Supreme Court clarifies reversionary rights of grand-daughters under Hindu Law: Gopalakrishna vs. Narayanagowda (2019)

Date of the Judgment: April 3, 2019
Citation: (2019) INSC 282
Judges: Ashok Bhushan, J. and K.M. Joseph, J.
Can a grand-daughter claim property rights as a reversioner under Hindu Law, especially when a widow has already alienated the property? The Supreme Court of India addressed this complex issue in a recent case, clarifying the rights of reversioners and the impact of limitation laws. This case involved a dispute over property rights, where the court had to determine the validity of a sale made by a widow and the subsequent claims of the grand-daughter. The bench consisted of Justice Ashok Bhushan and Justice K.M. Joseph, with the judgment authored by Justice K.M. Joseph.

Case Background

The case revolves around a property dispute originating from the estate of one Ramanna, who passed away in 1907. Ramanna had two wives, Jankamma (first wife) who predeceased him, and Seethamma (second wife) who passed away in 1938. Ramanna had a daughter named Venkamma through his first wife. Venkamma passed away in 1910 and had a daughter named Jankamma. The appellants claimed ownership of the properties based on sale deeds executed by Jankamma in 1955.

After Jankamma sold the properties, the respondents, who were in possession of the suit properties, filed suits for declaration of their title and injunction. The Trial Court decreed the suits in favor of the respondents. However, the High Court set aside the decree and confirmed the sale of Jankamma in favor of the first plaintiff’s father and the second plaintiff, holding that title to the properties could not be decided. The appellants then sued for declaration of title, recovery of possession, and mesne profits, claiming absolute ownership through the sale deed from Jankamma.

The respondents contested the claims, denying that Ramanna had a daughter named Venkamma and that Venkamma had a daughter named Jankamma. They argued that Seethamma had sold the properties to her brother, Srinivasa Rao, and that they had purchased the property from Srinivasa Rao under a registered sale deed dated September 13, 1954. They also claimed adverse possession, asserting they had been in possession of the property since their purchase.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Trial Court initially decreed the suit in favor of the appellants, finding that Venkamma was Ramanna’s daughter and Jankamma was Venkamma’s daughter. It held that Seethamma had only a widow’s estate and could not alienate the property, thus the sale made by her was illegal.

However, the First Appellate Court reversed the Trial Court’s decision, holding that the appellants’ right to recovery was extinguished due to a delay of more than 12 years since the sale by Jankamma in 1955. The Appellate Court also noted that the High Court’s observations in the earlier litigation did not extend the limitation period.

The High Court, in second appeal, framed substantial questions of law regarding the suit being barred by time and whether the respondents had perfected their title by adverse possession. The High Court found that the possession of the respondents remained unchallenged and that the suit was barred by limitation.

Legal Framework

The case primarily revolves around the interpretation of the Mysore Hindu Law Women’s Right to Property Act, 1933 (referred to as ‘the State Act’) and the principles of Hindu Law concerning a widow’s estate.

Section 10(2)(g) of the State Act defines “Stridhana” and includes:

“property taken by inheritance by a female from another female and property taken by inheritance by a female from her husband or son, or from a male relative connected by blood except when there is a daughter or daughter’s son of the propositus alive at the time the property is so inherited.”

This provision indicates that if a daughter or daughter’s son of the propositus (the original owner) is alive when the property is inherited, the widow does not get absolute rights.

Section 4(1)(ii) of the State Act specifies the order of succession to a Hindu male dying intestate, placing the widow before the daughters.

Section 11 of the State Act grants a female owning “Stridhana” absolute powers of disposition.

The court also considered the principles of Hindu Law, particularly the concept of a widow’s limited estate, which restricts a widow’s power of alienation except for necessity or benefit of the estate.

The Limitation Act, 1908, Articles 140 and 141, which were in force at the relevant time, prescribed a 12-year limitation period for reversioners to file a suit for possession of immovable property after the death of a Hindu female.

Arguments

The appellants argued that the High Court erred in granting absolute rights to Seethamma, the widow. They contended that Section 10(2)(g) of the State Act clearly states that Seethamma would not get absolute rights as Ramanna’s daughter, Venkamma, was alive when Ramanna died. They also argued that under Mitakshara law, which was applicable, the widow was only entitled to a limited estate.

The respondents argued that Seethamma transferred the property in 1913 and died in 1938. Therefore, the suit should have been filed within 12 years of Seethamma’s death. They further contended that under Mitakshara law, the grand-daughter was not a heir, and even the limited right attributed to Seethamma would become an absolute right by default.

