LEGAL ISSUE: Whether the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973, limit the maximum probation period for teachers to two years and whether continuation of service beyond this period results in automatic confirmation.
CASE TYPE: Education Law, Service Law
Case Name: Durgabai Deshmukh Memorial Sr. Sec. School & Anr. vs. J.A.J Vasu Sena & Anr.
Judgment Date: 21 August 2019
Introduction
Date of the Judgment: 21 August 2019
Citation: 2019 INSC 819
Judges: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J and Aniruddha Bose, J. The judgment was authored by Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J.
Can a school management extend a teacher’s probation indefinitely? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question, clarifying the maximum permissible probation period for teachers in Delhi schools. This judgment interprets Rule 105 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973, and settles whether an employee’s service is automatically confirmed after a certain period, even without a formal confirmation order.
Case Background
The case involves a teacher, J.A.J. Vasu Sena, who was appointed as a Post Graduate Teacher (PGT) in English at Durgabai Deshmukh Memorial Senior Secondary School on a probationary basis. The school is an aided minority institution in Delhi. Initially, her probation was for one year, starting from July 1, 2008. However, the school extended her probation multiple times, leading to a dispute over whether she was deemed to be a confirmed employee. The school eventually terminated her services on June 30, 2013.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 18 June 2008 | J.A.J. Vasu Sena appointed as PGT (English) on probation for one year. |
| 1 July 2008 | J.A.J. Vasu Sena joined the service. |
| 11 February 2010 | Probation extended for another year due to unsatisfactory service. |
| 30 November 2011 | Probation extended for another year. |
| 22 May 2013 | Managing Committee discharged J.A.J. Vasu Sena from service, effective June 30, 2013. |
| 23 July 2015 | Delhi School Tribunal orders reinstatement of J.A.J. Vasu Sena. |
| 7 May 2018 | Delhi High Court Division Bench sets aside Single Judge order and upholds Tribunal’s order of reinstatement. |
| 21 August 2019 | Supreme Court partly allows the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s order of deemed confirmation, but awards compensation. |
Course of Proceedings
The teacher challenged her discharge at the Delhi School Tribunal, which ruled in her favor, ordering her reinstatement. The school then filed a Writ Petition before the Delhi High Court. A single judge of the High Court overturned the Tribunal’s decision, stating that there was no maximum period of probation and that confirmation required a specific order. However, a Division Bench of the High Court reversed the single judge’s decision, agreeing with the Tribunal that the teacher’s service was deemed confirmed due to the lapse of the maximum probation period. The school then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Framework
The core of the dispute revolves around the interpretation of Rule 105 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973. This rule governs the probation period for employees in Delhi schools.
Rule 105 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 states:
“105. Probation (1) Every employee shall, on initial appointment, be on probation for a period of one year which may be extended by the appointing authority by another year [with the prior approval of the Director] and the services of an employee may be terminated without notice during the period of probation if the work and conduct of the employee, during the said period, is not, in the opinion of the appointing authority, satisfactory:
[Provided that the provisions of this sub-rule relating to the prior approval of the Director in regard to the extension of the period of probation by another year shall not apply in the case of an employee of a minority school:
…]
(2) If the work and conduct of an employee during the period of probation is found to be satisfactory, he shall be on the expiry of the period of probation or the extended period of probation, as the case may be confirmed with effect from the date of expiry of the said period.”
The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had failed to consider the amending history of Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules and had proceeded to analyze an incorrect provision of law. The Court clarified the legislative and drafting history of the provision.
The Court also referred to Section 28 of the Delhi School Education Act 1973, which empowers the Administrator to make rules for regulating education in Delhi.
Arguments
The appellant school argued that Rule 105 does not provide for deemed confirmation and that the extension of probation without a confirmation order is permissible. They contended that the phrase “by another year” does not limit the extension to only one additional year. The school also relied on a previous Delhi High Court judgment, Dy. Director of Education vs. Veena Sharma, which held that there is no fixed period of probation under Rule 105.
