Supreme Court Clarifies “Injury” in Seafarer Disability Claims: Nawal Kishore Sharma vs. Union of India (2021)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 10 February 2021
Citation: (2021) INSC 17
Judges: Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J., Dinesh Maheshwari, J., Hrishikesh Roy, J. (authored the judgment)
Can a seaman claim disability compensation for a heart condition, even if it wasn’t caused by an accident at sea? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in a case concerning a seaman who developed Dilated Cardiomyopathy. The court had to decide whether this condition qualified as an “injury” under the National Maritime Board Agreement, entitling the seaman to full disability compensation. The bench, comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Dinesh Maheshwari, and Hrishikesh Roy, delivered the judgment, with Justice Roy authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The appellant, Nawal Kishore Sharma, was a seaman who had previously worked in the Shipping Corporation of India’s (SCI) offshore fleet service. He was later transferred to the SCI’s foreign-going seaman’s roster, with fresh registration. On 18 September 2009, he joined a foreign-going vessel as a crew member. He was discharged on 18 June 2010, after being declared permanently unfit for sea service due to Dilated Cardiomyopathy, a condition that reduces the heart’s blood-pumping capacity. The SCI only offered severance compensation, arguing that his condition was not the result of an accidental injury during his duty on the vessel.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The High Court of Judicature at Patna upheld the SCI’s decision, stating that the seaman’s condition did not qualify as an “injury” sustained during employment. The High Court considered the medical literature presented by the appellant but concluded that disability compensation was not warranted because the seaman was not 100% incapacitated from performing any job. The High Court interpreted Clause 21 and Clause 25 of the National Maritime Board Agreement, ruling that the appellant’s case fell under Clause 25, which provides severance compensation for those medically unfit for sea service but capable of other work. The seaman then appealed to the Supreme Court of India.

Legal Framework

The case revolves around the interpretation of the National Maritime Board Agreement, specifically Clause 5.9.F (ii), Clause 21, and Clause 25.

• Clause 5.9.F (ii) states: “A rating on being medically unfit for sea service at seas as a result of injury whilst in employment shall be paid 100% compensation”.
• Clause 21 outlines the conditions for 100% disability compensation: “100% disability compensation-Rs.14.85 Lacs. In case of rating declared partially incapacitated whilst in employment above Disability Compensation shall be paid on proportionate basis. This Death & Disability Compensation shall not be paid if the death and/or disability has resulted due to the rating’s own wilful act.”
• Clause 25 provides for severance compensation: “With effect from 01/04/2006, a Rating borne on a Company’s Roster continuously for a period of not less than 5 years if declared permanently medically unfit for sea service by Company’s Medical Officer, severance compensation to be paid to such Rating as under: … The above provision of compensation will not be applicable to a rating dealt with under the provisions Death and Disability Compensation.”

The Court also considered the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “the Disability Act”) and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that Dilated Cardiomyopathy should be considered an internal “injury” under Clause 5.9.F (ii) of the Agreement.
• The term “injury” should encompass any impairment to health, not just external or accidental injuries.
• The appellant’s counsel cited articles on marine safety and occupational diseases, arguing that cardiovascular disease is a known risk for seafarers.
• The SCI’s failure to provide an alternative job suitable for the appellant’s medical condition violated Section 47 of the Disability Act.

Respondent’s Arguments (SCI and Union of India):

• The SCI argued that disability compensation is only for incapacitation resulting from accidental injury during the voyage.
• Dilated Cardiomyopathy does not fall under the definition of “injury” in Clause 5.9.F (ii).
• The appellant is covered by Clause 25, which applies to those medically unfit for sea service, not Clause 21, which requires 100% disability due to employment.
• The appellant’s heart condition was not caused by his work on the vessel, but rather by excessive liquor consumption.
• Dilated Cardiomyopathy is not mentioned in the Disability Act, so alternative employment cannot be claimed under that Act.
• There is no causal connection between the appellant’s medical condition and his employment.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issues:

