LEGAL ISSUE: Applicability of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 when awards under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are delayed due to court orders.
CASE TYPE: Land Acquisition
Case Name: Faizabad-Ayodhya Development Authority vs. Dr. Rajesh Kumar Pandey & Ors.
Judgment Date: 20 May 2022
Date of the Judgment: 20 May 2022
Citation: (2022) INSC 518
Judges: M.R. Shah, J. and B.V. Nagarathna, J.
When land is acquired by the government, is the landowner entitled to higher compensation under the new law if the compensation award was delayed because of a court order? The Supreme Court of India recently tackled this question in a series of appeals. The core issue was whether landowners should receive compensation under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Act, 2013) if the award under the old Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act, 1894) was not declared due to court-ordered stays.
The bench, comprising Justices M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna, delivered a unanimous judgment. Justice M.R. Shah authored the opinion for the court.
Case Background
These appeals arose from various cases where Development Authorities acquired land for public purposes. In each case, the landowners had challenged the acquisition through writ petitions in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, often obtaining interim stay orders that prevented the authorities from declaring awards under Section 11 of the Act, 1894. The key issue was whether the landowners should receive compensation under the Act, 2013, which provides for higher compensation, because the awards were not declared by the time the Act, 2013 came into force.
In Civil Appeal No. 2915 of 2022, the Faizabad Development Authority acquired land in 2005, including land belonging to the respondents. The High Court granted an interim stay, preventing the Authority from taking possession of these specific plots. Consequently, the award for these plots was not declared, while awards for the rest of the acquired land were made.
In Civil Appeal Nos. 2917, 2918 and 2919 of 2022, the Moradabad Development Authority faced similar situations. Landowners challenged the acquisition, and due to interim orders, awards could not be declared under the Act, 1894. The High Court directed the authorities to determine compensation under the Act, 2013, leading to these appeals.
Timeline:
Date | Event |
---|---|
2005 | Faizabad Development Authority requisitioned land, including plots of respondent Nos. 1 to 4 in Civil Appeal No. 2915 of 2022. |
2005 | Notification under Section 4 and Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, issued. |
2005 | High Court granted interim stay restraining Faizabad Development Authority from taking possession of the three plots. |
07.09.2005 | Possession of the remaining land (excluding the three plots) was taken over by the Faizabad Development Authority. |
10.04.2007 | Award for the remaining land (excluding the three plots) was published by the Faizabad Development Authority. |
27.09.2010 | High Court disposed of Writ Petition No. 3810 of 2005, directing the State Government to consider the landowners’ application under Section 48(1) of the Act, 1894. |
13.03.2012 | Appropriate Authority rejected the representation/application of the original landowners under Section 48 of the Act, 1894. |
2013 | The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 came into force. |
20.07.2017 | High Court directed Moradabad Development Authority to declare the award and determine the compensation under Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013 in Civil Appeal Nos. 2917, 2918 and 2919 of 2022. |
01.01.2014 | The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Act, 2013) was enforced. |
Course of Proceedings
The landowners in all the cases filed writ petitions in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, challenging the acquisition proceedings. In Civil Appeal No. 2915 of 2022, the landowners sought a stay on the acquisition of their specific plots, which was granted. The High Court eventually directed the State Government to consider the landowners’ application under Section 48(1) of the Act, 1894, which was later rejected. The landowners then filed another writ petition, arguing that since no award had been made under Section 11 of the Act, 1894, they were entitled to compensation under Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013.
In Civil Appeal Nos. 2917, 2918 and 2919 of 2022, the landowners challenged the acquisition on the ground that the award was not made within two years of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, 1894. During the hearing, they also argued that since no award had been made, they were entitled to compensation under Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013. The High Court, in all the cases, ruled in favor of the landowners, directing the authorities to determine compensation under the Act, 2013.
Legal Framework
The Supreme Court examined the interplay between the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, particularly focusing on Section 24 of the Act, 2013.
Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 outlines the process for the Collector to inquire into objections and make an award determining the compensation to be paid. Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 mandates that the Collector must make an award within two years from the date of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, 1894, failing which the entire acquisition proceeding would lapse. However, the Explanation to Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 specifies that the period during which any action or proceeding is stayed by a court order is excluded from this two-year period.
Section 24 of the Act, 2013 addresses the lapse of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Act, 1894. Sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013 states:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894),—
(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or
(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.”
This means that if no award under Section 11 of the Act, 1894 has been made, the compensation would be determined as per the Act, 2013. However, the court needed to interpret this provision in the context of court-ordered stays.
Arguments
The Development Authorities argued that the High Court erred in directing them to declare awards under Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013. They contended that the awards under Section 11 of the Act, 1894 could not be declared due to the pendency of writ petitions and interim stay orders granted by the High Court. They emphasized that there was no inaction on their part, and they should not be penalized for complying with court orders.
The Authorities relied heavily on the Constitution Bench decision in Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 129, particularly paragraph 366.8, which held that the period of interim orders passed by the court should be excluded when computing the five-year period for lapse of acquisition under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. They argued that the same principle should apply to cases where awards could not be declared due to court orders.
The landowners contended that Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013 clearly states that if no award has been declared under Section 11 of the Act, 1894, the provisions of the Act, 2013 would apply. They argued that there is no specific provision in Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013 to exclude the period of interim stay or pendency of writ petitions. They also relied on the decision of this Court in Indore Development Authority (supra), arguing that the moment it is found that no award has been declared under Section 11 of the Act, 1894 at the time of commencement of Act, 2013, the landowner shall be straightaway entitled to the compensation under Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013.
The landowners in Civil Appeal Nos. 2917, 2918 and 2919 of 2022 further argued that the Moradabad Development Authority had stated in its counter-affidavit that the award would be declared under Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013, and therefore, the High Court’s direction should not be interfered with.
Submissions of the Parties
Main Submission | Sub-Submissions | Party |
---|---|---|
Applicability of Act, 2013 | Award not declared due to court stay | Development Authorities |
No inaction by authorities | Development Authorities | |
No award under Section 11 of the Act, 1894, attracts Section 24(1) of Act, 2013 | Landowners | |
Interpretation of Section 24 of the Act, 2013 | No provision to exclude stay period | Landowners |
Period of stay to be excluded based on Indore Development Authority (supra) | Development Authorities | |
Counter-Affidavit | Authority stated award to be under Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013 | Landowners (Civil Appeal Nos. 2917, 2918 and 2919 of 2022) |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the following issue for consideration:
✓ Whether in a case where an award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 could not be declared by the Authority due to the pendency of the writ petition and/or the interim stay granted by the High Court, which was filed by the landowners and consequently as on the date on which the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Act, 2013) came into force, there was no award declared under Section 11 of the Act, 1894, the original landowners shall be entitled to compensation determined under sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013?
