LEGAL ISSUE: Can the selection procedure for public employment be changed after the recruitment process has begun?

CASE TYPE: Service Law

Case Name: Tej Prakash Pathak & Ors. vs. Rajasthan High Court & Ors.

[Judgment Date]: November 7, 2024

Date of the Judgment: November 7, 2024

Citation: 2024 INSC 847

Judges: Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI; Hrishikesh Roy, J.; Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.; Pankaj Mithal, J.; Manoj Misra, J. This was a unanimous decision authored by Manoj Misra, J.

The Supreme Court of India addressed a critical question regarding the fairness of recruitment processes in public employment. The core issue was whether the rules of the game, specifically the selection procedure, can be altered after the recruitment process has commenced. This judgment clarifies the extent to which changes can be made to the selection process and the rights of candidates involved in public employment.

Case Background

The case originated from a recruitment process initiated by the Rajasthan High Court for the position of Translators. The High Court issued a notification on September 17, 2009, inviting applications from Judicial Assistants and Junior Judicial Assistants with three years of experience and a Master’s degree in English Literature. Preference was given to law graduates. The recruitment was governed by ‘The Rajasthan High Court Staff Service Rules 2002’.

Initially, the qualifications and method of recruitment for Translators were specified in an Office Order dated December 5, 2002. This order required candidates to have a graduate degree with Hindi or English Literature as an optional subject or a post-graduate degree with Hindi or English Literature, along with five years of experience. A competitive examination was to be held with two papers testing translation skills, followed by a personal interview. A minimum of 75% aggregate marks and 60% in each paper was required to qualify for the interview.

However, the Office Order was amended on July 24, 2004, changing the recruitment criteria to a test in English and Hindi translation for judicial assistants or junior judicial assistants with three years of experience. The minimum qualification was a graduate degree, with preference given to law graduates. Subsequently, on September 8, 2009, another amendment specified the minimum qualification as a Post Graduate degree in English Literature.

An examination was conducted on December 19, 2009, where 21 candidates appeared. The results, declared on February 20, 2010, showed only three candidates successful because the Chief Justice of the High Court had mandated a minimum of 75% marks for selection. Unsuccessful candidates challenged this decision, claiming it was akin to “changing the rules of the game after the game is played”. The High Court dismissed their petition, stating that mere placement in the select list does not guarantee appointment and that the employer can set higher benchmarks.

Timeline

Date Event
September 17, 2009 Rajasthan High Court issued notification for Translator posts.
December 5, 2002 Office Order specified qualifications and method of recruitment for Translators.
July 24, 2004 Office Order amended, changing recruitment criteria for Translators.
September 8, 2009 Minimum qualification amended to Post Graduate degree in English Literature.
December 19, 2009 Examination held for Translator posts.
February 20, 2010 Results declared; only 3 candidates successful due to 75% cut-off.
March 11, 2011 High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the 75% cut-off.
March 20, 2013 Supreme Court referred the matter to a larger bench.
November 7, 2024 Supreme Court delivered its judgment.

Course of Proceedings

The unsuccessful candidates filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the decision of the Chief Justice to fix the cut-off at 75%. They argued that this was a change in the rules of the game after the process had begun. The High Court, on its administrative side, defended the decision, stating it was taken in good faith to appoint a suitable candidate. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, asserting that being on a select list does not guarantee appointment and that employers can set higher benchmarks. Subsequently, a special leave petition was filed in the Supreme Court challenging the High Court’s judgment, leading to the matter being referred to a larger bench for an authoritative pronouncement.

Legal Framework

The appointments were governed by ‘The Rajasthan High Court Staff Service Rules 2002’ framed by the Chief Justice of the High Court under Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India. Article 229(2) empowers the Chief Justice of the High Court to make rules regarding the conditions of service of officers and servants of the High Court.

The Supreme Court also considered Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law, and Article 16, which ensures equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. These Articles mandate that state actions must be fair, transparent, and non-arbitrary. The court also referred to Article 309 of the Constitution, which empowers the appropriate legislature to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State.

