LEGAL ISSUE: Whether a Domestic Incident Report is mandatory before initiating proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and what constitutes a ‘shared household’ and ‘domestic relationship’.
CASE TYPE: Criminal
Case Name: Prabha Tyagi vs. Kamlesh Devi
Judgment Date: 12th May, 2022
Date of the Judgment: 12th May, 2022
Citation: (2022) INSC 511
Judges: M.R. Shah J. and B.V. Nagarathna J.
Can a woman claim protection under the Domestic Violence Act if she doesn’t currently live in the shared household? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this crucial question, clarifying the scope of ‘domestic relationship’ and the necessity of a Domestic Incident Report. This judgment provides significant insights into the rights of women facing domestic violence.
The Supreme Court, in this case, examined whether a Domestic Incident Report is mandatory before a Magistrate can initiate proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (D.V. Act). The Court also clarified the definitions of ‘shared household’ and ‘domestic relationship’ under the Act, particularly concerning a woman’s right to reside in her matrimonial home even after the death of her husband.
The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice M.R. Shah and Justice B.V. Nagarathna, with the opinion authored by Justice B.V. Nagarathna.
Case Background
Prabha Tyagi (the appellant), married Kuldeep Tyagi on June 18, 2005. Shortly after the marriage, Kuldeep Tyagi died in a car accident on July 15, 2005. Following her husband’s death, Prabha Tyagi alleged that she faced mistreatment and harassment from her in-laws, including her mother-in-law, Kamlesh Devi (the respondent). She claimed that her Stridhana (gifts given to her at the time of marriage) was being used by her in-laws, and that they denied her rights to her husband’s property.
Prabha Tyagi also stated that she was pregnant at the time of her husband’s death and gave birth to a daughter on March 30, 2006. She moved to Dehradun with her daughter to work as a teacher. She sent a legal notice on November 22, 2006, requesting the return of her Stridhana, but received no response. The mother-in-law also allegedly claimed that the child was not Kuldeep Tyagi’s daughter and objected to recording Prabha Tyagi’s name in the revenue records of the property of her deceased husband.
Prabha Tyagi filed a case under Section 12 of the D.V. Act seeking protection, residence, and compensation orders due to the domestic violence she allegedly faced.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| June 18, 2005 | Prabha Tyagi marries Kuldeep Tyagi. |
| July 15, 2005 | Kuldeep Tyagi dies in a car accident. |
| March 30, 2006 | Prabha Tyagi gives birth to a daughter. |
| November 22, 2006 | Prabha Tyagi sends a legal notice to her in-laws demanding return of Stridhana. |
| 2007 | Prabha Tyagi files a case under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. |
| May 12, 2011 | Special Judicial Magistrate – I, Dehradun, partly allows Prabha Tyagi’s application. |
| July 11, 2014 | Vth Additional Sessions Judge, Dehradun, sets aside the Trial Court’s judgment. |
| July 23, 2019 | High Court of Uttarakhand dismisses the criminal revision petition. |
| May 12, 2022 | Supreme Court of India allows the appeal and sets aside the judgment of High Court of Uttarakhand. |
Course of Proceedings
The Special Judicial Magistrate – I, Dehradun, partly allowed Prabha Tyagi’s application on May 12, 2011, directing the respondents to pay Rs. 10,000 as compensation and return her Stridhana, except for a car, and not to obstruct her from enjoying her husband’s property. However, the Vth Additional Sessions Judge, Dehradun, set aside this order on July 11, 2014, stating that Prabha Tyagi never lived in a shared household with the respondents and that her Stridhana was not in their possession. The High Court of Uttarakhand upheld the Sessions Judge’s decision on July 23, 2019, emphasizing that a Domestic Incident Report was mandatory and that there was no domestic relationship between the parties.
Legal Framework
The Supreme Court analyzed key sections of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005:
- Section 2(a): Defines “aggrieved person” as any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence.
- Section 2(e): Defines “domestic incident report” as a report made in the prescribed form on receipt of a complaint of domestic violence from an aggrieved person.
- Section 2(f): Defines “domestic relationship” as a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption, or are family members living together as a joint family.
- Section 2(s): Defines “shared household” as a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent. It includes a household owned or tenanted by either party or by the joint family of which the respondent is a member.
- Section 3: Defines “domestic violence” to include any act, omission, or conduct that harms or endangers the health, safety, life, limb, or well-being of the aggrieved person, including physical, sexual, verbal, emotional, and economic abuse.
- Section 12(1): States that an aggrieved person, a Protection Officer, or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under this Act.