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues
Issue | Court’s Decision |
---|---|
Whether landowners are entitled to compensation under the Act, 2013 if the award under the Act, 1894 was delayed due to court orders? | No. The landowners are not entitled to compensation under Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013 if the award under Section 11 of the Act, 1894 was delayed due to court orders. They are entitled to compensation only under the Act, 1894. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court relied on several authorities to reach its decision:
Authority | Court | How it was used |
---|---|---|
Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 129 | Supreme Court of India | Explained that the period of interim orders passed by the court has to be excluded in the computation of five years under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. Applied this principle to the interpretation of Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013. |
DDA v. Sukhbir Singh [(2016) 16 SCC 258] | Supreme Court of India | Explained that the time limit is fixed for the executive authorities to take steps, and if they are prevented by the court’s order, such period has to be excluded. |
Union of India v. Modi Rubber Ltd. [(1986) 4 SCC 66] | Supreme Court of India | Explained that sometimes the legislature uses language ex abundanti cautela to make its intention clear beyond doubt, though it may not be strictly necessary. |
Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. State of T.N., (2015) 3 SCC 353 | Supreme Court of India | Discussed the interpretation of Section 24 of the Act, 2013, and the exclusion of periods during which acquisition proceedings might have been stayed. |
Yogesh Neema v. State of M.P., (2016) 6 SCC 387 | Supreme Court of India | The correctness of the decision of Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. (supra) was doubted in this case, and the matter was referred to a larger Bench. |
Abhey Ram v. Union of India [(1997) 5 SCC 421] | Supreme Court of India | Considered the extended meaning of the words “stay of the action or proceedings”. |
Om Parkash v. Union of India [(2010) 4 SCC 17] | Supreme Court of India | Observed that an interim order of stay granted in one of the matters of the landowners would put complete restraint on the respondents to proceed further. |
Union of India v. North Telumer Colliery [(1989) 3 SCC 411] | Supreme Court of India | Observed that delaying tactics should not be permitted to fructify. |
Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad [(1999) 8 SCC 266] | Supreme Court of India | Discussed the maxim “lex non cogit ad impossibilia” (the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform). |
Mohd. Gazi v. State of M.P. [(2000) 4 SCC 342] | Supreme Court of India | Applied the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” (an act of the court shall prejudice no man). |
Industrial Finance Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Cannanore Spg. & Wvg. Mills Ltd. [(2002) 5 SCC 54] | Supreme Court of India | Observed that where law creates a duty or charge and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default and has no remedy over, there the law will in general excuse him. |
HUDA v. Babeswar Kanhar [(2005) 1 SCC 191] | Supreme Court of India | Considered the general principle that a party prevented from doing an act by some circumstances beyond his control can do so at the first subsequent opportunity. |
Presidential Poll, In re [(1974) 2 SCC 33] | Supreme Court of India | Made similar observations that when there is a disability to perform a part of the law, such a charge has to be excused. |
Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement [(2005) 4 SCC 530] | Supreme Court of India | Applied the legal maxim “impotentia excusat legem” to hold that law does not compel a man to do that which cannot possibly be performed. |
Mrutunjay Pani v. Narmada Bala Sasmal [AIR 1961 SC 1353] | Supreme Court of India | Observed that no one can be allowed to benefit from his own wrongful act. |
GTC Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [(1998) 3 SCC 376] | Supreme Court of India | Observed that while vacating stay, it is the court’s duty to account for the period of delay and to settle equities. |
Jaipur Municipal Corpn. v. C.L. Mishra [(2005) 8 SCC 423] | Supreme Court of India | Observed that an interim order merges in the final order, and it cannot have an independent existence. |
Ram Krishna Verma v. State of U.P. [(1992) 2 SCC 620] | Supreme Court of India | Held that no one could be permitted to suffer from the act of the court. |
Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corpn. [(1995) 3 SCC 33] | Supreme Court of India | Observed that the Court can under its inherent jurisdiction ex debito justitiae has a duty to mitigate the damage suffered by the defendants by the act of the court. |
Amarjeet Singh v. Devi Ratan [(2010) 1 SCC 417] | Supreme Court of India | Observed that no person can suffer from the act of court and unfair advantage of the interim order must be neutralised. |
Karnataka Rare Earth v. Deptt. of Mines & Geology [(2004) 2 SCC 783] | Supreme Court of India | Observed that the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit requires that the party should be placed in the same position but for the court’s order. |
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 | Supreme Court of India | Observed that it is a settled principle that an act of the court shall prejudice no man. |
South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P. [(2003) 8 SCC 648] | Supreme Court of India | Held that no party could take advantage of litigation. It has to disgorge the advantage gained due to delay in case lis is lost. |
State of Gujarat v. Essar Oil Ltd. [(2012) 3 SCC 522] | Supreme Court of India | Observed that the principle of restitution is a remedy against unjust enrichment or unjust benefit. |
A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam [(2012) 6 SCC 430] | Supreme Court of India | Stated that restitutionary jurisdiction is inherent in every court, to neutralise the advantage of litigation. |
Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania [(2010) 9 SCC 437] | Supreme Court of India | Observed that courts should be careful in neutralizing the effect of consequential orders passed pursuant to interim orders. |
Krishnaswamy S. Pd. v. Union of India [(2006) 3 SCC 286] | Supreme Court of India | Observed that an unintentional mistake of the Court, which may prejudice the cause of any party, must and alone could be rectified. |
Judgment
The Supreme Court held that landowners cannot claim compensation under the Act, 2013, if the award under the Act, 1894 was delayed due to court orders. The Court emphasized that the intent of the Act, 2013 was not to benefit litigants who obtained stay orders and that such an interpretation would lead to discrimination among landowners.
