LEGAL ISSUE: Determining the prevailing regulatory body for architectural education in India.
CASE TYPE: Education Law, Regulatory Law
Case Name: All India Council for Technical Education vs. Shri Prince Shivaji Maratha Boarding House’s College of Architecture & Ors.
Judgment Date: 08 November 2019
Date of the Judgment: 08 November 2019
Citation: 2019 INSC 1142
Judges: Ranjan Gogoi, CJI, Deepak Gupta, J., Aniruddha Bose, J.
Can two regulatory bodies, both established by parliamentary acts, have overlapping powers? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a series of appeals concerning the regulation of architectural education. The core issue was whether the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) or the Council of Architecture (CoA) holds primary authority in setting standards and granting approvals for architectural programs. This judgment clarifies the roles of these two bodies, impacting institutions offering architectural courses across the country. The judgment was delivered by a three-judge bench comprising of Ranjan Gogoi, CJI, and Justices Deepak Gupta and Aniruddha Bose, with the majority opinion authored by Justice Aniruddha Bose.
Case Background
The dispute arose from conflicting directives issued by the AICTE and CoA regarding the approval and intake capacity of institutions offering architectural courses. Several institutions challenged orders from the AICTE, which sought to impose its norms and standards on architectural programs, arguing that the CoA was the sole authority for such matters. The appeals before the Supreme Court were consolidated to resolve the conflict between the two regulatory bodies.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1972 | Architects Act enacted, establishing the Council of Architecture (CoA). |
| 1987 | All India Council for Technical Education Act enacted, establishing the AICTE. |
| 25th April 2003 | Joint inspection by CoA and AICTE of Shri Prince Shivaji Maratha Boarding House’s College of Architecture. |
| 2003-2004 & 2004-2005 | CoA reduced the intake capacity of Shri Prince Shivaji Maratha Boarding House’s College of Architecture to 30 students based on joint inspection. |
| 18th May 2004 | CoA restored the intake capacity of Shri Prince Shivaji Maratha Boarding House’s College of Architecture to 40 students. |
| 2004-05 | Director of Technical Education fixed the intake capacity of Shri Prince Shivaji Maratha Boarding House’s College of Architecture at 30 students based on AICTE norms. |
| 8th September 2004 | Bombay High Court ruled in favor of the institution, stating that the Architects Act, 1972, was not impliedly repealed by the AICTE Act, 1987. |
| 2nd February 2011 | Madhya Pradesh High Court directed temporary affiliation to Bhartiya Vidya Mandir Shiksha Samiti, subject to CoA compliance within a year. |
| 2011-2012 | Dispute over admission of two students beyond the intake capacity by BMS Educational Trust. |
| 19th September 2011 | Visvesvaraya University issued a circular mandating all institutions teaching architecture to secure AICTE approval. |
| 21st September 2011 | State Government issued an order directing compliance with Visvesvaraya University circular. |
| 2017-2018 | CoA granted approval to 22 new institutions for Bachelor of Architecture courses and 6 existing institutions for PG courses. |
| 29th August 2018 | Kerala High Court held that AICTE approval is necessary for starting a new college of architecture. |
| 08 November 2019 | Supreme Court judgment clarifying the roles of AICTE and CoA. |
Course of Proceedings
The Bombay High Court, in the case of Shri Prince Shivaji Maratha Boarding House’s College of Architecture, ruled that the Architects Act of 1972 was not implicitly repealed by the AICTE Act of 1987, upholding the CoA’s authority in setting architectural education standards. This decision was challenged by AICTE, leading to an appeal in the Supreme Court. Similarly, the Madhya Pradesh High Court directed temporary affiliation to an institution, subject to compliance with CoA norms, which was also appealed. The Karnataka High Court’s judgment was subject to the outcome of the Bombay High Court case. The Kerala High Court ruled that AICTE approval was necessary for starting a new architecture college, which was also appealed. These various appeals were consolidated to resolve the conflict between the regulatory powers of the CoA and AICTE.
