Supreme Court clarifies execution of partition decrees: Joginder Singh vs. Dr. Virinderjit Singh Gill (2024)

Date of the Judgment: 17 October 2024

Citation: 2024 INSC 814

Judges: J.B. Pardiwala and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Can a co-sharer object to the execution of a partition decree? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case involving a dispute over land ownership and execution of partition decrees. The core issue revolved around whether objections raised by a co-sharer to the execution of a partition decree were maintainable. The Supreme Court, in this judgment, clarified the legal position on objections to execution of decrees, particularly in the context of partition suits, and emphasized that procedural irregularities should not defeat substantive rights. The judgment was delivered by a division bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Sanjay Karol, with Justice Sanjay Karol authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The case originated from a dispute over land in Moga, Punjab. The dispute involved multiple suits and objections related to the partition of land. The first suit, Civil Suit No.66 of 1979, was filed by Mukand Singh and Chanan Singh seeking a declaration and separate possession of a half share of land in Khasra No.6363, Khatauni No.7257, and Khasra No.2259. The suit was decreed in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring them owners and possessors of half the property, which was upheld in appeal on 18th October 1982. A warrant of possession was issued in favor of Mukand Singh on 21st September 1985.

Subsequently, in 1987, Dr. Thakar Singh filed Civil Suit No.266 for his individual one-fourth share of 58 marlas in Khasra No.2259. This second suit included the plaintiffs from the first suit as defendants. The court decreed this suit in favor of Dr. Thakar Singh. A final decree was drawn up on 4th February 1998. The respondents, the decree holders, filed an execution petition on 25th January 2002. The present appellant, Joginder Singh, son of Mukand Singh, filed objections to the execution petition on 25th January 2002.

Timeline

Legal Framework

The objections were filed under Section 47, Order XXI Rule 58, and Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). These provisions deal with the adjudication of claims and objections during execution proceedings.

Section 47 of the CPC states:

“(1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.”

Order XXI Rule 58 of the CPC deals with the adjudication of claims to or objections to the attachment of property. It states:

“(1) Where any claim is preferred to, or any objection is made to the attachment of, any property attached in execution of a decree on the ground that such property is not liable to such attachment, the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the claim or objection in accordance with the provisions herein contained…”

Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC addresses resistance or obstruction to the possession of immovable property. It states:

“(1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction.”

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments (Objector):

• The execution application is not maintainable against the property bearing Khasra Nos. 2259/1, 2259/2, and 2259/3, as the objector owns and possesses this land.
• The objector has owned and possessed 14.60 marlas of Khasra No. 2259 since 25.5.1989 by virtue of a civil court decree.
• The objector’s father, Mukand Singh, was given possession of 14.60 marlas of the property via warrants of possession dated 8.9.85.
• The decree holders misguided the court by not informing them that the objector owns and possesses the property.
• The objector was not aware of the litigation and was a necessary party to the suit.
• The objector is a bonafide transferee of the property via a civil court decree.
• The decree holders are stopped from filing the execution because they did not object when the objector raised construction on the land.

Respondent’s Arguments (Decree Holders):

• The objector has no locus standi to file objections.
• The objections are not maintainable.
• The objector claims the whole of Khasra No. 2259 but only claims 14.5 marlas based on a civil court decree.
• Mukand Singh was a party to the civil court decree.
• There was proper service of notice to Mukand Singh.
• The objector was aware of the suit and has not been concealed by the decree holder.
• The objector and his father never left Moga.

Submissions Table:

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issue for consideration:

1. Whether the objections filed by the present appellant, now represented through LRs, are maintainable and warrant interference with the decree of the learned civil court.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court relied on Deep Chand v. Mohan Lal [CITATION] to emphasize that execution proceedings should enable the decree-holder to obtain the fruits of the decree.
• The Court referenced Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi & Ors. [CITATION] to highlight that Section 47 of the CPC is intended to prevent multiplicity of suits and dispose of objections expeditiously.
• The Court cited Rajasthan Financial Corpn. v. Man Industrial Corpn. Ltd. [CITATION], SBI v. Indexport Registered [CITATION], J&K Bank Ltd. v. Jagdish C. Gupta [CITATION], and Rajasthan Udyog v. Hindustan Engg. & Industries Ltd. [CITATION] to reiterate that an executing court cannot go behind the decree or modify its terms.
• The Court referred to Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra [CITATION] to state that a decree passed by a competent court operates as res judicata, but a decree passed without jurisdiction is a nullity.
• The Court followed Sabitri Dei v. Sarat Chandra Rout [CITATION] and Jamia Masjid v. K.V. Rudrappa [CITATION] to affirm the principle that a decree passed by a competent court operates as res judicata.
• The Court considered Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. [CITATION] to emphasize that the executing court must determine all questions arising between the parties relating to the execution of the decree.
• The Court relied on Jai Narain Ram Lundia v. Kedar Nath Khetan [CITATION] to state that the executing court can consider whether the defendant can perform their part of the decree.
• The Court cited C.F. Angadi v. Y.S. Hirannayya [CITATION] and Deepa Bhargava & Anr. v. Mahesh Bhargava & Ors. [CITATION] to reiterate that an executing court must execute the decree as it stands and cannot modify its terms.
• The Court referenced Rafique Bibi v. Syed Waliuddin [CITATION], Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule [CITATION], and Asma Lateef v. Shabbir Ahmad [CITATION] to hold that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, but a decree suffering from illegality must be set aside as per law.
• The Court considered Shivashankar Prasad Shah v. Baikunth Nath Singh [CITATION] and Bhagyoday Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Ravindra Balkrishna Patel [CITATION] to hold that the dismissal of an execution petition for default does not bar further execution of the decree.
• The Court cited Hameed Kunju v. Nazim [CITATION] to state that writ petitions cannot be entertained in landlord-tenant disputes when the executing court is seized of applications seeking setting aside of the eviction decree.
• The Court relied on Lakshmi Narayanan v. S.S. Pandian [CITATION] and Oudh Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Thakurain Bind Basni Kuer [CITATION] to discuss the effect of a compromise decree on the executability of the decree.
• The Court referred to Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon [CITATION] to emphasize that rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice.
• The Court cited Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and Another [CITATION] to hold that non-compliance with procedural requirements should not entail automatic dismissal unless the statute mandates it.
• The Court mentioned General Manager of the Raj Durbhunga v. Coomar Ramaput Sing [CITATION] and Messer Griesheim GmbH v. Goyal MG Gases Pvt Ltd. [CITATION] to highlight the problems faced by litigants in India after obtaining a decree.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?:

The Supreme Court was primarily concerned with ensuring that substantive justice was not defeated by procedural technicalities. The Court noted that the objector, as a co-sharer and successor-in-interest, had a right to raise objections to the execution of the decree, especially since the decree of the first partition suit had already granted rights to the objector’s father. The Court was also concerned with the fact that the High Court had dismissed the revision application on purely procedural grounds, without considering the merits of the case. The Court emphasized that procedural rules are meant to aid the administration of justice and should not be used to deny substantive rights.

Logical Reasoning:

The Court rejected the High Court’s view that the objector had misapplied the provisions of the CPC. The Court held that even if the objector had incorrectly cited the provisions, the substantive rights of the objector needed to be protected. The Court emphasized that the procedure is the handmaiden of justice and should not be a tool to deny justice. The Court also noted that the first partition suit had already granted rights to the objector’s father, and therefore, the second partition suit could not take away those rights. The Court, therefore, remanded the matter to the First Appellate Court to take a fresh decision on the objections of the appellant on merits.

“…procedural irregularity cannot defeat substantive rights or cannot subvert substantive justice.”

“…procedure is the handmaiden of justice.”

“…the problems of the litigant in India, begin once he has obtained a decree.”

Decision

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order of the High Court. The matter was remanded to the First Appellate Court to take a fresh decision on the objections of the appellant on merits. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court should not have dismissed the revision application on mere procedural grounds and that the substantive rights of the objector needed to be considered.

Implications

This judgment clarifies that:

• Objections to the execution of a partition decree by a co-sharer are maintainable under Section 47 of the CPC.
• Procedural irregularities should not defeat substantive rights.
• Executing courts must consider the merits of objections raised by co-sharers and not dismiss them on mere technicalities.
• The principle that procedure is the handmaiden of justice should be upheld.

The judgment sets a precedent for similar cases where co-sharers raise objections to the execution of partition decrees. It underscores the importance of ensuring that substantive justice is not sacrificed for procedural compliance. The Court’s emphasis on the rights of co-sharers and the need to address objections on merits will have a significant impact on future execution proceedings in partition suits.