LEGAL ISSUE: Whether a limited estate granted to a Hindu female under a will becomes an absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, or remains a limited estate under Section 14(2).
CASE TYPE: Civil Law, Property Law, Testamentary Succession
Case Name: Jogi Ram vs. Suresh Kumar & Ors.
Judgment Date: 01 February 2022
Date of the Judgment: 01 February 2022
Citation: CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1543-1544 OF 2019
Judges: Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J., M.M. Sundresh, J.
Can a testator limit the rights of a beneficiary in a will, or does the law automatically convert a limited estate into an absolute one? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a property dispute arising from a will executed in 1968. The core issue revolved around whether a Hindu woman, Ram Devi, who received a limited estate in property through a will, could claim absolute ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, or whether her interest remained limited as per Section 14(2) of the same Act. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice M.M. Sundresh, with Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul authoring the opinion.
Case Background
The dispute originated from a will dated 15 April 1968, executed by Tulsi Ram, who passed away on 17 November 1969. Tulsi Ram bequeathed his estate to his son, Jogi Ram (the appellant), and his second wife, Ram Devi. The will granted absolute ownership rights to Jogi Ram for his share of the land and property. However, Ram Devi was given a limited ownership for her lifetime, with a specific restriction that she could not alienate, transfer, or create third-party rights over her share. After her lifetime, her share was to vest absolutely in Jogi Ram.
Following Tulsi Ram’s death, the properties were enjoyed as per the will for several years. The first round of litigation began when Bimla Devi, Ram Devi’s daughter, filed a collusive suit claiming ownership of half the land willed to Ram Devi. A decree was passed in her favor on 15 January 1986. Subsequently, Bimla Devi leased the land to Amar Singh on 17 June 1986. This prompted Jogi Ram to file a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against Ram Devi, Bimla Devi, and Amar Singh. The court ruled that Ram Devi had a limited estate under Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and set aside the decree and lease deed. During the pendency of the suit, Ram Devi executed multiple sale deeds for parts of the land in favor of Dharam Singh, Kanta Devi, and Baldeva. These sales were also challenged by Jogi Ram in the second round of litigation.
Timeline
Date | Event |
---|---|
15 April 1968 | Tulsi Ram executes a will. |
17 November 1969 | Tulsi Ram passes away. |
15 January 1986 | Bimla Devi obtains a decree in a collusive suit claiming ownership of Ram Devi’s share. |
17 June 1986 | Bimla Devi leases the land to Amar Singh. |
1993 | Jogi Ram files a suit challenging the decree and lease deed. |
29 April 1993 | Ram Devi executes two sale deeds for parts of the land. |
27 September 1995 | Court rules Ram Devi had a limited estate and sets aside the decree and lease deed. |
8/9 June 1998 | Another sale deed was executed by Ram Devi. |
15 April 1999 | Appeal by Ram Devi dismissed. |
26 August 1999 | Ram Devi passes away. |
23 October 2001 | Ram Devi’s second appeal is dismissed. |
29 April 2002 | Special Leave Petition is dismissed. |
2008 | Jogi Ram files a suit challenging the sale deeds executed by Ram Devi. |
13 August 2009 | Court decrees the suit in favor of Jogi Ram, holding that Ram Devi had a limited ownership right. |
7 October 2010 | Appeal against the judgment of 13 August 2009 was dismissed. |
22 February 2018 | High Court rules in favor of the respondents, stating that Ram Devi’s limited right had become absolute. |
4 July 2018 | Supreme Court issues notice in the SLP and directs status quo. |
4 February 2019 | Leave was granted and the interim order was made absolute. |
01 February 2022 | Supreme Court allows the appeals and sets aside the High Court’s judgment. |
Course of Proceedings
The initial suit filed by Jogi Ram was decided in his favor, with the court holding that Ram Devi had a limited estate under Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. This decision was upheld by the Additional District Judge, Karnal, and subsequently by the High Court in a second appeal. A Special Leave Petition (SLP) against the High Court’s decision was also dismissed by the Supreme Court. However, after Ram Devi’s death, Jogi Ram filed another suit challenging the sale deeds executed by Ram Devi. This suit was also decreed in his favor by the Civil Judge, SD, Karnal, stating that Ram Devi had limited ownership rights and could not have alienated the property. The appeal against this judgment was dismissed by the appellate court. However, the High Court, in a second appeal, reversed the lower courts’ decisions, relying on the Supreme Court’s judgments in V. Tulasamma & Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by LRs. and Jupudy Pardha Sarathy v. Pentapati Rama Krishna & Ors., holding that Ram Devi’s limited right had crystallized into an absolute ownership right. The High Court also stated that the first round of litigation would not operate as res judicata as the law had changed since the first round of litigation.
