Supreme Court Clarifies Limitation Period for Possession Suits Based on Declaratory Decrees: Mohinder Singh vs. Paramjit Singh (2018)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 28 March 2018
Citation: (2018) INSC 240
Judges: Dipak Misra, CJI and A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

When does the clock start ticking for a suit seeking possession of property after a declaratory decree has been issued? This was the core question before the Supreme Court in *Mohinder Singh (Dead) Through L.Rs. vs. Paramjit Singh & Ors.* The case revolved around interpreting the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920, and its interaction with the Limitation Act, 1963, specifically concerning the limitation period for filing a suit for possession of ancestral property after obtaining a declaratory decree. The Supreme Court had to determine whether the limitation period starts from the date of the declaratory judgment or the date when the formal decree is prepared.

The bench comprised of Chief Justice Dipak Misra and Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, with the judgment authored by Justice Khanwilkar.

Case Background

The case originates from a gift deed executed on 6th March, 1963, by Ujjagar Singh, who gifted ancestral lands to Rura Singh. Mohinder Singh, a coparcener, challenged this gift deed, leading to a compromise. As per the compromise, Mohinder Singh was to receive specific lands after Ujjagar Singh’s death. The court formalized this agreement on 20th August, 1963, decreeing that Mohinder Singh would get the land after the death of Ujjagar Singh.

Mohinder Singh initiated execution proceedings in 1964, which were dismissed as premature. After Ujjagar Singh’s death on 14th January, 1971, Mohinder Singh filed another execution petition. It was during this process that it was discovered that the formal decree sheet was prepared on 19th August, 1972. However, this execution petition was dismissed for default. A subsequent execution petition was also dismissed on 2nd February, 1974, with the court advising Mohinder Singh to file a suit for possession.

Following this, Mohinder Singh filed a suit for possession on 11th June, 1974. The respondents contended that the suit was time-barred as it was filed more than three years after Ujjagar Singh’s death, arguing the limitation period should be calculated from Ujjagar Singh’s death and not from the date the decree sheet was prepared.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Trial Court initially ruled in favor of Mohinder Singh, stating that the suit was within the limitation period as per Article 2(b) of the Punjab Limitation (Customs) Act, 1920, which stipulates that the limitation period starts from the date the right to sue accrues or the date the declaratory decree is obtained, whichever is later. The Trial Court considered the date of the decree sheet preparation (19th August, 1972) as the relevant date.

The First Appellate Court upheld the Trial Court’s decision, agreeing that the limitation period should be calculated from the date the decree sheet was prepared. The court noted that the decree sheet was prepared in the presence of both parties during the execution proceedings.

However, the High Court reversed these decisions, stating that the formal decree drawn on 19th August, 1972, relates back to the date of the compromise decree (20th August, 1963). It held that the limitation period commenced on 14th January, 1971, upon the death of Ujjagar Singh, and thus the suit filed on 11th June, 1974, was barred by limitation.

Legal Framework

The primary legal framework in this case is the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920. Section 8 of the 1920 Act states that a decree declaring an alienation of ancestral property as not binding benefits all persons entitled to challenge the alienation. Article 2 of the Schedule to the 1920 Act specifies the limitation period for suits related to ancestral property:

• Article 2(a): A suit for possession of ancestral immovable property when no declaratory decree is obtained has a limitation period of six years.
• Article 2(b): A suit for possession of ancestral immovable property when a declaratory decree is obtained has a limitation period of three years from the date the right to sue accrues or the date the declaratory decree is obtained, whichever is later.

The court also considered Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which allows for the exclusion of time spent in pursuing legal proceedings in the wrong forum, provided the proceedings were pursued in good faith. Section 5 of the 1920 Act makes Sections 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to suits under the 1920 Act. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, states that where a special or local law prescribes a different limitation period, Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act apply unless expressly excluded by the special or local law.

Section 5 of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 states:
“5. Dismissal of suits of the descriptions specified in the Act if instituted after the period of limitation therein prescribed has expired. – Subject to the provision contained in sections 4 to 25 (inclusive), of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the first schedule of the said Act, every suit, of any description specified in the schedule annexed to this Act, instituted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor in the schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.”

Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 states:
“29. Savings. – (1) xxx
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
(3) xxx
(4) xxx.”