Legal Framework
The core of the dispute lies in the interpretation of two key statutes:
- The Architects Act, 1972: This Act, particularly Section 3, established the Council of Architecture (CoA) with the aim of regulating the profession of architects. It also deals with the recognition of architectural qualifications. Section 14 of the Act stipulates that the qualifications included in the Schedule or notified under Section 15 shall be recognised qualifications for the purposes of this Act. Section 16 vests the power to amend the schedule with the Central Government. The Act empowers the CoA to set standards for architectural education and to make representations to the Central Government regarding the recognition of qualifications. Section 45 empowers the Council to make regulations with the approval of the Central Government to carry out the purposes of this Act.
“45. Power of Council to make regulations. (1) The Council may, with the approval of the Central Government, [by notification in the Official Gazette] make regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, or the rules made thereunder to carry out the purposes of this Act.” - The All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987: Section 3 of this Act established the AICTE to ensure the coordinated development of technical education. Section 2(g) defines “technical education” to include programs in architecture. Section 10 outlines the powers and functions of the AICTE, including setting norms and standards for courses, curricula, and granting approval for new technical institutions. Section 23 empowers the Council to make regulations to carry out the purposes of this Act.
“10. It shall be the duty of the Council to take all such steps as it may think fit for ensuring coordinated and integrated development of technical education and maintenance of standards and for the purposes of performing its functions under this Act, the Council may: – (k) grant approval for starting new technical institutions and for introduction of new courses or programmes in consultation with the agencies concerned;”
The conflict arose because both Acts appear to grant regulatory authority over architectural education, with the CoA focusing on the profession and the AICTE focusing on technical education as a whole.
Arguments
Submissions on behalf of AICTE:
- The AICTE argued that the 1987 Act, being a later statute, should prevail over the 1972 Act, especially in matters of technical education, which includes architecture.
- They contended that the 1987 Act implicitly repealed the provisions of the 1972 Act to the extent that they overlap in regulating architectural education.
- AICTE relied on the judgment in the case of State of Tamil Nadu and Others Vs. Adhiyaman Educational Research Institute and Others, arguing that the power of AICTE under the 1987 Act has already been upheld by the Supreme Court.
- They cited Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited Vs. Rabi Sankar Patro and Others and Parshvnath Charitable Trust and Others Vs. All India Council for Technical Education and Others to support their claim that the rules and regulations framed by AICTE have the force of law and are binding.
- AICTE emphasized a communication from the Ministry of Human Resource Development, which stated that all aspects of architectural education fall under the purview of AICTE, while CoA should focus on the architect profession and ethics.
Submissions on behalf of CoA:
- The CoA argued that the 1972 Act is a special law specifically designed to deal with architects and the maintenance of standards in architectural education.
- They submitted that the 1987 Act, being a general law covering a wide range of technical education, should not override the specific provisions of the 1972 Act.
- They contended that the definition of “technical education” in the 1987 Act should be interpreted in a manner that excludes architecture, given the existence of the 1972 Act.
- CoA relied on Bharathidasan University and Another vs. All India Council for Technical Education & Others, arguing that the 1972 Act should be the final authority for fixing norms and standards for architectural institutions.
- They argued that the 1972 Act’s focus on the registration of architects and the recognition of qualifications makes it a specialized statute that should take precedence.
- CoA contended that the 1972 Act has a non-obstante clause in Section 17, which gives its provisions an overriding effect.
Innovativeness of the Argument:
The CoA’s argument that the definition of “technical education” in the 1987 Act should be interpreted to exclude architecture, given the existence of the 1972 Act, was particularly innovative. This argument challenged the literal interpretation of the definition clause and focused on the context and purpose of the statutes.
Submissions Table
| Main Submission | AICTE Sub-Submissions | CoA Sub-Submissions |
|---|---|---|
| Primacy of Regulatory Authority |
|
|
| Authority for Setting Standards |
|
|
| Interpretation of Statutes |
|
|
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the following issues for adjudication:
- Whether the All India Council of Technical Education Act, 1987 (AICTE Act) overrides the provisions of the Architects Act, 1972 in the matter of prescribing and regulating norms and standards of architectural institutions.
- Whether the AICTE Act, which is a later Act, has impliedly repealed the provisions of the Architects Act.
- Whether the various regulations framed in pursuance of the 1972 Act could be overlooked by the Bench of the High Court in issuing such directions.
- Whether the power of the CoA to direct construction of a separate building is valid.