- Section 12(1) Proviso: States that before passing any order on such application, the Magistrate shall take into consideration any Domestic Incident Report received by him from the Protection Officer or the service provider.
- Section 17: Grants every woman in a domestic relationship the right to reside in the shared household, irrespective of whether she has any right, title, or beneficial interest in the same. It also protects an aggrieved person from being evicted or excluded from the shared household, except in accordance with the procedure established by law.
These provisions are designed to protect women from domestic violence and ensure their right to a safe and secure living environment. The Supreme Court emphasized that the D.V. Act is a piece of Civil Code applicable to every woman in India irrespective of her religious affiliation and/or social background.
Arguments
Appellant’s Arguments (Prabha Tyagi):
- The High Court and the First Appellate Court erred in setting aside the Trial Court’s order, primarily because the appellant was not sharing a household with the respondents.
- The appellant had resided in the family home of the respondents for thirteen days after her husband’s death, which qualifies as a shared household.
- The death of the appellant’s husband does not terminate the domestic relationship, and she continues to be related to the respondents by virtue of her marriage.
- It is not mandatory for the aggrieved person to reside with the respondents at the time of the violence, as long as they have lived together in a shared household at some point.
- The provisions of the D.V. Act must be interpreted to ensure that the protection granted to women is made available in the widest amplitude.
- A Domestic Incident Report is not mandatory for a Magistrate to take cognizance of a case under Section 12 of the D.V. Act.
Respondent’s Arguments (Kamlesh Devi):
- The appellant was not in a domestic relationship with the respondents, as she lived with her husband in Roorkee, not with the respondents in Jhabreda.
- The facts presented by the appellant are inaccurate and fabricated.
- The appellant failed to prove that her family had delivered the articles of Stridhana to the respondents.
- The Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the matter without a Domestic Incident Report.
- The proceedings under the D.V. Act were ill-motivated and intended to harass the respondents.
Sub-Submissions:
| Main Submission | Appellant’s Sub-Submission | Respondent’s Sub-Submission |
|---|---|---|
| Domestic Relationship | The appellant lived in a shared household for 13 days after her husband’s death, and the death does not end the domestic relationship. | The appellant did not live with the respondents in Jhabreda, but in Roorkee, hence no domestic relationship. |
| Shared Household | The appellant’s short stay after her husband’s death qualifies as residing in a shared household. | The appellant never lived in a shared household with the respondents. |
| Mandatory Incident Report | A Domestic Incident Report is not mandatory for a Magistrate to take cognizance of a case under Section 12. | A Domestic Incident Report is mandatory for the Magistrate to take cognizance of the matter. |
| Stridhana | The Stridhana was given at the time of marriage and was used by the respondent’s family. | No Stridhana was given to the respondents. |
Innovativeness of the argument: The appellant’s argument that the definition of domestic relationship includes past relationships and that a Domestic Incident Report is not mandatory for the Magistrate to take cognizance of a case was innovative.
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the following issues for consideration:
- Whether the consideration of a Domestic Incident Report is mandatory before initiating proceedings under the D.V. Act, in order to invoke substantive provisions of Sections 18 to 20 and 22 of the said Act?
- Whether it is mandatory for the aggrieved person to reside with those persons against whom the allegations have been leveled at the point of commission of violence?
- Whether there should be a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the person against whom the relief is claimed?
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
| Issue | Court’s Decision |
|---|---|
| Whether the consideration of a Domestic Incident Report is mandatory? | The Court held that it is not mandatory for a Magistrate to consider a Domestic Incident Report before initiating proceedings under the D.V. Act. The Magistrate can take cognizance of a complaint by an aggrieved person even without the report. |
| Whether it is mandatory for the aggrieved person to reside with those persons against whom the allegations have been leveled at the point of commission of violence? | The Court held that it is not mandatory for the aggrieved person to reside with the alleged perpetrators at the time of the violence. The right to reside in a shared household is an independent right. |
| Whether there should be a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the person against whom the relief is claimed? | The Court held that there should be a domestic relationship, but it need not be subsisting at the time of filing the application. The relationship can be past, as long as the acts of violence relate to the period of the domestic relationship. |
