LEGAL ISSUE: Applicability of the “no work no pay” principle in cases of prolonged unauthorized absence of teachers.
CASE TYPE: Service Law
Case Name: District Basic Education Officer Allahabad vs. Sushila Jaiswal (Dead) through her Lrs and Ors.
[Judgment Date]: May 17, 2018
Introduction
Date of the Judgment: May 17, 2018
Citation: 2018 INSC 420
Judges: Arun Mishra, J., Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
Can a teacher claim salary for a period of almost 10 years when she was absent for the majority of that time and had worked only for 36 days? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in a service law matter concerning a teacher who was absent from duty for a prolonged period. The court examined the applicability of the “no work no pay” principle in such cases. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice Arun Mishra and Justice Uday Umesh Lalit.
Case Background
Sushila Jaiswal, the 1st respondent, was initially appointed as an Assistant Teacher in a Primary School on June 12, 1979. She was later promoted to an upper Primary Institution in Dandupur, Chaka, Allahabad, on June 26, 2000. She took medical leave from November 25, 1999, to June 30, 2000, and again from August 1, 2001, to September 5, 2002. Upon her return on September 6, 2002, she was not allowed to rejoin her duties. The appellant requested a medical report on her fitness on October 19, 2002, but no report was received.
Subsequently, the 1st respondent filed a writ petition in 2006 seeking reinstatement and salary arrears, which was later dismissed for default. In 2009, her name was included in a list of teachers absent without authorization, and she was asked to either join or explain her absence. After appearing before the appellant on December 16, 2009, and failing to provide a satisfactory explanation, her services were terminated on January 14, 2010, citing her inability to perform teaching duties due to her physical condition and unauthorized absence.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| June 12, 1979 | Sushila Jaiswal appointed as Assistant Teacher in a Primary School. |
| June 26, 2000 | Sushila Jaiswal promoted to upper Primary Institution in Dandupur, Chaka, Allahabad. |
| November 25, 1999 – June 30, 2000 | Sushila Jaiswal on medical leave. |
| August 1, 2001 – September 5, 2002 | Sushila Jaiswal on medical leave. |
| September 6, 2002 | Sushila Jaiswal not allowed to join duty. |
| October 19, 2002 | Appellant requests medical report on Sushila Jaiswal’s fitness. |
| 2006 | Sushila Jaiswal files writ petition seeking reinstatement and salary arrears; later dismissed for default. |
| October 7, 2009 | Notice issued to Sushila Jaiswal to join services or explain unauthorized absence. |
| December 16, 2009 | Sushila Jaiswal appears before the appellant, fails to explain absence. |
| January 14, 2010 | Sushila Jaiswal’s services terminated. |
| April 7, 2010 | High Court directs CMO, Allahabad to conduct medical test. |
| April 21, 2010 | High Court directs reinstatement of Sushila Jaiswal. |
| May 5, 2010 | Appellant orders Sushila Jaiswal to join services in Lohandi. |
| May 15, 2010 | Sushila Jaiswal joins services. |
| May 17, 2010 | Appellant treats period of absence as “no work no pay”. |
| July 17, 2010 | Sushila Jaiswal applies for voluntary retirement. |
| July 31, 2010 | Sushila Jaiswal retires. |
| April 29, 2011 | Representation of Sushila Jaiswal rejected by Secretary, Department of Basic Education. |
| March 10, 2015 | Single Judge of High Court allows writ petition, orders salary arrears. |
| March 21, 2017 | Division Bench of High Court dismisses special appeal. |
| May 17, 2018 | Supreme Court allows appeal, sets aside High Court orders. |
Course of Proceedings
The 1st respondent challenged the termination order by filing Writ Petition No. 18853 of 2010. The High Court directed the Chief Medical Officer (CMO), Allahabad, to conduct a medical test. The CMO reported that while she had osteoarthritis and could not stand for long periods, she was fit for teaching. Based on this, the High Court ordered her reinstatement on April 21, 2010. The appellant then ordered her to join at a different school on May 5, 2010, as no post was available at her former school.
On May 17, 2010, the appellant passed an order treating the period from August 1, 2001, to May 14, 2010, as a period of absence, and denied salary for that period based on the “no work no pay” principle. The 1st respondent challenged this order in Writ Petition No. 30948 of 2010. The High Court allowed her to make a representation, which was rejected by the Secretary, Department of Basic Education, on April 29, 2011.
The 1st respondent then filed Writ Petition No. 30513 of 2011, which was allowed by a Single Judge of the High Court on March 10, 2015. The Single Judge ordered that she was entitled to arrears of salary from September 6, 2002, until her reinstatement on May 15, 2010, with interest. This order was challenged by the appellant in Special Appeal No. 374 of 2015, which was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court on March 21, 2017.