The respondent teacher argued that Rule 105 fixes a maximum probation period of two years and that her continuation in service beyond that period resulted in deemed confirmation. She relied on the Supreme Court’s judgment in State of Punjab vs. Dharam Singh, which held that if an employee continues beyond the maximum probation period, they are deemed to be confirmed.
| Appellant’s Submissions | Respondent’s Submissions |
|---|---|
|
✓ Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules does not envisage a deemed confirmation of the services of a probationer. ✓ Sub-rule (2) of Rule 105 provides that if the services of the probationer are satisfactory, a confirmation will be issued upon the expiry of the period of probation or the extended period of probation. ✓ Rule 105(1) does not stipulate a maximum period of probation. ✓ The continuation of the services of the first respondent on probation without an order of confirmation implies an extended period of probation. ✓ Under Rule 105(1), the termination of service without notice during the period of probation is legally permissible. ✓ The proviso to Rule 105(1) merely exempts a minority institution from seeking the prior approval of the Director for extending the period of probation by “another year”. ✓ Any extension of the period of probation beyond the mandatory year of probation shall require the prior approval of the Director. ✓ The High Court failed to consider a binding precedent of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Dy. Director of Education vs Veena Sharma holding that there is no fixed period of probation under Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules and that no question of a deemed confirmation of service arises. |
✓ The proviso to Rule 105, in so far as a minority institution is concerned, stipulates that the approval of the Director shall not be required where the probation period has been extended “by another year”. ✓ Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules fixes a maximum probationary period of two years and the continuation of service beyond the maximum period would amount to a deemed confirmation of service by implication. ✓ There is no requirement for the issuance of an order of confirmation under Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules. ✓ There is a deemed confirmation of the services of a probationer upon the expiry of the maximum prescribed period for probation. ✓ The absence of a stipulation requiring an order of confirmation in the Rules as well as the appointment letter leads to the inevitable conclusion that there was a deemed confirmation of service when the first respondent was continued in service beyond two years, even without an order of confirmation. ✓ The appointment letter of the first respondent dated 18 June 2008 stipulated a probationary period of one year. There was neither a stipulation for the extension in the probationary period nor a requirement of the issuance of an order of confirmation. |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the following issues for consideration:
- Whether the words “by another year” appearing in Rule 105(1) and its proviso limit the total duration of permissible probation to two years.
- Whether the 1973 Rules require the issuance of an order of confirmation for a probationer to be confirmed in service.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues
| Issue | Court’s Decision |
|---|---|
| Whether the words “by another year” limit the total duration of permissible probation to two years | The Court held that the words “by another year” in Rule 105(1) and its proviso limit the maximum probation period to two years. |
| Whether the 1973 Rules require the issuance of an order of confirmation for a probationer to be confirmed in service | The Court held that Rule 105(2) requires a specific order of confirmation for a probationer to be confirmed in service, and mere continuation beyond the probation period does not result in deemed confirmation. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered several legal authorities to reach its decision. These authorities were used to interpret the meaning of “another year” and to determine whether a deemed confirmation could occur.
| Authority | Court | How the Authority was Considered |
|---|---|---|
| State of Punjab v Dharam Singh [AIR 1968 SC 1210] | Supreme Court of India | Distinguished. The Court clarified that this case did not apply because Rule 105(2) requires a specific act of confirmation, unlike the rules in Dharam Singh. |
| High Court of MP v Satya Narayan Jhavar [(2001) 7 SCC 161] | Supreme Court of India | The Court used this case to categorize the present situation. It held that the case fell under the third category, where a specific order of confirmation is required. |
| Dy. Director of Education v Veena Sharma [(2010) 175 DLT 311 (DB)] | Delhi High Court | Distinguished. The Court noted that the facts of this case were different, and that the principal reason that no interpretation of the exemption stipulated for minority institutions in the proviso was involved. |
