Supreme Court Clarifies Daughters’ Inheritance Rights in Ancestral Property Partition: Prasanta Kumar Sahoo & Ors. vs. Charulata Sahu & Ors. (29 March 2023)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 29 March 2023

Citation: Not Available in the provided text.

Judges: Justice A.S. Bopanna and Justice J.B. Pardiwala

Can daughters claim an equal share in ancestral property, just like sons? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question, clarifying the scope of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as amended in 2005. This judgment is significant for understanding the property rights of women in India. The core issue was whether daughters, as coparceners, are entitled to an equal share in ancestral property, and whether a prior settlement between family members can override their rights.

Case Background

The case involves a dispute over the partition of ancestral properties of one Kumar Sahoo. The parties include the legal representatives of Kumar Sahoo’s son, Prafulla Sahoo (the appellants), and his two daughters, Charulata Sahoo (Respondent No. 1) and Santilata (Respondent No. 2). Kumar Sahoo acquired the properties in 1940 and passed away in 1969, leaving behind his son and two daughters. In 1980, Charulata Sahoo filed a suit seeking a 1/3rd share in the properties. The suit properties are detailed in Schedules ‘A’ to ‘F’ of the plaint, encompassing various plots of land in Cuttack.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Trial Court initially decreed the suit, granting the plaintiff a 1/6th share in ancestral properties and a 1/3rd share in self-acquired properties. Defendant No. 1 (Prafulla Sahoo) appealed this decision, arguing that all properties should be considered ancestral. While the first appeal was pending, Defendant No. 2 entered into a settlement with Defendant No. 1, relinquishing her share for a consideration. The High Court modified the trial court’s decree to reflect this settlement. However, in a Letters Patent Appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court set aside this compromise, ruling that the settlement was invalid, and restored the Trial Court’s judgment.

Legal Framework

The judgment primarily revolves around Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and its amendment in 2005. The original Section 6 dealt with the devolution of interest in coparcenary property, primarily recognizing the rule of survivorship among male members. The 2005 amendment significantly altered this, granting daughters the status of coparceners by birth, with the same rights and liabilities as sons. The amended Section 6(1) states that a daughter of a coparcener becomes a coparcener by birth in her own right, having the same rights in the coparcenary property as a son.

The proviso to Section 6(1) states that nothing in this subsection shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation, including any partition or testamentary disposition of property, which had taken place before December 20, 2004. Section 6(5) further clarifies that the section does not apply to a partition effected before December 20, 2004. The Explanation to Section 6(5) defines “partition” as a partition made by a registered deed or a decree of a court.

Arguments

Appellants’ Arguments (Legal heirs of Defendant No. 1):

• The appellants argued that all properties, including those listed in Schedule ‘J’ (1 to 8 properties), were ancestral, as they were acquired using income from ancestral properties.
• They contended that the 2005 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act should not affect the settlement deed made in 1991, as it was a valid disposition of property rights.
• They argued that the retrospective effect of the 2005 amendment would disrupt alienations made before 2004 and that the matter should be remitted to the Trial Court to ascertain available properties for partition.
• They relied on the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, stating that no disposition before 20.12.2004 should be invalidated.
• They cited Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma [(2020) 9 SCC 1] to support their argument that the 2005 amendment does not invalidate prior dispositions.
• They argued that the settlement between Defendant No. 1 and 2 was lawful and proper, relying on Bai Chanchal and Others v. Syed Jalaluddin and Others [(1970) 3 SCC 124], Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India and Others [(1992) 1 SCC 31], D.S. Lakshmaiah and Another v. L. Balasubramanyam and Another [(2003) 10 SCC 310], Jineshwardas (Dead) by LRs. and Others v. Jagrani (Smt) and Another [(2003) 11 SCC 372], and Pushpa Devi Bhagat (Dead) through LR. Sadhna Rai (Smt) v. Rajinder Singh and Others [(2006) 5 SCC 566].