The respondents also argued that the appellants’ suit was barred by limitation, as it was filed more than 20 years after the appellants purchased the property from Jankamma.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in this judgment. However, the core issues that the court addressed were:

1. Whether Seethamma acquired absolute rights over the property of her husband, Ramanna.
2. Whether Jankamma, the grand-daughter of Ramanna, had reversionary rights over the property.
3. Whether the suit filed by the appellants was barred by limitation.

Additionally, the court also dealt with the sub-issue of whether the sale made by Seethamma was a valid sale.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

Cases Relied Upon by the Court:

Legal Provisions Considered by the Court:

Judgment

The Court analyzed the authorities and provisions of law to come to the following conclusion:

The Court held that Seethamma, as the widow, did not acquire absolute rights over the property of her husband, Ramanna, because Ramanna was survived by his daughter, Venkamma. This meant that the property was not Seethamma’s Stridhana and she had only a limited estate.

The Court assumed that Jankamma, the grand-daughter, was a reversioner for the purpose of the limitation issue. However, it did not specifically rule on whether she was a reversioner.

The Court held that the suit filed by the appellants was barred by limitation. The limitation period for filing a suit for recovery of possession started upon the death of the widow, Seethamma, in 1938. The period of 12 years ran out in 1950. Therefore, the suit filed much later was barred by limitation.

The Court relied on Kalipada Chakraborti & Anr. v. Palani Bala Devi & Ors. [AIR 1953 SC 125]* to hold that the cause of action for a reversioner’s suit accrues only on the death of the female heir.

The Court also cited Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey & Ors. [AIR 1962 SC 83]*, to explain the position of a Hindu widow as an owner with limited powers of alienation and Gogula Gurumurthy & Ors. v. Kurimeti Ayyappa (1975) 4 SCC 458* to reiterate that no one has a vested interest in succession as long as the widow is alive.

The Court observed, “The time started ticking with the passing away of the widow in 1938. The period of limitation being 12 years, it ran out in 1950.”

The Court also noted, “With the running out of the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1908 (by Articles 140 and 141), the very right of the alleged reversioner Jankamma also came to an end. Thus, when she executed the sale in the year 1955 in favour of the appellants, she could not have conveyed any right.”

The Court concluded, “Quite clearly much before the Limitation Act, 1963 came into force, the period of limitation for instituting the suits had expired. This is apart from the effect of not filing such a suit on the very right itself.”

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the principles of limitation and the specific provisions of the Mysore Hindu Law Women’s Right to Property Act, 1933. The court emphasized that while the widow did not acquire absolute rights, the reversioner’s right to claim possession was extinguished due to the lapse of time as prescribed by the Limitation Act. The Court’s reasoning was based on the following points:

• Limitation Period: The court gave significant weight to the fact that the suit was filed well after the 12-year limitation period from the death of Seethamma, the widow, had expired.
• Interpretation of the State Act: The court interpreted Section 10(2)(g) of the State Act to mean that Seethamma did not acquire absolute rights over the property due to the existence of Ramanna’s daughter, Venkamma.
• Reversioner’s Rights: The court acknowledged the reversioner’s right to claim the property, but emphasized that this right was subject to the limitation period.
• Widow’s Limited Estate: The court recognized the concept of a widow’s limited estate, which did not grant her absolute rights of alienation unless for necessity or benefit of the estate.
• Effect of Limitation: The court highlighted that the expiry of the limitation period not only barred the remedy but also extinguished the right of the reversioner.

The emphasis on limitation indicates the Court’s intention to uphold the principle of finality and prevent the reopening of settled matters after a considerable period.

Key Takeaways

• A widow does not acquire absolute rights over her husband’s property if a daughter or daughter’s son of the husband is alive at the time of his death.
• Reversioners have a right to claim possession of property alienated by a widow, but this right is subject to a 12-year limitation period from the date of the widow’s death.
• The expiry of the limitation period not only bars the remedy but also extinguishes the right to the property.
• The State Act of 1933 did not grant absolute rights to a widow when a daughter of the husband was alive at the time of his death.

Directions

No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court in this judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the right of a reversioner to claim possession of property alienated by a Hindu widow is subject to a 12-year limitation period from the date of the widow’s death, and the expiry of this period extinguishes the right. This case reinforces the importance of limitation laws in property disputes and clarifies that while a widow’s alienation might not be valid, the reversioner must act within the prescribed time frame to claim their rights. This judgment does not change the previous position of law, but rather reinforces the existing legal principles.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court’s decision that the suit was barred by limitation. The Court clarified that while Seethamma did not acquire absolute rights over the property, the appellants’ claim was extinguished due to the lapse of the limitation period. This case underscores the significance of adhering to limitation laws in property disputes and the importance of timely action by reversioners to assert their rights.