Supreme Court clarifies limitation for cognizance in criminal cases: Amritlal vs. Shantilal Soni (2022)

LEGAL ISSUE: Determining the relevant date for calculating the limitation period under Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. CASE TYPE: Criminal. Case Name: Amritlal vs. Shantilal Soni & Ors. Judgment Date: 28 February 2022

Date of the Judgment: 28 February 2022
Citation: (2022) INSC 187
Judges: Dinesh Maheshwari, J. and Vikram Nath, J.

When does the clock start ticking for limitation in criminal cases? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this crucial question, clarifying whether the limitation period begins from the date of filing a complaint or the date when a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offense. This judgment in the case of Amritlal vs. Shantilal Soni & Ors. settles the law on this point, impacting how criminal cases are initiated and processed. The two-judge bench, comprising Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Vikram Nath, delivered the judgment.

Case Background

The case revolves around a complaint filed by Amritlal (the appellant) against Shantilal Soni and others (the respondents). Amritlal claimed that he had entrusted 33.139 kg of silver to the respondents, who refused to return it when demanded.

Specifically, the timeline of events is as follows:

• 04 October 2009: The alleged date when the respondents refused to return the silver.
• 10 July 2012: Amritlal filed a written complaint with the Superintendent of Police, Khachrod.
• 13 November 2012: The police filed a charge-sheet against the respondents for offenses under Section 406 read with Section 34 and Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
• 04 December 2012: The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Khachrod, took cognizance of the offenses.

The respondents were charged with criminal breach of trust and criminal conspiracy.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Khachrod, framed charges against the respondents on 12 September 2013. The respondents challenged this order in a revision petition, arguing that the cognizance was barred by limitation. The Additional Sessions Judge, Khachrod, dismissed this revision on 27 July 2015, holding that the limitation bar did not apply. The respondents then filed an application under Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 before the Trial Court, again raising the issue of limitation. This was rejected on 17 August 2017. The Additional Sessions Judge affirmed the Trial Court’s order on 20 February 2018. However, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore, in its order dated 06 March 2019, set aside these orders and quashed the proceedings, holding that the cognizance taken on 04 December 2012 was indeed barred by limitation.

Legal Framework

The case primarily revolves around Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC), which deals with the limitation period for taking cognizance of offenses. It states:

“468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.
(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court, shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub- section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be –
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.”

The Supreme Court also considered the interpretation of this provision in light of previous judgments, particularly regarding whether the relevant date for calculating limitation is the date of filing the complaint or the date of taking cognizance.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that the High Court erred in considering the date of taking cognizance (04 December 2012) as the relevant date for limitation.
• They contended that the relevant date should be the date of filing the complaint (10 July 2012), which was within the three-year limitation period from the date of the alleged offense (04 October 2009).
• The appellant relied on the Constitution Bench decision in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, (2014) 2 SCC 62, which clarified that the limitation period is calculated from the date of filing the complaint, not the date of cognizance.

Respondents’ Arguments:

• The respondents argued that the High Court was correct in holding that the prosecution was not maintainable because the Magistrate took cognizance on 04 December 2012, which was beyond the three-year limitation period from the alleged offense date of 04 October 2009.
• They relied on the decision in State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, (1981) 3 SCC 34.
• The respondents also attempted to argue that the decision in Sarah Mathew (supra) required reconsideration, claiming that several aspects related to the purpose of Chapter XXXVI of the CrPC had not been fully considered.