Legal Framework
The case involves the interpretation and application of the “no work no pay” principle as detailed in the UP Financial Handbook. The institution where the 1st respondent worked is recognized under the UP Basic Education Act, 1872, and the staff receives salaries under the UP Junior High School (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1978. The appellant relied on Rule 18 of the Financial Handbook Volume II, Part 2 to 4, which deals with persons absent for more than 5 years.
Arguments
Appellant’s Submissions:
- The appellant argued that the 1st respondent had worked only for 36 days between 2001 and 2010, yet the High Court had ordered payment of salary for the entire period from September 6, 2002, to May 15, 2010.
- It was submitted that the Department had regularly been paying the pension to the 1st respondent from her retirement on 31.07.2010.
- The appellant contended that the order passed by the appellant holding 1st respondent not to be entitled to any salary in respect of period of absence was correct and justified.
- The appellant relied on the “no work no pay” principle as per the provisions of the UP Financial Handbook.
- The appellant argued that the 1st respondent did not make any serious effort to pursue her legal rights.
Respondent’s Submissions:
- The respondent argued that she was not allowed to join her duties when she reported back on 06.09.2002 after her medical leave.
- The respondent sought payment of salary for the period she was not allowed to join, along with arrears.
- The respondent contended that she was fit for teaching job as per the medical report of CMO, Allahabad.
| Appellant’s Submissions | Respondent’s Submissions |
|---|---|
| High Court ordered salary for a period where the respondent worked only for 36 days. | She was not allowed to join her duties after reporting back from medical leave. |
| Department has been regularly paying pension to the respondent. | Sought salary for the period she was not allowed to join, along with arrears. |
| The order denying salary for the absence period was correct and justified. | She was fit for teaching job as per the medical report of CMO, Allahabad. |
| Relied on the “no work no pay” principle as per the UP Financial Handbook. | |
| Respondent did not make any serious effort to pursue her legal rights. |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame specific issues in a separate section. However, the core issue addressed by the court was:
- Whether the High Court was correct in ordering the payment of salary to the 1st respondent for the period she was absent from duty, despite the principle of “no work no pay” being applicable.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
| Issue | Court’s Decision |
|---|---|
| Whether the High Court was correct in ordering the payment of salary to the 1st respondent for the period she was absent from duty, despite the principle of “no work no pay” being applicable. | The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s order was unsustainable and erroneous. The Court emphasized that the 1st respondent was not entitled to salary for the period she was absent, as she had not worked during that time, and the principle of “no work no pay” was applicable. |
Authorities
The Court considered the following legal provisions:
- UP Basic Education Act, 1872: The Court noted that the institution where the 1st respondent worked was recognized under this Act.
- UP Junior High School (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1978: The Court observed that the staff of the institution received salaries under this Act.
- Rule 18 of the Financial Handbook Volume II, Part 2 to 4: The Court referred to this rule concerning persons who are absent for more than 5 years.
| Authority | How the Court Considered It |
|---|---|
| UP Basic Education Act, 1872 | The Court noted the institution’s recognition under this Act. |
| UP Junior High School (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1978 | The Court observed that the staff received salaries under this Act. |
| Rule 18 of the Financial Handbook Volume II, Part 2 to 4 | The Court used this rule to justify the application of the “no work no pay” principle. |
Judgment
| Submission by Parties | How it was treated by the Court |
|---|---|
| Appellant’s submission that the 1st respondent had worked only for 36 days between 2001 and 2010, yet the High Court had ordered payment of salary for the entire period from September 6, 2002, to May 15, 2010. | The Court accepted this submission, stating that the High Court’s order was erroneous as it directed payment for a period when no work was done. |
| Appellant’s submission that the Department had regularly been paying the pension to 1st respondent from her retirement on 31.07.2010. | The Court acknowledged this fact, highlighting that the respondent was already receiving retirement benefits. |
| Appellant’s submission that the order passed by the appellant holding 1st respondent not to be entitled to any salary in respect of period of absence was correct and justified. | The Court upheld this submission, stating that the “no work no pay” principle was correctly applied. |
| Appellant’s reliance on the “no work no pay” principle as per the provisions of the UP Financial Handbook. | The Court agreed with this, stating that the principle was applicable to the case. |
| Appellant’s argument that the 1st respondent did not make any serious effort to pursue her legal rights. | The Court noted this fact, stating that the respondent’s actions did not reflect a serious effort to resolve the issue. |
| Respondent’s argument that she was not allowed to join her duties when she reported back on 06.09.2002 after her medical leave. | The Court did not find this argument sufficient to justify payment of salary for the period of absence, given the “no work no pay” principle. |
| Respondent’s submission that she sought payment of salary for the period she was not allowed to join, along with arrears. | The Court rejected this submission, stating that the respondent was not entitled to salary for the period she was absent. |
| Respondent’s contention that she was fit for teaching job as per the medical report of CMO, Allahabad. | The Court acknowledged the medical report but emphasized that the respondent’s physical discomfort and disinclination were evident. |
| Authority | How it was viewed by the Court |
|---|---|
| UP Basic Education Act, 1872 | The Court acknowledged the Act as the basis for the institution’s recognition. |
| UP Junior High School (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1978 | The Court noted that the salaries of the staff were governed by this Act. |
| Rule 18 of the Financial Handbook Volume II, Part 2 to 4 | The Court used this rule to justify the application of the “no work no pay” principle, supporting the appellant’s decision to deny salary for the absence period. |
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was heavily influenced by the principle of “no work no pay.” The court emphasized that the 1st respondent had not worked for a significant period and was therefore not entitled to salary for that time. The court also noted that the 1st respondent had not made serious efforts to pursue her legal rights and had sought voluntary retirement shortly after rejoining, indicating a lack of genuine willingness to work.
