LEGAL ISSUE: Interpretation of the definition of “child” under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).
CASE TYPE: Criminal Law, Child Protection
Case Name: Ms. Eera Through Dr. Manjula Krippendorf vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
Judgment Date: July 21, 2017
Introduction
Citation: 2017 INSC 684. Can a person with a mental age below 18 years, but a biological age above 18, be considered a “child” under the POCSO Act? The Supreme Court of India addressed this crucial question in a recent judgment.
This case examines whether the definition of “child” under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act should include individuals who are intellectually challenged and have a mental age below 18 years, even if their biological age is above 18.
The judgment was delivered by a bench comprising Justice Dipak Misra (author of the majority opinion) and Justice R.F. Nariman (concurring).
Case Background
The appellant, Ms. Eera, represented by her mother, is a 38-year-old woman suffering from Cerebral Palsy (R. Hemiparesis). Her mental age is approximately 6 to 8 years. Her mother filed a First Information Report (FIR) against Respondent No. 2, alleging rape.
The case was initially tried under Section 376(2)(l) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) by the Assistant Special Judge/Special Fast Track Court, Saket, New Delhi.
The appellant sought to transfer the case to a Special Court under the POCSO Act, arguing that her functional age is that of a child. The High Court of Delhi directed videography of the proceedings and assigned the case to a lady judge in Saket Court, but did not transfer the case to the Special Court under POCSO Act.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2014 | FIR No. 197 lodged at Police Station Defence Colony, New Delhi, alleging rape of the appellant. |
| September 15, 2014 | The learned ASJ, Special Fast Track Court, Saket directed that the prosecutrix be provided a special educator/interpreter and necessary arrangements be made for videographing the in-camera trial. |
| May 15, 2015 | The learned Judge noted that videographing of the proceedings was not permissible. |
| June 15, 2015 | The High Court of Delhi issued directions for videography of the proceeding. |
| June 29, 2015 | The High Court disposed of the matter, directing the case to be assigned to a trial court presided over by a lady Judge in Saket Court. |
| April 1, 2016 | It was contended before the Supreme Court that the prosecutrix has not mentally grown beyond six years. |
| During the pendency of the proceeding | The sole accused, Respondent No. 2, died. |
Course of Proceedings
The trial commenced in the Court of the learned Assistant Special Judge/Special Fast Track Court, Saket, New Delhi.
The appellant, through her mother, filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) before the High Court of Delhi, seeking transfer of the case to a Special Court under the POCSO Act.
The High Court directed videography of the proceedings and assigned the case to a lady judge in Saket Court, but did not transfer the case to the Special Court.
Legal Framework
The core legal provision in question is Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act, which defines “child” as “any person below the age of eighteen years.”
The appellant argued that the definition of “child” should include individuals with a mental age below 18 years, even if their biological age is above 18.
The Court also considered Section 5(k) of the POCSO Act, which addresses aggravated penetrative sexual assault, stating: “(k) whoever, taking advantage of a child’s mental or physical disability, commits penetrative sexual assault on the child;”
The Court also examined Section 164A of the CrPC, which deals with medical examinations of victims of sexual assault.
The Court also referred to Article 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children, which defines a child as “every human being below the age of 18 years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”
Arguments
The appellant’s counsel argued that the definition of “child” under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act should be interpreted purposively to include individuals with a mental age below 18 years, emphasizing the protective nature of the Act.
The counsel contended that the term “age” should encompass both biological and mental age, to ensure that vulnerable individuals like the appellant receive the protection intended by the POCSO Act.
The appellant’s counsel also drew comparisons with provisions of the IPC, where the legislature recognizes persons of unsound mind to be on the same level as children.
The counsel for the State supported the appellant’s arguments, contending that a mentally challenged person is equivalent to a child in terms of understanding and vulnerability, and should be brought within the definition of a child under the POCSO Act.
