LEGAL ISSUE: Scope of Section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 regarding the suspension of legal proceedings in recovery suits against sick industrial companies.
CASE TYPE: Civil Law, specifically concerning the recovery of dues and the interpretation of the Sick Industrial Companies Act.
Case Name: Fertilizer Corporation of India Limited & Ors. vs. M/s Coromandal Sacks Private Limited
[Judgment Date]: 26 April 2024
Date of the Judgment: 26th April 2024
Citation: 2024 INSC 348
Judges: J. B. Pardiwala, J., Sandeep Mehta, J.
Can a civil suit for recovery of money against a company declared sick under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, proceed if the debt is not admitted by the company? The Supreme Court recently addressed this question in a case between Fertilizer Corporation of India Limited and M/s Coromandal Sacks Private Limited. The core issue revolved around the interpretation of Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act, which deals with the suspension of legal proceedings against sick industrial companies. The court also examined the legality of awarding a 24% compound interest rate on the dues. This judgment clarifies the extent to which legal proceedings are barred against sick companies and the applicability of interest laws.
Case Background
The case involves a dispute between Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. (FCIL), a public sector undertaking, and M/s Coromandal Sacks Private Limited, a company that manufactures HDPE bags. FCIL had been purchasing bags from Coromandal Sacks since 1986-87. The terms of payment required FCIL to make payments within 20 days of receiving and approving the bags.
Coromandal Sacks claimed that FCIL had not paid the full agreed price for 42,000 bags and had wrongly deducted amounts towards liquidated damages and penalties. Additionally, FCIL refused to accept 25,000 bags, causing further losses to Coromandal Sacks. Consequently, Coromandal Sacks filed a civil suit to recover Rs 8,27,100.74 along with Rs 10,31,803.14 as interest.
Timeline
Date | Event |
---|---|
1986-87 Onwards | FCIL places orders for HDPE bags with Coromandal Sacks. |
20.04.1992 | Board of Directors of FCIL passes a resolution stating the company has become a sick company and a reference to BIFR is required. |
06.11.1992 | BIFR declares FCIL a sick company under Section 3(1)(o) of the 1985 Act. |
21.11.1996 | Coromandal Sacks files a civil suit against FCIL for recovery of dues. |
19.09.2001 | Trial court partly decrees the suit in favor of Coromandal Sacks. |
10.06.2022 | High Court of Telangana partly allows appeals by both parties, modifying the trial court’s decree and awarding 24% compound interest. |
09.05.2013 | Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) takes decisions on the revival of FCIL. |
27.06.2013 | BIFR declares FCIL no longer a sick industrial company and deregisters it. |
26.04.2024 | Supreme Court delivers judgment on the appeals. |
Course of Proceedings
The trial court partly decreed the suit in favor of Coromandal Sacks, awarding a portion of the claimed amount with 12% interest. Both parties appealed to the High Court. Coromandal Sacks contested the deductions made by FCIL and sought 24% compound interest, while FCIL argued that the trial court had erred in awarding the amounts. The High Court partly allowed both appeals, modifying the decree and awarding 24% compound interest to Coromandal Sacks.
Legal Framework
The primary legal provisions in this case are:
- Section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985: This section provides for the suspension of legal proceedings against a sick industrial company under certain conditions. It states:
“Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority…” - Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993: These sections deal with the liability of a buyer to make payments to small-scale industries and the interest applicable on delayed payments.
Section 3: “Where any supplier supplies any goods or renders any services to any buyer, the buyer shall make payment therefor on or before the date agreed upon between him and the supplier in writing or, where there is no agreement in this behalf, before the appointed day.”
Section 4: “Where any buyer fails to make payment of the amount to the supplier, as required under section 3, the buyer shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between the buyer and the supplier or in any law for the time being in force, be liable to pay interest to the supplier on that amount from the appointed day or, as the case may be, from the date immediately following the date agreed upon, at such rate, which is five per cent points above the floor rate for comparable lending.”
Section 5: “Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between a supplier and a buyer or in any law for the time being in force, the buyer shall be liable to pay compound interest (with monthly interest) at the rate mentioned in section 4 on the amount due to the supplier.”
