Supreme Court Clarifies Maintenance Rights of Divorced Muslim Women Under CrPC and 1986 Act (2024) INSC 506 (10 July 2024)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 10 July 2024

Citation: 2024 INSC 506

Judges: B.V. Nagarathna, J. and Augustine George Masih, J. (Concurring Opinion)

Can a divorced Muslim woman seek maintenance under the general law (Section 125 of the CrPC), or is she restricted to the remedies provided under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question, clarifying the interplay between these two legal frameworks. This judgment settles the legal position on the maintenance rights of divorced Muslim women, ensuring their access to justice. The bench comprised Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Augustine George Masih, who delivered a concurring opinion.

Case Background

The appellant, Mohd. Abdul Samad, was married to Respondent No. 2 on 15 November 2012. Due to a deteriorating relationship, Respondent No. 2 left the matrimonial home on 9 April 2016. Subsequently, she filed a criminal complaint against the appellant, leading to FIR No. 578 of 2017 under Sections 498A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In response, the appellant pronounced triple talaq on 25 September 2017 and obtained an ex-parte divorce certificate on 28 September 2017 from the office of Quzath. The appellant attempted to pay INR 15,000 for the iddat period, which was refused. Respondent No. 2 then filed a petition for interim maintenance under Section 125(1) of the CrPC before the Family Court, which was allowed on 9 June 2023. The appellant challenged this order in the High Court of Telangana, which modified the order, reducing the interim maintenance from INR 20,000 to INR 10,000 per month on 13 December 2023. This led to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Family Court initially allowed the petition for interim maintenance filed by Respondent No. 2 under Section 125 of the CrPC on 9 June 2023, ordering the appellant to pay INR 20,000 per month. The appellant challenged this order before the High Court of Telangana. The High Court modified the Family Court’s order on 13 December 2023, reducing the interim maintenance to INR 10,000 per month. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court, arguing that the provisions of Section 125 of the CrPC do not apply to divorced Muslim women in light of the 1986 Act.

Legal Framework

The core legal provisions in this case are Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (1986 Act).

Section 125 of the CrPC provides a secular remedy for maintenance to wives, children, and parents who are unable to maintain themselves. It includes a divorced woman who has not remarried in the definition of “wife.”

The relevant part of the provision is:

“125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents. —
(1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain —
(a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or
(b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or
(c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or
(d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself,
a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate as such Magistrate thinks fit and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct:
Explanation. —For the purposes of this Chapter, —
(b) “wife” includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried.”

The 1986 Act was enacted to protect the rights of Muslim women who have been divorced. Section 3 of the 1986 Act specifies the entitlements of a divorced Muslim woman, including:

“3. Mahr or other properties of Muslim woman to be given to her at the time of divorce.—
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a divorced woman shall be entitled to —
(a) a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period by her former husband;
(b) where she herself maintains the children born to her before or after her divorce, a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid by her former husband for a period of two years from the respective dates of birth of such children;
(c) an amount equal to the sum of mahr or dower agreed to be paid to her at the time of her marriage or at any time thereafter according to Muslim law; and
(d) all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or after her marriage by her relatives or friends or the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends.”

The Supreme Court has previously held that Section 125 of the CrPC is a measure for social justice, irrespective of personal laws, to protect weaker sections as contemplated through Articles 15(3) and 38 of the Constitution of India. The Court also stated that the purpose of Section 125 of CrPC is to prevent vagrancy and destitution.

The Court also considered Section 127(3)(b) of the CrPC, which allows for the cancellation of a maintenance order if the divorced woman has received the full sum payable under customary or personal law.