The Amicus Curiae, representing Respondent No. 2, argued that the definition of “child” should be given its ordinary, literal meaning, and that the legislature would have specifically included mental age if it had intended to do so.
The Amicus Curiae also argued that including mental age in the definition would lead to ambiguity, chaos, and unwarranted delays in proceedings.
| Main Submission | Sub-Submissions (Appellant) | Sub-Submissions (State) | Sub-Submissions (Respondent) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Definition of “Child” |
|
|
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Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The primary issue framed by the Supreme Court was:
- Whether the definition of “child” under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act should be interpreted to include individuals with a mental age below 18 years, even if their biological age is above 18?
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
| Issue | Court’s Treatment |
|---|---|
| Whether the definition of “child” under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act should be interpreted to include individuals with a mental age below 18 years, even if their biological age is above 18? | The Court held that the definition of “child” under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act refers to biological age, and does not include mental age. |
Authorities
The Court considered various authorities to determine the correct interpretation of the term “child” under the POCSO Act.
The Court discussed the principle of purposive interpretation, referring to cases like Bharat Singh v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi and others, Githa Hariharan (Ms.) and another v. Reserve Bank of India and another, Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar and others, Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Hooghly Mills Company Limited and others, and Bangalore Turf Club Limited v. Regional Director, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation.
The Court also referred to Sheikh Gulfan & others v. Sanat Kumar Ganguli, Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar, Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand and another, and Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan and another to underscore the importance of legislative intent.
The Court also discussed the principle of purposive interpretation, referring to cases like Bharat Singh v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi and others, Githa Hariharan (Ms.) and another v. Reserve Bank of India and another, Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar and others, Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Hooghly Mills Company Limited and others, and Bangalore Turf Club Limited v. Regional Director, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation.
| Authority | Court | How Used |
|---|---|---|
| Bharat Singh v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi and others | Supreme Court of India | Cited for purposive interpretation. |
| Githa Hariharan (Ms.) and another v. Reserve Bank of India and another | Supreme Court of India | Cited for purposive interpretation. |
| Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar and others | Supreme Court of India | Cited for purposive interpretation. |
| Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Hooghly Mills Company Limited and others | Supreme Court of India | Cited for purposive interpretation. |
| Bangalore Turf Club Limited v. Regional Director, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation | Supreme Court of India | Cited for purposive interpretation. |
| Sheikh Gulfan & others v. Sanat Kumar Ganguli | Supreme Court of India | Cited for legislative intent. |
| Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar | Supreme Court of India | Cited for legislative intent. |
| Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand and another | Supreme Court of India | Cited for legislative intent. |
| Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan and another | Supreme Court of India | Cited for legislative intent. |
Judgment
| Submission | Court’s Treatment |
|---|---|
| The definition of “child” should include mental age. | Rejected. The Court held that the definition of “child” under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act refers to biological age and does not include mental age. |
| The POCSO Act should be interpreted purposively. | The Court agreed with the principle of purposive interpretation, but held that it cannot be used to alter the clear language of the statute. |
The Court held that the term “age” in Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act refers to chronological or biological age, not mental age.
The Court emphasized that while the POCSO Act is meant to protect children, the definition of “child” is clearly restricted to those below 18 years of age.
The Court stated that the legislature has deliberately used the word “years” in the definition, which signifies a chronological period, and there is no room for the Court to add the word “mental” to the definition of “age”.
The Court also noted that the legislature has considered mental disability in other provisions of the POCSO Act, indicating that they were aware of the issue but chose not to include mental age in the definition of “child”.
The Court observed: “The legislature in its wisdom has stipulated a definition of the “child” which I have noted hereinbefore. The submission is that the term “age” should not be perceived through the restricted prism but must be viewed with the telescope and thereby should include the mental age.”
The Court also observed: “By saying “age” would cover “mental age” has the potential to create immense anomalous situations without there being any guidelines or statutory provisions. Needless to say, they are within the sphere of legislature.”