Respondent No. 1’s Arguments (Original Plaintiff):

• Respondent No. 1 argued that, in light of Vineeta Sharma (supra), she is entitled to a 1/3rd share in all properties of her father, Kumar Sahoo, available at the time of filing the suit.
• She cited Ganduri Koteshwaramma and Another v. Chakiri Yanadi and Another [(2011) 9 SCC 788], arguing that a preliminary decree can be modified due to changed circumstances, even without an appeal.
• She contended that the 2005 amendment entitles daughters to an equal share with sons in coparcenary properties.
• She argued that alienations before 20.12.2004 are permitted, but the alienated property would fall to the share of the co-parcener who made the alienation.
• She submitted that the settlement between Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 was invalid as she was not a party to the compromise, nor did she sign any agreement.
• She highlighted defaults by Defendant No. 1, including unauthorized construction and non-payment of dues.

Respondent Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8’s Arguments (Legal heirs of Original Defendant No. 2):

• They argued that the properties were ancestral and that daughters are entitled to an equal share, citing Vineeta Sharma (supra).
• They contended that a cross-appeal is maintainable to challenge the compromise, even if the regular appeal is dismissed, relying on Order XLI Rule 22 and Order XLIII Rule 1-A(2) of the CPC.
• They argued that the settlement deed was invalid under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC.
• They stated that the compromise was not acted upon by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2.
• They also contended that the counsel could not sign the compromise petition without express consent.

The innovativeness of the arguments lies in the respondents’ reliance on the 2005 amendment and the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Vineeta Sharma (supra), which significantly altered the understanding of daughters’ rights in ancestral property.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issues for consideration:

1. How would the rights of the parties be governed in light of the decision in Vineeta Sharma (supra)?
2. Was the High Court justified in declaring the settlement between the appellants and Respondent No. 2 invalid?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

Cases Relied Upon by the Court:

Legal Provisions Considered by the Court:

• Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (original and amended versions)
• Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
• Order XLIII Rule 1-A(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
• Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court:

• Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma [(2020) 9 SCC 1]*: The court heavily relied on this case to establish that daughters are coparceners by birth with equal rights as sons.
• Ganduri Koteshwaramma and Another v. Chakiri Yanadi and Another [(2011) 9 SCC 788]*: The court used this case to support the modification of the preliminary decree due to the changed law.
• Prakash and Others v. Phulavati and Others [(2016) 2 SCC 36]*: This case was discussed and effectively overruled by the decision in Vineeta Sharma.
• Danamma alias Suman Surpur and Another v. Amar and Others [(2018) 3 SCC 343]*: This case was discussed and clarified by the decision in Vineeta Sharma.
• Bai Chanchal and Others v. Syed Jalaluddin and Others [(1970) 3 SCC 124]*, Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India and Others [(1992) 1 SCC 31]*, D.S. Lakshmaiah and Another v. L. Balasubramanyam and Another [(2003) 10 SCC 310]*, Jineshwardas (Dead) by LRs. and Others v. Jagrani (Smt) and Another [(2003) 11 SCC 372]*, and Pushpa Devi Bhagat (Dead) through LR. Sadhna Rai (Smt) v. Rajinder Singh and Others [(2006) 5 SCC 566]*: These cases were cited by the appellants to support the validity of the settlement but were not considered relevant in light of the 2005 amendment and the invalidity of the settlement.
• Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi (Smt) and Another [(1993) 1 SCC 581]*: The court used this case to discuss the procedure for challenging a compromise decree.
• Vipan Aggarwal and Another v. Raman Gandotra and Others [2022 SCCOnLine SC 1357]*: The court used this case to discuss the remedies available to a party aggrieved by a compromise decree.
• Himalayan Cooperative Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh and Others [(2015) 7 SCC 373]*: The court used this case to discuss the authority of a lawyer to make concessions on behalf of the client.
• United Bank of India, Calcutta v. Abhijit Tea Company Private Limited and Others [(2000) 7 SCC 357]*: The court used this case to support the view that a court must take notice of changes in law affecting pending actions.
• Nityamoni Dasi v. Gokul Chandra Sen [(1911) 9 Ind Cas 210 (Cal)]*: The court used this case to support the view that a decree by consent among some parties in a partition suit is not maintainable.
• Vir Singh and Others v. Kharak Singh and Others [AIR 1925 Lah 280]*: The court used this case to support the view that a compromise not assented to by all proprietors is contrary to law.
• Taraprasanna Sarkar and Another v. Kalika mohan Sarkar and Others [AIR 1924 Cal 80]*: The court used this case to support the view that there can be no compromise binding on all parties in a partition suit unless all parties joined in the compromise.
• Govindammal v. Marimuthu Maistry and Others [AIR 1959 Mad 7]*: The court used this case to discuss the authority of a vakil to enter into a compromise.
• Periyar & Pareekanni Rubber Ltd. v. State of Kerala [(1991) 4 SCC 195]*: The court used this case to discuss the status and responsibility of the Advocate General.
• Joginder Singh Wasu v. State of Punjab [(1994) 1 SCC 184]*: The court used this case to discuss the status and responsibility of the Advocate General.
• Sourendra Nath Mitra v. Tarubala Dasi [(1929-30) 57 IA 133]*: The court used this case to discuss the implied authority of counsel.
• Jamilabai Abdul Kadar v. Shankarlal Gulabchand [(1975) 2 SCC 609]*: The court used this case to discuss the implied authority of counsel.
• Svenska Handelsbanken v. Indian Charge Chrome Ltd. [(1994) 2 SCC 155]*: The court used this case to discuss the implied authority of counsel.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily driven by the need to ensure gender justice and uphold the rights of daughters as coparceners in Hindu joint families. The court emphasized the transformative nature of the 2005 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, which aimed to eliminate gender discrimination in property inheritance. The court’s reasoning was heavily influenced by the principle that daughters, by birth, acquire the same rights as sons in coparcenary property. The court also prioritized the need to prevent fraudulent or collusive attempts to deprive daughters of their rightful share, as seen in the rejection of the settlement agreement.