| GS Ramaswamy v Inspector General of Police [(1964) 6 SCR 279] | Supreme Court of India | The Court relied on this case to emphasize that a probationer does not become permanent merely by the efflux of time unless the rules specifically provide for automatic confirmation. |
| Kedar Nath Bahl v State of Punjab [(1974) 3 SCC 21] | Supreme Court of India | The Court cited this case to reiterate that a specific order of confirmation is required at the end of the probation period for confirmation. |
| Municipal Corporation, Raipur v Ashok Kumar Misra [(1991) 3 SCC 325] | Supreme Court of India | The Court referred to this case to support the view that the expiration of the probationary period does not necessarily lead to confirmation. |
| Jai Kishan v Commissioner of Police [1995 Supp (3) SCC 364] | Supreme Court of India | The Court cited this case to reinforce the principle that confirmation requires a positive act by the employer. |
| State of Punjab v Baldev Singh Khosla [(1996) 9 SCC 190] | Supreme Court of India | The Court relied on this case to affirm that confirmation does not occur automatically with the passage of time. |
| Chief GM, State Bank of India v Bijoy Kumar Mishra [(1997) 7 SCC 550] | Supreme Court of India | The Court referred to this case to support the view that an order of confirmation is necessary for substantive appointment. |
| Head Master, Lawrence School, Lovedale v Jayanthi Raghu [(2012) 4 SCC 793] | Supreme Court of India | The Court cited this case to highlight that the use of the words “if confirmed” in a rule denotes a condition precedent, and there is no deemed confirmation without a specific order. |
| Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v Jaycee Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd [(1991) 2 SCC 637] | Supreme Court of India | The Court relied on this case to emphasize the importance of interpreting statutory provisions in a manner that gives effect to all words and avoids rendering any part superfluous. |
| State of HP v Pawan Kumar [(2005) 4 SCC 550] | Supreme Court of India | The Court cited this case to highlight the principle of interpreting statutes according to their plain, literal, and grammatical meaning. |
| State of Rajasthan v Babu Ram [(2007) 6 SCC 55] | Supreme Court of India | The Court referred to this case to support the view that the words of a statute should be understood in their natural and ordinary sense. |
| Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v Dilip Kumar and Company [(2018) 9 SCC 1] | Supreme Court of India | The Court cited this case to reinforce the principle that statutory provisions should be construed according to their plain meaning. |
| Tahsildar Singh v The State Of Uttar Pradesh [1959 Supp (2) SCR 875] | Supreme Court of India | The Court relied on this case to explain how a proviso should be interpreted in relation to the main provision. |
| CIT v Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd. [1959 SCR Supp (2) 256] | Supreme Court of India | The Court cited this case to explain that a proviso carves out an exception to the main enactment. |
| Dwarka Prasad v Dwarka Das Saraf [1976 SCR (1) 277] | Supreme Court of India | The Court referred to this case to emphasize that a proviso should be read in relation to the main provision and not as a separate enactment. |
| S Sundaram Pillai v VR Pattabiraman [(1985) 1 SCC 591] | Supreme Court of India | The Court cited this case to support the view that a proviso must be read in relation to the principal matter. |
| JK Industries Ltd. v Chief Inspector of Factories and Boilers [(1996) 6 SCC 665] | Supreme Court of India | The Court relied on this case to reinforce the principle that a proviso should be read in the context of the main provision. |
| Holani Auto Links (P) Ltd. v State of MP [(2008) 13 SCC 185] | Supreme Court of India | The Court referred to this case to affirm the principle that a proviso is not a separate or independent enactment. |
Judgment
The Supreme Court held that the words “by another year” in Rule 105(1) of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973, limit the maximum permissible probation period to two years. This applies equally to minority institutions. The Court also clarified that Rule 105(2) requires a specific order of confirmation for an employee to be deemed confirmed, and mere continuation of service beyond the probation period does not imply automatic confirmation.
The Court also noted that the High Court had failed to consider the amending history of Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules and had proceeded to analyze an incorrect provision of law.
The Supreme Court also observed that the first respondent was continued as a probationer for nearly five years in contravention of Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules as well as the appointment letter dated 18 June 2008.
