Supreme Court Clarifies Limitation for Appeals Under Jogighopa Act: North Eastern Chemicals vs. Ashok Paper Mill (2023)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 11 December 2023

Citation: 2023 INSC 1059

Judges: Abhay S. Oka J., Sanjay Karol J.

When does the clock start ticking for filing an appeal when a specific law doesn’t say? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case concerning the Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990. The core issue was whether the general limitation period for appeals applies to this special law, or if a different approach is needed. This judgment clarifies the rules for appeals when a law doesn’t specify a time limit. The judgment was delivered by a bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Sanjay Karol.

Case Background

The case involves a dispute between M/S North Eastern Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd. (the Claimant-Appellant) and M/S Ashok Paper Mill (Assam) Ltd. (the Respondent). The Claimant-Appellant had supplied goods to the Respondent, but the Respondent only made partial payments. Subsequently, the Respondent was declared a “sick company” under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1935. To revive the industry, the Government of Assam enacted the Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990 (the Jogighopa Act).

The Claimant-Appellant filed a claim under Section 16 of the Jogighopa Act for ₹1,58,375, along with interest. The Commissioner of Payments awarded the principal sum but not the interest. The Claimant-Appellant accepted the principal amount under protest and claimed interest for the period from January 1983 to March 1993 and from March 1993 to the date of payment, totaling ₹21,49,698 at 18% per annum.

The matter went through several rounds of litigation, including writ petitions and review applications, with the High Court directing the Commissioner to recalculate the interest payable. Ultimately, the Commissioner stated a lack of funds and that no further amount was payable. Aggrieved, the Claimant-Appellant filed an appeal before the District Judge, Guwahati, along with an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The District Judge, Kamrup, Gauhati, admitted the appeal filed by the Claimant-Appellant, observing that no specific time limit was provided for appeals against the Commissioner’s decision. The Respondent challenged this order in a Civil Revision Petition before the Gauhati High Court. The High Court, relying on the Limitation Act, 1963, and various Supreme Court decisions, concluded that since an appeal under Section 22(8) of the Jogighopa Act is provided to a Principal Civil Court without a specific limitation period, it should be treated as an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, attracting the limitation period prescribed under Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Consequently, the High Court held that the appeal was erroneously admitted by the District Judge and dismissed it as not maintainable due to limitation.

Legal Framework

The core legal provisions in this case include:

• Section 22(6) of the Jogighopa Act: This section grants the Commissioner the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for specific purposes, such as summoning witnesses and receiving evidence. It states, “The commissioner shall have the power to regulate his own procedure in all matters arising out of the discharge of his functions, including the place or places at which he will hold his sittings and shall, for the purpose of making an investigation under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of the following matters, namely: – (a) The summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness and examining him on Oath : (b) the discovery and production of any document or other material object producible as evidence ; (c) the reception of evidences on affidavits; (d) the issuing of any commission for the examination of witness.”
• Section 22(7) of the Jogighopa Act: This section deems the Commissioner to be a Civil Court for the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It states, “Any investigation before the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, and the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.”
• Section 22(8) of the Jogighopa Act: This section provides for an appeal against the Commissioner’s decision to the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. It states, “A Claimant, who is dissatisfied with the decision of the Commissioner, may prefer an appeal against such decision to the principal civil court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the undertaking of the Government Company is situated Provided that where a person who is a Judge of High Court is appointed to be the Commissioner such appeal shall lie to the High Court at Guwahati, and such appeal shall be heard and disposed of by not less than two Judges of that High Court.”
• Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963: This article prescribes the limitation period for appeals to a High Court (90 days) and to any other court (30 days) from an order or decree.
• Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Defines “decree” as “the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final.”
• Section 2(14) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Defines “order” as “the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree.”

The interplay between these provisions is central to the dispute, particularly whether the appeal under Section 22(8) of the Jogighopa Act is governed by the Limitation Act.

