Supreme Court Clarifies Necessary Parties in Writ Petitions Challenging Tribunal Orders: M.S. Kazi vs. Muslim Education Society (2016)

Date of the Judgment: 22 August 2016

Citation: (2016) INSC 798

Judges: T.S. Thakur, CJI, A.M. Khanwilkar, J, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J

Can a tribunal whose order is challenged in a writ petition be considered a necessary party to the proceedings? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in a service law case involving a teacher’s dismissal. The core issue was whether the High Court of Gujarat was correct in dismissing a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) because the tribunal whose order was challenged was not impleaded as a party in the initial writ petition. This judgment clarifies the circumstances under which a tribunal must be made a party in writ proceedings.

The Supreme Court bench comprised Chief Justice T.S. Thakur, Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, and Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, with the opinion authored by Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud.

Case Background

The appellant, M.S. Kazi, was employed as an Assistant Teacher in a school run by the first respondent, a minority institution, from June 30, 1978. On June 25, 2002, he was issued a chargesheet alleging unauthorized absence for a pilgrimage between November 29, 2001, and December 15, 2001, and discrepancies in his leave and provident fund withdrawal applications. Specifically, the chargesheet stated that he had proceeded on a pilgrimage without prior permission and was absent without sanctioned leave. Further, the chargesheet noted that while his application for withdrawal from the provident fund cited “Haj” as the reason for the pilgrimage, his leave application cited “Umrah.”

After a departmental inquiry, the charges were deemed to be established, and he was dismissed from service on January 13, 2004. The appellant then challenged the dismissal before the Gujarat Higher Secondary Education Tribunal, which dismissed his application on June 13, 2006.

Aggrieved by the Tribunal’s decision, the appellant filed a Special Civil Application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the High Court, seeking to challenge the dismissal order and consequential reliefs, including being treated as in service until his superannuation in October 2005 and the grant of pensionary benefits.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition on December 24, 2012, on merits, holding that the charge of misconduct was established and there was no illegality in the Tribunal’s view or the disciplinary authority’s decision. Subsequently, an LPA was filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

The Division Bench, in its judgment dated March 28, 2014, held that the appeal was not maintainable. Although the Tribunal was impleaded in the LPA, the High Court relied on a five-judge bench judgment in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs. Firoze M. Mogal and Anr. [2014 GLH 1], which held that a Special Civil Application under Articles 226 and 227 is not maintainable if the court or tribunal whose order is challenged is not made a party. The High Court further held that impleading the tribunal in the LPA would not cure the defect of non-impleadment in the original writ petition.

Legal Framework

The judgment primarily revolves around the interpretation of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act 1972 and the principles governing writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Key provisions of the Act include:

• Section 2(o): Defines “private secondary school” as a school not owned, managed, or sponsored by the Central or State Governments.
• Section 2(s): Defines “registered school” as a school registered by the Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Board under Section 31.
• Section 38: Provides for the constitution of a tribunal to decide disputes between the management of a registered private secondary school and its employees. It states:

  “38. Dispute to be decided by Tribunal – (1) Where there is any dispute or difference between the manager of a registered private secondary school and any person in service of such school as head-master a teacher or a member of non-teaching staff, which is connected with the conditions of service of such person, the manager or, as the case may be, the person may make an application to the Tribunal for the decision of the dispute. (2) As from the appointed day the State Government or any officer of the State Government shall have no jurisdiction to decide any such dispute pending before the State Government or any officer of the State Government immediately before the appointed day shall, as soon as may be, after the appointed day, be transferred to the Tribunal for its decision.”

• Section 39(4): Empowers the tribunal to decide disputes under Section 38(1) and appeals under Section 36(5).
• Section 39(5): Provides a remedy of appeal before the tribunal to a person aggrieved by an order of dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank.
• Section 39(9): Specifies the orders the tribunal can pass if it finds the dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank of an employee to be unlawful or unjustified:

  “(9) Where any order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a headmaster, a teacher or a member of the non-teaching staff of a registered private secondary school is decided by the Tribunal to be wrong, unlawful or otherwise unjustified, the Tribunal may pass an order directing that the head master, the teacher or, as the case may be, the member of the non-teaching staff concerned shall be reinstated in service, or as the case may be, restored to the rank which he held immediately before his reduction in rank, by the manager, and the manager shall forthwith comply with such direction.”

The Act establishes the tribunal as both an original and appellate adjudicating forum. The Supreme Court also considered the constitutional provisions under Articles 226 and 227, which grant High Courts the power of judicial review over decisions of tribunals.