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that the limitation period for filing the suit for possession should be calculated from the date the decree sheet was prepared (19th August, 1972), as per Article 2(b) of the 1920 Act, which states that the limitation starts from the date the right to sue accrues or the date the declaratory decree is obtained, whichever is later.
• The appellant contended that the term “obtained” in Article 2(b) refers to the date when the formal decree is drawn, not just the date of the judgment. They relied on the ruling in Lala Balmukund (Dead) Through L.Rs. vs. Lajwanti and Ors. [1975] 1 SCC 725, which held that “obtaining” a copy means drawing of a decree.
• The appellant also argued that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, should apply, allowing for the exclusion of time spent pursuing execution proceedings in good faith. They asserted that the execution petitions were dismissed due to technical defects and that the respondents did not object to these dismissals.
• The appellant relied on Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and Ors. [2008] 7 SCC 169, stating that a liberal approach should be adopted when applying Section 14 of the Limitation Act, unless expressly excluded by special law.
• The appellant relied on Union of India and Ors. vs. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. and Anr. [2004] 3 SCC 458, to support the view that the Trial Court and First Appellate Court’s approach was correct.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The respondents argued that the decree drawn on 19th August, 1972, relates back to the date of the compromise judgment (20th August, 1963). Therefore, the limitation period should be calculated from the date of Ujjagar Singh’s death (14th January, 1971), which was the date the right to sue accrued.
• The respondents contended that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, only applies when a civil proceeding is dismissed due to technical defects, and the plaintiff did not exercise due diligence. They relied on paragraphs 21, 22, and 31 of Consolidated Engineering Enterprises to support this view.
• The respondents argued that the suit was time-barred as it was filed after the expiry of the three-year limitation period from the date of Ujjagar Singh’s death, and the plaintiff did not provide a valid explanation for the delay between the dismissal of the third execution petition and the filing of the suit for possession.

Innovativeness of the argument: The appellant’s argument was innovative in emphasizing the specific wording of Article 2(b) of the 1920 Act, particularly the term “obtained,” and linking it to the actual preparation of the decree sheet. This interpretation was crucial in extending the limitation period, showcasing a nuanced understanding of the legal text.

Submissions Table

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issue for consideration:

1. Whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has no impact in view of the provisions contained in the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920, and if so, will it be applicable in the facts of this case?

The court also considered the sub-issue of whether the limitation period should be calculated from the date of the declaratory judgment or the date when the formal decree is prepared.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Cases:

• Lala Balmukund (Dead) Through L.Rs. vs. Lajwanti and Ors. [1975] 1 SCC 725 – This case was relied upon to interpret the term “obtained” in the context of a decree. The court held that “obtaining” a copy means drawing of a decree.
• Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and Ors. [2008] 7 SCC 169 – This case was cited to support the argument that a liberal approach should be adopted when applying Section 14 of the Limitation Act, unless expressly excluded by special law.
• Union of India and Ors. vs. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. and Anr. [2004] 3 SCC 458 – This case was used to emphasize that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not limited to jurisdictional issues but also includes other causes of a like nature and that a liberal interpretation should be given to the Limitation Act.
• CST vs. Parson Tools and Plants [1975] 4 SCC 22 – This case was referred to in the context of the requirements to attract the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
• Roshanlal Kuthalia vs. R.B. Mohan Singh Oberai [1975] 4 SCC 628 – This case was cited to support the liberal interpretation of the expression “other cause of a like nature” in Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
• W.B. Essential Commodities Supply Corpn. Vs. Swadesh Agro Farming & Storage Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. [1999] 8 SCC 315 – This case was used to understand the enforceability of a decree and when the limitation period starts.
• Yeshwant Deorao v. Walchand Ramchand AIR 1951 SC 16 – This case was cited to distinguish between conditional and unconditional decrees.
• Shankar Balwant Lokhande v. Chandrakant Shankar Lokhande (1995) 3 SCC 413 – This case was cited in the context of decrees in partition suits.

Legal Provisions:

• Section 8 of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 – This section states that a decree declaring an alienation of ancestral property as not binding benefits all persons entitled to challenge the alienation.
• Article 2 of the Schedule to the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 – This article specifies the limitation period for suits related to ancestral property.
• Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 – This section allows for the exclusion of time spent in pursuing legal proceedings in the wrong forum, provided the proceedings were pursued in good faith.
• Section 5 of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 – This section makes Sections 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applicable to suits under the 1920 Act.
• Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 – This section states that where a special or local law prescribes a different limitation period, Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act apply unless expressly excluded by the special or local law.

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• Lala Balmukund (Dead) Through L.Rs. vs. Lajwanti and Ors. [1975] 1 SCC 725*: The Court followed this authority, using it to interpret the term “obtained” in Article 2(b) of the 1920 Act, emphasizing that it refers to the drawing of the decree.
• Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and Ors. [2008] 7 SCC 169*: The Court relied on this authority to support the view that a liberal approach should be adopted when applying Section 14 of the Limitation Act, unless expressly excluded by special law.
• Union of India and Ors. vs. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. and Anr. [2004] 3 SCC 458*: The Court followed this authority to emphasize that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not limited to jurisdictional issues but also includes other causes of a like nature.
• W.B. Essential Commodities Supply Corpn. Vs. Swadesh Agro Farming & Storage Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. [1999] 8 SCC 315*: The Court used this case to understand the enforceability of a decree and when the limitation period starts, highlighting that a decree may not be enforceable on the date it is passed.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by a literal interpretation of the term “obtained” in Article 2(b) of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920, and a liberal application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Court emphasized that the limitation period should start from the date the formal decree is prepared, not merely from the date of the judgment. This interpretation was crucial in ensuring that the plaintiff was not penalized for delays in the preparation of the decree sheet. The Court also considered the fact that the plaintiff had pursued execution proceedings in good faith, and the dismissal of those proceedings was due to technical defects or other causes of a like nature.

