LEGAL ISSUE: Whether storing adulterated food for use as an ingredient is an offense under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
CASE TYPE: Criminal – Food Adulteration
Case Name: Delhi Administration vs. Vidya Gupta
Judgment Date: 24 April 2018
Date of the Judgment: 24 April 2018
Citation: (2018) INSC 344
Judges: S.A. Bobde, J., L. Nageswara Rao, J.
Can a food vendor be held liable for storing adulterated ghee, even if it’s not directly sold but used as an ingredient in other food items? The Supreme Court of India addressed this critical question in a recent judgment. The case revolves around the interpretation of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, specifically concerning the storage of adulterated food. The Supreme Court bench, comprising Justices S.A. Bobde and L. Nageswara Rao, delivered the judgment.
Case Background
On April 8, 2004, a Food Inspector, Shri S.K. Sharma, purchased a sample of ghee from the shop of M/s New Bikaner Sweet Center, where the respondent, Vidya Gupta, was in charge. The ghee was stored in an open tin without any label or declaration. The sample was divided into three parts and sealed as per procedure. One part was sent to the Public Analyst (PA), Delhi, while the other two were deposited with the Local Health Authority (LHA).
The PA’s report stated that the ghee sample exceeded the permissible Butyro Refractometer (BR) reading limit, had a low Reichert value, and tested positive for the Baudouin Test, indicating adulteration. The respondent then requested that the second sample be analyzed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. The Director’s report also confirmed that the ghee did not meet the standards.
The Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (ACMM-II) found the respondent guilty. However, the Sessions Judge overturned this conviction, acquitting the respondent. The High Court declined to grant leave to appeal against the acquittal, leading the Delhi Administration to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| April 8, 2004 | Food Inspector collects ghee sample from the respondent’s shop. |
| 2004 | Public Analyst (PA) declares the sample as adulterated. |
| 20.10.2004 | Director, Central Food Laboratory also declares the sample as adulterated. |
| April 15, 2011 | ACMM-II convicts the respondent. |
| April 15, 2011 | Sessions Judge acquits the respondent. |
| 20.12.2013 | High Court declines to grant leave to appeal against the acquittal. |
| April 24, 2018 | Supreme Court sets aside the acquittal and convicts the respondent. |
Course of Proceedings
The Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (ACMM-II) initially convicted the respondent for violating the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. However, the Sessions Judge set aside this order and acquitted the respondent. The Delhi High Court refused to grant leave to appeal against the acquittal, citing two main reasons: first, the ghee was not meant for direct sale but for use in making sweets, and second, there was a discrepancy in the BR readings between the PA and Director’s reports. This led to the Delhi Administration filing an appeal in the Supreme Court.
Legal Framework
The case primarily revolves around Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, which prohibits the manufacture, storage, sale, or distribution of adulterated food. Specifically, the explanation to Section 7 states:
“Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed to store any adulterated food or misbranded food or any article of food referred to in clause (iii) or clause (iv) or clause (v) if he stores such food for the manufacture therefrom of any article of food for sale.”
This explanation clarifies that storing adulterated food for the purpose of manufacturing another food item for sale is also an offense. The Supreme Court also refers to Section 13 of the Act, which deals with the procedure for analyzing food samples and the evidentiary value of the reports from the Public Analyst and the Director of the Central Food Laboratory.
Arguments
The respondent argued that since the adulterated ghee was not intended for direct sale but was to be used as an ingredient in making sweets, no offense was committed under Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The respondent relied on the judgment in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narain Tandon [1976] 1 SCC 546, which held that the term “store” in Section 7 means “store for sale.”
The prosecution argued that the explanation to Section 7 clearly states that storing adulterated food for the purpose of manufacturing another food item for sale is an offense. They contended that the purpose of the Act is to prevent the adulteration of food and its sale to the public, regardless of whether the adulterated food is directly sold or used as an ingredient.