Arguments

The core argument revolved around whether the Tribunal was a necessary party to the proceedings before the High Court. The High Court had relied on the judgment of a five-judge bench in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs. Firoze M. Mogal and Anr. [2014 GLH 1] to hold that the Tribunal was a necessary party and that its non-impleadment in the writ petition was fatal to the maintainability of the proceedings.

The appellant contended that the Tribunal was not a necessary party, as it was not required to defend its order in the writ proceedings. The appellant argued that the lis was between the management and the employee, and the Tribunal’s role was limited to adjudication. The appellant relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sh Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji vs. State of Gujarat and Ors [(2015) 9 SCC 1], which clarified that tribunals are necessary parties only when they are required to defend their own orders.

The respondent, on the other hand, supported the High Court’s decision, arguing that the Tribunal was a necessary party and that the writ petition was not maintainable without its impleadment.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The primary issue before the Supreme Court was:

1. Whether a tribunal or court whose order is challenged in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is a necessary party to the proceedings.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s judgment and restoring the LPA before the High Court for disposal on merits. The Court held that the Tribunal was not a necessary party in the writ proceedings.

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

The Supreme Court specifically overruled the judgment of the five-judge bench of the Gujarat High Court in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs. Firoze M. Mogal and Anr. [2014 GLH 1], which had held that the tribunal was a necessary party. The Court relied on its own judgment in Sh Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji vs. State of Gujarat and Ors [(2015) 9 SCC 1] to hold that tribunals are necessary parties only when they are required to defend their own orders. The court considered the provisions of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act 1972 to determine the role of the Tribunal.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the principle that a tribunal is not required to defend its orders in writ proceedings unless it is specifically mandated to do so. The Court emphasized that the lis in such cases is between the employer and the employee, and the tribunal’s role is limited to adjudication. The Court also relied on its earlier judgment in Sh Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji vs. State of Gujarat and Ors [(2015) 9 SCC 1] to support this view.

The Court reasoned that the tribunal’s role is to adjudicate disputes, not to defend its orders in subsequent writ proceedings. The Court observed that the Gujarat Secondary Education Act 1972 does not require the tribunal to defend its orders. The Court also noted that even if the High Court requires the production of records from the tribunal, it does not necessitate the tribunal’s impleadment as a party.

The Court stated, “The tribunal is not required to defend its orders when they are challenged before the High Court in a Special Civil Application under Articles 226 and 227. The lis is between the management and a member of its teaching or non-teaching staff, as the case may be.”

The Court further clarified, “When the remedy is invoked, the tribunal is not required to step into arena of conflict for defending its order. Hence, the tribunal is not a necessary party to the proceedings in a Special Civil Application.”

The Court also reasoned, “The lawfulness of the punishment imposed upon the Appellant was a matter for the employer to defend against a challenge of illegality in the Special Civil Application. The tribunal was not required to defend its order in the writ proceedings before the learned Single Judge.”

Key Takeaways

• Tribunals are not necessary parties in writ petitions challenging their orders unless they are specifically required to defend their orders.
• The lis in such cases is between the employer and the employee, and the tribunal’s role is limited to adjudication.
• The judgment overrules the Gujarat High Court’s view that tribunals are necessary parties in all writ petitions challenging their orders.
• This decision clarifies the scope of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed the High Court to expeditiously dispose of the LPA, given that the disciplinary proceedings related to a chargesheet issued fourteen years ago. The Court clarified that all rights and contentions of the parties on merits were left open for the High Court’s decision.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a tribunal is not a necessary party in a writ petition challenging its order unless it is specifically required to defend its order. This judgment clarifies and reinforces the principle established in Sh Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji vs. State of Gujarat and Ors [(2015) 9 SCC 1] and overrules the contrary view taken by the Gujarat High Court in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs. Firoze M. Mogal and Anr. [2014 GLH 1]. This case has changed the previous position of law in the jurisdiction of the High Court of Gujarat.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in M.S. Kazi vs. Muslim Education Society & Ors. clarifies that a tribunal is not a necessary party in writ proceedings challenging its order unless it is legally required to defend its order. This decision overturns the Gujarat High Court’s view and aligns with the Supreme Court’s previous stance on the matter, ensuring that writ proceedings are not unnecessarily complicated by impleading tribunals that are not required to defend their orders. This judgment is significant for service law and administrative law, providing clarity on the scope of judicial review and the necessary parties in writ petitions.