1. Whether the term “injury” in Clause 5.9.F (ii) of the National Maritime Board Agreement should be interpreted to include any impairment to health, or whether it is limited to accidental injuries sustained during employment?
2. Whether the appellant’s Dilated Cardiomyopathy qualifies as a disability under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, or the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, entitling him to alternative employment?
3. Whether the appellant is entitled to 100% disability compensation under Clause 21 of the Agreement or only severance compensation under Clause 25?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court:

• Divisional Controller, NEKRTC vs. Sangamma and Ors. [2005 (2) LLN 776]*: The Court distinguished this case, noting that in *Sangamma*, the impairment occurred during duty, whereas in the present case, no such connection was established.
• Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Rita Fernandez [1969 (2) LLJ 812]*: The Court distinguished this case as well, because while it dealt with a seafarer’s cardiac ailment, the log-book of the ship had recorded entry relating to the employee’s hospitalization for treatment of cardiac ailment, which was not the case here.

The Supreme Court held that the term “injury” in Clause 5.9.F (ii) of the National Maritime Board Agreement must be interpreted as an accidental injury sustained during employment, not just any health impairment. The Court emphasized that the agreement’s specific language should not be ignored to give it a different meaning, even for a beneficial objective. The Court also noted that the appellant’s Dilated Cardiomyopathy was not a specified disability under either the 1995 or 2016 Disability Acts. Therefore, the Court concluded that the appellant was not entitled to disability compensation under Clause 21 but only to severance compensation under Clause 25. The Court stated, “Merely because of the beneficial objective, the clear expression in the agreement must not be ignored to give another meaning which could not have been the intention or the understanding, of the contracting parties.” The Court further stated, “In the present case, the appellant never claimed to have suffered any injury during his ship duty.” and “The dilated Cardiomyopathy condition of the appellant is neither a specified disability nor is the same relatable to the broad spectrum of impairments, which hinders his full and effective participation in society.”

There was no dissenting opinion.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:

• Literal Interpretation of the Agreement: The Court adhered to a literal interpretation of the term “injury” as used in the National Maritime Board Agreement, emphasizing that the term should not be given a broad meaning that was not intended by the contracting parties.
• Absence of Accidental Injury: The lack of any evidence of an accidental injury during the appellant’s sea voyage was a major factor in denying disability compensation.
• No Causal Link: The Court found no causal connection between the appellant’s Dilated Cardiomyopathy and his 9-month engagement on the ship. The medical condition was not directly linked to his work.
• Definition of Disability: The Court strictly interpreted the definitions of “disability” under the 1995 and 2016 Disability Acts, concluding that Dilated Cardiomyopathy did not fall within the specified categories.
• Intention of the Parties: The Court emphasized that the clear intention of the contracting parties in the Agreement was to provide disability compensation only for injuries sustained during employment, not for any health condition.

Key Takeaways

• Seafarers cannot claim disability compensation for any health condition; there must be an accidental injury during employment.
• The term “injury” in maritime employment contracts will be interpreted strictly, requiring a direct link to an accident during work.
• Heart conditions like Dilated Cardiomyopathy are not considered disabilities under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 or the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, unless they meet the specified criteria.
• Seafarers who are medically unfit for sea service but capable of other jobs will only be entitled to severance compensation, not full disability compensation.

Directions

No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court in this judgment.

Specific Amendments Analysis

There is no discussion of any specific amendment in this judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the term “injury” in the context of disability compensation for seafarers, as per the National Maritime Board Agreement, is restricted to accidental injuries sustained during employment and does not extend to any health condition that may develop during the course of employment. This judgment clarifies that a causal link between the injury and the employment is necessary for disability compensation.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the seaman was not entitled to disability compensation for his heart condition because it was not caused by an accidental injury during his employment. The Court emphasized that the term “injury” should be interpreted strictly as per the employment contract, and that the seaman’s condition did not qualify as a disability under the relevant Acts. The judgment reinforces the need for a direct causal link between an injury and employment for disability claims.