Supreme Court Clarifies Halt Contractor Preference: Union of India vs. Md. Samim Azad (2019)

Date of the Judgment: 01 February 2019

Citation: Civil Appeal No. 1382 of 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 22212 of 2018)

Judges: R. Banumathi, J. and R. Subhash Reddy, J.

Can a person claim preference for a halt contractor position based on being the heir of a deceased contractor, even if the original contract had expired? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in a recent case, clarifying the conditions under which such preference can be claimed. The court examined whether the respondent, who was allowed to work in place of his ailing father, could claim preference as an heir when the original contract had expired. The bench comprised of Justices R. Banumathi and R. Subhash Reddy, with the judgment authored by Justice R. Subhash Reddy.

Case Background

The respondent’s father was initially appointed as a halt contractor at a railway station. This contract expired in 2010 and was not renewed. The respondent’s father passed away on December 5, 2016. During his father’s lifetime, the respondent was permitted to sell tickets at the Pirtala halt station. Subsequently, the Railway authorities issued a notification on February 16, 2017, inviting applications for the halt contractor position. The respondent participated in this selection process but was not selected through the draw of lots.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The respondent filed a writ petition before the Calcutta High Court, arguing that he should be given preference for the halt contractor position based on a circular dated May 17, 1999. The Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court rejected the petition, noting that the contract of the respondent’s father had expired before his death. However, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court overturned this decision, directing the Railway authorities to grant preference to the respondent and appoint him as a halt contractor within four weeks.

Legal Framework

The primary legal provision in question is Clause VI of the circular dated May 17, 1999, which deals with the appointment of heirs and successors of deceased halt contractors. The clause states:

“VI. Appointment of heirs and successors of deceased halt contractors:
Appointment of heirs and successors of deceased halt contractors, in the event of death of the halt contractor, may be considered along with other applicants and preference will be given to the heirs, all other things being equal.”

This clause was interpreted by the High Court to mean that the respondent, as the son of the deceased contractor, should be given preference. The Supreme Court, however, re-evaluated this interpretation.

Arguments

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The respondent argued that he was entitled to preference as an heir of the deceased halt contractor, as per Clause VI of the circular dated May 17, 1999.
• He contended that since he was permitted to work in place of his ailing father, he should be considered as an existing contractor or at least be given preference.

Appellants’ Arguments:

• The appellants argued that the contract of the respondent’s father had expired in 2010 and was not renewed.
• They stated that merely being allowed to work temporarily in place of his father did not make the respondent an existing contractor.
• They pointed out that the respondent participated in the selection process without raising any objections and only filed the writ petition after he was not selected.
• The appellants also brought to the notice of the court that the respondent’s father was also working as a Primary School Teacher under the Department of Primary School Education, Government of West Bengal and gained unlawfully pecuniary benefits from both Central Government and State Government organisations.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issue:

1. Whether the respondent could claim preference as an heir of a deceased halt contractor when the original contract had expired and was not renewed.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court:

Authorities

The court considered Clause VI of the circular dated May 17, 1999, which deals with the appointment of heirs and successors of deceased halt contractors. The court interpreted that the clause would only apply if the contract was valid and subsisting at the time of death of the contractor.

Judgment

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the fact that the original contract had expired in 2010 and was not renewed. The court emphasized that the respondent’s temporary permission to work in place of his father did not grant him any right to claim preference as an heir of a contractor. The court also noted that the respondent had participated in the selection process without objection, which further weakened his claim.

The court’s reasoning was based on the interpretation of the circular and the factual matrix of the case. The court emphasized that the circular’s benefit could only be extended to the heirs of contractors whose contracts were valid and subsisting at the time of their death. The court also highlighted that the respondent’s temporary permission to work did not confer any legal right to claim preference.

The court stated, “Merely because the respondent-original writ petitioner was permitted to act as a halt contractor on his request, he cannot be treated as an existing contractor.” The court further noted, “In view of the expiry of the contract of his late father in the year 2010, the respondent cannot claim as an heir of contractor for giving preference, as pleaded by him.” The court also observed, “It is also brought to our notice by the learned Additional Solicitor General, in the course of hearing, by referring to the rejoinder affidavit filed by the appellants, that the respondent was allowed only on his request when it was represented that his father was sick and in his place he was allowed to work temporarily on sympathetic and humanitarian grounds.”

Key Takeaways

• Heirs of deceased halt contractors cannot claim preference if the original contract had expired and was not renewed.
• Temporary permission to work in place of a contractor does not confer any right to claim preference.
• Participation in a selection process without objection can weaken a subsequent claim for preference.

Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court and allowed the civil appeal with no order as to costs.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of the case is that the preference for appointment as a halt contractor, as outlined in the circular dated May 17, 1999, is only applicable if the original contract was valid and subsisting at the time of the contractor’s death. This clarifies that the mere fact of being an heir of a deceased contractor does not automatically entitle one to preference if the contract had expired. This judgment reinforces the principle that contracts must be valid and subsisting for any claims to be made under them.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the respondent was not entitled to preference as a halt contractor because the original contract of his father had expired and was not renewed. The court emphasized that temporary permission to work does not grant any right to claim preference. This judgment clarifies the conditions under which heirs of deceased halt contractors can claim preference, ensuring that such claims are based on valid and subsisting contracts.