Supreme Court clarifies Sanction Validity and Timelines under UAPA: Fuleshwar Gope vs. Union of India (23 September 2024)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 23 September 2024

Citation: 2024 INSC 718

Judges: C.T. Ravikumar, J., Sanjay Karol, J.

Can a sanction order under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) be challenged at any stage of the proceedings? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question, along with issues relating to statutory timelines and independent review, in the case of Fuleshwar Gope vs. Union of India & Ors. This judgment clarifies the procedural requirements for granting sanctions under the UAPA and their implications for criminal proceedings.

The Supreme Court, in this case, examined the validity of a sanction order issued against the appellant, Fuleshwar Gope, under the UAPA. The court also delved into whether the statutory timelines for granting such sanctions are mandatory or directory and whether the requirement of an independent review was adequately met. The bench comprised Justices C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol, who delivered the judgment.

Case Background

The case revolves around allegations that Fuleshwar Gope (A-17), is associated with the People’s Liberation Front of India (PLFI) and conspired with other members, including Dinesh Gope (A-6), to collect funds through extortion. It is alleged that, on the directions of A-6, Fuleshwar Gope formed a company, M/s. Shiv Shakti Samridhi Infra Pvt. Ltd. (A-20), with Hira Devi (A-14). This company’s bank account was purportedly used to collect funds for PLFI activities.

On 10th November 2016, an FIR was registered against six persons, including A-6, for possessing demonetized currency of Rs. 25.83 lakhs. The case was initially investigated by the local police but was later transferred to the National Investigation Agency (NIA) on 16th January 2018. The NIA filed a supplementary chargesheet on 21st October 2019, naming Fuleshwar Gope as a prosecution witness (PW-65). However, he was later arrested on 13th July 2020, and a suo-motu sanction was issued against him on 22nd July 2020.

Fuleshwar Gope filed a Writ Petition before the High Court seeking to quash the sanction order, the cognizance order, and the charges framed against him. The High Court dismissed the petition, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi considered the following issues: (i) whether the Central Government had the power to transfer the investigation to the NIA after the District Police had completed it; (ii) whether the sanction order dated 22nd July 2020 was legal; and (iii) whether the cognizance order was valid.

The High Court relied on Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. to hold that the NIA had jurisdiction to carry out further investigation. It also concluded that the sanction order adhered to the timelines stipulated in Rule 3 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation & Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008. The High Court further held that the cognizance order was valid, based on the material placed before the Special Judge.

Legal Framework

The primary legal framework in this case is the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), along with the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation & Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008 (2008 Rules). Key provisions include:

• Section 2(g) of the UAPA: Defines “proceeds of terrorism” as properties derived from terrorist acts or used for such acts.
• Section 45 of the UAPA: Requires prior sanction from the Central or State Government to take cognizance of offenses under Chapters III, IV, and VI of the Act. It also mandates an independent review of the evidence by an authority appointed by the government before granting sanction. Specifically, Section 45(2) states:
  
  “Sanction for prosecution under sub-section (1) shall be given within such time as may be prescribed only after considering the report of such authority appointed by the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government which shall make an independent review of the evidence gathered in the course of investigation and make a recommendation, within such time as may be prescribed, to the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government.”
• Rule 3 of the 2008 Rules: Stipulates that the authority appointed under Section 45(2) of the UAPA must submit its report to the government within seven working days of receiving the evidence.
  
  “The Authority shall, under sub-section (2) of Section 45 of the Act, make its report containing the recommendations to the Central Government [or, as the case may be, the State Government] within seven working days of the receipt of the evidence gathered by the investigating officer under the Code.”
• Rule 4 of the 2008 Rules: Requires the government to decide on granting sanction within seven working days of receiving the authority’s recommendations.
  
  “The Central Government [or, as the case may be, the State Government] shall, under sub-section (2) of Section 45 of the Act, take a decision regarding sanction for prosecution within seven working days after receipt of the recommendations of the Authority.”
• Section 22A of the UAPA: Deals with offenses by companies, holding individuals in charge of the company responsible unless they prove the offense was committed without their knowledge or they exercised due diligence.

