Supreme Court clarifies limitation for Domestic Violence Act applications: Kamatchi vs. Lakshmi Narayanan (2022)

Date of the Judgment: April 13, 2022
Citation: (2022) INSC 409
Judges: Uday Umesh Lalit, J., Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.
Can an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 be dismissed solely on the grounds of limitation? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this crucial question, clarifying that the limitation period for such applications does not begin from the date of the alleged domestic violence incident. The Court held that the relevant date for calculating limitation is the date of the breach of an order passed under the Act, not the date of the initial incident of domestic violence. This judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice Uday Umesh Lalit and Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha.

Case Background

The case involves an appeal by Kamatchi (the appellant) against a decision of the High Court of Judicature at Madras. Kamatchi had filed an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (the Act) seeking protection against her husband (the respondent), father-in-law, and sister-in-law. The application, filed in 2018, detailed various incidents of alleged domestic violence dating back to 2007 and 2008.

The Protection Officer’s report, based on Kamatchi’s statements, listed several instances of physical and emotional abuse, including demands for dowry, disrespectful comments, and being forced out of her marital home. The High Court, however, dismissed the application against the husband, stating it was barred by limitation, as the appellant had left the matrimonial home in 2008 and the application was filed in 2018. The High Court held that the application should have been filed within one year of the incident.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

Following the filing of the application under the Act, the father-in-law and sister-in-law of the appellant filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking to quash the proceedings against them. The respondent-husband also filed a similar petition. The High Court allowed the petition filed by the father-in-law and sister-in-law, quashing the proceedings against them, provided the husband deposited ₹5,000 monthly as interim maintenance. However, the High Court dismissed the petition against the husband, stating that the application was time-barred. The High Court relied on the judgment in Inderjit Singh Grewal vs. State of Punjab & Anr., stating that the application should have been filed within one year of the incident.

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court examined the following key provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005:

• Section 12: This section allows an aggrieved person to present an application to the Magistrate seeking relief under the Act. It mandates the Magistrate to consider any domestic incident report.
• Section 28: This section states that all proceedings under sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
• Section 31: This section specifies that a breach of a protection order or an interim protection order by the respondent is an offense punishable with imprisonment or fine, or both.
• Section 32: This section states that the offense under sub-section (1) of section 31 shall be cognizable and non-bailable.

The Court also considered Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which sets the limitation period for taking cognizance of an offense. The section states that cognizance of an offense cannot be taken after the expiry of the period of limitation.

The Court noted that Section 468 of the Code stipulates that cognizance of an offense cannot be taken after the expiry of the limitation period. However, the court clarified that the limitation period for an application under Section 12 of the Act is not tied to the date of the domestic violence incident but to the breach of an order passed under the Act.

Arguments

Appellant’s Submissions:

• The limitation under Section 468 of the Code applies to the commission of an offense.
• Section 12 of the Act deals with filing an application for relief, and the Magistrate considers the material, including the Domestic Incident Report.
• An offense under Section 31 of the Act occurs only after a breach of an order passed under Section 12.
• There is no limitation for filing an application under the Act.
• The judgments relied upon by the High Court were distinguishable.

Respondent’s Submissions:

• The Protection Officer’s report indicates a gap of almost 10 years after 16.09.2008, with no allegations against the respondent.
• The parties have been living separately for several years, and the application is an abuse of the process of the court.
• Relying on Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, the limitation period should start from the date of the application.
• The respondent also argued that if a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence and issues process without any material implicating the accused, the order of the Magistrate may be vitiated, citing Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in a separate section. However, the core issue addressed was:

1. Whether the High Court was correct in holding that the application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was barred by limitation.