Authorities
| Authority | Court | How it was used by the Court | Legal Point |
|---|---|---|---|
| Juveria Abdul Majid Patni vs. Atif Iqbal Mansoori and Another [(2014) 10 SCC 736] | Supreme Court of India | The Court referred to this case to interpret the definition of aggrieved person under Section 2(a) of the D.V. Act. It was used to emphasize that even a woman who has been in a domestic relationship in the past can be an aggrieved person. | Definition of Aggrieved Person |
| V.D. Bhanot vs. Savita Bhanot [(2012) 3 SCC 183] | Supreme Court of India | This case was used to support the view that conduct of the parties even prior to coming into force of the D.V. Act can be taken into consideration while passing an order under Sections 18, 19 and 20 of the D.V. Act. | Retrospective Application of D.V. Act |
| Krishna Bhattacharjee vs. Sarathi Choudhury and Another [(2016) 2 SCC 705] | Supreme Court of India | This case was used to support that a claim for recovery of Stridhana, two years after a decree of judicial separation is maintainable, and that judicial separation does not end the domestic relationship under Section 2(f) of the D.V. Act. | Domestic Relationship after Judicial Separation |
| Saraswathy vs. Babu [(2014) 3 SCC 712] | Supreme Court of India | Referred to in Krishna Bhattacharjee vs. Sarathi Choudhury and Another. | Domestic Relationship after Judicial Separation |
| Rashmi Kumar vs. Mahesh Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2 SCC 397] | Supreme Court of India | This case was used to support the view that Stridhana property is the exclusive property of the wife. | Stridhana Property |
| Ajay Kumar vs. Lata alias Sharuti and Others [(2019) 15 SCC 352] | Supreme Court of India | This case was used to support that even after the death of the husband, maintenance can be claimed from the brother of the deceased husband. | Maintenance Claims |
| Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja [(2021) 1 SCC 414] | Supreme Court of India | This case was used to interpret the expressions ‘lives or have at any point of time lived’ appearing in Section 2(s) of the D.V. Act. It overruled S.R. Batra vs. Taruna Batra. | Interpretation of Shared Household |
| S.R. Batra vs. Taruna Batra [(2007) 3 SCC 169] | Supreme Court of India | Overruled. This case was overruled by Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja, which clarified that the definition of ‘shared household’ is not limited to the husband’s property but includes a household where the aggrieved person has lived with the relatives of the husband. | Interpretation of Shared Household |
| Harbhajan Singh vs. Press Council of India (AIR 2002 SC 1351) | Supreme Court of India | This case was used to explain how to interpret the words of a statute in their context and purpose. | Statutory Interpretation |
| Smt. Bharati Naik vs. Shri Ravi Ramnath Halarnkar and Another [2010 SCC Online Bom 243] | High Court of Bombay at Goa | This case was used to emphasize that the words ‘has been’ and ‘have lived’ take in their sweep even a past relationship. | Past Relationships under D.V. Act |
| Vandhana vs. T. Srikanth and Krishnamachari [2007 SCC Online Mad 553] | High Court of Madras | This case was used to support that Sections 2(f), 2(s) and 17 of the D.V. Act ought to be given the widest interpretation possible, and that the words ‘live’ or ‘have at any point of time lived’ would include in its purview ‘the right to live’. | Interpretation of ‘Live’ and ‘Lived’ in D.V. Act |
| D. Velu Samy v. D. Patchaiammal [(2010) 10 SCC 469] | Supreme Court of India | This case was used to discuss the concept of “relationship in the nature of marriage” in the context of the DV Act, and it was held to be akin to a common law marriage. | Relationship in the nature of Marriage |
| Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma [(2013) 15 SCC 755] | Supreme Court of India | This case was used to further clarify the concept of “relationship in the nature of marriage” and provided guidelines to determine if a relationship falls under this category. | Relationship in the nature of Marriage |
| Nayanakumar vs. State of Karnataka [ILR 2009 Kar 4295] | High Court of Karnataka | This case was used to support that a Domestic Incident Report is not a sine qua non for entertaining or deciding the application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. | Mandatory Nature of Domestic Incident Report |
| Abhiram Gogoi vs. Rashmi Rekha Gogoi [(2011) 4 Gauhati Law Reports 276] | Gauhati High Court | This case was used to support that it is the duty of the Protection Officer to make a Domestic Incident Report to the Magistrate upon receipt of a complaint of domestic violence. | Mandatory Nature of Domestic Incident Report |
| Md. Basit vs. State of Assam and Others [(2012) 1 Gauhati Law Reports 747] | Gauhati High Court | This case was used to support that Section 12 of the D.V. Act does not require a Magistrate to specifically call for a Domestic Incident Report. | Mandatory Nature of Domestic Incident Report |
