LEGAL ISSUE: Scope of the Speaker’s power to disqualify members under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution and the extent of judicial review in such matters.
CASE TYPE: Constitutional Law, Anti-Defection Law
Case Name: Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil vs. Hon’ble Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly and Others
[Judgment Date]: 13 November 2019
Introduction
Date of the Judgment: 13 November 2019
Citation: (2019) INSC 910
Judges: N.V. Ramana, J., Sanjiv Khanna, J., Krishna Murari, J.
Can a Speaker of a Legislative Assembly disqualify a member for the rest of the term? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this crucial question in a batch of writ petitions arising from Karnataka, where several members of the Legislative Assembly were disqualified by the Speaker. This case delves into the complexities of party politics, the balance between dissent and defection, and the role of the Speaker in upholding constitutional values. The core issue revolved around the Speaker’s power to disqualify members under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, particularly concerning the duration of such disqualification and whether it extends to barring members from contesting re-elections.
Case Background
The 15th Karnataka Legislative Assembly elections in May 2018 resulted in a hung assembly. Although the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) emerged as the single largest party, the Indian National Congress (INC) and Janata Dal (Secular) (JD(S)) formed a coalition government. This coalition government faced internal strife, leading to several members resigning from their positions. The political turmoil culminated in a no-confidence motion, which the government lost.
The petitioners, who were members of the INC, JD(S) and KPJP, submitted their resignations between 1st July 2019 and 11th July 2019. Simultaneously, disqualification petitions were filed against them, alleging defection. The Speaker, instead of acting on the resignations, initiated disqualification proceedings. The Supreme Court intervened, directing the Speaker to decide on the resignations. Despite this, the Speaker rejected the resignations and disqualified the members, barring them from contesting elections for the rest of the assembly term. The petitioners, aggrieved by the disqualification, approached the Supreme Court.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 15 May 2018 | Results of the 15th Karnataka Legislative Assembly declared. |
| 11 February 2019 | Disqualification Petition No. 1 of 2019 filed against Ramesh L. Jarkhiholi and others. |
| 01 July 2019 – 11 July 2019 | Several members of the Legislative Assembly submit their resignations. |
| 11 July 2019 | Supreme Court directs the Speaker to decide on the resignations forthwith in Writ Petition (C) No. 872 of 2019. |
| 12 July 2019 | INC and JD(S) issue a whip to their members. Disqualification petitions filed against several members. |
| 17 July 2019 | Supreme Court allows the Speaker to decide on resignations and grants members the option to not participate in assembly proceedings. |
| 20 July 2019 | INC issues a whip requiring members to attend the House on 22 July 2019. |
| 23 July 2019 | Trust vote taken up, and the coalition government loses. |
| 25 July 2019 | Speaker passes orders in Disqualification Petition Nos. 1 and 7 of 2019. |
| 28 July 2019 | Speaker passes orders in Disqualification Petition Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 8 of 2019. |
Arguments
Petitioners’ Arguments:
- ✓ The members have an indefeasible right to resign, and the Speaker overstepped his constitutional duty by questioning their motives.
- ✓ Once a valid resignation is tendered, the Speaker loses jurisdiction to disqualify a member under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution.
- ✓ The disqualification orders were perverse, lacked application of mind, and violated principles of natural justice, specifically due to the short notice period for hearings.
- ✓ Even if disqualification is valid, it cannot bar the petitioners from contesting future elections.
- ✓ The Speaker’s inquiry should be limited to the voluntariness and genuineness of the resignation, not the motive behind it.
- ✓ Some petitioners argued that they had not resigned and were disqualified without proper notice or consideration of their circumstances.
Respondents’ Arguments:
- ✓ The Speaker’s rejection of resignations was valid as they were motivated to frustrate the object of disqualification.
- ✓ The Speaker’s power is quasi-judicial, and the court’s discretion is limited.
- ✓ The Speaker can consider the conduct of the members before and after the resignation to determine its genuineness and voluntariness.
- ✓ Rules of natural justice are flexible and were not violated in this case.
- ✓ The members were duty-bound to follow the party whip, especially during a motion of confidence, and their violation resulted in voluntary relinquishment of party membership.
- ✓ Disqualified members should not be allowed to contest by-elections as it would dilute the effect of disqualification.
- ✓ The Speaker has the power to disqualify members till the end of the term.
Election Commission of India’s Argument:
- ✓ Members disqualified under the Tenth Schedule can participate in the next elections.
- ✓ The Speaker’s power is limited to adjudicating disqualification, and any consequential action is beyond his jurisdiction.