- Whether AICTE norms can be made applicable in respect of architecture courses.
- Whether approval of AICTE is necessary for starting a new college of architecture.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:
| Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
|---|---|---|
| Whether the AICTE Act overrides the Architects Act in matters of architectural education standards. | No. The Architects Act, 1972 prevails. | The 1972 Act is a special law for architectural education and profession. The 1987 Act is a general law. |
| Whether the AICTE Act impliedly repealed the Architects Act. | No. | Implied repeal is not presumed unless two statutes cannot stand together. The 1972 Act has a non-obstante clause. |
| Whether regulations framed under the 1972 Act could be overlooked by the High Court. | No. The High Court’s directions were subject to compliance with CoA norms. | The High Court had directed compliance with CoA norms, which were to be implemented. |
| Whether the CoA’s power to direct construction of a separate building is valid. | Yes. | Such directives are incidental to the regulatory powers of the CoA. |
| Whether AICTE norms can be applied to architecture courses. | No. | The 1972 Act prevails in matters of architecture education. |
| Whether AICTE approval is necessary for starting a new architecture college. | No. | Recognition under the 1972 Act is sufficient. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:
On the interpretation of statutes and implied repeal:
- M/s. Mathra Parshad and Sons Vs. State of Punjab and Others (Supreme Court of India) – Established that implied repeal of an earlier statute should not be presumed unless the two statutes cannot stand together.
- A.B. Abdulkadir Vs. State of Kerala (Supreme Court of India) – Stated that the principle of repeal could be applied if the later Act deals with substantially the same subject as the former Act.
- Ajoy Kumar Banerjee and Others Vs. Union of India and Others (Supreme Court of India) – Discussed the tests for determining whether a later law overrides a prior special law.
- Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh – Explained the presumption against implied repeal.
- Bennion on Statutory Interpretation by F A R Bennion – Discussed the concept of strained construction to avoid unworkable results.
On the interpretation of definition clauses:
- Assn. of Registration Plates v. Union of India (Supreme Court of India) – Stated that definition clauses must be construed with caution.
- Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (Supreme Court of India) – Held that a definition may have to be reversed if the statutory context requires.
- K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal (Supreme Court of India) – Stated that a definition can be departed from if the context shows it cannot be applied.
- Printers (Mysore) Ltd. V. Asstt. CTO (Supreme Court of India) – Held that a word in a definition can have different meanings in different parts of a statute.
- Pushpa Devi v. Milkhi Ram (Supreme Court of India) – Held that it is permissible to refer to internal and external context while interpreting a definition.
On the distinction between technical institutions and technical education:
- Bharathidasan University and Another vs. All India Council for Technical Education & Others (Supreme Court of India) – Held that a “technical institution” does not include a “university”.
- Association of Management of Private Colleges Vs. All India Council of Technical Education and Others (Supreme Court of India) – Reiterated that universities are exempt from AICTE’s regulatory ambit.
On the repugnancy between a State Act and a Central Act:
- Municipal Council Palai Vs. T.J. Joseph (Supreme Court of India) – Discussed the need for a unified regime in case of overlapping powers.
- Tika Ramji Vs. State of U.P. (Supreme Court of India) – Discussed the principle of repugnancy between State and Central laws.
On the principle of special law overriding general law:
- R.S. Raghunath Vs. State of Karnataka (Supreme Court of India) – Held that a general provision should yield to a special provision.
- LIC Vs. D.J. Bahadur (Supreme Court of India) – Explained that an Act may be general for certain purposes and special for others.
- U.P. State Electricity Board Vs. Hari Shankar Jain (Supreme Court of India) – Held that special provisions prevail over general provisions in case of conflict.
- J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. (Supreme Court of India) – Held that a general provision should yield to a special provision in case of conflict.
On the primacy of AICTE:
- State of Tamil Nadu and Another Vs. Adhiyaman Educational and Research Institute and Others (Supreme Court of India) – Held that the Central Act and the Council created under it would have jurisdiction in respect of the subjects specified under Section 10 of the 1987 Act.
- Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited Vs. Rabi Sankar Patro and Others (Supreme Court of India) – Gave primacy to AICTE on the necessity for engineering colleges to obtain approval.