Arguments

The appellant, Fuleshwar Gope, argued that:

• The sanction order was issued 2 years and 11 months after the incident, violating the timeline under Section 45 of the UAPA and Rules 3 and 4 of the 2008 Rules.
• The requirement of ‘independent review’ under Section 45(2) of the UAPA was not met, as the sanction order was passed mechanically without any reasons or application of mind.
• The validity of sanction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, citing several judgments where convictions were set aside due to invalid sanctions.
• The requisitioning and sanctioning authorities failed to consider the absence of mens rea, which is essential for a criminal offense.
• The appellant was not an accused in the initial FIR or the second module of the case and was wrongly implicated in an independent transaction.
• The appellant, being a daily wage worker and illiterate, was wrongly implicated as a director of the company (A-20) and is protected by the proviso to Section 22A of the UAPA.
• No specific role was ascribed to the appellant, and he was implicated merely because he is a director of A-20, which allegedly received funds for PLFI, and because he hails from the same locality as Dinesh Gope.

The respondent, Union of India, contended that:

• The sanction order was granted after following due process, with the NIA recommending prosecution on 14th July 2020, and the Central Government referring the report to an independent review authority on 15th July 2020.
• The independent review authority submitted its report on 16th July 2020, within the stipulated time under Rule 3 of the 2008 Rules.
• The sanction order was passed after considering all relevant materials, including the recommendation of the independent review authority.
• The second and third modules of the case are not independent transactions but are part of the same continuing transaction to channel proceeds of terrorism.
• The appellant is an active member of a terrorist gang and was involved in collecting and channeling funds through companies, with A-20 serving as a front to launder proceeds of terrorism.
• The trial is at an advanced stage, and no discretion should be exercised to quash the proceedings.

The innovativeness of the appellant’s argument lies in emphasizing the lack of independent review and the violation of statutory timelines, arguing that these procedural lapses invalidate the entire prosecution.

Submissions by Parties

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issues for consideration:

1. Whether the validity of the sanction order can be challenged at any stage?
2. Whether a violation of Section 45(2) of the UAPA read with Rules 3 & 4 of the 2008 Rules, if any, vitiates the proceedings? Specifically, whether violation of (a) statutory timelines and (b) the requirement of independent review, including application of mind, are necessary aspects of procedure.
3. Whether, in the present facts, the argument of the appellant that the transactions in connection with which he has been brought to book were actually independent of the ones in which Dinesh Gope (A-6) and other members were arrayed as accused, has any merit?
4. Whether, in the facts, the statutory exemption under Section 22A of the UAPA applies to the appellant who claims to be unaware of the affairs of the company?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered various authorities to arrive at its decision. These have been categorized below for clarity.

On the Validity of Sanction:

• Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal [CITATION (2014) 14 SCC 295] (Supreme Court of India): Emphasized the importance of a thorough process for granting sanction.
• Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab [CITATION (2007) 1 SCC 1] (Supreme Court of India): Held that the sanctioning authority need not specify each offense separately.
• Dinesh Kumar v. Airport Authority of India [CITATION (2012) 1 SCC 532] (Supreme Court of India): Distinguished between absence of sanction and invalidity due to non-application of mind.
• Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors. v. Pramila Virendra Kumar Agarwal [CITATION (2020) 17 SCC 664] (Supreme Court of India): Reaffirmed that invalidity of sanction can be raised at trial.
• P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim [CITATION (2001) 6 SCC 704] (Supreme Court of India): Discussed the timing of raising the issue of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
• State of Karnataka v. S. Subbegowda [CITATION 2023 SCC OnLine SC 911] (Supreme Court of India): Underscored that challenges to sanction should be raised at the earliest stage.