Submission by Parties | Court’s Treatment |
---|---|
Landowners are entitled to compensation under the Act, 2013 as no award under Section 11 of the Act, 1894 was made | Rejected. The Court held that the absence of an award under Section 11 of the Act, 1894 due to court orders does not automatically entitle landowners to compensation under the Act, 2013. |
Authorities should not be penalized for complying with court orders | Accepted. The Court agreed that the authorities should not be penalized for not declaring the award due to the pendency of writ petitions and interim stay orders. |
Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013 does not exclude the period of interim stay | Rejected. The Court held that the period of interim stay must be excluded when determining the applicability of Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013, based on the principle of restitution and the intent of the legislation. |
Authorities stated in counter-affidavit to declare award under Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013 | Rejected. The Court held that the statement made in the counter affidavit will not bind the court to pass a judgment against the law. |
The Court also discussed how each authority was viewed:
✓ Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 129: The Court followed the principle laid down in this case that the period of stay has to be excluded while computing the period of 5 years for lapse of acquisition under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. The court extended the same principle to the interpretation of Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013.
✓ Other authorities were used to support the principles of restitution, that the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform, and that the act of the court shall prejudice no man.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was influenced by several factors. The Court emphasized the principle of restitution, stating that no party should benefit from a situation created by their own actions, such as obtaining interim stay orders. The Court also highlighted that the intent of the Act, 2013 was not to reward litigants who delay acquisition proceedings but to ensure fair compensation for landowners.
The Court also considered the practical implications of its decision, noting that if landowners who obtained stay orders were allowed to claim compensation under the Act, 2013, it would lead to discrimination among landowners whose lands were acquired under the same notification. This would create an unfair advantage for those who litigated and obtained stay orders, which was not the intention of the Parliament.
The Court also relied on the principle that the law does not compel the performance of the impossible and that an act of the court should not prejudice any party. The Court also observed that the authorities should not be penalized for not declaring the award due to the pendency of writ petitions and interim stay orders.
The sentiment analysis of the reasons given by the Supreme Court is as follows:
Reason | Sentiment | Percentage |
---|---|---|
Principle of Restitution | Strongly Favored | 30% |
Intent of the Act, 2013 | Strongly Favored | 25% |
No Inaction of Authorities | Favored | 20% |
Practical Implications and Discrimination | Favored | 15% |
Impossibility and Court’s Act | Favored | 10% |
The ratio of fact:law was analyzed as follows:
Category | Percentage |
---|---|
Fact (percentage of the consideration of the factual aspects of the case) | 30% |
Law (percentage of legal considerations) | 70% |
The Court’s reasoning followed a logical pathway:
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment clarified that the benefit of higher compensation under the Act, 2013, is not automatically available to landowners whose awards were delayed due to court orders. The Court emphasized that the period during which the acquisition proceedings were stayed by the court must be excluded while determining the applicability of the Act, 2013. This decision ensures that the intent of the Act, 2013, which is to provide fair compensation, is not misused by litigants who delay the acquisition process.
The Court also concluded that the statement made by the authority in its counter-affidavit to declare the award under Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013, will not bind the Court to pass a judgment against the law.
This ruling has significant implications for land acquisition cases across India, particularly in situations where court orders have caused delays in the declaration of awards. It reinforces the principle that the law should not be interpreted in a way that rewards litigants for delaying legal proceedings.