The Court also stated: “I am obliged to state that stretching of the words “age” and “year” would be encroaching upon the legislative function.”
| Authority | Court’s View |
|---|---|
| Bharat Singh v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi and others, Githa Hariharan (Ms.) and another v. Reserve Bank of India and another, Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar and others, Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Hooghly Mills Company Limited and others, and Bangalore Turf Club Limited v. Regional Director, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation | The Court acknowledged the principle of purposive interpretation, but held that it cannot be used to alter the clear language of the statute. |
| Sheikh Gulfan & others v. Sanat Kumar Ganguli, Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar, Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand and another, and Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan and another | The Court considered these authorities to understand the legislative intent, but ultimately held that the plain language of the statute must prevail. |
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Court’s reasoning was primarily influenced by the clear and unambiguous language of Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act, which defines “child” based on biological age.
The Court emphasized that while the POCSO Act aims to protect children, the definition of “child” is explicitly linked to chronological age.
The Court was also concerned that expanding the definition of “child” to include mental age could lead to ambiguity and practical difficulties in implementation.
| Reason | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Plain Language of the Statute | 40% |
| Legislative Intent | 30% |
| Practical Difficulties | 20% |
| Avoiding Judicial Overreach | 10% |
| Category | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 20% |
| Law | 80% |
Logical Reasoning
Start: Is the definition of “child” under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act ambiguous?
No: The definition clearly states “below the age of eighteen years”.
Does the term “age” include mental age?
No: The term “age” refers to chronological or biological age, not mental age.
Does the legislative intent support including mental age?
No: The legislature has used the word “years” which signifies a chronological period.
Conclusion: The definition of “child” under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act does not include mental age.
Key Takeaways
- The definition of “child” under the POCSO Act is based on biological age, not mental age.
- Individuals above 18 years of age, even with a mental age below 18, are not considered “children” under the POCSO Act.
- The Court emphasized that any change to the definition of “child” must come from the legislature, not the judiciary.
- The POCSO Act, while child-centric, does not extend its definition of a child to include persons with mental disability.
Directions
The Supreme Court directed the State Legal Services Authority, Delhi, to award maximum compensation to the victim, considering her mental disability.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the definition of “child” under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act does not include mental age. This clarifies the scope of the Act and confirms that it applies to individuals below the biological age of 18 years.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment clarifies that the definition of “child” under the POCSO Act is based on biological age, and does not include mental age. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the plain language of the statute and respecting the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary.
Category
- Criminal Law
- Child Protection
- POCSO Act, 2012
- Section 2(d), POCSO Act
- Section 5(k), POCSO Act
- Section 164A, CrPC
- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012
- Section 2(d), Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012
- Code of Criminal Procedure
- Section 164A, Code of Criminal Procedure
FAQ
Q: What does the Supreme Court say about the definition of a “child” under the POCSO Act?
A: The Supreme Court has clarified that a “child” under the POCSO Act refers to a person below the biological age of 18 years, and does not include individuals with a mental age below 18 but a biological age above 18.
Q: Does the POCSO Act protect individuals with intellectual disabilities who are older than 18?
A: While the POCSO Act aims to protect children from sexual offenses, its definition of a “child” is based on biological age. Individuals above 18 years, even with intellectual disabilities, are not considered children under this Act.
Q: What if a person has a mental age of a child but is biologically an adult?
A: The Supreme Court has ruled that the POCSO Act’s definition of a child does not extend to such individuals. The Act focuses on the biological age of the victim.
Q: Can a person with a mental disability be considered a “child” under the POCSO Act?
A: No, the POCSO Act’s definition of “child” is based on biological age only. The mental state of a person does not qualify them as a “child” under this Act.
Q: What is the significance of this judgment?
A: This judgment clarifies the scope of the POCSO Act and confirms that it applies to individuals below the biological age of 18 years. It also highlights the importance of adhering to the plain language of the statute and respecting the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary.
Source: Eera vs. State