Supreme Court Clarifies Preliminary Assessment Timeline Under Juvenile Justice Act: Child in Conflict with Law vs. State of Karnataka (2024)

Date of the Judgment: May 7, 2024
Citation: 2024 INSC 387
Judges: C.T. Ravikumar, J. and Rajesh Bindal, J.
Can a delay in the preliminary assessment of a child in conflict with the law (CCL) lead to the case being automatically tried by the Juvenile Justice Board instead of a Children’s Court? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question in a case concerning a child accused of heinous offenses. The court clarified the timeline for preliminary assessments under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, and the powers of the Juvenile Justice Board and Children’s Court. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice C.T. Ravikumar and Justice Rajesh Bindal, with the majority opinion authored by Justice Rajesh Bindal.

Case Background

The case involves a Child in Conflict with Law (CCL) who was accused of offenses under Section 376(i) and 342 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The CCL was apprehended on November 3, 2021, and subsequently produced before the Juvenile Justice Board. Initially granted bail on November 9, 2021, the Board was tasked with determining whether the CCL should be tried as a juvenile or as an adult. This decision hinged on a preliminary assessment of the child’s mental and physical capacity to commit the alleged offenses.

On April 5, 2022, the Principal Magistrate of the Board ordered that the CCL be tried as an adult by the Children’s Court, based on preliminary assessment and social investigation reports. However, another member of the Board dissented, stating they would issue a detailed order later. On April 12, 2022, two members of the Board (without the Principal Magistrate) ordered that the inquiry be conducted by the Board, treating the CCL as a juvenile. Subsequently, on October 18, 2022, the victim’s mother filed an application to transfer the case to the Children’s Court, which was dismissed on April 10, 2023. This dismissal led to a revision petition before the High Court, which was allowed, setting aside the Board’s order and directing the case to be transferred to the Children’s Court for trial.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, in its order dated November 15, 2023, set aside the order of the Juvenile Justice Board, which had dismissed the complainant’s application to transfer the case to the Children’s Court. The High Court held that the Principal Magistrate’s order of April 5, 2022, was final under Section 7(4) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, and that subsequent proceedings by the Board were invalid. The High Court directed the Board to transmit the case records to the Children’s Court for trial.

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court examined several key provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, including:

• Section 2(10): Defines “Board” as the Juvenile Justice Board constituted under Section 4 of the Act.
• Section 2(13): Defines “child in conflict with law” as a child alleged or found to have committed an offense and who has not completed eighteen years of age on the date of commission of such offense.
• Section 2(20): Defines “Children’s Court” as a court established under the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005, or a Special Court under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, or the Court of Sessions having jurisdiction.
• Section 4: Outlines the constitution of the Juvenile Justice Board, consisting of a Principal Magistrate and two social workers.
• Section 7(3): States that at least two members, including the Principal Magistrate, must be present for the final disposal of a case or to make an order under Section 18(3).
• Section 7(4): Provides that in case of a difference of opinion among Board members, the opinion of the majority prevails, and if there is no majority, the opinion of the Principal Magistrate prevails.
• Section 14: Deals with the inquiry by the Board regarding a child in conflict with law. It specifies a four-month period for completing the inquiry, extendable by two months, and a three-month period for preliminary assessments in heinous offenses.
  • Section 14(3): “A preliminary assessment in case of heinous offences under section 15 shall be disposed of by the Board within a period of three months from the date of first production of the child before the Board.”
• Section 15: Provides for preliminary assessment by the Board in cases of heinous offenses committed by children above sixteen years of age to assess their mental and physical capacity.
  • Section 15(1): “In case of a heinous offence alleged to have been committed by a child, who has completed or is above the age of sixteen years, the Board shall conduct a preliminary assessment with regard to his mental and physical capacity to commit such offence, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which he allegedly committed the offence, and may pass an order in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 18”
• Section 18(3): Allows the Board, after preliminary assessment under Section 15, to order the transfer of the case to the Children’s Court for trial as an adult.
  • Section 18(3): “Where the Board after preliminary assessment under section 15 pass an order that there is a need for trial of the said child as an adult, then the Board may order transfer of the trial of the case to the Children’s Court having jurisdiction to try such offences.”
• Section 19: Outlines the powers of the Children’s Court, including the authority to decide whether a child should be tried as an adult.
  • Section 19(1): “After the receipt of preliminary assessment from the Board under section 15, the Children’s Court may decide that — (i) there is a need for trial of the child as an adult as per the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and pass appropriate orders after trial subject to the provisions of this section and section 21, considering the special needs of the child, the tenets of fair trial and maintaining a child friendly atmosphere; (ii) there is no need for trial of the child as an adult and may conduct an inquiry as a Board and pass appropriate orders in accordance with the provisions of section 18.”
• Section 101: Deals with appeals against orders made by the Committee or the Board.
  • Section 101(1): “Subject to the provisions of this Act, any person aggrieved by an order made by the Committee or the Board under this Act may, within thirty days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal to the Children’s Court, except for decisions by the Committee related to Foster Care and Sponsorship After Care for which the appeal shall lie with the District Magistrate”
  • Section 101(2): “An appeal shall lie against an order of the Board passed after making the preliminary assessment into a heinous offence under section 15 of the Act, before the Court of Sessions and the Court may, while deciding the appeal, take the assistance of experienced psychologists and medical specialists other than those whose assistance has been obtained by the Board in passing the order under the said section.”
• Section 102: Grants the High Court revisional powers over orders passed by the Committee, Board, or Children’s Court.