Arguments

A. Claimant-Appellants’ Arguments:

• The Claimant-Appellants argued that the High Court erred in applying Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel & Ors. [AIR 1964 SC 1099]. They contended that the majority view in Vidyacharan Shukla was that to attract Article 156 of the Limitation Act 1908 (the corresponding provision to Article 116 of the present Act), it was not necessary that the appeal should be conferred by the Code itself, but it would be sufficient if the procedure governing the appeal would be according to the Code.
• Unlike the situation in Vidyacharan Shukla, where the statute expressly stated that the procedure governing the appeal shall be in accordance with the Code, the Jogighopa Act does not contain such a provision.
• Article 116 applies only to appeals arising from an order or a decree. The order passed by the Commissioner was neither a decree nor an order of a Civil Court. They relied on Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation [(2009) 8 SCC 646], emphasizing that the Commissioner is an executive officer, not a court.
• The powers of the Civil Court conferred upon the Commissioner are limited, and therefore, Article 116 does not apply. They cited Uttam Namdeo Mahale v. Vithal Deo & Ors. [(1997) 6 SCC 73].
• Without prejudice, the Claimant-Appellants argued that even if Article 116 applies or a “reasonable period” is applicable, the matter should be remanded to the District Judge for consideration of their application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

B. Respondent’s Arguments:

• The Respondent argued that to attract Article 116, it is not necessary for the appellate remedy to be conferred by the Code, but only that the procedure for the appeal be governed by the Code.
• The Jogighopa Act provides for an appeal to a Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, which is governed by the Code.
• The statutory scheme suggests that the Commissioner functions as a Civil Court for all practical purposes.
• The Respondent contended that Vidyacharan Shukla carved out a third category where the appeal is not governed by the provisions of the Code, but the procedure and powers are governed by the Code.
• The Claimant-Appellants’ contention runs contrary to the objective of the Law of Limitation, which is to ensure that disputes do not survive endlessly.
• The appeal before the District Judge was filed after a delay of 3 years, 6 months, and 22 days. The delay cannot be condoned based on ignorance of the law. They cited Amalendu Kumar Bera v. State of W.B. [(2013) 4 SCC 52].
• Without prejudice, the Respondent argued that in the absence of a prescribed statutory limitation, the court should be approached within a “reasonable time,” citing Satyan v. Deputy Commissioner [(2020) 14 SCC 210].
• The Jogighopa Act provides a strict timeline for claims (30 days, extendable by another 30 days), suggesting a summary and expeditious mechanism, and it would be unfair to provide an endless opportunity for appeals.

Submissions Table

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issues for determination:

1. Whether Article 116 of the Limitation Act 1963, applies to proceedings under the Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990.
2. Contingently, if the Limitation Act does not apply then, in the absence of Limitation being placed within the text of the Statute in question, could the Appeal filed against the Order of the Commissioner of Payments be held as maintainable having been filed after a period of nearly three years from the said order?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

Cases Relied Upon by the Court:

• Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel & Ors. [AIR 1964 SC 1099] – The court distinguished this case, stating that it dealt with a statute where the Code of Civil Procedure was expressly applicable, unlike the Jogighopa Act. (Supreme Court of India)
• Aga Mahomed Hamadani v. Cohen [(1886) ILR 13 Cal 221] – This case was referred to by the Constitution Bench in Vidyacharan Shukla, where it was observed that an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code is an appeal governed by the Code of Civil Procedure so far as procedure is concerned. (Calcutta High Court)
• Ramasami Pillai v. Deputy Collector of Madura [AIR 1920 Mad 407] – This case was also referred to by the Constitution Bench in Vidyacharan Shukla, where it was held that the procedure in its entirety set out in the code to govern appeals was made applicable to the Land Acquisition Act. (Madras High Court)
• Dropadi v. Hira Lal [ILR (1912) 34 All 496 (FB)] – This case was referred to by the Constitution Bench in Vidyacharan Shukla, where it was observed that the objection of Section 47 thereof appears to be to attract the provisions of the Code. (Allahabad High Court)
• Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation [(2009) 8 SCC 646] – This case was cited by the Claimant-Appellant to argue that the Commissioner is not a court. (Supreme Court of India)
• Uttam Namdeo Mahale v. Vithal Deo & Ors. [(1997) 6 SCC 73] – This case was cited by the Claimant-Appellant to support the argument that the powers of the Civil Court conferred upon the Commissioner are limited. (Supreme Court of India)
• State of M.P v. Anshuman Shukla [(2008) 7 SCC 487] – This case was referred to while discussing the definition of “Court” under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. (Supreme Court of India)
• Empress v. Ashootosh Chuckerbutty [ILR (1879-80) 4 Cal 483] – This case was referred to in State of M.P v. Anshuman Shukla, observing that the definition of “Court” under the Indian Evidence Act is not exhaustive. (Calcutta High Court)
• P. Sarathy v. SBI [(2000) 5 SCC 355] – This case was referred to for the essential conditions of a court, emphasizing the power to give a definitive judgment. (Supreme Court of India)
• International Asset Reconstruction Company of India vs Official Liquidator [(2017) 16 SCC 137] – This case was referred to, stating that vesting select powers upon a Tribunal, does not equate the same to be a Court within the meaning of the code. (Supreme Court of India)
• State of Punjab & Ors. v. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union [(2007) 11 SCC 363] – This case was referred to, stating that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. (Supreme Court of India)
• Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Sunil Krishna Khaitan & Ors. [(2023) 2 SCC 643] – This case reiterated the principle that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. (Supreme Court of India)
• Jagdish v. State of Karnataka [(2021) 12 SCC 812] – This case reiterated that where the statute in question does not prescribe a limitation, the rights conferred therein must be exercised within reasonable time. (Supreme Court of India)
• Madras Aluminium Co Ltd v. Tamil Nadu State Electricity Board [(2023) 8 SCC 240] – This case discussed the aspect of reasonable time, stating that it is to be applied and judged in each case per its own peculiar facts. (Supreme Court of India)
• SEBI v. Bhavesh Pabari [(2019) 5 SCC 90] – This three-judge bench decision was referred to in Madras Aluminium Co Ltd, stating that the concept of reasonable time is to be applied and judged in each case per its own peculiar facts. (Supreme Court of India)
• Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. [(1999) 6 SCC 82] – This case stated that Courts should be wary of prescribing specific period of limitation in cases where the legislature has refrained from doing so. (Supreme Court of India)
• Purohit & Co. v. Khatoonbee [(2017) 4 SCC 783] – This three-judge bench decision affirmed the holding in Ajaib Singh. (Supreme Court of India)
• Amalendu Kumar Bera v. State of W.B. [(2013) 4 SCC 52] – This case was cited by the Respondent to argue that the Court should not take a liberal approach in condonation of delay in the absence of sufficient cause. (Supreme Court of India)
• Satyan v. Deputy Commissioner [(2020) 14 SCC 210] – This case was cited by the Respondent to argue that in the absence of a prescribed statutory limitation, the court should be approached within a “reasonable time”. (Supreme Court of India)