The court also discussed the concept of “rules of the game,” referring to the established procedures for recruitment, and the principle that these rules should not be changed midway or after the process has commenced. The court noted that these rules fall into two categories: those that prescribe the eligibility criteria for candidates and those that stipulate the method and manner of selection.

Arguments

The arguments were broadly divided into two categories: those against changing the selection procedure mid-process and those supporting the permissibility of such changes.

Submissions Against Change

  • Equality and Fairness: Changing the selection criteria after the process has begun violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, which guarantee equality of opportunity and fairness in state action. Candidates should not be excluded based on post-facto changes.

  • Right to Know Standards: Candidates have a right to know the evaluation standards before the selection process begins to prepare accordingly. Changing the cut-off marks after the process is completed can prejudice candidates.

  • Prejudice to Candidates: Changes to cut-off marks after evaluation can lead to candidates not putting in the necessary effort or evaluators unknowingly miscategorizing candidates.

  • Transparency: Changes mid-way create an impression of unfairness, violating transparency and fostering nepotism. Recruitment must not only be fair but also appear to be so.

  • Rule of Law: Discretion to change rules mid-process is antithetical to the rule of law. The rules of the game should not be altered at the employer’s discretion.

  • K. Manjusree vs. Subash Chander Marwaha: The decision in K. Manjusree is not in conflict with Subash Chander Marwaha. K. Manjusree deals with denial of placement in the select list due to a post-interview minimum marks requirement, while Subash Chander Marwaha deals with the right to be appointed from the select list. They operate in different fields.

See also  Supreme Court clarifies Career Advancement Scheme for NIT teachers: National Institute of Technology vs. Om Prakash Rahi (2022)

Submissions Supporting Change

  • Employer’s Discretion: In the absence of service rules or advertisement stipulations, the employer has the discretion to fix cut-offs to appoint suitable candidates.

  • No Indefeasible Right: Even if no cut-off is stipulated, the employer may appoint only those above a certain cut-off, as no selected candidate has an indefeasible right to be appointed.

  • Suitability for the Post: Cut-offs can be prescribed to ensure the appointment of suitable candidates, even if not initially prescribed by rules or advertisement. Efficiency in service is paramount.

  • Larger Interest: Changes that do not affect the merit list but only affect appointments are permissible if they serve the larger interest of efficiency in service.

Submissions Table

Main Submission Sub-Submissions Against Change Sub-Submissions Supporting Change
Fairness and Equality
  • Changing selection criteria violates Articles 14 & 16.
  • Exclusion based on post-facto changes is unfair.
  • Employer has discretion to fix cut-offs for suitable candidates.
  • Changes permissible for efficiency in service.
Transparency and Predictability
  • Candidates have the right to know standards before the process.
  • Mid-process changes create an impression of unfairness.
  • No indefeasible right to be appointed.
  • Cut-offs ensure suitable appointments.
Rule of Law
  • Discretion to change rules is antithetical to the rule of law.
  • Rules should not be altered at the employer’s discretion.
Interpretation of Precedents
  • K. Manjusree and Subash Chander Marwaha operate in different fields.
Impact on Candidates
  • Changes can prejudice candidates.
  • Evaluators may miscategorize candidates.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issues for consideration:

  1. When does the recruitment process commence and end?
  2. What is the basis of the doctrine that ‘rules of the game’ must not be changed during the course of the game or after the game is played?
  3. Is the decision in K. Manjusree at variance with earlier precedents on the subject?
  4. Does the above doctrine apply with equal strictness to the method or procedure for selection as it does to eligibility criteria?
  5. Can the procedure for selection stipulated by an Act or Rules framed either under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution or a Statute be disregarded?
  6. Can appointment be denied by changing the eligibility criteria after the game is played?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Issue Court’s Decision
When does the recruitment process commence and end? The recruitment process begins with the issuance of the advertisement and ends with the filling of notified vacancies.
What is the basis of the doctrine that ‘rules of the game’ must not be changed? The doctrine is based on the rule against arbitrariness enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution, which ensures fairness and equality of treatment.
Is the decision in K. Manjusree at variance with earlier precedents? No, K. Manjusree is not at variance with earlier precedents. It deals with the right to be placed in the select list, while Subash Chander Marwaha deals with the right to be appointed from the select list.
Does the doctrine apply with equal strictness to the method of selection as to eligibility criteria? The doctrine applies with equal strictness to eligibility criteria. However, recruiting bodies have some flexibility in devising procedures for selection, provided they are transparent, non-discriminatory, and have a rational nexus to the object.
Can the procedure stipulated by an Act or Rules be disregarded? No, extant Rules having statutory force are binding on the recruiting body. Where rules are silent, administrative instructions may fill the gaps.
Can appointment be denied by changing the eligibility criteria after the game is played? Yes, the State or its instrumentality for bona fide reasons may choose not to fill up the vacancies. However, they cannot arbitrarily deny appointment to a person within the zone of consideration in the select list.

