Supreme Court Clarifies Res Judicata in Property Dispute: Jamia Masjid vs. K V Rudrappa (23 September 2021)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 23 September 2021
Citation: Not Available
Judges: Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J, Vikram Nath, J, Hima Kohli, J. The judgment was authored by Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J.

Can a previous court decision prevent a party from raising the same issue again? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a property dispute involving the Jamia Masjid and the successors of Sri K V Rudrappa. The core issue was whether the principle of res judicata (a legal doctrine preventing re-litigation of decided matters) applied to bar the Masjid’s claim over a disputed property. The Supreme Court clarified the scope of res judicata, especially in the context of representative suits and compromise decrees.

Case Background

The Jamia Masjid, through its President, filed a suit seeking declaration of ownership, possession, and an injunction against the defendants regarding a property in Gubbi village. The Masjid claimed the property was a ‘Khazi Service Inam’ managed by Abdul Khuddus, who was a mutawalli (manager) on behalf of the Wakf Board. The Masjid argued that Abdul Khuddus was only entitled to the usufruct of the property while performing his duties as a Khazi. The Wakf Board had notified the property as a wakf property in 1965. After Abdul Khuddus’s death, his successors allegedly sold the property to Defendants 1 to 4, which the Masjid claimed was void without the Wakf Board’s approval.

The defendants contended that the suit was barred by res judicata, citing three previous suits: (1) a suit by members of the mosque where the property was declared Abdul Khuddus’s personal property; (2) a suit by the Wakf Board that ended in a compromise; and (3) a suit by the Wakf Board that was withdrawn. They also argued that the property was not a Khazi Service Inam but Abdul Khuddus’s personal property.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Trial Court initially held that the suit was barred by res judicata due to the previous suits. The First Appellate Court upheld this decision. However, the High Court initially reversed this decision, stating that the previous suits did not conclusively decide the issue of title. The Supreme Court remanded the matter back to the High Court for a fresh hearing. After remand, the High Court again dismissed the appeal, holding that the ownership of the property was conclusively decided in the first suit in favor of Abdul Khuddus. The High Court also held that the compromise decree in the second suit was intended to end the litigation and would operate as res judicata in subsequent suits. The Supreme Court then granted leave to appeal.

Legal Framework

The judgment primarily revolves around Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), which deals with res judicata. Section 11 states:

“No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.”

The Supreme Court also discussed Explanation IV to Section 11, which states that any matter that might have been used as a ground of defense or attack in a former suit is deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue. Explanation VI to Section 11 states that where persons litigate in respect of a public right, all persons interested in such right are deemed to claim under the persons so litigating. The Court also considered Order 14 Rule 2 of the CPC, which allows a court to decide a case on a question of law if it relates to jurisdiction or a bar to the suit.

Arguments

Appellant (Jamia Masjid) Arguments:

• Regarding OS 92/1950-51:
  • The suit was for setting up a scheme for the administration of the mosque, not for a declaration of title.
  • The appellant was not a party to the suit.
  • There was no final declaration that the suit property is a private property belonging to Abdul Khuddus.
  • The court had limited jurisdiction in a suit under Section 92 of the CPC and could not have issued declaratory relief.
• Regarding OS 748/1968:
  • The suit was based on the premise that Abdul Khuddus, as a khazi, only had the right to the usufruct of the property.
  • The compromise decree did not concede title to the defendants or create any new right in their favor.
  • The decree protected possession without any adjudication of title.
• Regarding OS 100/1983:
  • The suit was for a permanent injunction, anticipating a sale by Abdul Khuddus’s heirs.
  • The appellant was not a party to the suit.
  • The suit was dismissed without costs after the plaintiff filed a memo for dismissal.
  • The present suit, seeking declaration and possession, was instituted before the dismissal of the previous suit.
• The issue of title to the suit property has not been decided in any of the three prior suits.
• The suit property was notified as wakf property.
• A collateral finding does not demonstrate an adjudication of title.
• The doctrine of res judicata would not be attracted in the absence of a prior adjudication.
• The notification of the suit property as a wakf was pursuant to a declaration by Abdul Khuddus for the general benefit of the community.
• Once the property is constituted as a wakf, it remains so, and no objection to the notification was filed.
• The issue of res judicata raises mixed questions of law and fact and ought to have been decided after a full trial.

Respondent (Successors of K V Rudrappa) Arguments:

• In the first suit, there was a specific finding that the suit property was the personal property of Abdul Khuddus.
• In the second suit, a compromise was reached on a portion of the reliefs, which amounted to an abandonment of the other reliefs.
• The third suit was for a permanent injunction and was dismissed as withdrawn.
• The Jamia Masjid is seeking a declaration of title on behalf of the Wakf Board, which is not a party to the suit.