Innovativeness of the argument: The respondents’ argument that the decision in Sarah Mathew required reconsideration was an innovative attempt to challenge a Constitution Bench ruling, though it was ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court addressed the following issues:

1. Whether, for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the CrPC, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date on which a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offense.
2. Which of the two cases, Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 Supp SCC 121, or Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P., (2003) 8 SCC 559 (followed in Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, (2007) 7 SCC 394), lays down the correct law.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran [1990 Supp SCC 121]*: The Supreme Court restricted this case to its own facts and held that it is not the authority for deciding the relevant date for computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC.
• Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P. [(2003) 8 SCC 559]*: The Supreme Court held that this case lays down the correct law regarding the relevant date for computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC.
• Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty [(2007) 7 SCC 394]*: The Supreme Court followed this case as it upheld the decision in Bharat Damodar Kale.
• Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases [(2014) 2 SCC 62]*: The Supreme Court relied on this Constitution Bench decision, which clearly stated that the relevant date for computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence.
• State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh [(1981) 3 SCC 34]*: The Supreme Court rejected this case as it was not in line with the Constitution Bench decision in Sarah Mathew.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily driven by the need to uphold the principle of legal certainty and the binding nature of its Constitution Bench decisions. The court emphasized that once a Constitution Bench has authoritatively settled a point of law, it is binding on all lower courts and subsequent benches of the Supreme Court itself. This principle of stare decisis was paramount in the Court’s reasoning. The Court also noted that the High Court had committed a fundamental error in ignoring the clear enunciation of law in Sarah Mathew (supra). The Court’s reasoning was also influenced by the need to ensure that criminal proceedings are not unduly delayed or frustrated by technicalities, provided they are initiated within the prescribed limitation period.

The Supreme Court’s reasoning can be summarized as follows:

• The Constitution Bench in Sarah Mathew (supra) had already clarified that the relevant date for computing the limitation period under Section 468 of the CrPC is the date of filing the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution, and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offense.
• The High Court erred in assuming that the date of taking cognizance was decisive, ignoring the fact that the complaint was filed within the limitation period.
• The respondents’ argument that Sarah Mathew requires reconsideration was rejected, as a Constitution Bench decision cannot be questioned on suggestions about different interpretations of provisions.
• The Supreme Court emphasized the binding effect of its decisions, stating that it does not depend on whether a particular argument was considered, provided the point was decided.

The Supreme Court, therefore, set aside the High Court’s order and directed the Trial Magistrate to proceed with the trial expeditiously. The Court also cautioned against any further attempts by the accused-respondents to delay or obstruct the trial, granting the Magistrate the authority to take coercive measures if necessary.

The Court quoted from the judgment:

“In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance.”

“We further hold that Bharat Kale [Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P. , (2003) 8 SCC 559] which is followed in Japani Sahoo [Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty , (2007) 7 SCC 394] lays down the correct law.”

“Krishna Pillai [Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran , 1990 Supp SCC 121 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 646] will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC.”

Key Takeaways

• The limitation period for taking cognizance of an offense under Section 468 of the CrPC is calculated from the date of filing the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution, not the date when the Magistrate takes cognizance.
• The Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench decision in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, (2014) 2 SCC 62, is the binding authority on this issue.
• Lower courts must adhere to the law declared by the Supreme Court, and any deviation will be corrected.
• This judgment ensures that criminal proceedings are not dismissed on technical grounds if the complaint was filed within the limitation period.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed the Trial Magistrate to proceed with the trial expeditiously. It also authorized the Magistrate to take coercive measures, including cancellation of bail or imposing monetary conditions, if the accused-respondents attempted to delay or obstruct the trial.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the relevant date for computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the CrPC is the date of filing the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution, and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offense. This judgment reaffirms the position of law settled by the Constitution Bench in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, (2014) 2 SCC 62, and clarifies that the date of cognizance is irrelevant for calculating limitation.

Conclusion

In Amritlal vs. Shantilal Soni & Ors., the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the limitation period for taking cognizance of an offense under Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, begins from the date of filing the complaint, not the date of cognizance. This decision upholds the binding nature of the Constitution Bench decision in Sarah Mathew and ensures that criminal proceedings are not unjustly dismissed due to delays in taking cognizance, provided the complaint is filed within the limitation period. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and directed the trial court to proceed expeditiously, emphasizing the importance of adhering to established legal principles.