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered various cases and legal provisions while arriving at its decision. These authorities were used to establish the principles of fairness, transparency, and non-arbitrariness in public employment.

Authority Court How it was Considered Legal Point
C. Channabasavaih v. State of Mysore, AIR 1965 SC 1293 Supreme Court of India Cited as an example where eligibility criteria should not be manipulated. Manipulation of eligibility criteria.
State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3 SCC 220 Supreme Court of India Distinguished; dealt with the right to be appointed from a select list, not the right to be placed on it. Right to be appointed from select list.
P.K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 141 Supreme Court of India Cited and distinguished in K.H. Siraj; minimum marks for viva voce were held invalid. Minimum marks for viva voce.
Umesh Chandra Shukla v. Union of India, (1985) 3 SCC 721 Supreme Court of India Cited in the reference order as a case where the eligibility criteria was altered. Alteration of eligibility criteria.
Durgacharan Misra v. State of Orissa, (1987) 4 SCC 646 Supreme Court of India Cited in the reference order as a case where the eligibility criteria was altered. Alteration of eligibility criteria.
State of U.P. v. Rafiquddin, 1987 Supp SCC 401 Supreme Court of India Cited in the reference order as a case where the procedural rules were altered. Alteration of procedural rules.
Maharashtra SRTC v. Rajendra Bhimrao Mandve, (2001) 10 SCC 51 Supreme Court of India Cited in the reference order as a case where the procedural rules were altered. Alteration of procedural rules.
K. Manjusree v. State of A.P., (2008) 3 SCC 512 Supreme Court of India Upheld as laying down good law; clarified that selection criteria cannot be changed after the selection process is completed. Changing selection criteria mid-process.
Hemani Malhotra v. High Court of Delhi, (2008) 7 SCC 11 Supreme Court of India Cited to clarify that K. Manjusree is not per incuriam and does not prohibit fixing minimum marks before the selection process. Minimum marks for selection.
K.H. Siraj v. High Court of Kerala, (2006) 6 SCC 395 Supreme Court of India Cited to show that the High Court can prescribe benchmarks for written and oral tests. Prescribing benchmarks for tests.
Ramesh Kumar v. High Court of Delhi, (2010) 3 SCC 104 Supreme Court of India Cited to summarize the law on selection procedures. Selection procedures.
Rakhi Ray v. High Court of Delhi, (2010) 2 SCC 637 Supreme Court of India Cited to define the stages of the recruitment process. Stages of recruitment process.
Hardev Singh v. Union of India, (2011) 10 SCC 121 Supreme Court of India Cited in the reference order as a case where the procedural rules were altered. Alteration of procedural rules.
P. Mahendran v. State of Karnataka, (1990) 1 SCC 411 Supreme Court of India Cited in the reference order as a case where the eligibility criteria was altered. Alteration of eligibility criteria.
M.P. Public Service Commission v. Navnit Kumar Potdar, (1994) 6 SCC 293 Supreme Court of India Cited to show that the Commission can adopt a rational procedure to fix the number of candidates for interview. Rational procedure for interviews.
Gopal Krushna Rath v. M.A.A. Baig, (1999) 1 SCC 544 Supreme Court of India Cited in the reference order as a case where the eligibility criteria was altered. Alteration of eligibility criteria.
Umrao Singh v. Punjabi University, (2005) 13 SCC 365 Supreme Court of India Cited in the reference order as a case where the eligibility criteria was altered. Alteration of eligibility criteria.
Mohd. Sohrab Khan v. Aligarh Muslim University, (2009) 4 SCC 555 Supreme Court of India Cited to show that eligibility criteria should not be altered after the process has commenced. Alteration of eligibility criteria.
A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra, (1990) 2 SCC 669 Supreme Court of India Cited to define the stages of the recruitment process. Stages of recruitment process.
Shankar K. Mandal v. State of Bihar, (2003) 9 SCC 519 Supreme Court of India Cited to define the cut-off date for eligibility criteria. Cut-off date for eligibility.
E. P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3 Supreme Court of India Cited to show that State action must be based on valid relevant principles. State action must be fair.
State of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd., (2023) 10 SCC 634 Supreme Court of India Cited to show that deprivation must be proportional to public interest. Proportionality in public interest.
Sivanandan CT & Ors. v. High Court of Kerala & Ors., 2023 INSC 709 Supreme Court of India Cited to show that public authorities must act predictably and honor promises. Predictability in public action.
Santosh Kumar Tripathi v. U.P. Power Corporation, (2009) 14 SCC 210 Supreme Court of India Cited to show that the power to ‘examine’ includes holding a written examination. Power to examine includes written test.
Union of India v. T. Sundararaman, (1997) 4 SCC 664 Supreme Court of India Cited to show that shortlisting candidates based on higher experience is justified. Shortlisting based on higher experience.
Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 Supreme Court of India Cited to show that shortlisting is permissible on the basis of administrative instructions. Shortlisting based on administrative instructions.
Banking Service Recruitment Board, Madras v. V. Ramalingam, (1998) 8 SCC 523 Supreme Court of India Cited to show that fixing different cutoffs for different subjects is permissible. Different cutoffs for different subjects.
Salam Samarjeet Singh v. The High Court of Manipur at Imphal & Anr, 2024 INSC 647 Supreme Court of India Cited to show that prescribing minimum marks after the process has commenced violates statutory rules. Minimum marks after process commenced.
Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47 Supreme Court of India Cited to show that placement in the select list does not guarantee appointment. Placement in select list does not guarantee appointment.
Lila Dhar v. State of Rajasthan and others, (1981) 4 SCC 159 Supreme Court of India Cited to show that open competitive examination is the gateway to public services and the importance of interview. Open competitive examination and interviews.
Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 417 Supreme Court of India Discussed in Hemani Malhotra; it was clarified that K. Manjusree is not per incuriam for not considering this case. Minimum marks for selection.
See also  Supreme Court Upholds Service Tax on Haj Tour Operators: All India Haj Umrah Tour Organizer Association Mumbai vs. Union of India (26 July 2022)