Arguments

Arguments of the Appellant (CCL)

• The CCL argued that the order passed by the Principal Magistrate on April 5, 2022, was not a valid order as it was not signed by all members of the Board and was followed by a dissenting note.
• The subsequent order of April 12, 2022, passed by two members of the Board without the Principal Magistrate, was considered valid, and the victim should have appealed this order within the stipulated time.
• The application to terminate proceedings before the Board and transfer the case to the Children’s Court was filed much later and was correctly dismissed by the Board.
• The preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the Act must be completed within three months of the child’s first production before the Board, as per Section 14(3). Since this timeline was not met, the CCL should be tried by the Board as a juvenile.
• Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Barun Chandra Thakur vs. Master Bholu & Anr. [2022 INSC 716], emphasizing adherence to timelines under the Act.

Arguments of the Respondents (State of Karnataka)

• The State argued that the order of the Principal Magistrate on April 5, 2022, was final under Section 7(4) of the Act, and the subsequent order of April 12, 2022, by two members of the Board was invalid.
• The Children’s Court can reconsider the Board’s decision to transfer the case under Section 19(1) of the Act.
• The three-month timeline for preliminary assessments under Section 14(3) is directory, not mandatory, as no consequences are specified for non-compliance.
• The delay in obtaining the report from NIMHANS was due to the investigating officer, and the Board should have the power to extend the time for valid reasons.
• The State cited judgments from Madhya Pradesh, Punjab & Haryana, and Delhi High Courts to support the view that the timelines are directory.

Submissions Table

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

1. Whether the period provided for completion of preliminary assessment under Section 14(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is mandatory or directory?
2. Whether the High Court was correct in exercising its revisional power?
3. What is the legal position regarding the terms “Children’s Court” and “Court of Sessions” as used in the Act?
4. What is the time for filing an appeal against an order of the Board under Section 15 of the Act?
5. Whether the order passed by the Board on 05.04.2022 is valid?
6. Whether the appellant should be given a remedy of appeal?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered several legal authorities in its judgment:

Cases

Statutes

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Supreme Court followed the principle laid down in Topline Shoes Ltd vs Corporation Bank [(2002) 6 SCC 33: 2002 INSC 287]* and Kailash vs Nanhku and Others [(2005) 4 SCC 480: 2005 INSC 186]* that time limits in procedural laws are generally directory.
• The Supreme Court followed the principle laid down in State of Bihar and Others vs Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti [(2018) 9 SCC 472: 2018 INSC 648]* and C. Bright vs District and Others [(2021) 2 SCC 392: 2020 INSC 633]* that time limits are directory if no consequences for non-compliance are specified.
• The Supreme Court distinguished the judgment in SCG Contracts (India) (P) Ltd. v. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure (P) Ltd. [(2019) 12 SCC 210 : 2019 INSC 187]* stating time limits are mandatory if consequences for non-compliance are specified.
• The Supreme Court referred to Balaji Baliram Mupade and Another v. State of Maharashtra and Others [(2021) 12 SCC 603]* regarding the practice of passing orders stating reasons will follow is deprecated.
• The Supreme Court referred to Barun Chandra Thakur vs. Master Bholu & Anr. [2022 INSC 716]* regarding the timelines under the Act have to be adhered to.
• The Supreme Court referred to Shilpa Mittal vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2020) 2 SCC 787 : 2020 INSC 25]* regarding the general principles of Juvenile Justice Act.
• The Supreme Court referred to Afcons Infrastructure Limited and Another vs Cherian Varkey Construction Company Private Limited and Others [(2010) 8 SCC 24: 2010 INSC 431]* regarding the tools of interpretation of statutes.
• The Supreme Court referred to Surjit Singh Kalra vs. Union of India and Another [(1991) 2 SCC 87 : 1991 INSC 36]* regarding the exceptions to the rule of causus omissus.
• The Supreme Court referred to Rajbir Singh Dalal (Dr.) vs. Chaudhari Devi Lal University, Sirsa and Another [(2008) 9 SCC 284 : 2008 INSC 913]* regarding the permissibility of supplying words in a statute.
• The Supreme Court referred to Central Bureau of Investigation, Bank Securities and Fraud Cell vs. Ramesh Gelli and Others [(2016) 3 SCC 788 : 2016 INSC 134]* regarding the principles of interpretation of statutes.
• The Supreme Court approved the views of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Bhola vs State of Madhya Pradesh [2019 SCC OnLine MP 521]* and the High Court of Delhi in CCL vs State (NCT) of Delhi [2023 SCC OnLine Del 5063]* that the time period for preliminary assessment is directory.
• The Supreme Court approved the views of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Neeraj and Others vs State of Haryana [2005 SCC OnLine P&H 611]* and the High Court of Delhi in X (Through his Elder Brother) vs State [2019 SCC OnLine Del 11164]* that the time period for preliminary assessment under repealed Juvenile Justice Act was directory.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following considerations:

• Absence of Consequences for Non-Compliance: The Court noted that the Act does not specify any consequences for failing to complete the preliminary assessment within three months. This lack of a penalty suggested that the timeline was intended to be directory rather than mandatory.
• Purpose of the Act: The Court emphasized that the Juvenile Justice Act aims to protect the rights of children and ensure a fair process. A strict interpretation of the timeline could lead to unjust outcomes, potentially forcing a child to be tried as an adult due to procedural delays.
• Flexibility and Extensions: The Court acknowledged that delays in obtaining reports from experts are common and that the Act allows for extensions of time by the Chief Judicial Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. This flexibility further supported the directory nature of the timeline.
• Interpretation of Statutes: The Court applied established principles of statutory interpretation, stating that procedural timelines are generally directory unless the statute explicitly specifies otherwise.
• Balance of Interests: The Court sought to balance the need for timely proceedings with the need to ensure justice for the child. It concluded that a directory interpretation of the timeline would better serve the interests of justice.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court held that the timeline of three months for completing the preliminary assessment under Section 14(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is directory and not mandatory. The Court further held that the order passed by the Principal Magistrate on April 5, 2022, was valid under Section 7(4) of the Act. It also clarified that the terms “Children’s Court” and “Court of Sessions” are to be read interchangeably, with jurisdiction primarily vesting in the Children’s Court, and the Court of Sessions in its absence. The Court also prescribed a 30-day period for filing appeals against orders of the Board under Section 15, with provisions for condonation of delay. The Court also granted the appellant the right to appeal against the order dated 05.04.2022.

Obiter Dicta

The Court made several observations that are not central to the decision but provide further guidance:

• Importance of Expert Reports: The Court reiterated the importance of obtaining expert reports in cases involving preliminary assessments, as mandated by the Act.
• Need for a Child-Friendly Atmosphere: The Court emphasized the need to maintain a child-friendly atmosphere during all proceedings, as stipulated in the Act.
• Role of the Board: The Court highlighted the crucial role of the Juvenile Justice Board in ensuring the welfare of children in conflict with the law.
• Revisional Powers of the High Court: The Court clarified the scope of the High Court’s revisional powers under Section 102 of the Act.

Flowchart of the Process

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Child in Conflict with Law vs. State of Karnataka (2024) provides significant clarity on the interpretation of timelines for preliminary assessments under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. By holding that the three-month timeline is directory, the Court has ensured that the focus remains on the child’s welfare and the principles of justice, rather than rigid adherence to procedural timelines. The judgment also clarifies the powers of the Juvenile Justice Board and Children’s Court in dealing with cases involving children in conflict with the law. The decision underscores the need for a balanced approach, protecting the rights of children while ensuring that justice is served. This judgment is a crucial addition to the jurisprudence on juvenile justice in India and will guide future cases in this field.