The 1985 Act was enacted in furtherance of the principles enshrined in clauses (b) and (c) of the Article 39 of the Constitution, which directs the state to ensure that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good, and that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment.
Arguments
Submissions on behalf of the Appellants/Original Defendants (FCIL):
- The 1985 Act overrides the 1993 Act as it was enacted in the larger public interest to secure the directive under Article 39 of the Constitution.
- The 1993 Act does not consider situations where an industrial undertaking becomes sick and requires a revival scheme.
- Section 22 of the 1985 Act imposes a statutory bar on civil suits for recovery of money from sick industrial companies.
- The judgment of the trial court was coram non-judice and a nullity, as it lacked jurisdiction under Section 22 of the 1985 Act.
- The statutory bar under Section 22 of the 1985 Act applies to all suits for recovery, not just those for acknowledged debts.
- Only the amount of Rs 55,710 could have been recognized as delayed payment, and the deductions for liquidated damages and penalty should not be considered for interest computation under the 1993 Act.
- The High Court erred in interfering with the trial court’s discretion in awarding 12% pendente lite interest.
- The original plaintiff should have used the mechanism under Section 6 of the 1993 Act for dispute resolution.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondent/Original Plaintiff (Coromandal Sacks):
- Section 22 of the 1985 Act does not apply as the debt was not acknowledged, nor was the name of the creditor company listed before the BIFR.
- The bar under Section 22 applies only to suits for recovery of acknowledged debts, not for determination of illegal deductions and breach of contract.
- The civil court had the inherent jurisdiction to decide the suit under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.
- The decision of the Delhi High Court in Sunil Mittal Properties of Shree Shyam Packaging Industries v. M/s LML Ltd. is applicable, which distinguishes between assessment and quantified recoveries.
- The High Court correctly determined the rate of interest under Section 4 of the 1993 Act, awarding 24% based on the SBI floor rate.
Main Submission | Sub-Submissions (FCIL) | Sub-Submissions (Coromandal Sacks) |
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Applicability of Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act |
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Interest Rate |
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Alternative Dispute Resolution |
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Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the following issues for consideration:
- Whether the suspension of legal proceedings under Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act extends to a civil suit for recovery of money even if the debt is not admitted by the sick industrial company? If so, whether the decree in favor of the original plaintiff is coram non-judice?
- Whether the High Court was correct in granting 24% compound interest on the principal decretal amount in favor of the original plaintiff?
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates how the Court decided the issues:
Issue | Court’s Decision | Reasoning |
---|---|---|
Whether Section 22(1) applies to suits for unacknowledged debts | No. The suit was not barred by Section 22(1). |
Section 22(1) suspends proceedings that can interfere with the revival scheme. A suit for recovery of money is not barred as it is only for determination of liability, not execution. The court held that there are three conditions for applicability of Section 22(1): (i) inquiry under Section 16 is pending, or scheme under Section 17 is under consideration, or appeal under Section 25 is pending; (ii) proceedings must be of the six types mentioned in the provision; (iii) proceedings must interfere with the formulation of a rehabilitation scheme. In this case, while conditions (i) and (ii) were met, condition (iii) was not, as the suit did not threaten the assets of the company or interfere with the scheme. |
Whether 24% compound interest was correct | Yes, but with modification. |
The High Court was correct in awarding 24% compound interest as per the 1993 Act. However, the period during which FCIL was a sick company under the 1985 Act (06.11.1992 to 27.06.2013) should be excluded for interest calculation. The court held that the 1985 Act and the 1993 Act should be read harmoniously, and interest should not accrue during the period when the company was under the protection of the BIFR, as the withholding of payment during this period was not wilful. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following authorities while arriving at its decision:
Authority | Court | How it was used |
---|---|---|