The prosecution also argued that the Director’s report supersedes the Public Analyst’s report, and any variation between the two is irrelevant, relying on Calcutta Municipal Corporation v. Pawan Kumar Saraf and another [1999] 2 SCC 400.
| Submission | Sub-Submissions |
|---|---|
| Respondent’s Argument: Ghee was not for direct sale |
|
| Prosecution’s Argument: Storing adulterated food for any sale-related purpose is illegal |
|
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court addressed the following issues:
- Whether the storage of adulterated ghee, intended not for direct sale but as an ingredient in the preparation of sweets, constitutes an offense under Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
- Whether the discrepancy between the Public Analyst’s report and the Director’s report regarding the BR reading is a valid ground for acquittal.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
| Issue | Court’s Decision | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| Whether storing adulterated ghee for use in sweets is an offense | Yes, it is an offense. | The explanation to Section 7 of the Act clearly states that storing adulterated food for the purpose of manufacturing another food item for sale is an offense. |
| Whether the variation between PA and Director’s report is a valid ground for acquittal | No, it is not a valid ground. | The Director’s report supersedes the Public Analyst’s report, and the variation between the two is irrelevant. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:
| Authority | Court | How it was considered |
|---|---|---|
| Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kacheroo Mal [1976] 1 SCC 412 | Supreme Court of India | The court applied the rule of interpretation that a statute should be construed to suppress mischief and advance the remedy. |
| Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narain Tandon [1976] 1 SCC 546 | Supreme Court of India | Overruled. The court held that this case is no longer applicable due to the amendment to Section 7 of the Act. |
| Calcutta Municipal Corporation v. Pawan Kumar Saraf and another [1999] 2 SCC 400 | Supreme Court of India | Followed. The court reiterated that the Director’s report supersedes the Public Analyst’s report. |
| State (Delhi Administration) v. Ram Singh and Another [2009] 1 FAC 371 | Delhi High Court | The court held that this case was not applicable in the present context. |
| Kanshi Nath v. State [2005] 2 FAC 219 | Delhi High Court | The court held that this case did not lay down good law. |
| State v. Mahender Kumar & Ors. [2008] 1 FAC 177 | Delhi High Court | The court held that this case did not lay down good law. |
| Section 7, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 | Parliament of India | The court interpreted the explanation to Section 7, which defines storage of adulterated food. |
| Section 13, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 | Parliament of India | The court interpreted the provisions related to the evidentiary value of the reports of Public Analyst and the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. |
Judgment
| Submission by Parties | Treatment by the Court |
|---|---|
| Respondent’s argument that the ghee was not for direct sale | Rejected. The court held that the explanation to Section 7 of the Act clearly states that storing adulterated food for manufacturing another food item for sale is an offense. |
| Respondent’s reliance on Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narain Tandon [1976] 1 SCC 546 | Rejected. The court held that the case is no longer applicable due to the amendment to Section 7 of the Act. |
| Prosecution’s argument that storing adulterated food for any sale-related purpose is illegal | Accepted. The court held that the explanation to Section 7 of the Act clearly states that storing adulterated food for manufacturing another food item for sale is an offense. |
| Prosecution’s argument that the Director’s report supersedes the Public Analyst’s report | Accepted. The court held that the Director’s report supersedes the Public Analyst’s report, and any variation between the two is irrelevant. |
The Supreme Court held that the respondent was guilty of storing adulterated food, as the explanation to Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, clearly states that storing adulterated food for the purpose of manufacturing another food item for sale is an offense. The court also reiterated that the Director’s report supersedes the Public Analyst’s report, and the variation between the two is irrelevant.
The court observed that the decision in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narain Tandon [1976] 1 SCC 546, which held that “store” means “store for sale,” was no longer applicable due to the amendment to Section 7 of the Act. The court also relied on Calcutta Municipal Corporation v. Pawan Kumar Saraf and another [1999] 2 SCC 400, which emphasized the finality and conclusiveness of the Director’s report.