The Court exercised its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to award ex-gratia compensation of INR 5,00,000 to the first respondent, considering her five years of service and the violation of law by the school management.
| Submission by the Parties | How the Court Treated the Submission |
|---|---|
| The school argued that Rule 105 does not provide for deemed confirmation and that the extension of probation without a confirmation order is permissible. | The Court agreed that Rule 105 does not provide for deemed confirmation. It held that a specific order of confirmation is required. |
| The school contended that the phrase “by another year” does not limit the extension to only one additional year. | The Court rejected this argument, holding that “by another year” means one additional year, limiting the total probation period to two years. |
| The teacher argued that Rule 105 fixes a maximum probation period of two years and that her continuation in service beyond that period resulted in deemed confirmation. | The Court agreed that the maximum probation period is two years but rejected the argument of deemed confirmation. It held that a specific order of confirmation is required. |
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court viewed the authorities
| Authority | How the Authority was Viewed by the Court |
|---|---|
| State of Punjab v Dharam Singh [AIR 1968 SC 1210] | The Court distinguished this case, stating that it did not apply because Rule 105(2) requires a specific act of confirmation, unlike the rules in Dharam Singh. |
| High Court of MP v Satya Narayan Jhavar [(2001) 7 SCC 161] | The Court used this case to categorize the present situation. It held that the case fell under the third category, where a specific order of confirmation is required. |
| Dy. Director of Education v Veena Sharma [(2010) 175 DLT 311 (DB)] | The Court distinguished this case, noting that the facts were different and that the principal reason that no interpretation of the exemption stipulated for minority institutions in the proviso was involved. |
| GS Ramaswamy v Inspector General of Police [(1964) 6 SCR 279] | The Court relied on this case to emphasize that a probationer does not become permanent merely by the efflux of time unless the rules specifically provide for automatic confirmation. |
| Kedar Nath Bahl v State of Punjab [(1974) 3 SCC 21] | The Court cited this case to reiterate that a specific order of confirmation is required at the end of the probation period for confirmation. |
| Municipal Corporation, Raipur v Ashok Kumar Misra [(1991) 3 SCC 325] | The Court referred to this case to support the view that the expiration of the probationary period does not necessarily lead to confirmation. |
| Jai Kishan v Commissioner of Police [1995 Supp (3) SCC 364] | The Court cited this case to reinforce the principle that confirmation requires a positive act by the employer. |
| State of Punjab v Baldev Singh Khosla [(1996) 9 SCC 190] | The Court relied on this case to affirm that confirmation does not occur automatically with the passage of time. |
| Chief GM, State Bank of India v Bijoy Kumar Mishra [(1997) 7 SCC 550] | The Court referred to this case to support the view that an order of confirmation is necessary for substantive appointment. |
| Head Master, Lawrence School, Lovedale v Jayanthi Raghu [(2012) 4 SCC 793] | The Court cited this case to highlight that the use of the words “if confirmed” in a rule denotes a condition precedent, and there is no deemed confirmation without a specific order. |
| Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v Jaycee Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd [(1991) 2 SCC 637] | The Court relied on this case to emphasize the importance of interpreting statutory provisions in a manner that gives effect to all words and avoids rendering any part superfluous. |
| State of HP v Pawan Kumar [(2005) 4 SCC 550] | The Court cited this case to highlight the principle of interpreting statutes according to their plain, literal, and grammatical meaning. |
| State of Rajasthan v Babu Ram [(2007) 6 SCC 55] | The Court referred to this case to support the view that the words of a statute should be understood in their natural and ordinary sense. |
| Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v Dilip Kumar and Company [(2018) 9 SCC 1] | The Court cited this case to reinforce the principle that statutory provisions should be construed according to their plain meaning. |
| Tahsildar Singh v The State Of Uttar Pradesh [1959 Supp (2) SCR 875] | The Court relied on this case to explain how a proviso should be interpreted in relation to the main provision. |
| CIT v Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd. [1959 SCR Supp (2) 256] | The Court cited this case to explain that a proviso carves out an exception to the main enactment. |
| Dwarka Prasad v Dwarka Das Saraf [1976 SCR (1) 277] | The Court referred to this case to emphasize that a proviso should be read in relation to the main provision and not as a separate enactment. |
| S Sundaram Pillai v VR Pattabiraman [(1985) 1 SCC 591] | The Court cited this case to support the view that a proviso must be read in relation to the principal matter. |
| JK Industries Ltd. v Chief Inspector of Factories and Boilers [(1996) 6 SCC 665] | The Court relied on this case to reinforce the principle that a proviso should be read in the context of the main provision. |
| Holani Auto Links (P) Ltd. v State of MP [(2008) 13 SCC 185] | The Court referred to this case to affirm the principle that a proviso is not a separate or independent enactment. |
The Court emphasized the importance of interpreting the words “by another year” in their ordinary grammatical sense, which means one additional year. It rejected the argument that “by another year” could mean an indefinite extension of one year at a time.