Fact:Law Ratio

The sentiment analysis reveals that legal considerations and the intention of the 2005 amendment heavily influenced the court’s decision. The court prioritized the legal rights of daughters over the factual aspects of prior settlements and alienations. The ratio of fact:law indicates that the court was more influenced by the legal interpretation of the 2005 amendment and the principles of gender justice than the specific facts of the case.

The court’s reasoning was based on the following points:

• The 2005 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, grants daughters coparcenary rights by birth, making them equal to sons in matters of inheritance.
• The decision in Vineeta Sharma (supra) clarified that daughters are coparceners from birth, with equal rights and liabilities as sons.
• The court emphasized that the rights of daughters are substantive and cannot be overridden by prior settlements or alienations made without their consent.
• The court held that the settlement between Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 was invalid because it was not signed by all parties, particularly the plaintiff, and because the advocate for Defendant No. 2 did not have express authorization.
• The court emphasized that a compromise in a partition suit must be entered into by all parties to be valid.
• The court also highlighted that the law must evolve to reflect changes in societal norms and to ensure gender equality.

Final Order

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the legal heirs of Defendant No. 1 and upheld the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court. The court held that the daughters (Respondent Nos. 1 and 2) are each entitled to a 1/3rd share in the properties of Kumar Sahoo. The court directed the Trial Court to proceed with the partition of the suit properties in accordance with the judgment.

Key Takeaways

• Daughters are coparceners by birth with equal rights as sons in ancestral property, as per the 2005 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
• The 2005 amendment has a retrospective effect, granting daughters equal rights in coparcenary property from 9 September 2005.
• A settlement or compromise in a partition suit must be signed by all parties to be valid.
• An advocate must have express authorization to sign a compromise on behalf of their client.
• The courts will not uphold settlements that attempt to deprive daughters of their rightful share in ancestral property.
• The decision in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma [(2020) 9 SCC 1] is the guiding principle for determining the rights of daughters in coparcenary property.
• Preliminary decrees can be modified to reflect changes in law, even without an appeal.