| Rahul Soorma vs. State of Himachal Pradesh [2012 SCC Online HP 2574] | High Court of Himachal Pradesh | This case was used to support that the purpose of the D.V. Act is to give immediate relief to the aggrieved person, and a Magistrate can take cognizance of an application under Section 12 even before the receipt of a Domestic Incident Report. | Mandatory Nature of Domestic Incident Report |
| A. Vidya Sagar vs. State of Andhra Pradesh [2014 SCC Online Hyd 715] | High Court of Andhra Pradesh | This case was used to support that a domestic violence case can be instituted and taken cognizance of on the basis of the application filed by the aggrieved person. | Mandatory Nature of Domestic Incident Report |
| Ravi Kumar Bajpai vs. Renu Awasthi Bajpai [ILR (2016) MP 302] | High Court of Madhya Pradesh | This case was used to support that the legislative intent of the D.V. Act does not make it mandatory for the Magistrate to call for a report from the Protection Officer as a pre-condition. | Mandatory Nature of Domestic Incident Report |
| Shambhu Prasad Singh vs. Manjari [190 (2012) DLT 647] | High Court of Delhi | This case was used to support that Section 12(1) of the D.V. Act does not mandate that an application seeking relief must be accompanied by a Domestic Incident Report. | Mandatory Nature of Domestic Incident Report |
| Rakesh Choudhary vs. Vandana Choudhary [2019 SCC Online J&K 512] | High Court of Jammu and Kashmir | This case was used to support that the report of the Protection Officer is not a sine qua non for issuing process in a petition under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. | Mandatory Nature of Domestic Incident Report |
| Vijay Maruti Gaikwad vs. Savita Vijay Gaikward [2018 (1) HLR 295] | High Court of Bombay at Aurangabad Bench | This case was used to support that if the matter is before the Court and the wife preferred not to approach the Protection Officer, the Court is not bound to call the report of the Protection Officer. | Mandatory Nature of Domestic Incident Report |
| Suraj Sharma vs. Bharti Sharma [2016 SCC Online Chh 1825] | High Court of Chhattisgarh | This case was used to support that the Domestic Incident Report shall not be conclusive material for making any order. | Mandatory Nature of Domestic Incident Report |
| Rama Singh vs. Maya Singh [(2012) 4 MPLJ 612] | High Court of Madhya Pradesh | Overruled. This case was overruled by the Supreme Court, which held that the proviso to Section 12(1) is not mandatory for every case. | Mandatory Nature of Domestic Incident Report |
| Ravi Dutta vs. Kiran Dutta and Another [208 (2014) DLT 61] | High Court of Delhi | Overruled. This case was overruled by the Supreme Court, which held that the proviso to Section 12(1) is not mandatory for every case. | Mandatory Nature of Domestic Incident Report |
Judgment
| Submission | Court’s Treatment |
|---|---|
| Appellant’s submission that she lived in a shared household for 13 days after her husband’s death. | The Court accepted this submission, stating that the short stay qualifies as residing in a shared household. |
| Appellant’s submission that the death of her husband does not terminate the domestic relationship. | The Court accepted this submission, stating that the appellant continues to be related to the respondents by virtue of her marriage. |
| Appellant’s submission that a Domestic Incident Report is not mandatory. | The Court accepted this submission, stating that the Magistrate can take cognizance of a case even without a Domestic Incident Report. |
| Respondent’s submission that the appellant did not live with them in Jhabreda. | The Court rejected this submission, stating that the appellant’s right to reside in the shared household is not dependent on her actual residence. |
| Respondent’s submission that a Domestic Incident Report is mandatory. | The Court rejected this submission, stating that the proviso to Section 12(1) is not mandatory for every case. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court:
- The Court relied on Juveria Abdul Majid Patni vs. Atif Iqbal Mansoori and Another [(2014) 10 SCC 736]* to define ‘aggrieved person’ as including women who have been in a domestic relationship in the past.
- The Court used V.D. Bhanot vs. Savita Bhanot [(2012) 3 SCC 183]* to emphasize that conduct prior to the D.V. Act can be considered.
- The Court cited Krishna Bhattacharjee vs. Sarathi Choudhury and Another [(2016) 2 SCC 705]* to support that judicial separation does not end a domestic relationship.
- The Court referred to Rashmi Kumar vs. Mahesh Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2 SCC 397]* to support that Stridhana is the wife’s exclusive property.
- The Court used Ajay Kumar vs. Lata alias Sharuti and Others [(2019) 15 SCC 352]* to support that maintenance can be claimed from the deceased husband’s brother.
- The Court relied on Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja [(2021) 1 SCC 414]* to interpret the meaning of ‘shared household’ and overruled S.R. Batra vs. Taruna Batra [(2007) 3 SCC 169]* in the process.
- The Court used Harbhajan Singh vs. Press Council of India (AIR 2002 SC 1351)* to explain how to interpret the words of a statute in their context and purpose.
- The Court cited Smt. Bharati Naik vs. Shri Ravi Ramnath Halarnkar and Another [2010 SCC Online Bom 243]* to emphasize that past relationships are included in the D.V. Act.