Submissions Table

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The primary issue before the Supreme Court was:

1. Whether the suit instituted by Jamia Masjid is barred by the principles of res judicata?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

Cases Relied Upon by the Court:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai (dead) by L.Rs v. Mohd. Hanifa (dead) by L.Rs [ (1976) 4 SCC 780 ]: The Court used this case to explain the conditions for the application of res judicata.
• Alka Gupta v. Narender Kumar Gupta [ (2010) 10 SCC 141]: The Court used this case to highlight that the plea of res judicata must be clearly established, especially constructive res judicata.
• Madhukar D Shende v. Tarabai Aba Shedage [ (2002) 2 SCC 85 ] and Ram Harakh v. Hamid Ahmed Khan & Ors. [ (1998) 7 SCC 484 ]: The Court relied on these cases to establish that the plea of res judicata is a mixed question of law and facts.
• Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra [ (1990) 1 SCC 193 ]: The Court used this case to explain that the principle of res judicata cannot be fit into the pigeon hole of ‘mixed question of law and facts’ in every case.
• Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B Jeejeebhoy [ (1970) 1 SCC 613 ]: The Court relied on this case to explain that res judicata is a matter of procedure and does not affect the interpretation of statutes.
• Mahant Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji v. Patel Ishwarlalbhai Narsibhai [AIR 1952 SC 143]: The Court used this case to explain the scope of a suit under Section 92 of the CPC and that a declaration of title is outside the scope of Section 92.
• Raje Anandrao v. Shamrao [ (1961) 3 SCR 930 ], Ahmad Adam Sait v. M E Makhri [ (1964) 2 SCR 647 ], R. Venugopala Naidu v. Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities [AIR 1990 SC 444] and Shiromani Gurdwara Parbhandhak Committee v. Mahant Harnam Singh C. (Dead) M.N. Singh [AIR 2003 SC 3349]: The Court relied on these cases to establish that a suit under Section 92 is a representative suit and binds all those interested in the trust.
• Sajjadanashin Syed MD B.E. Edr. (D) by Lrs. v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer [ (2000) 3 SCC 350 ]: The Court used this case to explain the meaning of “directly and substantially in issue” in Section 11 of the CPC.
• Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha v. Ujagar Singh [ (2000) 7 SCC 543 ]: The Court used this case to hold that a decision in an earlier suit for an injunction, where no question of title was adjudicated upon will not be binding on the question of title.
• Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair [ (1994) 2 SCC 14 ] and Vanagiri Sri Selliamman Ayyanar Uthirasomasundareswarar Temple v. Rajanga Asari [AIR 1965 Mad 355]: The Court referred to these cases to emphasize the need to consider the unique facts of each case to determine if an issue was substantially decided.
• Nand Ram (Dead) Through Legal Representatives v. Jagdish Prasad (Dead) Through Legal Representatives [ (2020) 9 SCC 393 ]: The Court relied on this case to reiterate that if a matter has only collaterally or in an auxiliary manner been in issue or decided in an earlier proceeding, the finding would not ordinarily be res judicata.
• Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao [AIR 1967 SC 591] and Sunderabai v. Devaji Shankar Deshpande [AIR 1954 SC 82]: The Court used these cases to explain that a compromise decree is not a decision of the court, and the principle of res judicata cannot be made applicable. However, it may create an estoppel.
• Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India [AIR 1991 SC 2234]: The Court distinguished this case and held that the compromise decree in the second suit was restricted to the issue of possession and not title.
• Provash Chandra Daluj v. Biswanath Banerhee [AIR 1989 SC 1834]: The Court mentioned this case in the context of estoppel created by a compromise.
• Sarguja Transport Service v. S.T.A.T Gwalior [AIR 1987 SC 88]: The Court mentioned this case in the context of withdrawal of suits.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:

• Lack of Conclusive Title Adjudication: The Court emphasized that none of the previous suits conclusively determined the absolute title of Abdul Khuddus over the suit property. The finding in the first suit was only a prima facie observation.
• Nature of Representative Suits: The Court highlighted that the first suit was a representative suit under Section 92 of the CPC, which is meant for the administration of trusts, and not for the determination of absolute title.
• Limited Scope of Compromise Decree: The Court noted that the compromise decree in the second suit was limited to the issue of possession and did not involve any adjudication on the title of the property.
• Changed Circumstances: The Court considered the fact that the suit property was notified as a wakf property after the first suit was decided.
• Suit for Injunction: The Court noted that the third suit was for a bare injunction and no adjudication was made on the merits of the case.

Decision

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court. The Court held that the suit instituted by the Jamia Masjid was not barred by the principles of res judicata. The case was remanded back to the Trial Court for a decision on the merits of the case.

Flow Chart

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Jamia Masjid vs. K V Rudrappa clarified that the principle of res judicata cannot be applied in a rigid manner without considering the specific context and nature of the previous suits. The Court emphasized that for res judicata to apply, the issue must have been directly and substantially decided in a previous suit. The Court also clarified that a compromise decree does not amount to a decision on the merits of the case and that a suit under Section 92 of the CPC is meant for the administration of trusts and not for the determination of absolute title. This judgment provides valuable guidance on the application of res judicata in property disputes, particularly in cases involving representative suits and compromise decrees.