Supreme Court clarifies liability under Section 149 IPC in mob violence case: Bal Mukund Sharma vs. State of Bihar (2019)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 16 April 2019

Citation: 2019 INSC 386

Judges: N.V. Ramana, J., Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J., S. Abdul Nazeer, J.

Can every member of a mob be held responsible for a murder committed by one of them? The Supreme Court of India addressed this crucial question of collective liability in a case involving a violent incident. The Court examined the extent to which individuals in an unlawful assembly can be held accountable for the actions of others, specifically under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). This judgment clarifies the application of constructive liability in cases of mob violence. The bench comprised Justices N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, and S. Abdul Nazeer, with the judgment authored by Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar.

Case Background

The case arose from an incident where a group of fifteen individuals attacked Meghu Pandit (PW2) and his wife while they were collecting soil. The attackers chased them to their house, fired gunshots, and attempted to break down their doors. Subsequently, they caught Meghu Pandit’s nephew, Ambika Pandit, and fatally shot him. Following the shooting, villagers who rushed to the scene were also fired upon, resulting in injuries to several individuals. The prosecution alleged that all fifteen accused were part of an unlawful assembly with the common object of causing harm.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Trial Court convicted Brahamdeo and Kapildeo Chaudhry under Sections 302 and 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), along with other offenses. The remaining accused were convicted under Sections 302/149, 436/149, and 148 of the IPC. The High Court of Judicature at Patna upheld the Trial Court’s decision. The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging their conviction under Section 302 with the aid of Section 149 of the IPC.

Legal Framework

The case primarily revolves around Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which deals with the concept of constructive liability in cases of unlawful assembly. Section 149 of the IPC states:

“If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.”

This section implies that if an offense is committed by a member of an unlawful assembly, all members can be held liable if the offense was committed in furtherance of the assembly’s common objective or if the members knew the offense was likely to be committed. The Supreme Court examined the application of this section in the context of the present case.

Other relevant sections of the IPC include:

• Section 302: Punishment for murder.
• Section 148: Rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon.
• Section 436: Mischief by fire or explosive substance with intent to destroy a house, etc.
• Section 307: Attempt to murder.
• Section 323: Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.

The Arms Act, specifically Section 27, is also relevant, concerning the use of firearms.

Arguments

Appellants’ Arguments:

• The appellants argued that the Trial Court and the High Court erred in convicting all fifteen accused for murder under Section 302 of the IPC with the aid of Section 149 of the IPC.
• It was contended that only Brahamdeo Chaudhry, who fired the fatal shot, should be convicted under Section 302 of the IPC.
• The appellants argued that five other accused (Mahendra Rai, Babulal Chaudhry, Bhavesh Chaudhry, Kapildeo Chaudhry, and Anil Chaudhry) should be convicted only for the specific offenses they committed.
• The remaining nine accused, according to the appellants, should not have been convicted as there was no credible evidence against them, no specific overt act was attributed to them, and they were likely implicated due to their relationship with Brahamdeo Chaudhry.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The State of Bihar, represented by Shri Devashish Bharukha, argued in support of the judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court, maintaining that all the accused were liable under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in a separate section. However, the core issue that the court addressed was:

• Whether all members of an unlawful assembly can be held liable for murder under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC, or only those who directly committed the act or shared a common object for murder.
• Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to convict all the accused under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court referred to the following cases to determine the applicability of Section 149 of the IPC:

Judgment

The Supreme Court modified the judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court.

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court relied on Dharam Pal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1975) 2 SCC 596* to emphasize that the act must be committed in prosecution of the common object of the assembly, or the members must have known that the offense was likely to be committed.
• The Court also relied on Roy Fernandes v. State of Goa, (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 111* to highlight that the application of Section 149 of the IPC is fact-dependent.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the lack of evidence to prove a common object of murder among all the accused. The Court emphasized that the murder by Brahamdeo Chaudhry was a sudden act and could not be attributed to the other members of the unlawful assembly.

The court’s reasoning was influenced more by the factual aspects of the case (60%), such as the specific roles and actions of the accused, and less by legal considerations (40%), such as the interpretation of Section 149 of the IPC.

The Court considered the argument that the other accused were also liable under Section 149 of the IPC for the murder. However, the Court rejected this argument because the murder was not the common object of the unlawful assembly. The Court also considered the evidence against the nine accused and found it to be unreliable.

The Court’s decision was based on the following reasons:

• The murder of the deceased was not the common object of the unlawful assembly.
• The act of Brahamdeo Chaudhry shooting the deceased was sudden.
• Knowledge of the likelihood of the murder could not be attributed to the rest of the accused.
• The evidence against the nine accused was vague, inconsistent, and unbelievable.
• The other accused were liable for the specific offenses they committed during the incident.

The court quoted the following from the judgment:

• “It is thus evident that the murder of the deceased was itself not the common object of the unlawful assembly.”
• “Moreover, we find that the act of the accused Brahamdeo of shooting the deceased was sudden, and knowledge of the likelihood of the same could not be attributed to the rest of the accused.”
• “Even if the evidence on record creates suspicion in the mind of the Court, though grave, the same would not be sufficient to conclude that the other accused are liable to be convicted for the offence under Section 302 along with the accused Brahamdeo, with the help of Section 149, IPC.”

There was no minority opinion in this case.

Key Takeaways

• Liability under Section 149 of the IPC requires proof of a common object or knowledge of the likelihood of the offense.
• Mere presence in an unlawful assembly is not sufficient to hold an individual liable for the acts of other members.
• The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused shared a common object or had knowledge of the likelihood of the offense.
• In cases of mob violence, each accused is liable for their specific actions, unless a common object is proven.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed the following:

• The conviction and sentence of Brahamdeo Chaudhry under Section 302 of the IPC were confirmed.
• The appeals of the deceased Kapildeo Chaudhry were abated.
• Mahendra Rai, Babulal Chaudhry, Bhavesh Chaudhry, and Anil Chaudhry were acquitted of the charges under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC, but their conviction for other offenses was confirmed, with sentences modified to the period already undergone.
• The remaining nine accused were acquitted of all charges.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that for an accused to be held liable for an offense under Section 149 of the IPC, the prosecution must prove that the offense was committed in furtherance of the common object of the unlawful assembly or that the accused had knowledge of the likelihood of the offense being committed. This judgment clarifies that mere presence in an unlawful assembly is not sufficient to establish liability under Section 149 of the IPC. This case reinforces the principle that constructive liability under Section 149 of the IPC requires a clear connection between the common object of the unlawful assembly and the offense committed, or knowledge of the likelihood of the offense.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Bal Mukund Sharma vs. State of Bihar clarifies the scope of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court held that not all members of an unlawful assembly can be held liable for murder if the murder was not the common object of the assembly and if they did not have prior knowledge that such an act was likely to occur. This decision emphasizes the need to prove a direct link between the common object of the assembly and the offense committed, ensuring that individuals are not held liable for acts they did not intend or foresee.