- Parshvnath Charitable Trust and Others Vs. All India Council for Technical Education and Others (Supreme Court of India) – Held that the rules and regulations framed by AICTE have the force of law and are binding.
Authority Analysis Table
| Authority | Court | How it was used |
|---|---|---|
| M/s. Mathra Parshad and Sons Vs. State of Punjab and Others | Supreme Court of India | Followed – Established that implied repeal of an earlier statute should not be presumed unless the two statutes cannot stand together. |
| A.B. Abdulkadir Vs. State of Kerala | Supreme Court of India | Distinguished – Stated that the principle of repeal could be applied if the later Act deals with substantially the same subject as the former Act, but was not applicable in the present case. |
| Ajoy Kumar Banerjee and Others Vs. Union of India and Others | Supreme Court of India | Followed – Discussed the tests for determining whether a later law overrides a prior special law. |
| Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh | Textbook | Followed – Explained the presumption against implied repeal. |
| Bennion on Statutory Interpretation by F A R Bennion | Textbook | Followed – Discussed the concept of strained construction to avoid unworkable results. |
| Assn. of Registration Plates v. Union of India | Supreme Court of India | Followed – Stated that definition clauses must be construed with caution. |
| Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks | Supreme Court of India | Followed – Held that a definition may have to be reversed if the statutory context requires. |
| K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal | Supreme Court of India | Followed – Stated that a definition can be departed from if the context shows it cannot be applied. |
| Printers (Mysore) Ltd. V. Asstt. CTO | Supreme Court of India | Followed – Held that a word in a definition can have different meanings in different parts of a statute. |
| Pushpa Devi v. Milkhi Ram | Supreme Court of India | Followed – Held that it is permissible to refer to internal and external context while interpreting a definition. |
| Bharathidasan University and Another vs. All India Council for Technical Education & Others | Supreme Court of India | Followed – Held that a “technical institution” does not include a “university”. |
| Association of Management of Private Colleges Vs. All India Council of Technical Education and Others | Supreme Court of India | Followed – Reaffirmed that universities are exempt from AICTE’s regulatory ambit. |
| Municipal Council Palai Vs. T.J. Joseph | Supreme Court of India | Followed – Discussed the need for a unified regime in case of overlapping powers. |
| Tika Ramji Vs. State of U.P. | Supreme Court of India | Followed – Discussed the principle of repugnancy between State and Central laws. |
| R.S. Raghunath Vs. State of Karnataka | Supreme Court of India | Followed – Held that a general provision should yield to a special provision. |
| LIC Vs. D.J. Bahadur | Supreme Court of India | Followed – Explained that an Act may be general for certain purposes and special for others. |
| U.P. State Electricity Board Vs. Hari Shankar Jain | Supreme Court of India | Followed – Held that special provisions prevail over general provisions in case of conflict. |
| J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. | Supreme Court of India | Followed – Held that a general provision should yield to a special provision in case of conflict. |
| State of Tamil Nadu and Another Vs. Adhiyaman Educational and Research Institute and Others | Supreme Court of India | Distinguished – Held that the Central Act and the Council created under it would have jurisdiction in respect of the subjects specified under Section 10 of the 1987 Act, but was not applicable in the present case. |
| Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited Vs. Rabi Sankar Patro and Others | Supreme Court of India | Distinguished – Gave primacy to AICTE on the necessity for engineering colleges to obtain approval, but was not applicable in the present case. |
| Parshvnath Charitable Trust and Others Vs. All India Council for Technical Education and Others | Supreme Court of India | Distinguished – Held that the rules and regulations framed by AICTE have the force of law and are binding, but was not applicable in the present case. |
Judgment
How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?
| Submission | How the Court Treated it |
|---|---|
| AICTE’s claim that the 1987 Act should prevail as a later statute. | Rejected. The Court held that the 1972 Act, being a special law, prevails over the 1987 Act in matters of architectural education. |
| AICTE’s argument that the 1987 Act implicitly repealed the 1972 Act. | Rejected. The Court found no implied repeal, as the two Acts can coexist. |
| CoA’s argument that the 1972 Act is a special law for architects and architectural education. | Accepted. The Court agreed that the 1972 Act is a special law in this context. |
| CoA’s contention that the definition of “technical education” should exclude architecture. | Partially Accepted. The Court held that the word “architecture” should be treated as inapplicable when AICTE imports its regulatory framework. |
| AICTE’s reliance on the Ministry of HRD communication. | Rejected. The Court held that the communication was not a valid exercise of power and had no binding effect. |
| CoA’s reliance on the non-obstante clause in the 1972 Act. | Accepted. The Court recognized the overriding effect of the non-obstante clause. |
How the Authorities were viewed by the Court?
