Date of the Judgment: 18 January 2022
Citation: (2022) INSC 33
Judges: M.R. Shah, J., Sanjiv Khanna, J.
Can a High Court, while hearing a second appeal against a dismissal of a first appeal, set aside the original trial court decree? The Supreme Court addressed this procedural question, clarifying the limits of the High Court’s powers in such cases. The core issue revolved around whether the High Court could overturn a trial court’s ex-parte decree when the first appellate court had dismissed the appeal solely on the grounds of limitation, without considering the merits of the case. This judgment was delivered by a division bench comprising Justice M.R. Shah and Justice Sanjiv Khanna, with Justice M.R. Shah authoring the opinion.
Case Background
The case began when the appellants, Mamtaz & Ors., filed a suit for declaration and possession. The Trial Court decreed the suit in their favor on 08 January 2018. This decree was passed ex-parte, meaning the defendant, Gulsuma Alias Kulusuma, did not appear in court. Gulsuma had two options: apply to set aside the ex-parte decree under Order IX Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), or appeal the decree. She chose to appeal to the First Appellate Court.
Gulsuma’s appeal to the First Appellate Court was delayed by 2 years and 7 months. She filed an application (I.A. No. 1 of 2020) to condone the delay, but later withdrew it. The First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal on 10 December 2020, citing the absence of a valid application to condone the delay, without considering the merits of the case. Gulsuma then filed a second appeal before the High Court of Karnataka, Kalaburagi Bench. The High Court, in its judgment dated 21 April 2021, not only set aside the First Appellate Court’s order but also the original ex-parte decree of the Trial Court, and remanded the case back to the Trial Court for fresh consideration. The original plaintiffs, Mamtaz & Ors., then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 08 January 2018 | Trial Court decrees the suit in favor of Mamtaz & Ors. ex-parte. |
| 2020 (Date not specified) | Gulsuma files appeal before the First Appellate Court with a delay of 2 years and 7 months and files I.A. No. 1 of 2020 to condone the delay. |
| 10 December 2020 | First Appellate Court dismisses Gulsuma’s appeal due to the absence of a valid application to condone the delay. |
| 21 April 2021 | High Court sets aside the First Appellate Court’s order and the Trial Court’s ex-parte decree, remanding the case to the Trial Court. |
| 18 January 2022 | Supreme Court allows the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s order and remanding the matter to the First Appellate Court. |
Course of Proceedings
The Trial Court initially decreed the suit ex-parte in favor of the plaintiffs, Mamtaz & Ors. The defendant, Gulsuma, instead of applying to set aside the ex-parte decree, chose to appeal to the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal due to a lack of a valid application to condone the delay, without examining the merits. The High Court, in the second appeal, set aside both the First Appellate Court’s order and the Trial Court’s decree, remanding the case to the Trial Court. The Supreme Court then heard the appeal against the High Court’s decision.
Legal Framework
The case primarily involves the interpretation of Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which deals with appeals from original decrees. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court’s actions were not in accordance with the established procedure under the CPC. The court also referred to Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC, which provides the procedure for setting aside ex-parte decrees.
Section 96 of the CPC states:
“96. Appeal from original decree.—(1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court. (2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte.”
Arguments
The appellants argued that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by setting aside the Trial Court’s decree when the First Appellate Court had only dismissed the appeal on the grounds of limitation. The respondent, on the other hand, contended that the High Court was justified in setting aside the ex-parte decree to ensure justice, especially since the first appeal was dismissed on technical grounds.
The respondent’s counsel requested the court to allow the revival of the condonation of delay application, I.A. No. 1 of 2020, which was withdrawn earlier, arguing that the original defendant would be remediless if not permitted to do so.
| Main Submission | Sub-Submissions |
|---|---|
| Appellants’ Submission |
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| Respondent’s Submission |
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The innovativeness of the argument lies in the respondent’s request to revive the withdrawn application for condonation of delay, highlighting the potential injustice if the matter was not heard on merits due to a technicality.
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame specific issues, but the core issue was whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the Trial Court’s ex-parte decree when the First Appellate Court had dismissed the appeal solely on the grounds of limitation.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in setting aside the Trial Court’s ex-parte decree. The High Court should have only addressed the dismissal of the first appeal on limitation grounds and, if necessary, remanded the case to the First Appellate Court to decide on merits.
| Issue | Court’s Decision | Reasoning |
|---|---|---|
| Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the Trial Court’s ex-parte decree? | No | The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by setting aside the Trial Court’s decree when the First Appellate Court had only dismissed the appeal on the grounds of limitation. The High Court should have remanded the matter to the First Appellate Court to decide on merits if the delay was condoned. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court did not explicitly cite any specific cases or books in this judgment. The judgment focused on the procedural aspects of the Civil Procedure Code, particularly Section 96 and Order IX Rule 13.
