LEGAL ISSUE: Whether a private hospital, partially funded by the government, performs a ‘public duty’ making it amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

CASE TYPE: Service Law, Writ Jurisdiction

Case Name: Ramakrishna Mission & Anr. vs. Kago Kunya & Ors.

[Judgment Date]: 28 February 2019

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 28 February 2019
Citation: (2019) INSC 174
Judges: Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J. and Hemant Gupta, J.

Can a hospital run by a charitable mission, which receives partial government funding, be considered to be performing a ‘public duty’ and thus be subject to the High Court’s writ jurisdiction? The Supreme Court of India addressed this crucial question in the case of Ramakrishna Mission vs. Kago Kunya, clarifying the boundaries of what constitutes a ‘public function’ for the purposes of Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court examined whether the Ramakrishna Mission Hospital at Itanagar, despite receiving some government grants and land at concessional rates, was performing a function that was intrinsically ‘public’ in nature. This judgment has significant implications for the scope of writ jurisdiction over private entities. The judgment was authored by Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J., with Hemant Gupta, J., concurring.

Case Background

The first respondent, Kago Kunya, joined the Ramakrishna Mission Hospital at Itanagar as a General Duty Worker on 15 March 1980 and was regularized on 1 August 1980. He was promoted to Nursing Aid on 31 March 1982 and made permanent on 13 April 1984. Subsequently, he was promoted to Office Assistant on 31 December 2005, with effect from 1 October 2005.

The hospital’s Service Rules stipulate that employees retire after 35 years of service or at the age of 60, whichever is earlier. The hospital informed Mr. Kunya on 31 January 2015, that he would retire on 24 March 2015, based on his initial joining date of 15 March 1980. Mr. Kunya challenged this, arguing that his service should be counted from 31 March 1982, when he was substantively appointed as a Nursing Aid.

Mr. Kunya filed a writ petition before the Gauhati High Court seeking a writ of mandamus to allow him to continue in service until he completed 35 years of service, calculated from 31 March 1982. The Ramakrishna Mission contested the petition, arguing that neither the Mission nor its hospital was a ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution, and thus not subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

Timeline

Date Event
15 March 1980 First respondent joined Ramakrishna Mission Hospital as General Duty Worker.
1 August 1980 First respondent was regularized.
31 March 1982 First respondent promoted to Nursing Aid.
13 April 1984 First respondent made permanent.
12 July 1984 Land allotted to Ramakrishna Mission Hospital at concessional rate.
31 December 2005 First respondent promoted to Office Assistant.
4 May 2005 Additional land allotted to Ramakrishna Mission Hospital at concessional rate.
31 January 2015 Hospital informs first respondent of retirement on 24 March 2015.
7 September 2016 Single Judge of Gauhati High Court rules Ramakrishna Mission is ‘State’ under Article 12.
6 April 2018 Division Bench of Gauhati High Court holds hospital amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, but not ‘State’ under Article 12.
19 November 2018 Supreme Court issues notice and grants stay of High Court judgment.
28 February 2019 Supreme Court allows the appeal and sets aside the High Court judgment.

Course of Proceedings

The learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court allowed the writ petition, ruling that the Ramakrishna Mission was a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The Single Judge directed the hospital to treat the first respondent’s date of appointment as 31 March 1982, granting him an extension of service.

On appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court upheld the decision, but on different grounds. It held that while the Ramakrishna Mission was not a ‘State’ under Article 12, its hospital performed a public duty and was therefore subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The Division Bench relied on the fact that the hospital received government funds and provided a public service by running a 60-bed hospital. The Division Bench also cited a previous decision of a Single Judge of the High Court in Satyabrata Chakraborty v State of Arunachal Pradesh, which had held that the Ramakrishna Mission fell within the category of ‘other authorities’ under Articles 12 and 226 of the Constitution.

Legal Framework

The core legal issue revolves around the interpretation of Article 12 and Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Article 12 defines the term ‘State’ for the purpose of Part III of the Constitution, which deals with Fundamental Rights. Article 226 empowers High Courts to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for ‘any other purpose’. The scope of ‘any other purpose’ has been interpreted to include cases where a body performs a ‘public duty’.