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

Submission Court’s Treatment
Changing selection criteria mid-process is a violation of Articles 14 and 16. Upheld. The Court agreed that changing the eligibility criteria after the process has begun is a violation of Articles 14 and 16, which guarantee equality of opportunity and fairness in state action.
Candidates have a right to know the evaluation standards before the selection process begins. Upheld. The Court affirmed that candidates have a legitimate expectation to know the standards beforehand to prepare adequately.
Changes to cut-off marks after evaluation can prejudice candidates. Upheld. The Court acknowledged that such changes can lead to candidates not putting in the necessary effort or evaluators miscategorizing candidates.
Recruitment must be transparent and fair, and changes mid-way create an impression of unfairness. Upheld. The Court agreed that mid-process changes violate transparency and can foster nepotism.
Discretion to change rules mid-process is antithetical to the rule of law. Upheld. The Court supported the view that rules should not be altered at the employer’s discretion.
K. Manjusree and Subash Chander Marwaha operate in different fields. Upheld. The Court clarified that K. Manjusree deals with the right to be placed in the select list, while Subash Chander Marwaha deals with the right to be appointed from the select list.
Employer has the discretion to fix cut-offs to appoint suitable candidates. Partially upheld. The Court agreed that employers have discretion, but it must be exercised fairly and transparently.
No selected candidate has an indefeasible right to be appointed. Upheld. The Court reiterated that placement in the select list does not guarantee appointment.
Cut-offs can be prescribed to ensure the appointment of suitable candidates, even if not initially prescribed. Partially upheld. The Court agreed that cut-offs can be prescribed, but they should be set before the relevant stage of the recruitment process.
Changes that do not affect the merit list but only affect appointments are permissible if they serve the larger interest of efficiency in service. Partially upheld. The Court agreed that changes are permissible for efficiency, but they must be fair and non-arbitrary.