The court’s reasoning shows a strong emphasis on ensuring that the law does not deprive a litigant of a remedy due to technicalities or delays not attributable to the litigant’s fault. This is evident in the court’s reliance on precedents that advocate for a liberal interpretation of limitation laws to preserve legal remedies.

Fact:Law Ratio

The court’s reasoning was more influenced by legal considerations (70%) than factual aspects of the case (30%).

Logical Reasoning

Issue 1: Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963

Issue 2: Calculation of Limitation Period

Decision

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court. The Court restored the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court as affirmed by the First Appellate Court. The Court reasoned that the expression “the declaratory decree is obtained” in Article 2(b) of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920, refers to the date on which the formal decree is drawn or prepared, not merely the date on which the declaratory judgment is passed. The Court also held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies to the case, allowing for the exclusion of time spent pursuing execution proceedings in good faith.

The Court emphasized that:

“The expression “the declaratory decree is obtained”, therefore, assumes significance. If the legislature intended to provide it differently, it could have couched the provision as “the date on which the declaratory judgment is passed”. The legislature in enacting 1920 Act, however, consciously used the expression “the declaratory decree is obtained”, which intrinsically includes the date on which a formal decree is drawn or prepared and not merely the date on which a declaratory judgment is passed by the Court.”

The Court further noted:

“The expanse of Section 14 of the Act, therefore, is not limited to mere jurisdictional issue but also other cause of a like nature. Taking cue from this decision, the appellant would submit that the reasons for dismissal of the execution petitions would qualify as “defect of jurisdiction” or “other cause of a like nature”. We find force in this submission.”

Ratio Decidendi

The ratio decidendi of the case is that for suits seeking possession of ancestral property after obtaining a declaratory decree, the limitation period, as per Article 2(b) of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920, starts from the date when the formal decree is prepared, not just the date of the declaratory judgment. Additionally, Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which allows for the exclusion of time spent pursuing legal proceedings in the wrong forum, applies to such cases unless expressly excluded by the special or local law. This ruling clarifies that the term “obtained” in the context of a declaratory decree refers to the date of the formal decree and not the date of the judgment and that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is applicable unless expressly excluded by the local or special law.

Obiter Dicta

There are several obiter dicta in this case:

• The Court emphasized the need for a liberal interpretation of limitation laws to ensure that litigants are not deprived of their legal remedies due to technicalities or delays not attributable to their fault.
• The Court reiterated that the scope of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is not limited to jurisdictional issues but also includes other causes of a like nature.
• The Court’s interpretation of the term “obtained” in the context of a decree suggests that the formal drawing up of the decree is a significant step in the legal process, not merely a formality.
• The Court also highlighted that the application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is not excluded by the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920, unless expressly stated, thus reinforcing the principle that general laws apply unless specifically excluded.

Implications

The Supreme Court’s judgment in *Mohinder Singh vs. Paramjit Singh* has several significant implications:

• Clarity on Limitation Period: The judgment provides clarity on when the limitation period begins for filing a suit for possession after a declaratory decree, specifically under the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920. It establishes that the limitation period starts from the date the formal decree is prepared, not the date of the judgment, which helps avoid ambiguity and ensures that litigants are not penalized for delays in the formalization of the decree.
• Application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act: The decision reinforces the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in cases governed by special or local laws, unless expressly excluded. This ensures that litigants who pursue legal remedies in good faith are not disadvantaged due to technical defects or other similar reasons.
• Liberal Interpretation of Limitation Laws: The judgment underscores the importance of a liberal interpretation of limitation laws to ensure that legal remedies are not lost due to technicalities. This aligns with the principle that the law should be interpreted to preserve, not defeat, legal rights.
• Impact on Property Law: The case has a direct impact on property law, particularly in cases involving ancestral property and declaratory decrees. It ensures that the limitation period is calculated justly, protecting the rights of those who have obtained a declaratory decree.
• Precedent for Similar Cases: The decision serves as a significant precedent for future cases involving similar issues, providing guidance to lower courts and legal practitioners. It clarifies the interpretation of specific legal provisions and establishes a clear rule of law.

Key Takeaways

• The limitation period for filing a suit for possession of ancestral property after obtaining a declaratory decree, as per Article 2(b) of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920, starts from the date when the formal decree is prepared, not just the date of the declaratory judgment.
• Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies to cases under the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920, unless expressly excluded, allowing for the exclusion of time spent pursuing legal proceedings in good faith.
• The term “obtained” in the context of a declaratory decree refers to the date of the formal decree and not the date of the judgment.
• Courts should adopt a liberal interpretation of limitation laws to ensure that legal remedies are not lost due to technicalities or delays not attributable to the fault of the litigant.
• This judgment provides clarity and guidance for future cases involving similar issues, ensuring a consistent and fair application of the law.