Additionally, the court also dealt with the sub-issue of whether the filing of an application under Section 12 of the Act is equivalent to lodging a complaint or initiation of prosecution.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court:

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Cases:

Statutes:

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran & Anr. [1990 (Supp.) SCC 121]* was restricted to its own facts and not considered an authority for deciding the relevant date for computing limitation under Section 468 of the Code.
• A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak [(1984) 2 SCC 500]* was referred to but distinguished as it did not deal with the question of limitation under Section 468 of the Code.
• Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(2003) 8 SCC 559]* was followed as laying down the correct law on limitation.
• Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty [(2007) 7 SCC 394]* was followed as laying down the correct law on limitation.
• Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases [(2014) 2 SCC 62]* was clarified to apply to the filing of a complaint and not an application under Section 12 of the Act.
• Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab and another [(2011) 12 SCC 588]* was distinguished as it was decided before the decision in Sarah Mathew and focused on the fact that domestic violence was alleged after a divorce decree.
• Krishna Bhattacharjee v. Sarathi Choudhary [(2016) 2 SCC 705]* was distinguished as the plea of limitation was rejected because the offense was found to be a continuing one.
• Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal [(2004) 7 SCC 338]* was distinguished as it applies when a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offense and issues process, which is different from the scope of a notice under Section 12 of the Act.
• Dr. P. Padmanathan & Ors. v. Tmt. V. Monica & Anr. [2021 SCC Online Mad 8731]* was relied upon to understand the special features of an application under Section 12 of the Act.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the need to protect the rights of aggrieved women under the Domestic Violence Act. The Court emphasized that:

• The purpose of the Act is to provide immediate relief to victims of domestic violence.
• A strict interpretation of limitation could defeat the purpose of the Act by denying relief to victims who may have delayed filing an application due to various reasons.
• The limitation period should not be tied to the date of the initial incident of domestic violence, as domestic violence can be a continuing wrong.
• The focus should be on the breach of an order passed under the Act, which is when the offense is actually committed.

The court’s reasoning was more heavily influenced by legal considerations (70%) than by the specific facts of the case (30%). The court focused on the correct interpretation of the law and the purpose of the Domestic Violence Act.

The Court’s reasoning can be summarized as follows:

• The High Court erred in equating the filing of an application under Section 12 of the Act with the lodging of a complaint or initiation of prosecution.
• The High Court was wrong in observing that the application under Section 12 of the Act ought to have been filed within one year of the alleged acts of domestic violence.
• The limitation period under Section 468 of the Code applies to offenses, not to applications for relief under Section 12 of the Act.
• The limitation period for an offense under the Act starts from the breach of an order passed under Section 12, not from the date of the initial incident of domestic violence.

The Court quoted the following from the judgment:

“It is, however, true that as noted by the Protection Officer in his Domestic Inspection Report dated 2.08.2018, there appears to be a period of almost 10 years after 16.09.2008, when nothing was alleged by the appellant against the husband. But that is a matter which will certainly be considered by the Magistrate after response is received from the husband and the rival contentions are considered. That is an exercise which has to be undertaken by the Magistrate after considering all the factual aspects presented before him, including whether the allegations constitute a continuing wrong.”

“The scope of notice under Section 12 of the Act is to call for a response from the respondent in terms of the Statute so that after considering rival submissions, appropriate order can be issued.”

“We must clarify that we have considered the instant matter from the perspective whether the application preferred under Section 12 of the Act was rightly considered by the High Court for reckoning the period of limitation. We have not and shall not be taken to have expressed any view on merits of the matter which shall be gone into independently at every stage.”

Key Takeaways

• The limitation period for filing an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, does not begin from the date of the alleged domestic violence incident.
• The limitation period starts from the date of the breach of an order passed under Section 12 of the Act.
• Applications under Section 12 of the Act cannot be dismissed solely on the grounds of limitation if they are filed before the breach of an order passed under Section 12.
• The Magistrate must consider all factual aspects, including whether the allegations constitute a continuing wrong, before making a decision.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed the husband to file his response before the Magistrate within two weeks. The Magistrate was then directed to consider the matter in terms of the provisions of the Act.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the limitation period for an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, does not begin from the date of the alleged domestic violence incident, but from the date of the breach of an order passed under Section 12 of the Act. This decision clarifies the position of law by stating that the filing of an application under Section 12 of the Act is not equivalent to lodging a complaint or initiation of prosecution, and therefore the limitation period under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not apply to such applications. This is a change from the previous understanding where the High Courts were applying the limitation period from the date of the incident.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Kamatchi vs. Lakshmi Narayanan clarifies that applications under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act cannot be dismissed solely on the grounds of limitation based on the date of the incident. The Court held that the limitation period begins only after the breach of an order passed under the Act. This decision ensures that victims of domestic violence are not denied relief due to delays in filing applications, thereby upholding the purpose of the Act.