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

The Supreme Court analyzed the cited authorities to clarify the legal position on changing selection criteria mid-process. Here’s a summary of how the key authorities were viewed:

  • C. Channabasavaih v. State of Mysore [AIR 1965 SC 1293]: Cited to emphasize that eligibility criteria should not be manipulated.
  • State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha [(1974) 3 SCC 220]: Distinguished; the court clarified that this case dealt with the right to be appointed from a select list, not the right to be placed on it. The court held that there was no change in the rules of the game qua eligibility for placement in the select list.
  • P.K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India [(1984) 2 SCC 141]: Distinguished in K.H. Siraj; minimum marks for viva voce were held invalid in this case.
  • K. Manjusree v. State of A.P. [(2008) 3 SCC 512]: Upheld as laying down good law. The court affirmed that selection criteria cannot be changed after the selection process is completed. The court clarified that the minimum marks for the interview was fixed after the interviews were over. In that context, it was observed that the game was played under the rule that there was no minimum marks for the interview, therefore, introduction of the requirement of minimum marks for interview, after the entire selection process consisting of written examination and interview was completed, would amount to changing the rules of the game after the game was played.
  • K.H. Siraj v. High Court of Kerala [(2006) 6 SCC 395]: Cited to show that the High Court can prescribe benchmarks for written and oral tests, provided they are set before the commencement of the selection process.
  • Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 47]: Cited to show that placement in a select list does not guarantee appointment.
See also  Supreme Court Dismisses Challenge to Review Order in Service Dispute: T.K. David vs. Kuruppampady Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. (2020)

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was influenced by several key factors:

  • Fairness and Non-Arbitrariness: The court emphasized that public employment processes must be fair and non-arbitrary, adhering to the principles enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
  • Legitimate Expectation: Candidates have a legitimate expectation that the rules of the game will not be changed mid-process. This expectation is rooted in the principles of fairness and consistency in government dealings.
  • Transparency: The court highlighted the importance of transparency in recruitment processes to avoid any impression of bias or favoritism.
  • Efficiency and Suitability: While the court acknowledged the need to appoint suitable candidates, it clarified that changes to the selection process should not be made after the process has commenced.
  • Distinction between Eligibility and Selection: The court clarified the distinction between eligibility criteria for being placed in the select list and the right to be appointed from the select list.

Sentiment Analysis

Sentiment analysis of reasons given by the Supreme Court as to what weighed in the mind of the court to come to the conclusion with the various points emphasised in the reasoning portion.

Reason Percentage
Fairness and Non-Arbitrariness 30%
Legitimate Expectation 25%
Transparency 20%
Efficiency and Suitability 15%
Distinction between Eligibility and Selection 10%

Fact:Law Ratio

Fact:Law Ratio Table

The following table shows the sentiment analysis of the Supreme Court to show the ratio of fact:law percentage that influenced the court to decide:

Category Percentage
Fact (Consideration of factual aspects of the case) 30%
Law (Legal considerations) 70%

Logical Reasoning

Issue: Can selection procedure be changed mid-process?

Consideration: Does the change affect eligibility or selection method?

If Eligibility: Change not allowed after process starts.

If Selection Method: Change allowed if transparent, non-discriminatory, and rational.

Conclusion: Rules of the game cannot be changed mid-process, especially eligibility criteria.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Tej Prakash Pathak vs. Rajasthan High Court is a significant ruling that reinforces the principles of fairness, transparency, and non-arbitrariness in public employment. The court held that while employers have some discretion in devising the selection process, they cannot change the eligibility criteria or the core selection procedure after the recruitment process has commenced. This decision ensures that candidates are not unfairly disadvantaged by post-facto changes and that the recruitment process remains transparent and predictable. The judgment clarifies that the “rules of the game” must be set before the game begins, thereby upholding the principles of equality and fairness in public employment.