about the limitation period can be considered sufficient cause for delay.
• Courts should adopt a liberal approach when deciding applications for condonation of delay, especially when meritorious appeals are at stake.

Directions

The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, thereby upholding the High Court’s decision to condone the delay in filing the appeal.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, particularly Section 5, which allows for condonation of delay, are applicable to appeals filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, arising from decrees of divorce under the Special Marriage Act, 1954. This judgment clarifies that Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act does not bar the application of Section 5 to such appeals. This is a reaffirmation of the position of law that appeals in matrimonial matters are not excluded from the beneficial provisions of the Limitation Act.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Arunoday Singh vs. Lee Anne Elton clarifies that delays in filing appeals from divorce decrees under the Special Marriage Act can be condoned by the High Court. The Court emphasized that the Limitation Act’s exclusion of its provisions for original proceedings related to marriage and divorce does not apply to appeals. The Court also reiterated that the Family Courts Act does not explicitly exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which allows for condonation of delay. This judgment ensures that meritorious appeals are not rejected on technical grounds of limitation, promoting access to justice in family law matters.