Legal Provisions Considered by the Court:

• Section 22(6) of the Jogighopa Act: This section outlines the powers of the Commissioner.
• Section 22(7) of the Jogighopa Act: This section deems the Commissioner to be a Civil Court for specific purposes.
• Section 22(8) of the Jogighopa Act: This section provides for an appeal against the Commissioner’s decision.
• Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963: This article prescribes the limitation period for appeals.
• Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Defines “decree”.
• Section 2(14) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Defines “order”.
• Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Defines “Court”.
• Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Provides for prosecution for contempt of lawful authority.
• Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Relates to provisions as to offences affecting the administration of justice.

Authority Table

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was treated by the Court?

Final Order

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and restored the order of the District Judge admitting the appeal. The Court held that Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963, does not apply to appeals under Section 22(8) of the Jogighopa Act. The Court also held that the Claimant-Appellants did not transgress the boundaries of “reasonable time” in filing their appeal. The matter was remanded back to the District Judge for disposal on merits.

Ratio Decidendi

The ratio decidendi of the case can be summarized as follows:

• Applicability of the Limitation Act: Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963, does not apply to appeals under Section 22(8) of the Jogighopa Act because the Act does not explicitly state that the procedure governing the appeal shall be in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure. The application of the Code is limited to certain aspects of the Act only.
• Definition of “Court”: The Commissioner of Payments under the Jogighopa Act is not a court but a statutory authority, as the powers of the Commissioner are limited.
• Principle of “Reasonable Time”: In the absence of a specific limitation period prescribed by a statute, the principle of “reasonable time” applies. The determination of what constitutes “reasonable time” depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
• Judicial Restraint in Prescribing Limitation: Courts should be cautious in prescribing specific periods of limitation where the legislature has refrained from doing so.

Impact of the Judgment

This judgment clarifies the position on the applicability of the Limitation Act to appeals arising under special statutes where no specific limitation period is prescribed. It reinforces the principle that the Limitation Act cannot be automatically applied to such cases unless the statute explicitly provides for it. The judgment also emphasizes the importance of the principle of “reasonable time” in such situations, providing a flexible approach while ensuring that disputes are not kept pending indefinitely. It serves as a reminder that the courts should be cautious in imposing limitation periods where the legislature has not done so, upholding the intent of the legislature to provide a remedy without unduly restricting access to justice.

The judgment also clarifies the distinction between a “court” and a statutory authority, emphasizing that merely vesting some powers of a Civil Court does not transform a statutory authority into a court. This distinction is crucial in determining the applicability of procedural laws like the Code of Civil Procedure and the Limitation Act.

Flowchart of the Decision-Making Process

Ratio Table

Sentiment Analysis Table