- The Court referred to Vandhana vs. T. Srikanth and Krishnamachari [2007 SCC Online Mad 553]* to support the widest interpretation of the D.V. Act.
- The Court used D. Velu Samy v. D. Patchaiammal [(2010) 10 SCC 469]* and Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma [(2013) 15 SCC 755]* to clarify the concept of ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’.
- The Court relied on various High Court judgments such as Nayanakumar vs. State of Karnataka [ILR 2009 Kar 4295]*, Abhiram Gogoi vs. Rashmi Rekha Gogoi [(2011) 4 Gauhati Law Reports 276]*, Md. Basit vs. State of Assam and Others [(2012) 1 Gauhati Law Reports 747]*, Rahul Soorma vs. State of Himachal Pradesh [2012 SCC Online HP 2574]*, A. Vidya Sagar vs. State of Andhra Pradesh [2014 SCC Online Hyd 715]*, Ravi Kumar Bajpai vs. Renu Awasthi Bajpai [ILR (2016) MP 302]*, Shambhu Prasad Singh vs. Manjari [190 (2012) DLT 647]*, Rakesh Choudhary vs. Vandana Choudhary [2019 SCC Online J&K 512]*, Vijay Maruti Gaikwad vs. Savita Vijay Gaikward [2018 (1) HLR 295]*, and Suraj Sharma vs. Bharti Sharma [2016 SCC Online Chh 1825]* to support its view that a Domestic Incident Report is not mandatory for the Magistrate to take cognizance of a case.
- The Court overruled Rama Singh vs. Maya Singh [(2012) 4 MPLJ 612]* and Ravi Dutta vs. Kiran Dutta and Another [208 (2014) DLT 61]*, which had held that a Domestic Incident Report is mandatory.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the need to protect women from domestic violence, interpreting the D.V. Act in a manner that ensures its benefits are widely available. The Court emphasized that the Act is a piece of civil code applicable to all women in India, irrespective of their religious affiliation or social background. The court also considered the societal context in India, where many women are not financially independent and rely on their male relatives for residence and support.
The Court’s reasoning was also influenced by the need to provide immediate relief to aggrieved women. By holding that a Domestic Incident Report is not mandatory, the Court ensured that women can seek redressal under the D.V. Act even if they have not approached a Protection Officer or service provider. Further, the Court’s interpretation of the term ‘shared household’ and ‘domestic relationship’ was expansive, ensuring that women who have been in a domestic relationship, even if not currently residing in the shared household, are protected.
| Sentiment | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Protection of Women | 40% |
| Broad Interpretation of D.V. Act | 30% |
| Immediate Relief to Aggrieved Women | 20% |
| Societal Context in India | 10% |
Final Order
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court of Uttarakhand, and restored the order passed by the Trial Court. The Court also directed the Trial Court to proceed with the matter in accordance with law.
Key Findings
- A Domestic Incident Report is not mandatory for a Magistrate to take cognizance of a case under Section 12 of the D.V. Act.
- It is not mandatory for the aggrieved person to reside with the alleged perpetrators at the time of the violence.
- A domestic relationship need not be subsisting at the time of filing the application, as long as the acts of violence relate to the period of the domestic relationship.
- The definition of ‘shared household’ is not limited to the husband’s property but includes a household where the aggrieved person has lived with the relatives of the husband.
- The D.V. Act is a piece of civil code applicable to every woman in India irrespective of her religious affiliation and/or social background.
Flowchart of Legal Process
Implications
This judgment has significant implications for women facing domestic violence:
- It clarifies that women can seek protection under the D.V. Act even if they are not currently residing in the shared household.
- It removes the requirement of a mandatory Domestic Incident Report, making it easier for women to access legal recourse.
- It expands the definition of ‘shared household’, providing greater protection to women in various living arrangements.
- It reinforces the principle that the D.V. Act is a protective legislation designed to safeguard the rights of women.
For the legal system, this judgment clarifies the interpretation of key provisions of the D.V. Act, ensuring that they are applied in a manner that is consistent with the legislative intent. It also sets a precedent for future cases, providing guidance to lower courts on how to approach cases of domestic violence.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Prabha Tyagi vs. Kamlesh Devi is a landmark decision that reinforces the protection of women from domestic violence. By clarifying the definitions of ‘shared household’ and ‘domestic relationship’, and by holding that a Domestic Incident Report is not mandatory, the Court has made it easier for women to access legal recourse. This judgment is a significant step towards ensuring that the D.V. Act serves its intended purpose of protecting women from violence and abuse. It underscores the importance of interpreting laws in a manner that promotes social justice and equality.