On Timelines and Mandatory vs. Directory Provisions:

• Rangku Dutta v. State of Assam [CITATION (2011) 6 SCC 358] (Supreme Court of India): Discussed the mandatory nature of provisions with negative commands.
• Hussein Ghadially v. State of Gujarat [CITATION (2014) 8 SCC 425] (Supreme Court of India): Held that sanction by an unauthorized authority is illegal.
• State of Rajasthan v. Mohinuddin Jamal Alvi [CITATION (2016) 12 SCC 608] (Supreme Court of India): Reiterated that sanction by an unauthorized authority is illegal.
• Mahesh Kariman Tirki v. State of Maharashtra (High Court of Judicature at Bombay): Held that timelines in the 2008 Rules are directory.
• Binod Kumar Ganjhu v. Union of India (Jharkhand High Court): Held that timelines in the 2008 Rules are directory.
• Roopesh v. State of Kerala [CITATION 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 1372] (Kerala High Court): Held that timelines in the 2008 Rules are mandatory.
• Manjeet Singh v. State of Punjab (High Court of Punjab and Haryana): Concurred with the view that timelines are mandatory.
• Vijay Rajmohan v. Central Bureau of Investigation (Anti-Corruption Branch) [CITATION (2023) 1 SCC 329] (Supreme Court of India): Discussed time-bound sanctions under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
• State of T.N. v. Sivarasan [CITATION (1997) 1 SCC 682] (Supreme Court of India): Discussed the implications of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act , 1987.
• Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin [CITATION LR (1917) AC 170] (Privy Council): Discussed the nature of mandatory and directory provisions.
• State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava [CITATION 1957 SCC OnLine SC 4] (Supreme Court of India): Interpreted ‘shall’ and ‘may’ in the context of the Constitution.
• State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya [CITATION 1960 SCC OnLine SC 5] (Supreme Court of India): Considered the interpretation of ‘shall’ as mandatory.
• Bachahan Devi v. Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur [CITATION (2008) 12 SCC 372] (Supreme Court of India): Considered the interpretation of ‘may’ and ‘shall’.
• Vijay Dhanuka v. Najima Mamtaj [CITATION (2014) 14 SCC 638] (Supreme Court of India): Interpreted ‘may’ and ‘shall’ in the context of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
• Union of India v. A.K. Pandey [CITATION (2009) 10 SCC 552] (Supreme Court of India): Cited Crawford’s Statutory Construction on mandatory and directory words.
• A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak [CITATION (1984) 2 SCC 500] (Supreme Court of India): Held that courts should read sections as they are.
• Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [CITATION 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323] (Supreme Court of India): Held that courts should read sections as they are.
• Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse [CITATION (1997) 6 SCC 312] (Supreme Court of India): Held that courts should read sections as they are.
• Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers [CITATION (2003) 6 SCC 659] (Supreme Court of India): Held that courts should read sections as they are.

On Independent Review and Application of Mind:

• C.S. Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka [CITATION (2005) 4 SCC 81] (Supreme Court of India): Held that a sanction order should speak for itself.
• State of M.P. v. Harishankar Bhagwan Prasad Tripathi [CITATION (2010) 8 SCC 655] (Supreme Court of India): Referred to C.S. Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka.
• State of Maharashtra v. Mahesh G. Jain [CITATION (2013) 8 SCC 119] (Supreme Court of India): Outlined factors for a valid sanction order.
• Judgebir Singh v. National Investigation Agency [CITATION 2023 SCC OnLine SC 543] (Supreme Court of India): Emphasized the need for thorough application of mind in sanction orders.
• State of Punjab v. Mohd. Iqbal Bhatti [CITATION (2009) 17 SCC 92] (Supreme Court of India): Stated that validity of sanction depends on application of mind.
• State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu [CITATION (2005) 11 SCC 600] (Supreme Court of India): Discussed the scheme of TADA in connection with sanctions.
• State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [CITATION 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222] (Supreme Court of India): Held that sanctions are not an empty formality.
• Superintendent of Police (CBI) v. Deepak Chowdhary [CITATION (1995) 6 SCC 225] (Supreme Court of India): Held that authorities only need to reach a prima facie satisfaction.
• Mohd. Iqbal M. Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra [CITATION (1998) 4 SCC 494] (Supreme Court of India): Held that the sanction is valid if the authority applied its mind to all materials.