Submissions of Parties
| Main Submission | Petitioners’ Sub-Submissions | Respondents’ Sub-Submissions |
|---|---|---|
| Right to Resign |
|
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| Disqualification under Tenth Schedule |
|
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| Speaker’s Powers |
|
|
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
- Whether the Writ Petition challenging the order of the Speaker under Article 32 is maintainable?
- Whether the order of the Speaker rejecting the resignation and disqualifying the Petitioners is in accordance with the Constitution?
- Even if the Speaker’s order of disqualification is valid, does the Speaker have the power to disqualify the members for the rest of the term?
- Whether the issues raised require a reference to the larger Bench?
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
| Issue | Court’s Decision and Reasoning |
|---|---|
| Maintainability of Writ Petition under Article 32 | The Court held that the writ petition is maintainable under Article 32 as it involves the violation of fundamental rights, specifically principles of natural justice, which are traceable to Article 14. The Court noted that although the High Court is the primary forum for such matters, it proceeded to hear the case due to the peculiar facts and interim orders passed earlier. |
| Validity of Speaker’s Order Rejecting Resignations and Disqualifying Members | The Court clarified that the Speaker’s power to reject resignations is limited to cases where the resignation is not voluntary or genuine. The Speaker cannot inquire into the motive behind the resignation. The Court held that the disqualification proceedings can continue even after the resignation is tendered, as the disqualification relates back to the date of defection. The Court upheld the disqualification orders but struck down the part barring members from contesting re-elections. |
| Speaker’s Power to Disqualify Members for the Rest of the Term | The Court held that the Speaker does not have the power to disqualify members for the rest of the term of the Legislative Assembly. The power to disqualify is limited to the act of defection, and the consequences are separately provided under the Constitution. The Court emphasized that barring someone from contesting elections requires an explicit legal provision, which does not exist for disqualification under the Tenth Schedule. |
| Reference to a Larger Bench | The Court declined to refer the matter to a larger bench, stating that the issues raised were already settled by previous Constitution Bench judgments. The Court emphasized that a substantial question of law arises only when there are two or more possible interpretations of a constitutional provision, which was not the case here. |
Authorities
Cases Relied Upon:
| Case Name | Court | Legal Point | How the Court Used it |
|---|---|---|---|
| U.P. State Spinning Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey, (2005) 8 SCC 264 | Supreme Court of India | Exhaustion of remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction | Cited to emphasize the general principle that parties should exhaust available remedies before approaching the Supreme Court. |
| State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 | Supreme Court of India | Writ jurisdiction in cases of violation of natural justice | Cited to establish that the Supreme Court can exercise writ jurisdiction even if other remedies exist, especially when principles of natural justice are violated. |
| Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107 | Supreme Court of India | Writ jurisdiction in cases of failure of natural justice | Cited to support the view that the Supreme Court can exercise writ jurisdiction if there is a failure of natural justice. |
| Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 | Supreme Court of India | Scope of judicial review under the Tenth Schedule | Cited to define the limited scope of judicial review of the Speaker’s orders under the Tenth Schedule, confined to jurisdictional errors, mala fides, non-compliance with natural justice, and perversity. |
| Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 | Supreme Court of India | Principles of natural justice and right to fair hearing | Cited to establish that principles of natural justice and the right to a fair hearing are traceable to Article 14 of the Constitution. |
| Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1621 | Supreme Court of India | Writ jurisdiction when natural justice is violated | Cited to support the view that writ jurisdiction under Article 32 is available when principles of natural justice are violated. |
| Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 | Supreme Court of India | Affirmation of Ujjam Bai ruling | Cited to affirm the view that writ jurisdiction is available when principles of natural justice are violated. |
| Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1 | Supreme Court of India | Challenge to disqualification orders under Tenth Schedule | Cited to establish that a challenge to an order of disqualification under the Tenth Schedule is available under the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. |
| Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra, (1978) 2 SCC 301 | Supreme Court of India | Resignation is a unilateral act | Cited to show the position of law before the 33rd Amendment that a member could resign by a unilateral act. |
| Moti Ram v. Param Dev, (1993) 2 SCC 725 | Supreme Court of India | Resignation is a unilateral act | Cited to show the position of law before the 33rd Amendment that a member could resign by a unilateral act. |
| Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 | Supreme Court of India | Interpretation of constitutional limitations | Cited to support the view that constitutional limitations should be interpreted widely to cure existing evils. |
| State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 501 | Supreme Court of India | Principles of constitutional interpretation | Cited to emphasize that courts should adopt interpretations that glorify the democratic spirit of the Constitution. |
| Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya, (2007) 4 SCC 270 | Supreme Court of India | Date of disqualification under Tenth Schedule | Cited to establish that the disqualification relates to the date when the act of defection takes place. |
| D. Sanjeevayya v. Election Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 1211 | Supreme Court of India | Resignation does not terminate election petition | Cited to support the view that the taint of disqualification does not vanish upon resignation if the act of defection occurred before the resignation. |
| R.S. Dass v. Union of India, (1986) Supp SCC 617 | Supreme Court of India | Flexibility of natural justice principles | Cited to show that the application of natural justice depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. |
| Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 641 | Supreme Court of India | Violation of natural justice and judicial review | Cited to show that an order passed in violation of natural justice is procedurally ultra vires and subject to judicial review. |
| Balachandra L. Jarkhiholi v. B. S. Yeddyurappa, (2011) 7 SCC 1 | Supreme Court of India | Disqualification order struck down due to short notice | Petitioners cited this case to argue that disqualification orders with short notice should be struck down, but the court distinguished it based on the facts of the case. |
| Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184 | Supreme Court of India | Meaning of constitutional mandate | Cited to explain that a constitutional mandate is what is required under or by the Constitution. |
| E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3 | Supreme Court of India | Burden of proof for mala fides | Cited to emphasize that the burden of proof regarding mala fides is on the one who challenges the action. |
| Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 699 | Supreme Court of India | Burden of proof for mala fides | Cited to emphasize that the burden of proof regarding mala fides is on the one who challenges the action. |
| Mayawati v. Markandeya Chand, (1998) 7 SCC 517 | Supreme Court of India | Differing views on the “some material” test for perversity | Cited to show that there are differing views on the “some material” test for perversity. |
| G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam, (1972) 3 SCC 717 | Supreme Court of India | Qualifications for contesting elections | Cited to establish that qualifications for contesting elections must be prescribed by law and cannot be added by courts. |
| N.S. Vardachari v. G. Vasantha Pai, (1972) 2 SCC 594 | Supreme Court of India | Qualifications for contesting elections | Cited to reiterate that once a candidate meets the qualifications and is not disqualified, other considerations become irrelevant. |
| Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 | Supreme Court of India | Constitutional morality vs political morality | Cited to emphasize that constitutional morality should not be replaced by political morality in deciding what the Constitution mandates. |
| Abdul Rahim Ismail C. Rahimtoola v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 1315 | Supreme Court of India | Rejection of reference to larger bench | Cited to show that a reference to a larger bench can be rejected if the questions are already settled. |
| Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 682 | Supreme Court of India | Rejection of reference to larger bench | Cited to show that a reference to a larger bench can be rejected if the questions are already settled. |
| People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399 | Supreme Court of India | Rejection of reference to larger bench | Cited to reiterate the principle that a reference to a larger bench can be rejected if the questions are already settled. |
| Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 224 | Supreme Court of India | Rejection of reference to larger bench | Cited to support the view that casual references to a larger bench should not be undertaken. |
Legal Provisions Considered:
- ✓ Article 14, Constitution of India (Right to Equality)
- ✓ Article 32, Constitution of India (Right to Constitutional Remedies)
- ✓ Article 102(2), Constitution of India (Disqualifications for Membership of Parliament)
- ✓ Article 122, Constitution of India (Courts not to inquire into proceedings of Parliament)
- ✓ Article 136, Constitution of India (Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court)
- ✓ Article 145(3), Constitution of India (Rules of Court)
- ✓ Article 164(1B), Constitution of India (Disqualification for appointment as Minister)
- ✓ Article 168, Constitution of India (Constitution of Legislatures in States)
- ✓ Article 171, Constitution of India (Composition of the Legislative Councils)
- ✓ Article 172, Constitution of India (Duration of State Legislatures)
- ✓ Article 173, Constitution of India (Qualification for membership of the State Legislature)
- ✓ Article 190, Constitution of India (Vacation of seats)
- ✓ Article 191, Constitution of India (Disqualifications for membership)
- ✓ Article 191(1)(e), Constitution of India (Disqualification by law made by Parliament)
- ✓ Article 191(2), Constitution of India (Disqualification under Tenth Schedule)
- ✓ Article 212, Constitution of India (Courts not to inquire into proceedings of the Legislature)
- ✓ Article 226, Constitution of India (Power of High Courts to issue certain writs)
- ✓ Article 227, Constitution of India (Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court)
- ✓ Article 361B, Constitution of India (Disqualification for appointment on remunerative political post)
- ✓ Tenth Schedule, Constitution of India (Anti-Defection Law)
- ✓ Section 36, Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Scrutiny of nominations)
- ✓ Sections 7 to 11, Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Disqualifications for Membership)
- ✓ Karnataka Legislative Assembly (Disqualification of Members on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1986 (Rule 7(3)(b))
- ✓ Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Karnataka Legislative Assembly (Rule 202(2))
Judgment
How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?