| Authority | How it was considered |
|---|---|
| Section 96, Civil Procedure Code, 1908 | The court analyzed the scope of appeal under this section, particularly concerning the powers of the appellate court when the first appeal was dismissed on limitation grounds. |
| Order IX Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code, 1908 | The court referred to this provision to highlight the correct procedure for setting aside ex-parte decrees, which was not followed by the High Court. |
Judgment
| Submission | Court’s Treatment |
|---|---|
| Appellants’ submission that the High Court overstepped its authority | Accepted. The Supreme Court agreed that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction. |
| Respondent’s submission that the High Court was justified in setting aside the ex-parte decree to ensure justice | Rejected. The Supreme Court held that the High Court should have remanded the matter to the First Appellate Court. |
| Respondent’s request to revive the condonation of delay application | Permitted. The Supreme Court allowed the revival of the application, providing a chance for the case to be heard on merits. |
The Supreme Court did not cite any authorities in the judgment.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily driven by the need to adhere to the established procedures under the Civil Procedure Code. The court emphasized that the High Court should have focused on the specific issue of whether the First Appellate Court was correct in dismissing the appeal on limitation grounds. The court also considered the need to ensure that the respondent was not left without a remedy due to a technicality.
| Sentiment | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Procedural Correctness | 60% |
| Fairness and Equity | 40% |
| Ratio | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 30% |
| Law | 70% |
The Court’s reasoning was driven by a need to adhere to the correct procedure as laid down in the Civil Procedure Code. The Court also wanted to ensure that the respondent was not left without a remedy due to a technicality.
Logical Reasoning
Trial Court passes ex-parte decree.
Defendant appeals to First Appellate Court with delay.
First Appellate Court dismisses appeal due to delay.
Defendant appeals to High Court.
High Court sets aside both First Appellate Court order and Trial Court decree.
Supreme Court sets aside High Court order, remands to First Appellate Court.
The Supreme Court found that the High Court had overstepped its bounds. The High Court should have only considered the correctness of the First Appellate Court’s decision to dismiss the appeal on the grounds of limitation. If the High Court found that the First Appellate Court had erred, it should have remanded the case to the First Appellate Court to consider the merits of the appeal.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s procedure was not in accordance with the Civil Procedure Code. The court stated:
“From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court proceeded further with the hearing of the appeal as if the High Court was considering the appeal against the order passed on an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, whereas the appeal was against the order and decree passed by the Trial Court, which was affirmed by the First Appellate Court as barred by limitation. Therefore, the procedure adopted by the High Court is unknown to the procedure known to law under the provisions of the CPC.”
The Supreme Court also noted that the High Court should have remanded the matter to the First Appellate Court to decide the appeal on merits, after considering the condonation of delay application.
The Supreme Court allowed the respondent to revive their application for condonation of delay, stating:
“The respondent herein – original defendant – appellant before the First Appellate Court is permitted to move an appropriate application for revival of I.A. No.1 of 2020 and the First Appellate Court is directed to revive I.A. No.1 of 2020, which seems to have been withdrawn by the original defendant – appellant before the First Appellate Court mistakenly and thereafter the First Appellate Court to first decide and dispose of the said application for condonation of delay and if the delay is condoned in that case the First Appellate Court to finally decide and dispose of the first appeal in accordance with law and on its own merits.”
The Supreme Court also clarified that if the First Appellate Court dismisses the application for condonation of delay, it would be open to the original defendant to challenge the same before a higher court.
Key Takeaways
- The High Court cannot set aside a Trial Court’s ex-parte decree when the First Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal solely on limitation grounds.
- The correct procedure is for the High Court to remand the case to the First Appellate Court to decide on merits if the delay is condoned.
- The Supreme Court allowed the revival of the withdrawn application for condonation of delay, ensuring the case can be heard on merits.
Directions
The Supreme Court directed the First Appellate Court to restore the appeal to its file, revive the condonation of delay application, and decide on the condonation of delay first. If the delay is condoned, the First Appellate Court should then decide the appeal on its merits.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that a High Court cannot set aside a Trial Court’s ex-parte decree when the First Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal solely on the grounds of limitation. The High Court’s role is limited to reviewing the First Appellate Court’s decision on limitation and, if necessary, remanding the case for a decision on merits. This judgment reinforces the procedural hierarchy of the Civil Procedure Code and clarifies the appellate powers of the High Court.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Mamtaz & Ors. vs. Gulsuma Alias Kulusuma clarifies the procedural limits of the High Court’s powers when dealing with second appeals in cases where the first appeal was dismissed on limitation grounds. The judgment ensures that the established procedures under the Civil Procedure Code are followed and that parties are not deprived of a hearing on the merits due to technicalities.