The Court also clarified that the proviso in Rule 105(1) exempts minority institutions from seeking the Director’s approval for the first extension of probation by another year, but it does not remove the two-year limit.
The Court emphasized that the purpose of probation is to assess an employee’s performance and that the limit on the extension of probation ensures that the probation period is not converted into a temporary appointment.
The Court reiterated that a proviso must be read in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso, and not as a separate or independent enactment.
The Court also held that the prior approval of the Director, except for minority institutions, is mandatory for extending the probation period and that the Director’s discretion must be exercised objectively based on the probationer’s performance.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was influenced by several factors, including the plain meaning of the words “by another year,” the purpose of probation, and the need to balance the interests of both the employer and the employee. The Court emphasized the importance of following the rules and ensuring that the probation period is not unduly extended.
| Sentiment Analysis of Reasons | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Plain meaning of “by another year” | 25% |
| Purpose of probation | 20% |
| Need for balance between employer and employee interests | 20% |
| Importance of following rules and limiting probation period | 25% |
| Need to provide relief to the teacher under Article 142 | 10% |
The Court’s sentiment analysis reveals a strong emphasis on the textual interpretation of the rule and the need to adhere to the established legal framework. The Court also considered the practical implications of its decision, particularly the need to protect the interests of the employee who had served for a considerable period.
| Ratio | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 30% |
| Law | 70% |
The ratio of fact to law indicates that the Court primarily focused on the legal interpretation of the rules and precedents, while also considering the specific facts of the case. This suggests that the Court’s decision was driven more by legal principles than by the specific factual circumstances.
Logical Reasoning
Rule 105(1) states probation for one year, extendable “by another year”
Ordinary meaning of “another” is “one more”
Therefore, probation can be extended by only one additional year
Rule 105(2) requires a specific order of confirmation
No deemed confirmation even after two years
Key Takeaways
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- Maximum Probation Period: The maximum probation period for teachers in Delhi schools is two years, including the initial one-year period and one extension.
- No Deemed Confirmation: Mere continuation of service beyond the probation period does not lead to automatic confirmation. A specific order of confirmation is required.
- Interpretation of “by another year”: The phrase “by another year” in Rule 105(1) limits the extension to one additional year.
- Proviso to Rule 105(1): The proviso exempts minority institutions from seeking the Director’s approval for the first extension of probation by another year, but it does not remove the two-year limit.
- Importance of Specific Confirmation Order: Rule 105(2) requires a specific order of confirmation for a probationer to be confirmed in service.
- Purpose of Probation: The probation period is intended to assess the employee’s performance, and it should not be unduly extended.
- Protection of Employee Rights: The judgment aims to balance the interests of both the employer and the employee, ensuring that probation is not used to create temporary appointments.
- Article 142: The Supreme Court exercised its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to award ex-gratia compensation to the teacher, considering her long service and the violation of law by the school management.
Implications
The Supreme Court’s judgment has significant implications for teachers in Delhi schools, particularly those on probation. The ruling clarifies the maximum permissible probation period and emphasizes that a specific order of confirmation is necessary for an employee to be considered permanent. This judgment will prevent arbitrary extensions of probation and provide more security to teachers. It also serves as a reminder to school managements to adhere to the rules and regulations governing the service conditions of their employees.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Durgabai Deshmukh Memorial Sr. Sec. School & Anr. vs. J.A.J Vasu Sena & Anr. provides crucial clarification on the probation period for teachers in Delhi schools. The Court’s interpretation of Rule 105 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973, establishes a clear limit of two years for probation and mandates a specific confirmation order for regularization of service. This decision balances the interests of both the employer and the employee, ensuring fair and transparent practices in the education sector. The judgment also highlights the importance of following statutory rules and the need for a formal confirmation process, preventing ambiguity and arbitrary actions.