| Submission | How the Court Treated it |
|---|---|
| Petitioners’ claim that the Speaker cannot question motive behind resignation | The Court agreed that the Speaker’s inquiry is limited to voluntariness and genuineness, not motive. |
| Petitioners’ argument that disqualification proceedings terminate upon resignation | The Court disagreed, holding that disqualification relates to the date of defection and is not terminated by resignation. |
| Respondents’ argument that Speaker has inherent power to bar re-election | The Court rejected this, stating that such power must be explicitly provided by law. |
| Respondents’ argument that the Speaker can consider conduct before and after resignation | The Court agreed that the Speaker can consider conduct to determine genuineness and voluntariness of the resignation. |
| Election Commission’s submission that disqualification does not bar re-election | The Court agreed with this submission and held that the Speaker cannot bar members from contesting re-elections. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
✓ Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu [1992 Supp (2) SCC 651]: The Court relied on this case to define the limited scope of judicial review of the Speaker’s orders under the Tenth Schedule, confined to jurisdictional errors, mala fides, non-compliance with natural justice, and perversity.
✓ Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya [(2007) 4 SCC 270]: The Court used this case to establish that the disqualification relates to the date when the act of defection takes place.
✓ G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam [(1972) 3 SCC 717]: The Court used this case to establish that qualifications for contesting elections must be prescribed by law and cannot be added by courts.
✓ Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India [1994 Supp (2) SCC 641]: The Court used this case to show that an order passed in violation of natural justice is procedurally ultra vires and subject to judicial review.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s reasoning was primarily influenced by the need to uphold constitutional principles and the balance of powers. The court emphasized that the Speaker’s power is limited and cannot be expanded beyond what is explicitly provided in the Constitution. The court was also concerned about the growing trend of Speakers acting against their constitutional duty of neutrality and the need to discourage undemocratic practices like horse-trading. The sentiments were a mix of upholding constitutional principles, ensuring a fair process, and preventing abuse of power. The court also emphasized the need for the Parliament to strengthen the Tenth Schedule to prevent undemocratic practices.
| Sentiment | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Upholding Constitutional Principles | 40% |
| Ensuring Fair Process | 30% |
| Preventing Abuse of Power | 20% |
| Need to strengthen Tenth Schedule | 10% |
Fact:Law Ratio Analysis:
| Category | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact (Consideration of Factual Aspects) | 35% |
| Law (Legal Considerations) | 65% |
The Supreme Court’s decision was more heavily influenced by legal considerations (65%) than factual aspects (35%). This indicates that the court primarily focused on interpreting the Constitution and relevant laws, rather than the specific facts of the case.
Logical Reasoning:
Issue: Is the Speaker’s order of disqualification valid?
Step 1: Examine if the Speaker acted within constitutional mandate.
Step 2: Determine if there was a violation of natural justice.
Step 3: Check for mala fides and perversity in the Speaker’s order.
Step 4: Conclude that the Speaker’s order is valid to the extent of disqualification, but the period of disqualification is invalid.
Key Takeaways
- ✓ The Speaker’s power to reject resignations is limited to cases where the resignation is not voluntary or genuine. The Speaker cannot inquire into the motive behind the resignation.
- ✓ The disqualification proceedings can continue even after the resignation is tendered, as the disqualification relates back to the date of defection.
- ✓ The Speaker does not have the power to disqualify members for the rest of the term of the Legislative Assembly.
- ✓ Disqualified members are not barred from contesting re-elections.
- ✓ The Supreme Court upheld the disqualification orders but struck down the part barring members from contesting re-elections.
- ✓ The Court emphasized the need for the Parliament to strengthen the Tenth Schedule to prevent undemocratic practices.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil vs. Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly is a landmark ruling that clarifies the scope of the Speaker’s power to disqualify members under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. The Court has emphasized that the Speaker’s power is limited and cannot be expanded beyond what is explicitly provided in the Constitution. The judgment has also affirmed the right of members to resign and to contest re-elections, even if they have been disqualified. This ruling is crucial for maintaining the balance of power and upholding democratic values in India. The Court has also highlighted the need for the Parliament to strengthen the Tenth Schedule to prevent undemocratic practices and ensure the integrity of the democratic process.