“127. Alteration in allowance –
(3) Where any order has been made under section 125 in favour of a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from her husband, the Magistrate shall, if he is satisfied that –
(b) the woman has been divorced by her husband and that she has received, whether before or after the date of the said order, the whole of the sum which, under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties, was payable on such divorce, cancel such order –
(i) in the case where such sum was paid before such order, from the date on which such order was made;
(ii) in any other case, from the date of expiry of the period, if any, for which maintenance has been actually paid by the husband to the woman;”

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The Appellant contended that the 1986 Act is a special law that prevails over the general provisions of Section 125 of the CrPC.
• The Appellant argued that the 1986 Act provides a more beneficial and efficacious remedy for divorced Muslim women, thus recourse should be exclusively under the 1986 Act.
• Reliance was placed on M/s. Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Another (1980) 4 SCC 435, arguing a special law supersedes a general law.
• It was argued that Sections 3 and 4 of the 1986 Act, commencing with a non-obstante clause, have an overriding effect on any other statute.
• The Appellant cited Danial Latifi and Another v. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 740 and Iqbal Bano v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2007) 6 SCC 785 to support the claim of the 1986 Act’s prevalence.
• The transitional provision of Section 7 of the 1986 Act was also emphasized to establish the legislature’s intent for the 1986 Act to prevail.

Amicus Curiae’s Arguments:

• The amicus curiae, Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, argued that Section 125 of the CrPC is not foreclosed for a divorced Muslim woman by the 1986 Act.
• He highlighted the distinction between the objects and purposes of Section 125 of the CrPC and Section 3 of the 1986 Act.
• He submitted that the 5-Judge Bench in Danial Latifi (supra) did not explicitly address whether the non-obstante clause in Section 3 of the 1986 Act takes away rights under Section 125 of the CrPC.
• He contended that observations in paragraph 33 of Danial Latifi suggest that a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to all maintenance rights available to other women, and any other interpretation would infringe Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution of India.
• He brought to the Court’s attention conflicting decisions of various High Courts, highlighting the need for clarification.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following key issues for consideration:

1. Whether the provisions of Section 125 of the CrPC are applicable to a divorced Muslim woman in light of the enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986?
2. Whether fulfillment of a divorced Muslim woman’s rights, particularly maintenance under Section 3 of the 1986 Act, bars her from filing an application under Section 125 of the CrPC?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• M/s. Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Another (1980) 4 SCC 435:* The Court distinguished this case, stating that the principle of a special law superseding a general law does not apply in this context.
• Danial Latifi and Another v. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 740:* The Court extensively relied on this case, interpreting it to mean that the 1986 Act does not foreclose rights under Section 125 of the CrPC. The Court also noted that the constitutionality of the 1986 Act was upheld on the basis of a purposive interpretation that mitigated the possibility of denying access to justice to a divorced Muslim woman.
• Iqbal Bano v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2007) 6 SCC 785):* The Court referred to this case in the context of the 1986 Act and its interpretation, noting that the rights of divorced Muslim women are to be protected.
• Other Authorities: The Court relied on a series of other cases to establish the secular nature of Section 125 of the CrPC, its purpose in preventing vagrancy and destitution, and the rights of divorced women to seek maintenance. The Court also considered the interpretation and application of the non-obstante clause, emphasizing that it does not override the rights under Section 125 of the CrPC.

Decision of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court held that:

1. Section 125 of the CrPC is applicable to divorced Muslim women, and the 1986 Act does not bar its application.
2. The rights under Section 125 of the CrPC and the 1986 Act exist parallelly.
3. Fulfillment of rights under Section 3 of the 1986 Act does not automatically bar an application under Section 125 of the CrPC.
4. Section 127(3)(b) of the CrPC acts as a proviso, preventing double benefit, but only if the maintenance under personal law is a reasonable substitute.

The Court also clarified that the non-obstante clause in Section 3 of the 1986 Act does not override the rights under Section 125 of the CrPC. The Court emphasized that the purpose of Section 125 of the CrPC is to prevent vagrancy and destitution and to provide social justice. The Court also noted that any interpretation of the law that would lead to an infringement of Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution of India would be impermissible. The Court concluded that a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to all maintenance rights available to other women, and the 1986 Act does not take away these rights.

Flowchart: Maintenance Rights for Divorced Muslim Women

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Mohd. Abdul Samad vs. The State of Telangana & Anr. (2024 INSC 506) clarifies that a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to seek maintenance under both the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, and Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. This judgment ensures that divorced Muslim women are not deprived of their right to maintenance and can access justice through both legal frameworks. The Court has upheld the secular nature of Section 125 of the CrPC and its role in providing social justice, preventing vagrancy and destitution. This ruling provides much-needed clarity and ensures that divorced Muslim women have access to all available legal remedies for maintenance.