The Court relied heavily on the principles of statutory interpretation, emphasizing that a special law should prevail over a general law. The Court also held that the definition of “technical education” in the 1987 Act should be interpreted in a manner that excludes architecture, given the existence of the 1972 Act. It distinguished the cases cited by AICTE, stating that those cases did not deal with the specific issue of architectural education.
Findings
The Supreme Court held that the Architects Act, 1972, is a special law designed to regulate the profession of architects and the standards of architectural education. The AICTE Act, 1987, is a general law aimed at ensuring coordinated development of technical education, which includes architecture as a component. However, the Court clarified that the Architects Act, 1972, prevails over the AICTE Act, 1987, in matters of architectural education. The Court found that the definition of technical education in the 1987 Act does not include architecture when it comes to the regulatory framework. The Court also held that the non-obstante clause in the 1972 Act gives its provisions an overriding effect.
Final Verdict: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Council of Architecture (CoA), affirming its sole authority in setting standards and granting approvals for architectural programs. The Court held that AICTE approval is not necessary for starting a new architecture college. The Court also held that the regulations framed under the 1972 Act cannot be overlooked, and that the CoA has the power to direct construction of a separate building as an incident of its regulatory power. The Court set aside the judgments of the Kerala High Court and the Karnataka High Court, which had held that AICTE approval was necessary for starting a new architecture college. The Court also set aside the communication from the Ministry of HRD, which stated that all aspects of architectural education fall under the purview of AICTE.
Implications
This judgment has significant implications for architectural education in India:
- Clarity in Regulatory Authority: The judgment provides clarity on the regulatory landscape for architectural education, establishing the CoA as the primary authority.
- Autonomy of Architectural Institutions: Architectural institutions are now primarily governed by the norms and standards set by the CoA, without the need for AICTE approval.
- Specialized Focus: The judgment reinforces the specialized focus of the CoA on the architectural profession and architectural education, as opposed to the broader scope of the AICTE.
- No Dual Regulation: The judgment eliminates the confusion and potential for conflicting directives from two regulatory bodies.
- Legal Precedent: The judgment serves as a legal precedent for interpreting the interplay between general and special laws in the context of regulatory bodies.
Future Considerations:
- Coordination between Regulatory Bodies: While the judgment clarifies the primary authority, it also underscores the need for coordination between the CoA and AICTE to avoid any gaps or overlaps in the regulation of technical education.
- Amendments to Statutes: The judgment may prompt amendments to the AICTE Act to explicitly exclude architecture from its purview, further solidifying the CoA’s authority.
- Uniform Standards: The CoA will need to ensure that uniform standards are maintained across all architectural institutions to uphold the quality of education.
- Implementation of the Judgment: The judgment needs to be effectively implemented by all stakeholders, including educational institutions, regulatory bodies, and state governments.
- Future Litigation: There may be future litigation arising from the implementation of this judgment, especially concerning issues of compliance and interpretation of the CoA’s regulations.
Flowchart of Regulatory Authority
(Special Law)
(Primary Authority for Architectural Education)
(Governed by CoA Norms and Standards)
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of All India Council for Technical Education vs. Shri Prince Shivaji Maratha Boarding House’s College of Architecture & Ors. is a landmark decision that clarifies the regulatory landscape for architectural education in India. The Court’s emphasis on the special status of the Architects Act, 1972, and its interpretation of the definition of “technical education” in the AICTE Act, 1987, have significant implications for the autonomy of architectural institutions and the authority of the Council of Architecture. By resolving the conflict between the AICTE and the CoA, this judgment ensures that architectural education is governed by a specialized body that is best equipped to maintain the standards of the profession. This case serves as a critical reference point for understanding the interplay between different regulatory bodies and the interpretation of statutes in the context of education law.