| Reason | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Application of “no work no pay” principle | 40% |
| Lack of actual work by the 1st respondent | 30% |
| 1st respondent’s lack of serious effort to pursue legal rights | 20% |
| 1st respondent’s voluntary retirement shortly after rejoining | 10% |
| Category | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact (consideration of factual aspects of the case) | 60% |
| Law (consideration of legal aspects) | 40% |
The court’s reasoning was based on a combination of factual analysis and legal principles. The factual aspects included the 1st respondent’s prolonged absence, the lack of work done, and the circumstances surrounding her rejoining and subsequent voluntary retirement. The legal aspect was the application of the “no work no pay” principle as per the Financial Handbook.
The court considered the fact that the 1st respondent had worked only for 36 days in a span of nearly 10 years and that she had voluntarily retired shortly after rejoining. These facts weighed heavily in the court’s decision to reject the High Court’s order for payment of salary for the period of absence. The court did not find any alternative interpretation that would justify payment of salary for the period when no work was done.
The Supreme Court’s decision is clear and accessible. The court held that the 1st respondent was not entitled to salary for the period she was absent from duty. The court’s reasoning was based on the “no work no pay” principle, which is a well-established principle in service law.
The reasons for the decision are:
- The 1st respondent did not work during the period for which she claimed salary.
- The principle of “no work no pay” is applicable in such cases.
- The 1st respondent’s actions did not reflect a serious effort to resolve the issue.
- The 1st respondent sought voluntary retirement shortly after rejoining, indicating a lack of genuine willingness to work.
The court quoted from the judgment:
“In the face of these facts, the order passed by the appellant holding 1st respondent not to be entitled to any salary in respect of period of absence was correct and justified.”
“The effect of the orders passed by the High Court, on the other hand, is that 1st respondent is to be paid salary for nearly 10 years when in reality she had actually worked for only 36 days during that period.”
“Considering all these facts and circumstances, the orders passed by the Single Judge and the Division Bench in the present matter, in our view are unsustainable and erroneous.”
Key Takeaways
- The “no work no pay” principle is strictly applicable in cases of prolonged unauthorized absence.
- Employees cannot claim salary for periods when they have not performed their duties.
- Courts will consider the employee’s conduct and intent in such cases.
- Employees must make serious efforts to resolve issues and pursue their legal rights diligently.
- The judgment reinforces the importance of actual work done as a prerequisite for salary payment.
This judgment will likely impact future cases involving unauthorized absence and salary claims. It reinforces the principle that employees are not entitled to salary for periods when they have not worked, and it emphasizes the need for employees to be diligent in pursuing their legal rights.
Directions
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and order under appeal, and dismissed Writ Petition No. 30513 of 2011. No specific directions were given other than setting aside the High Court’s order.
Specific Amendments Analysis
There was no specific amendment discussed in this case.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the “no work no pay” principle is strictly applicable in cases of prolonged unauthorized absence. The Supreme Court did not introduce any new legal principle but reinforced the existing principle. The judgment clarifies that employees are not entitled to salary for periods when they have not performed their duties and emphasizes the importance of actual work done as a prerequisite for salary payment. There is no change in the previous position of law, but the judgment clarifies the application of the principle in the context of prolonged absence.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the District Basic Education Officer Allahabad, setting aside the High Court’s order that had directed payment of salary to the respondent for a period of absence. The court reaffirmed the “no work no pay” principle, emphasizing that employees are not entitled to salary for periods when they have not worked. The judgment underscores the importance of actual work done as a prerequisite for salary payment and highlights the need for employees to be diligent in pursuing their legal rights.