Legal Framework
The core legal issue revolves around the interpretation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which deals with the property rights of a female Hindu. Section 14(1) states that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as a full owner and not as a limited owner. The Explanation to this sub-section defines “property” broadly to include various modes of acquisition, such as inheritance, devise, partition, maintenance, gift, etc.
However, Section 14(2) provides an exception to Section 14(1). It states that nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift, under a will, or any other instrument, or under a decree or order of a civil court, or under an award, where the terms of the gift, will, or other instrument prescribe a restricted estate in such property. The Supreme Court had to interpret whether Ram Devi’s limited estate under the will fell under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
The relevant provision is reproduced below:
“14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.—
(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
Explanation.—In this sub-section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.”
Arguments
Appellant’s Arguments:
- The appellant argued that Ram Devi was not given the life estate in lieu of any pre-existing right or maintenance. Therefore, Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, should apply, not Section 14(1).
- The appellant reiterated the plea of res judicata, stating that the High Court erred in assuming that the law had changed since the first round of litigation.
- The appellant contended that the High Court wrongly relied on Shakuntla Devi v. Kamla & Ors., as the will in that case was dated 1 October 1935, which is a pre-1956 will, making it an inapplicable precedent.
- The appellant also argued that since the possession of the property was taken over by the appellant and Ram Devi was not in possession thereof, she cannot claim the benefit of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, citing Sadhu Singh v. Gurudwara Sahib Narike & Ors. and Gaddam Ramakrishna Reddy & Ors. v. Gaddam Ramireddy & Ors..
Respondents’ Arguments:
- The respondents emphasized that the factual scenario was similar to Shakuntla Devi v. Kamla & Ors., and the rights of a female Hindu post the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, have been crystallized in V. Tulasamma & Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by LRs.
- They argued that since Ram Devi was an absolute owner, she was entitled to sell the land, and the respondents were bona fide buyers protected by Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
- They further contended that no substantial question of law was required to be framed, citing the Constitution Bench judgment in Pankajakshi (dead) through LRs & Ors. v. Chandrika & Ors.
Submissions by Parties
Main Submission | Sub-Submissions |
---|---|
Appellant’s Submission: Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, applies, not Section 14(1). |
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Appellant’s Submission: Plea of res judicata applies. |
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Respondents’ Submission: Ram Devi was an absolute owner. |
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Respondents’ Submission: Respondents are bona fide purchasers. |
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Respondents’ Submission: No substantial question of law needed. |
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Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the following issues:
- In the given factual scenario, did Ram Devi become the absolute owner of the property under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, or would the Explanation under Section 14(2) apply given the nature of the will?
- What is the effect of the first round of litigation, which reached the Supreme Court, between the appellant and Ram Devi, the two beneficiaries of the will?
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:
Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
---|---|---|
Whether Ram Devi became the absolute owner under Section 14(1) or if Section 14(2) applies. | Section 14(2) applies. | The will created a new title with a restricted estate, not a recognition of a pre-existing right. The testator intended to give a limited life interest, and the income from the property was for maintenance, not the property itself. |
Effect of the first round of litigation. | The first round of litigation operates as res judicata. | The first round of litigation clearly held that Ram Devi had a limited estate. The respondents cannot have a better title than the vendor, Ram Devi. The reliance on Shakuntla Devi v. Kamla & Ors. was misplaced as the will in that case was pre-1956. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:
Cases:
- V. Tulasamma & Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by LRs. [CITATION: (1977) 3 SCC 99] – The court discussed the incidents and characteristics of a Hindu woman’s right to maintenance and the interpretation of Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The court held that Section 14(2) applies to instruments that create new titles and not those that recognize pre-existing rights. This case was used to understand the nature of a Hindu woman’s right to maintenance and how it interacts with Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
- Jupudy Pardha Sarathy v. Pentapati Rama Krishna & Ors. [CITATION: (2016) 2 SCC 563] – This case was referred to in the High Court’s judgment to support the proposition that a limited right could crystallize into an absolute ownership right. The Supreme Court distinguished this case on facts.