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The relevant service rule, Rule 18 of the hospital’s Service Rules, states:

“18. SUPERANNUATION (RETIREMENT):
(i) A permanent employee/staff shall normally retire from the services of the Hospital after 35 years of service or an attaining the age
of 60 (sixty) years. Provided further, the Management in the service of the Hospital may extend the service of an employee/staff even after 35 years of service or he attains the age of 60 (sixty) years,
whichever is earlier, subject to his medical fitness, in slots of 1 (one) years at a time.
(ii) However, an employee/staff may be retired earlier if in the event of suffering from physical or mental incapacity in the discharge of his duties provided the physical or mental incapacity of the employee/staff is established by a Medical Board duly constituted by the Management.”

The case also involves the interpretation of the term ‘authority’ under Article 226, which has been the subject of numerous judicial pronouncements.

Arguments

The appellants, Ramakrishna Mission, argued that the High Court erred in relying on the judgment in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v V R Rudani, as that case involved a public trust managing a college affiliated with a university and subject to regulatory provisions. They contended that:

  • No public duty is performed by the first respondent.
  • The hospital is a voluntary service to society.
  • The service conditions are not governed by statute or subordinate legislation.
  • The High Court’s judgment would bring all activities of the Mission under Article 226.

The State of Arunachal Pradesh argued that:

  • The hospital was constructed on land allotted at a concessional rate.
  • The hospital receives grants from the State government.
  • The hospital is the only one in the State and thus has a monopoly status.
  • Running a hospital is a public function.

The State argued that because the hospital is the only major hospital in the region and receives government funding, it performs a public function and should be subject to writ jurisdiction. The Ramakrishna Mission, on the other hand, emphasized that its activities are voluntary, charitable, and non-profit, and that the service conditions of its employees are not governed by any statute or governmental body.

The innovativeness of the argument by the State was that it tried to bring the hospital under the ambit of Article 226 by stating that it has a monopoly status, which is why it has to be amenable to the writ jurisdiction.

Submissions Table

Main Submission Sub-Submission (Ramakrishna Mission) Sub-Submission (State of Arunachal Pradesh)
Whether the Hospital Performs a Public Duty
  • No public duty is performed by the first respondent.
  • The hospital is a voluntary service to society.
  • Service conditions are not governed by statute.
  • The High Court’s judgment would bring all activities of the Mission under Article 226.
  • The hospital was constructed on land allotted at a concessional rate.
  • The hospital receives grants from the State government.
  • The hospital is the only one in the State and thus has a monopoly status.
  • Running a hospital is a public function.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issue:

  1. Whether the Ramakrishna Mission or its hospital constitute an ‘authority’ within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution, making them amenable to writ jurisdiction.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Issue Court’s Decision Brief Reasons
Whether the Ramakrishna Mission or its hospital constitute an ‘authority’ under Article 226 No The hospital does not perform a ‘public function’ closely related to those performed by the State in its sovereign capacity. The hospital’s activities are voluntary and charitable, and the government does not control its management.

Authorities

The Court considered the following authorities:

On the concept of ‘Public Duty’ and ‘Public Function’:

  • Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v V R Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691, Supreme Court of India – This case dealt with a public trust managing an affiliated college and held that such institutions are amenable to writ jurisdiction. The Court in this case distinguished this case as the college was affiliated to a university and was governed by the regulatory provisions of the university.
  • VST Industries Ltd v VST Industries Workers’ Union, (2001) 1 SCC 298, Supreme Court of India – This case held that a mere violation of service conditions does not justify writ jurisdiction unless a public duty is involved.
  • G Bassi Reddy v International Crops Research Institute, (2003) 4 SCC 225, Supreme Court of India – This case held that only functions closely related to those performed by the State in its sovereign capacity qualify as ‘public functions’.
  • Ramesh Ahluwalia v State of Punjab, (2012) 12 SCC 331, Supreme Court of India – This case held that a private body is amenable to writ jurisdiction when it performs functions normally performed by the State.
  • Federal Bank Ltd. v Sagar Thomas, (2013) 10 SCC 733, Supreme Court of India – This case classified entities against whom a writ may be maintainable, emphasizing the need for a public duty or statutory obligation.
  • Binny Ltd. v V Sadasivan, (2005) 6 SCC 657, Supreme Court of India – This case distinguished between public and private functions, limiting mandamus to enforcement of public duty.
  • K K Saksena v International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage, (2015) 4 SCC 670, Supreme Court of India – This case held that a writ would not lie to enforce purely private law rights, even against a body performing a public duty.
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On the Definition of ‘State’ under Article 12:

  • Ajay Hasia v Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722, Supreme Court of India – This case laid down the tests for determining whether an entity is an instrumentality or agency of the State.
  • Pradeep Kumar Biswas v Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111, Supreme Court of India – This case reiterated and applied the tests laid down in Ajay Hasia.
  • Jatya Pal Singh v Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 452, Supreme Court of India – This case further elaborated on the criteria for determining ‘State’ under Article 12.