On Joinder of Charges:

• Balbir v. State of Haryana [CITATION (2000) 1 SCC 285] (Supreme Court of India): Discussed the meaning of “same transaction.”
• R. Dineshkumar v. State [CITATION (2015) 7 SCC 497] (Supreme Court of India): Considered the aspect of “transaction.”
• Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab [CITATION (2022) 2 SCC 89] (Supreme Court of India): Formulated principles for joint and separate trials.
• State of U.P. v. Paras Nath Singh [CITATION (2009) 6 SCC 372] (Supreme Court of India): Held that the burden is on the accused to show failure of justice due to misjoinder.

On Section 22A of UAPA and similar provisions:

• S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla [CITATION (2005) 8 SCC 89] (Supreme Court of India): Held that only persons in charge of the company’s affairs are liable.
• Susela Padmavathy Amma v. Bharti Airtel Ltd. [CITATION 2024 SCC OnLine SC 311] (Supreme Court of India): Referred to S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals and acquitted the appellant.
• N. Rangachari v. BSNL [CITATION (2007) 5 SCC 108] (Supreme Court of India): Referred to S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals and acquitted the appellant.
• Central Bank of India v. Asian Global Ltd. [CITATION (2010) 11 SCC 203] (Supreme Court of India): Referred to S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals and acquitted the appellant.
• Gunmala Sales (P) Ltd. v. Anu Mehta [CITATION (2015) 1 SCC 103] (Supreme Court of India): Referred to S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals and acquitted the appellant.
• Rajesh Viren Shah v. Redington India Ltd. [CITATION (2024) 4 SCC 305] (Supreme Court of India): Referred to S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals and acquitted the appellant.

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

The Court used the authorities to establish the following principles:

• Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal [CITATION (2014) 14 SCC 295]:* Used to highlight the importance of a thorough and conscious process for granting sanction.
• Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab [CITATION (2007) 1 SCC 1]:* Used to clarify that sanctioning authorities need not specify each offense separately, but materials must be placed before them for the application of mind.
• Dinesh Kumar v. Airport Authority of India [CITATION (2012) 1 SCC 532]:* Used to distinguish between the absence of sanction and the invalidity of sanction due to non-application of mind, stating that the latter can be raised at trial.
• Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors. v. Pramila Virendra Kumar Agarwal [CITATION (2020) 17 SCC 664]:* Used to reiterate that the invalidity of sanction can be raised at the stage of trial.
• P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim [CITATION (2001) 6 SCC 704]:* Used to discuss the timing of raising the issue of sanction, emphasizing that it should be raised at the earliest opportunity.
• State of Karnataka v. S. Subbegowda [CITATION 2023 SCC OnLine SC 911]:* Used to underscore that challenges to sanction should be raised at the earliest stage.
• Rangku Dutta v. State of Assam [CITATION (2011) 6 SCC 358]:* Used to discuss the mandatory nature of provisions with negative commands, and to establish that timelines prescribed in the rules are mandatory.
• Hussein Ghadially v. State of Gujarat [CITATION (2014) 8 SCC 425]:* Used to highlight that sanction by an unauthorized authority is illegal, emphasizing the importance of proper procedure.
• State of Rajasthan v. Mohinuddin Jamal Alvi [CITATION (2016) 12 SCC 608]:* Used to reinforce that sanction by an unauthorized authority is illegal.
• Mahesh Kariman Tirki v. State of Maharashtra:* The Court disagreed with this judgment which held that timelines in the 2008 Rules are directory.
• Binod Kumar Ganjhu v. Union of India:* The Court disagreed with this judgment which held that timelines in the 2008 Rules are directory.
• Roopesh v. State of Kerala [CITATION 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 1372]:* Used to support the view that timelines in the 2008 Rules are mandatory.
• Manjeet Singh v. State of Punjab:* Used to support the view that timelines in the 2008 Rules are mandatory.
• Vijay Rajmohan v. Central Bureau of Investigation (Anti-Corruption Branch) [CITATION (2023) 1 SCC 329]:* Used to discuss time-bound sanctions under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, highlighting the importance of timely decisions.
• State of T.N. v. Sivarasan [CITATION (1997) 1 SCC 682]:* Used to discuss the implications of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act , 1987, and to emphasize the need for strict adherence to procedural requirements.
• Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin [CITATION LR (1917) AC 170]:* Used to discuss the nature of mandatory and directory provisions, and to determine the nature of timelines in the 2008 Rules.
• State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava [CITATION 1957 SCC OnLine SC 4]:* Used to interpret ‘shall’ and ‘may’ in the context of the Constitution, and to determine the nature of timelines in the 2008 Rules.
• State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya [CITATION 1960 SCC OnLine SC 5]:* Used to consider the interpretation of ‘shall’ as mandatory, and to determine the nature of timelines in the 2008 Rules.
• Bachahan Devi v. Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur [CITATION (2008) 12 SCC 372]:* Used to consider the interpretation of ‘may’ and ‘shall’, and to determine the nature of timelines in the 2008 Rules.
• Vijay Dhanuka v. Najima Mamtaj [CITATION (2014) 14 SCC 638]:* Used to interpret ‘may’ and ‘shall’ in the context of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and to determine the nature of timelines in the 2008 Rules.
• Union of India v. A.K. Pandey [CITATION (2009) 10 SCC 552]:* Used to cite Crawford’s Statutory Construction on mandatory and directory words, and to determine the nature of timelines in the 2008 Rules.
• A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak [CITATION (1984) 2 SCC 500]:* Used to highlight that courts should read sections as they are, and to emphasize the importance of adhering to the plain language of the law.
• Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [CITATION 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323]:* Used to highlight that courts should read sections as they are, and to emphasize the importance of adhering to the plain language of the law.
• Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse [CITATION (1997) 6 SCC 312]:* Used to highlight that courts should read sections as they are, and to emphasize the importance of adhering to the plain language of the law.
• Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers [CITATION (2003) 6 SCC 659]:* Used to highlight that courts should read sections as they are, and to emphasize the importance of adhering to the plain language of the law.
• C.S. Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka [CITATION (2005) 4 SCC 81]:* Used to establish that a sanction order should speak for itself and demonstrate the application of mind.
• State of M.P. v. Harishankar Bhagwan Prasad Tripathi [CITATION (2010) 8 SCC 655]:* Used to reinforce the principle that a sanction order should speak for itself.
• State of Maharashtra v. Mahesh G. Jain [CITATION (2013) 8 SCC 119]:* Used to outline factors for a valid sanction order, emphasizing the need for a thorough review.
• Judgebir Singh v. National Investigation Agency [CITATION 2023 SCC OnLine SC 543]:* Used to emphasize the need for a thorough application of mind in sanction orders, and to highlight the importance of an independent review.
• State of Punjab v. Mohd. Iqbal Bhatti [CITATION (2009) 17 SCC 92]:* Used to state that the validity of sanction depends on the application of mind, and that the sanctioning authority must consider all the materials.
• State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu [CITATION (2005) 11 SCC 600]:* Used to discuss the scheme of TADA in connection with sanctions, and to emphasize the importance of procedural safeguards.
• State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [CITATION 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222]:* Used to highlight that sanctions are not an empty formality, and that the sanctioning authority must apply its mind.
• Superintendent of Police (CBI) v. Deepak Chowdhary [CITATION (1995) 6 SCC 225]:* Used to clarify that authorities only need to reach a prima facie satisfaction, but still must apply their mind to the materials.
• Mohd. Iqbal M. Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra [CITATION (1998) 4 SCC 494]:* Used to state that the sanction is valid if the authority applied its mind to all materials, and that the sanction order must reflect this.
• Balbir v. State of Haryana [CITATION (2000) 1 SCC 285]:* Used to discuss the meaning of “same transaction,” and to establish the principle that the court must determine if the transactions are linked.
• R. Dineshkumar v. State [CITATION (2015) 7 SCC 497]:* Used to consider the aspect of “transaction,” and to establish the principle that the court must determine if the transactions are linked.
• Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab [CITATION (2022) 2 SCC 89]:* Used to formulate principles for joint and separate trials, and to establish the principle that the court must determine if the transactions are linked.
• State of U.P. v. Paras Nath Singh [CITATION (2009) 6 SCC 372]:* Used to highlight that the burden is on the accused to show failure of justice due to misjoinder, and to establish the principle that the court must determine if the transactions are linked.
• S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla [CITATION (2005) 8 SCC 89]:* Used to establish that only persons in charge of the company’s affairs are liable, and that the proviso under 22A can be invoked.
• Susela Padmavathy Amma v. Bharti Airtel Ltd. [CITATION 2024 SCC OnLine SC 311]:* Used to refer to S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals and to establish that only persons in charge of the company’s affairs are liable, and that the proviso under 22A can be invoked.
• N. Rangachari v. BSNL [CITATION (2007) 5 SCC 108]:* Used to refer to S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals and to establish that only persons in charge of the company’s affairs are liable, and that the proviso under 22A can be invoked.
• Central Bank of India v. Asian Global Ltd. [CITATION (2010) 11 SCC 203]:* Used to refer to S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals and to establish that only persons in charge of the company’s affairs are liable, and that the proviso under 22A can be invoked.
• Gunmala Sales (P) Ltd. v. Anu Mehta [CITATION (2015) 1 SCC 103]:* Used to refer to S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals and to establish that only persons in charge of the company’s affairs are liable, and that the proviso under 22A can be invoked.
• Rajesh Viren Shah v. Redington India Ltd. [CITATION (2024) 4 SCC 305]:* Used to refer to S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals and to establish that only persons in charge of the company’s affairs are liable, and that the proviso under 22A can be invoked.