- Shakuntla Devi v. Kamla & Ors. [CITATION: (2005) 5 SCC 390] – This case was relied upon by the High Court to argue that the first round of litigation would not operate as res judicata. The Supreme Court distinguished this case on facts, noting that the will in Shakuntla Devi v. Kamla & Ors. was pre-1956.
- Mathura Prasad Bajoo & Ors. v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejebhoy [CITATION: (1970) 1 SCC 613] – This case was referred to in Shakuntla Devi v. Kamla & Ors., which was then relied upon by the High Court.
- Sadhu Singh v. Gurudwara Sahib Narike & Ors. [CITATION: (2006) 8 SCC 75] – This case was cited by the appellant to argue that Ram Devi not being in possession cannot claim benefit of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Supreme Court did not find it to be a material consideration.
- Gaddam Ramakrishna Reddy & Ors. v. Gaddam Ramireddy & Ors. [CITATION: (2010) 9 SCC 602] – This case was also cited by the appellant to argue that Ram Devi not being in possession cannot claim benefit of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Supreme Court did not find it to be a material consideration.
- Pankajakshi (dead) through LRs & Ors. v. Chandrika & Ors. [CITATION: AIR 2016 SC 1213] – This case was cited by the respondents to argue that the High Court was not required to frame a substantial question of law. The Supreme Court accepted this argument.
Statutes:
- Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – This section was the core of the dispute, dealing with the property of a female Hindu. The court interpreted both sub-sections (1) and (2).
- Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – This section was invoked by the respondents to claim protection as bona fide purchasers. The Supreme Court rejected this claim.
- Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 – This section was mentioned in the context of the second appeal before the High Court.
- Section 97(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – This section was mentioned in the context of the High Court not framing a substantial question of law.
Authorities Considered by the Court
Authority | How Considered |
---|---|
V. Tulasamma & Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by LRs. [CITATION: (1977) 3 SCC 99] | Explained the principles of Hindu women’s right to maintenance and interpretation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Used to show that Section 14(2) applies to new titles, not pre-existing rights. |
Jupudy Pardha Sarathy v. Pentapati Rama Krishna & Ors. [CITATION: (2016) 2 SCC 563] | Distinguished on facts, as the case was not applicable to the facts of the present case. |
Shakuntla Devi v. Kamla & Ors. [CITATION: (2005) 5 SCC 390] | Distinguished on facts, as the will in that case was pre-1956. Overruled the High Court’s view that it was applicable. |
Mathura Prasad Bajoo & Ors. v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejebhoy [CITATION: (1970) 1 SCC 613] | Referred to in Shakuntla Devi v. Kamla & Ors., which was then distinguished by the Supreme Court. |
Sadhu Singh v. Gurudwara Sahib Narike & Ors. [CITATION: (2006) 8 SCC 75] | Not considered a material factor by the court. |
Gaddam Ramakrishna Reddy & Ors. v. Gaddam Ramireddy & Ors. [CITATION: (2010) 9 SCC 602] | Not considered a material factor by the court. |
Pankajakshi (dead) through LRs & Ors. v. Chandrika & Ors. [CITATION: AIR 2016 SC 1213] | Accepted the argument that no substantial question of law was required to be framed. |
Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 | Interpreted both sub-sections (1) and (2) in detail. |
Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 | Rejected the claim of protection under this section for the respondents. |
Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 | Mentioned in the context of the second appeal before the High Court. |
Section 97(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 | Mentioned in the context of the High Court not framing a substantial question of law. |
Judgment
How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?