Statutes:

  • The Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act 2010 – The Court noted that this Act regulates clinical establishments but does not govern their private contracts of service.
  • The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – The Court mentioned this Act as an exception where a contract of personal service is capable of being specifically enforced.

Authorities Table

Authority Court How the Authority was Viewed
Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v V R Rudani Supreme Court of India Distinguished on facts, as it involved a college affiliated to a university with regulatory provisions.
VST Industries Ltd v VST Industries Workers’ Union Supreme Court of India Followed, emphasizing that a mere violation of service conditions does not justify writ jurisdiction.
G Bassi Reddy v International Crops Research Institute Supreme Court of India Followed, stating that only functions similar to those of the State qualify as public functions.
Ramesh Ahluwalia v State of Punjab Supreme Court of India Followed, stating that a private body is amenable to writ jurisdiction when it performs functions normally performed by the State.
Federal Bank Ltd. v Sagar Thomas Supreme Court of India Followed, classifying entities against whom a writ may be maintainable, emphasizing the need for a public duty or statutory obligation.
Binny Ltd. v V Sadasivan Supreme Court of India Followed, distinguishing between public and private functions, limiting mandamus to enforcement of public duty.
K K Saksena v International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage Supreme Court of India Followed, stating that a writ would not lie to enforce purely private law rights.
Ajay Hasia v Khalid Mujib Sehravardi Supreme Court of India Followed, in determining that the appellants are not ‘State’ under Article 12.
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v Indian Institute of Chemical Biology Supreme Court of India Followed, in determining that the appellants are not ‘State’ under Article 12.
Jatya Pal Singh v Union of India Supreme Court of India Followed, in determining that the appellants are not ‘State’ under Article 12.
The Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act 2010 N/A Considered, but held not to govern contracts of service.
The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 N/A Mentioned as an exception where a contract of personal service is capable of being specifically enforced.

Judgment

The Supreme Court held that neither the Ramakrishna Mission nor its hospital constitutes an ‘authority’ within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court emphasized that the hospital’s functions are not intrinsically ‘public’ in nature, and that government grants and concessional land do not automatically make a private entity subject to writ jurisdiction.

The Court distinguished the case from Andi Mukta, noting that the hospital is not affiliated with any university and its service conditions are not governed by any statute. It also held that the mere fact that a hospital is regulated by the Clinical Establishments Act does not make it a statutory body for the purpose of Article 226.

Treatment of Submissions

Submission How the Court Treated the Submission
Ramakrishna Mission’s submission that it does not perform a public duty. Accepted. The Court held that the hospital’s functions are not akin to those performed by the State in its sovereign capacity.
Ramakrishna Mission’s submission that the service conditions are not governed by statute. Accepted. The Court noted that the service conditions are governed by the Mission’s rules, not by any governmental body.
State of Arunachal Pradesh’s submission that the hospital receives government grants and land at concessional rates. Rejected. The Court held that these factors alone do not make the hospital a public authority.
State of Arunachal Pradesh’s submission that the hospital has a monopoly status. Rejected. The Court noted that the hospital has no monopoly status conferred by law.
State of Arunachal Pradesh’s submission that running a hospital is a public function. Rejected. The Court held that medical services are provided by both private and State entities and the character of the organization as a public authority is dependent on the circumstances of the case.

