Supreme Court Clarifies Proof of Corruption in Absence of Complainant: Neeraj Dutta vs. State (2022)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 15 December 2022

Citation: 2022 INSC 705

Judges: S. Abdul Nazeer, B.R. Gavai, A.S. Bopanna, V. Ramasubramanian, B.V. Nagarathna

Can a public servant be convicted of corruption if the person who made the complaint is not available to testify? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question, clarifying the evidentiary standards required under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. This judgment is significant because it deals with how corruption cases should be handled when the main witness, the complainant, is unable to give direct evidence.

The core issue revolves around whether a conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, can be sustained if the complainant’s direct evidence of demand for illegal gratification is missing due to the complainant’s death or unavailability. The Supreme Court, in this case, examined the circumstances under which a public servant can be held guilty of corruption even when the primary witness is absent.

The judgment was delivered by a five-judge Constitution Bench, with Justice B.V. Nagarathna authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The case originated from a reference made by a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, which highlighted a conflict in previous judgments regarding the evidentiary requirements for proving corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The central question was whether a public servant could be convicted based on circumstantial evidence when the complainant’s direct testimony is unavailable due to death or other reasons.

The reference arose out of an order dated 28.02.2019, passed by a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, which expressed doubts about the validity of the legal position in the case of P.Satyanarayana Murthy vs. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh and another, (2015) 10 SCC 152. In that case, the court had held that in the absence of primary evidence from the complainant, inferential deductions to sustain a conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, were not permissible.

The two-judge bench, however, noted several other judgments where the court had sustained convictions despite the absence of direct evidence from the complainant, relying instead on other evidence and statutory presumptions. This divergence in the treatment of evidentiary requirements led to the matter being referred to a larger bench.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The judgment notes that a three-judge bench referred the matter to a larger bench due to a conflict between two three-judge bench decisions and an earlier three-judge bench decision. The conflict was regarding the nature and quality of proof required to convict someone under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, when the primary evidence of the complainant is not available.

Specifically, the court noted that the decisions in B. Jayaraj vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 55 and P. Satyanarayana Murthy vs. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, (2015) 10 SCC 152, were in conflict with an earlier decision in M. Narsinga Rao vs. State of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 691. These cases dealt with the evidentiary requirements when the complainant’s direct evidence was unavailable.

The court observed that in B. Jayaraj, the complainant did not support the prosecution, while in P. Satyanarayana Murthy, the complainant had died. This led to the question of whether convictions could be sustained based on other evidence, without the complainant’s direct testimony. The matter was then referred to a larger bench to resolve this conflict.

Legal Framework

The judgment discusses several key provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and the Evidence Act, 1872. The relevant sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, as they stood prior to their amendments, are as follows:

• Section 7: This section deals with “Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act.” It states that a public servant who accepts or obtains any gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward for doing or not doing any official act is punishable with imprisonment and fine.

  “Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act…”

• Section 13(1)(d): This section defines “Criminal misconduct by a public servant.” It states that a public servant commits criminal misconduct if, by corrupt or illegal means, or by abusing their position, they obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage.

  “A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct… if he, by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage…”

• Section 20: This section deals with the “Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration.” It states that if it is proved that a public servant has accepted or obtained any gratification other than legal remuneration, it shall be presumed that they accepted it as a motive or reward, unless the contrary is proved.

  “Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under section 7 or section 11 or clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 13 it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained… any gratification (other than legal remuneration)… it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained…that gratification…as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7…”

The court also discussed relevant sections of the Evidence Act, 1872, including:

• Section 3: Defines “fact,” “relevant,” and “proved.”
• Section 4: Defines “may presume,” “shall presume,” and “conclusive proof.”
• Section 59: States that all facts, except the contents of documents, may be proved by oral evidence.
• Section 60: Requires that oral evidence must be direct.
• Sections 61-65: Deals with proof of contents of documents and primary and secondary evidence.
• Section 114: Allows the court to presume the existence of certain facts based on the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business.
• Section 154: Allows the court to permit a party to cross-examine its own witness.

Arguments

The arguments presented before the Supreme Court by the various parties can be summarized as follows:

• Arguments on behalf of the Appellants:
  • It was argued that the question for consideration was not appropriately framed and needed to be reframed. The core issue was whether the facts of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification could be proved by any other mode in the absence of direct evidence from the complainant.
  • Emphasis was placed on the difference between “acceptance” and “obtainment” under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It was submitted that in the case of acceptance, there need not be any prior demand by the public servant, whereas, in the case of obtainment, a prior demand is a must.
  • It was contended that Section 20 of the Act, which deals with legal presumption, is applicable only to Section 7 and not to Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii). The presumption under Section 20 is regarding motive or reward, and not the guilt of an offence.
  • It was argued that mere recovery of tainted notes from the possession of the accused does not give rise to a presumption of demand. Demand as a matter of fact cannot be presumed under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, unless foundational facts are proved.
  • It was submitted that the expression “acceptance” must be differentiated from the expression “receipt.” Mere receipt of any property or valuable security would not amount to acceptance unless the bribe giver had made an offer demanding a favor from the public servant.
  • It was contended that in the case of obtainment, both prior demand and receipt of illegal gratification must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
  • It was also argued that M. Narasinga Rao does not lay down any proposition of law and has not dealt with the difference between Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) of the Act.
  • Reliance was placed on the Woolmington principle, which states that there should be proof beyond reasonable doubt, and this principle would apply under the Act under consideration.
• Arguments on behalf of the Respondents:
  • It was argued that the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is a social legislation intended to curb the illegal activities of public servants and should be liberally construed.
  • It was submitted that even if the complainant turns “hostile” regarding certain aspects of the evidence, his entire evidence cannot be discarded.
  • It was contended that proof does not mean proof in the sense of a rigid and mathematical demonstration but such evidence as would induce a reasonable man to come to a particular conclusion.
  • It was argued that a presumption of fact can be made by a court of law by exercise of discretion, having regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, public or private business in relation to the facts of the particular case.
  • It was submitted that the word “obtain” means to secure or gain something as a result of a request, and “accept” means to take or receive with a consenting mind.
  • It was argued that the death or non-availability of the complainant would not vitiate the case of the prosecution, as the incriminating circumstance of demand can be proved by circumstances even in the absence of the complainant.

Submissions Table

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issue for determination:

1. Whether, in the absence of evidence of complainant/direct or primary evidence of demand of illegal gratification, is it not permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered various authorities, including previous judgments and legal provisions, to arrive at its decision. These authorities are categorized by the legal points they address:

Cases Considered by the Court:

Legal Provisions Considered by the Court:

• Section 7, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration.
• Section 13(1)(d), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: Criminal misconduct by a public servant.
• Section 20, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration.
• Sections 3, 4, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 114 and 154 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Various provisions related to evidence, presumptions, and witnesses.

• The court agreed that “acceptance” implies taking or receiving with a consenting mind, while “obtainment” suggests securing or gaining something as a result of a request.
• The court clarified that while a prior demand is essential for “obtainment,” it is not necessary for “acceptance.” However, in both cases, the prosecution must prove that the public servant acted with a corrupt motive.
• The court held that Section 20 of the Act applies to both Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) and not only to Section 7.

Decision

The Supreme Court held that in the absence of direct evidence from the complainant, an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is permissible based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution.

The court clarified that the absence of direct evidence from the complainant does not automatically lead to an acquittal. The prosecution can still prove its case through circumstantial evidence, other witnesses, and the presumptions available under the Act and the Evidence Act.

The court emphasized that the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is a social legislation intended to curb corruption, and it should be interpreted in a manner that achieves this objective.

The court also held that even if the complainant turns hostile, his evidence cannot be completely discarded. The court can still consider those parts of the evidence that are supported by other evidence.

The court concluded that a public servant can be convicted of corruption even when the complainant’s direct evidence is unavailable, provided that the prosecution can prove its case through other evidence and presumptions.

Flowchart of Decision Making

Key Takeaways

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Neeraj Dutta vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) provides the following key takeaways:

• Conviction Without Direct Complainant Evidence: A public servant can be convicted of corruption even if the complainant’s direct evidence is unavailable due to death or other reasons.
• Circumstantial Evidence: The prosecution can rely on circumstantial evidence, other witnesses, and presumptions to prove the charge of corruption.
• Presumptions: The legal presumptions under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and the presumptions under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872, play a crucial role in such cases.
• Hostile Witness: Even if the complainant turns hostile, their evidence cannot be completely discarded. The court can consider those parts of the evidence that are supported by other evidence.
• Objective of the Act: The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is a social legislation intended to curb corruption, and it should be interpreted in a manner that achieves this objective.
• Standard of Proof: The standard of proof is not mathematical certainty but rather what would satisfy a reasonable person.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Neeraj Dutta vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) is a landmark decision that clarifies the evidentiary standards required to prove corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The judgment provides a clear framework for handling cases where the complainant’s direct evidence is unavailable, ensuring that corrupt public servants are not able to escape justice due to the absence of the complainant.

The judgment balances the need to protect the rights of the accused with the need to curb corruption in public life. It emphasizes that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt but also allows for the use of circumstantial evidence, other witnesses, and presumptions to establish guilt.

This judgment will have a significant impact on the way corruption cases are handled in India, especially in cases where the complainant is unable to testify. It provides a clear legal framework that will help courts to effectively deal with corruption cases and ensure that corrupt public servants are held accountable for their actions.