Submission | Court’s Treatment |
---|---|
Appellant’s submission that Section 14(2) applies. | Accepted. The court held that the will created a new title with a restricted estate, not a recognition of a pre-existing right. |
Appellant’s submission that the plea of res judicata applies. | Accepted. The court held that the first round of litigation was binding. |
Appellant’s submission that the High Court wrongly relied on Shakuntla Devi v. Kamla & Ors. | Accepted. The court distinguished the case on facts. |
Appellant’s submission that Ram Devi was not in possession of the property. | Not considered a material factor. |
Respondents’ submission that Ram Devi was an absolute owner. | Rejected. The court held that Ram Devi had only a limited life interest. |
Respondents’ submission that they were bona fide purchasers. | Rejected. The court held that the transactions were not bona fide. |
Respondents’ submission that no substantial question of law was required. | Accepted. The court agreed with the respondents on this point. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
The Supreme Court relied on V. Tulasamma & Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by LRs. [CITATION: (1977) 3 SCC 99]* to explain the principles of Hindu women’s right to maintenance and interpretation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Court distinguished Jupudy Pardha Sarathy v. Pentapati Rama Krishna & Ors. [CITATION: (2016) 2 SCC 563]* on facts. The Court distinguished Shakuntla Devi v. Kamla & Ors. [CITATION: (2005) 5 SCC 390]* on facts and overruled the High Court’s view that it was applicable. The Court did not consider Sadhu Singh v. Gurudwara Sahib Narike & Ors. [CITATION: (2006) 8 SCC 75]* and Gaddam Ramakrishna Reddy & Ors. v. Gaddam Ramireddy & Ors. [CITATION: (2010) 9 SCC 602]* as material factors. The Court accepted the argument in Pankajakshi (dead) through LRs & Ors. v. Chandrika & Ors. [CITATION: AIR 2016 SC 1213]* that no substantial question of law was required to be framed.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court emphasized that the intent of the testator, Tulsi Ram, was to provide a limited life interest to his second wife, Ram Devi, while ensuring that his son, Jogi Ram, would inherit the property absolutely after her lifetime. The Court noted that the testator had made provisions for Ram Devi’s maintenance by ensuring that the revenue generated from the estate would go to her. The Court also pointed out that the objective of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is to create an absolute interest in the case of a limited interest of the wife where such limited estate owes its origin to law as it stood then, and not to override the testator’s intent to give a limited estate to his wife if all other aspects including maintenance are taken care of. The Court also highlighted that the respondents’ claim of being bona fide purchasers was not credible given the history of litigation against Ram Devi.
Sentiment | Percentage |
---|---|
Intent of the Testator | 30% |
Limited Nature of Estate | 25% |
Maintenance Provisions | 20% |
Res Judicata | 15% |
Dubious Transactions | 10% |
Category | Percentage |
---|---|
Fact | 30% |
Law | 70% |
Logical Reasoning:
The Supreme Court rejected the High Court’s view that the law had changed since the first round of litigation, emphasizing that all judgments were much prior in time. The court also found that the transactions by Ram Devi were not bona fide and were an attempt to deny the appellant his rights under the will.
The Supreme Court stated: “The testator in the present case, Tulsi Ram, had taken all care for the needs of maintenance of his wife by ensuring that the revenue generated from the estate would go to her alone. He, however, wished to give only a limited lift interest to her as the second wife with the son inheriting the complete estate after her lifetime.”
The Court also observed: “The first endeavour was by the daughter of Ram Devi by seeking what is undoubtedly a collusive decree when she had no interest in the property. She then sought to create lease interest in the property. Both these aspects were held against Ram Devi and her daughter right till the Supreme Court in the first round of litigation clearly opining that Ram Devi had only a limited estate in the property.”
The Supreme Court further added: “We believe from the facts on record that the transactions in question are not only not bona fide but dubious in character to somehow deny the appellant rights conferred under the Will respondents being third parties.”
Key Takeaways
- A testator can create a limited estate for a beneficiary in a will if the intent is clear and provisions for maintenance are made.
- Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, applies to instruments like wills that create new titles with restricted estates, not just confirming pre-existing rights.
- The principle of res judicata applies to previous litigation between the same parties, and subsequent purchasers cannot have a better title than the vendor.
- Courts will consider the testator’s intent when interpreting a will, especially when it comes to the nature of the estate granted.
Directions
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court’s judgment, and reaffirmed the decree of the trial court dated 13 August 2009, as affirmed by the appellate court dated 7 October 2010. The parties were left to bear their own costs.
Development of Law
The Supreme Court clarified that Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, applies to wills that create new titles with restricted estates, emphasizing that the intent of the testator is paramount. The Court also reaffirmed the principle of res judicata and the importance of bona fide transactions in property law. The ratio decidendi is that a limited estate created by a will does not automatically become an absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, if the will clearly restricts the estate and provides for maintenance. This is a reaffirmation of the existing legal position.
Conclusion
In the case of Jogi Ram vs. Suresh Kumar, the Supreme Court has provided a clear interpretation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Court held that a limited estate granted to a Hindu female under a will does not automatically become an absolute estate under Section 14(1) if the will clearly restricts the estate and makes provisions for maintenance. This judgment reinforces the importance of testamentary intent and the application of res judicata in property disputes. The Supreme Court has also emphasized that the intention of the testator is paramount in such matters and that courts should not interpret the law in a way that defeats the testator’s intention.
Source: Jogi Ram vs. Suresh Kumar