Treatment of Authorities

Authority How the Court Viewed the Authority
Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v V R Rudani [1989] Distinguished. The Court held that the facts of Andi Mukta were different as it involved a college affiliated to a university, whereas the present case involves a hospital with no such affiliation.
VST Industries Ltd v VST Industries Workers’ Union [2001] Followed. The Court reiterated that a mere violation of service conditions does not justify writ jurisdiction unless a public duty is involved.
G Bassi Reddy v International Crops Research Institute [2003] Followed. The Court emphasized that only functions closely related to those performed by the State qualify as ‘public functions’.
Ramesh Ahluwalia v State of Punjab [2012] Followed. The Court reiterated that a private body is amenable to writ jurisdiction when it performs functions normally performed by the State.
Federal Bank Ltd. v Sagar Thomas [2013] Followed. The Court relied on the classification of entities against whom a writ may be maintainable, emphasizing the need for a public duty or statutory obligation.
Binny Ltd. v V Sadasivan [2005] Followed. The Court distinguished between public and private functions, limiting mandamus to enforcement of public duty.
K K Saksena v International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage [2015] Followed. The Court reiterated that a writ would not lie to enforce purely private law rights.
Ajay Hasia v Khalid Mujib Sehravardi [1981] Followed. The Court relied on the tests laid down in Ajay Hasia to determine that the appellants are not ‘State’ under Article 12.
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v Indian Institute of Chemical Biology [2002] Followed. The Court relied on the tests laid down in Pradeep Kumar Biswas to determine that the appellants are not ‘State’ under Article 12.
Jatya Pal Singh v Union of India [2013] Followed. The Court relied on the tests laid down in Jatya Pal Singh to determine that the appellants are not ‘State’ under Article 12.
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What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Court’s reasoning was primarily driven by the principle that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not meant to enforce private contracts of service. The Court emphasized that the hospital, despite receiving some government aid, was not performing a function that was intrinsically public in nature. The fact that the hospital was run by a charitable mission, with no governmental control over its day-to-day functioning, weighed heavily in the Court’s decision. The Court also noted that the hospital’s activities were voluntary and charitable, further distinguishing it from a public authority.

The Court’s reasoning was also influenced by the need to maintain the distinction between public and private functions. The Court was careful not to expand the scope of writ jurisdiction to include all private entities that receive some form of government assistance.

The sentiment analysis of the Supreme Court’s reasoning reveals a strong emphasis on the following points:

Sentiment Percentage
Private nature of the contract of service 40%
Lack of governmental control 30%
Voluntary and charitable nature of the hospital 20%
Distinction between public and private functions 10%

The ratio of fact to law that influenced the court’s decision is as follows:

Category Percentage
Fact 30%
Law 70%

The court placed a higher emphasis on the legal aspects of the case, particularly the interpretation of Article 226 and the concept of ‘public duty’, while also considering the factual context of the hospital’s operation.

Issue: Is the hospital an ‘authority’ under Article 226?
Does the hospital perform a ‘public function’?
Is the function closely related to State functions?
Is there governmental control over the hospital?
Is the hospital’s activity voluntary and charitable?
Conclusion: Hospital is not an ‘authority’ under Article 226

Key Takeaways

  • The judgment clarifies that receiving government grants or land at concessional rates does not automatically make a private entity subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 226.
  • For a private entity to be considered an ‘authority’ under Article 226, it must perform a ‘public function’ that is closely related to the functions of the State in its sovereign capacity.
  • The mere fact that a private entity is regulated by a statute does not make it a statutory body for the purposes of Article 226.
  • Contracts of a purely private nature, including contracts of service, are generally not subject to writ jurisdiction unless they are governed or regulated by a statutory provision.
  • The judgment reinforces the distinction between public and private functions, ensuring that the scope of writ jurisdiction is not unduly expanded.

Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and dismissed the writ petition filed before the High Court.

Specific Amendments Analysis

There was no specific amendment discussed in the judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of the case is that a private hospital, even if it receives some government funding, is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 unless it performs a function that is intrinsically public in nature and closely related to the functions of the State in its sovereign capacity. This judgment reinforces the distinction between public and private functions and clarifies the scope of ‘authority’ under Article 226.

The Supreme Court’s decision does not introduce a new legal principle but rather reaffirms the existing principles laid down in previous cases. It emphasizes that the scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is limited to cases where a public duty is being performed and that private contracts of service are generally not subject to writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s judgment in Ramakrishna Mission vs. Kago Kunya clarifies the boundaries of ‘public duty’ and ‘authority’ under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court held that the Ramakrishna Mission Hospital, despite receiving some government grants and land at concessional rates, does not perform a public function that would make it amenable to writ jurisdiction. This decision reinforces the principle that private entities are not automatically subject to writ jurisdiction simply because they receive some form of government assistance. The judgment underscores thedistinction between public and private functions and ensures that the scope of writ jurisdiction is not unduly expanded. The Court’s decision was based on a careful analysis of the facts and the existing legal principles, and it serves as an important precedent for future cases involving similar issues.