Supreme Court Clarifies Rights in Joint Family Property After Reconveyance: Doddmuniyappa vs. Muniswamy (2019)

Date of the Judgment: July 01, 2019

Citation: Not Available in the source document

Judges: A.M. Khanwilkar, J., Ajay Rastogi, J.

Can a compromise entered into by some members of a joint family, without the consent of other members, affect the rights of those other members in the joint family property? This question was addressed by the Supreme Court in a recent case concerning the reconveyance of property and its subsequent status as joint family property. The Court examined whether a compromise made during the execution of a decree could bind all members of a joint family, particularly when some members were not party to the compromise. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justices A.M. Khanwilkar and Ajay Rastogi, with Justice Rastogi authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The case revolves around a property originally owned by Chikkanna, the propositus of a joint Hindu family. Chikkanna had three sons: Pillappa, Venkataramanappa, and Muniyappa. The respondents (plaintiffs) are the grandsons of Chikkanna through Pillappa and Venkataramanappa. In 1950, Chikkanna’s three sons jointly sold the property to one Muthappa, with a clause in the sale deed stipulating that if Muthappa were to sell the property, it should be reconveyed to Chikkanna’s sons at the price offered by the purchaser. Subsequently, the property was purchased by Muniswamy @ Annaiyappa in 1954, and later by the appellant, Doddmuniyappa, in 1962.

In 1964, Chikkanna’s sons filed a suit for reconveyance of the property, which was initially dismissed by the trial court. However, the first appellate court allowed their appeal in 1969, and this decision was upheld by the High Court in 1970. Consequently, a reconveyance deed was executed, and possession of the property was restored to Chikkanna’s sons on March 7, 1974. Following this, Doddmuniyappa filed an execution appeal. In 1976, a compromise was reached in the execution appeal, where part of the property was given back to Doddmuniyappa. The grandsons of Chikkanna (respondents/plaintiffs), who were not party to this compromise, filed a suit in 1980 claiming that the compromise was not binding on them as the property was joint family property.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The trial court initially dismissed the suit filed by Chikkanna’s sons for reconveyance. However, the first appellate court allowed the appeal, and this was upheld by the High Court. Subsequently, when the decree was put into execution, the property was reconveyed to Chikkanna’s sons. During the execution appeal filed by Doddmuniyappa, a compromise was reached, which was later challenged by Chikkanna’s grandsons. The trial court dismissed the grandsons’ suit, holding that they failed to establish the property as joint family property. The High Court, however, reversed this decision, stating that the property was indeed joint family property and the compromise was not binding on the grandsons. The present appeal was filed in the Supreme Court against the High Court’s decision.

Legal Framework

The judgment primarily revolves around the concept of joint family property under Hindu law. The Supreme Court referred to the principle that property inherited from a paternal ancestor becomes joint family property in the hands of the sons, as established in Smt. Dipo vs. Wassan Singh and Others 1983(3) SCC 376. The court also discussed the nature of ancestral property, stating that while it is ancestral property for male issue, it is absolute property for other relations. The key legal principle is that coparceners have a right by birth in joint family property, and any compromise affecting that right requires their consent.

The Court considered the following legal principles:

• ✓ The nature of ancestral property and its devolution within a Hindu joint family.
• ✓ The rights of coparceners in joint family property.
• ✓ The binding nature of a compromise decree on parties not consenting to it.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments (Doddmuniyappa):

• ✓ The property sold by Chikkanna’s sons in 1950 did not have the character of joint family property, as the grandsons were not even born then.
• ✓ When part of the property was returned under the compromise, it did not acquire the character of coparcenary property.
• ✓ The compromise was binding on the original plaintiffs (Chikkanna’s sons), and the High Court erred in treating the property as joint family property.
• ✓ The trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to establish the property as joint family property was correct.
• ✓ The nature of the property did not become coparcenary property when the sons came into possession after the decree.

Respondents’ Arguments (Muniswamy & Ors.):

• ✓ The clause of reconveyance in the 1950 sale deed enured to the benefit of the family.
• ✓ After the decree and restoration of possession in 1974, the property reassumed its original character of joint family property.
• ✓ The property inherited from the father by his sons becomes joint family property, as held in Smt. Dipo vs. Wassan Singh and Others.
• ✓ The compromise was entered into without the consent of the respondents and, therefore, did not bind their rights.
• ✓ The filing of an execution appeal did not take away the efficacy of the reconveyance decree.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in a separate section. However, the core issue that the court addressed was:

1. Whether the compromise decree dated 25th March, 1976, entered into between the appellant and respondent nos. 7 to 9, was binding on respondent nos. 1 to 6, who were not parties to the compromise, given that the property was joint family property.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:

Authorities

The Supreme Court relied on the following authority:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

The Supreme Court relied on Smt. Dipo vs. Wassan Singh and Others [1983(3) SCC 376]* to support its decision that property inherited from a father by his sons becomes joint family property. The Court used this precedent to establish that the property, after reconveyance, reassumed its character as joint family property in the hands of Chikkanna’s sons, and thus the grandsons had a right by birth in the property.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the principle that once the property was reconveyed to Chikkanna’s sons, it reassumed its character as joint family property. The Court emphasized that the grandsons had a right by birth in this property, and any compromise affecting their rights required their consent. The Court also considered the fact that the grandsons were not parties to the compromise. The Court’s reasoning was based on the established principles of Hindu law regarding joint family property and coparcenary rights.

Fact:Law Ratio

Logical Reasoning:

The Court rejected the appellant’s argument that the property did not become joint family property after reconveyance. The Court reasoned that the reconveyance decree restored the property to its original character as joint family property, and therefore, the grandsons had a right in it. The Court also rejected the argument that the compromise was binding on the grandsons, stating that the compromise was entered into without their consent and therefore did not bind their share in the property.

The Court quoted from Smt. Dipo vs. Wassan Singh and Others, stating: “Property inherited from paternal ancestors is, of course, “ancestral property” as regards the male issue of the propositus, but it is his absolute property and not ancestral property as regards other relations.” and “The share which a coparcener obtains on partition of ancestral property is ancestral property as regards his male issue. They take an interest in it by birth, whether they are in existence at the time of partition or are born subsequently.”

The Court concluded that the compromise would bind the share of Chikkanna’s sons as they were parties to the compromise, but it would not bind the share of the grandsons. The Court found no error in the High Court’s judgment and dismissed the appeal.

Key Takeaways

• ✓ Property inherited from paternal ancestors by sons becomes joint family property in their hands.
• ✓ Coparceners have a right by birth in joint family property.
• ✓ A compromise decree entered into by some coparceners without the consent of other coparceners is not binding on the latter.
• ✓ Reconveyance of property restores its original character as joint family property.
• ✓ The filing of an execution appeal does not negate the effect of a reconveyance decree.

Directions

The Supreme Court did not issue any specific directions in this judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a compromise decree entered into by some coparceners without the consent of other coparceners is not binding on the latter, especially when the property has been reconveyed and has assumed the character of joint family property. This ruling reinforces the principle that coparceners have a right by birth in joint family property, and any compromise affecting that right requires their consent. This decision does not change the previous position of law but rather clarifies and reinforces it.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s decision that the compromise entered into by Chikkanna’s sons was not binding on their sons (Chikkanna’s grandsons) as the property was joint family property and they were not parties to the compromise. The Court emphasized that the property, after reconveyance, reassumed its original character as joint family property, and the grandsons had a right by birth in it. This judgment reaffirms the established principles of Hindu law regarding joint family property and the rights of coparceners.