The Supreme Court set aside the acquittal of the respondent and convicted him for the offense under Section 2 (ia) (a) (c) & (m) of the Act, punishable under Section 16 (1) (a), read with Section 7 of the Act. However, considering the age of the respondent and the fact that the proceedings commenced in 2004, the court limited the sentence to the period already undergone.
| Authority | How it was viewed by the Court |
|---|---|
| Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narain Tandon [1976] 1 SCC 546 | Overruled. The court held that the case is no longer applicable due to the amendment to Section 7 of the Act. |
| Calcutta Municipal Corporation v. Pawan Kumar Saraf and another [1999] 2 SCC 400 | Followed. The court reiterated that the Director’s report supersedes the Public Analyst’s report. |
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily driven by the need to prevent food adulteration and protect public health. The court emphasized the importance of interpreting the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, in a manner that would suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. The court also stressed the finality and conclusiveness of the Director’s report, which is given higher evidentiary value under the Act.
The court’s reasoning was heavily influenced by the explicit language of the explanation to Section 7 of the Act, which clearly states that storing adulterated food for the purpose of manufacturing another food item for sale is an offense. The court also considered the legislative intent behind the Act, which is to prevent the sale of adulterated food to the public.
The court also noted that the decision in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narain Tandon [1976] 1 SCC 546, was no longer applicable due to the amendment to Section 7 of the Act.
| Reason | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Interpretation of Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 | 40% |
| Evidentiary value of the Director’s report | 30% |
| Legislative intent to prevent food adulteration | 20% |
| Rejection of precedent in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narain Tandon [1976] 1 SCC 546 | 10% |
| Category | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 30% |
| Law | 70% |
Logical Reasoning
The Supreme Court considered the arguments and authorities, and concluded that the respondent was guilty of storing adulterated food. The court emphasized that the explanation to Section 7 of the Act clearly states that storing adulterated food for the purpose of manufacturing another food item for sale is an offense. The court also held that the Director’s report supersedes the Public Analyst’s report, and the variation between the two is irrelevant.
The court rejected the argument that the ghee was not for direct sale, stating that the explanation to Section 7 of the Act clearly covers such situations. The court also rejected the reliance on the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narain Tandon [1976] 1 SCC 546, stating that it was no longer applicable due to the amendment to Section 7 of the Act.
The court’s decision was based on the need to prevent food adulteration and protect public health. The court emphasized that the Act should be interpreted in a manner that would suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.
The Supreme Court quoted the following from the judgment:
“The Act has been enacted to curb and remedy the widespread evil of food adulteration, and to ensure the sale of wholesome food to the people.”
“The explanation to the section does not support this contention. It clearly lays down that if a person stores any adulterated food for the purpose of manufacturing from it any article of food for sale, he shall be deemed to store adulterated food.”
“The certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory [under sub-section (2B)] shall supersede the report given by the public analyst under sub-section (1).”
There was no minority opinion in this case.
Key Takeaways
- ✓ Storing adulterated food, even if it is intended for use as an ingredient in other food items, is an offense under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
- ✓ The report of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory supersedes the report of the Public Analyst.
- ✓ Any variation between the reports of the Public Analyst and the Director is irrelevant.
- ✓ The legislative intent of the Act is to prevent the sale of adulterated food to the public.
This judgment has significant implications for food vendors, as it clarifies that they cannot escape liability by claiming that the adulterated food was not for direct sale. It also reinforces the importance of ensuring that all food items, including ingredients, meet the required standards.
Directions
The Supreme Court directed that the sentence be confined to the period already undergone, considering that the proceedings commenced in 2004, the business had closed down, and the respondent was about 70 years old.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that storing adulterated food for the purpose of manufacturing another food item for sale is an offense under Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. This case overruled the previous interpretation of the term “store” in Section 7 as “store for sale” as held in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narain Tandon [1976] 1 SCC 546, which was decided before the amendment to the Act.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s judgment in Delhi Administration vs. Vidya Gupta clarifies that storing adulterated food for any purpose related to the sale of food is an offense under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The court emphasized the importance of preventing food adulteration and protecting public health. The decision also reinforces the evidentiary value of the Director’s report and sets aside the previous interpretation of the law.