Final Decision and Directions

The Supreme Court held that the timelines under Rules 3 and 4 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation & Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008, are mandatory and must be strictly adhered to. The Court also emphasized that the independent review under Section 45(2) of the UAPA must be genuine and not a mere formality.

However, the Supreme Court did not quash the proceedings against the appellant at this stage. The Court observed that the issue of the validity of the sanction should be raised before the Trial Court. The Trial Court was directed to examine the issue of the validity of the sanction order, keeping in mind the observations made in this judgment.

The Court also left it open for the Trial Court to decide on the issues of misjoinder of charges and the applicability of Section 22A of the UAPA, based on the evidence presented during the trial.

Flowchart of Sanction Process under UAPA

Key Takeaways and Implications

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Fuleshwar Gope vs. Union of India has several key takeaways and implications for cases under the UAPA:

• Mandatory Timelines: The judgment unequivocally establishes that the timelines prescribed under Rules 3 and 4 of the 2008 Rules are mandatory and not directory. This means that any delay in the submission of the independent review report or the decision on sanction can invalidate the sanction order.
• Genuine Independent Review: The independent review under Section 45(2) of the UAPA is not a mere formality. The reviewing authority must genuinely apply its mind to the evidence and provide a reasoned report. A mechanical or perfunctory review will not suffice.
• Challenge to Sanction: The validity of a sanction order can be challenged at any stage of the proceedings, but the challenge should be raised at the earliest opportunity. This ensures that the accused has the opportunity to raise the issue, while also preventing unnecessary delays in the trial.
• Focus on Procedural Compliance: The judgment emphasizes the importance of strict adherence to procedural requirements in UAPA cases. This is particularly significant given the stringent nature of the UAPA and the potential for abuse if procedures are not followed diligently.
• Impact on UAPA Cases: This judgment will have a significant impact on UAPA cases, as it sets a precedent for strict adherence to timelines and independent review. It also provides a basis for challenging sanction orders that do not meet these requirements.
• Trial Court’s Role: The judgment clarifies that the Trial Court has a crucial role in examining the validity of the sanction order and in deciding on the issues of misjoinder of charges and the applicability of Section 22A of the UAPA.

Overall, this judgment reinforces the importance of procedural fairness in UAPA cases and provides a crucial safeguard against potential abuses of power. It ensures that the sanction process is not merely a formality but a thorough and conscious exercise of power, in line with the principles of natural justice.