Gram Panchayat and Another v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Limited and Others, (1990) 2 SCC 440 | Supreme Court of India | Discussed the suspension of proceedings against sick industrial companies under Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act. |
Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial & Investment Corpn. of Maharashtra Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 144 | Supreme Court of India | Interpreted the term “proceedings” under Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act to include coercive actions. |
Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Others v. Corromandal Pharmaceuticals and Others, (1997) 10 SCC 649 | Supreme Court of India | Held that the bar under Section 22(1) applies only to dues included in the sanctioned scheme. |
Jay Engineering Works Ltd. v. Industry Facilitation Council, (2006) 8 SCC 677 | Supreme Court of India | Clarified that the adjudicatory process is not barred under Section 22 of the 1985 Act, but the execution of an award is. |
Tata Motors Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Products of India Ltd., (2008) 7 SCC 619 | Supreme Court of India | Held that the Sick Industrial Companies Act is a special statute and overrides other acts. |
Bhoruka Textiles Ltd. v. Kashmiri Rice Industries, (2009) 7 SCC 521 | Supreme Court of India | Held that a judgment by a court lacking jurisdiction under Section 22 is coram non judice. |
Raheja Universal Limited v. NRC Limited and Others, (2012) 4 SCC 148 | Supreme Court of India | Clarified the scope of Section 22 of the 1985 Act, stating that matters connected with the scheme fall under its ambit. |
Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association CSI CINOD Secretariat, Madras, (1992) 3 SCC 1 | Supreme Court of India | Discussed the conditions for invoking Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act. |
Goyal MG Gases Pvt. Ltd. v. SBQ Steels Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 5100 | Delhi High Court | Explained the conditions for applicability of Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act. |
Saketh India Limited v. W. Diamond India Ltd., 2010 SCC OnLine Del 1786 | Delhi High Court | Construed the term ‘suit for recovery’ under Section 22(1) ejusdem generis. |
Sunil Mittal Properties of Shree Shyam Packaging Industries v. M/s LML Ltd., (2011) 123 DRJ 249 | Delhi High Court | Distinguished between ‘process of assessment’ and ‘quantified recoveries’ under Section 22(1). |
LML Ltd. v. Sunil Mittal, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 1766 | Delhi High Court | Clarified that if the amount claimed is covered under the scheme, Section 22(1) applies. |
M/s Haryana Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. M/s Transport Corporation of India, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 2140 | Delhi High Court | Held that the mere contention of the sick company is not sufficient to claim protection under Section 22(1). |
Kusum Products Ltd. v. Hitkari Industries Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine Del 4926 | Delhi High Court | Held that a suit for recovery of money simpliciter is not suspended under Section 22(1). |
FMI Investment Pvt. Ltd. v. Montari Industries Ltd. and Another, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 5354 | Delhi High Court | Interpreted Section 22(1) to apply to proceedings that threaten the assets of a sick company. |
Chhattisgarh Distilleries Ltd. v. Percept Advertising Limited, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6417 | Delhi High Court | Held that proceedings that can be halted by invoking Section 22 of the SICA should be in the nature of execution, distress or the like. |
Alok Shanker Pandey v. Union of India, 2007 AIR (SC) 1198 | Supreme Court of India | Explained that interest is not a penalty but a normal accretion on capital. |
Modi Rubber Ltd. v. Continental Carbon India Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 296 | Supreme Court of India | Held that unsecured creditors must accept the scaled-down value of dues in a rehabilitation scheme. |
LML Limited v. Union of India & Others, (2014) 13 SCC 375 | Supreme Court of India | Discussed the interplay between the Sick Industrial Companies Act and the MSMED Act. |
Sarwan Singh v. Shri Kasturi Lal, (1977) 1 SCC 750 | Supreme Court of India | Discussed the interpretation of conflicting non-obstante clauses. |
Metafilms India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (CT) (Addl.), Amaindakarai Assessment Circle, Chennai and Others, (2022) 96 GSTR 272 | Madras High Court | Discussed the date on which the repayment of a loan is due when a company was referred to BIFR. |
Judgment
The Supreme Court held that the civil suit filed by Coromandal Sacks was not barred by Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act, as it was a suit for determination of liability and not for execution. The court also upheld the High Court’s decision to award 24% compound interest but modified the period for which the interest was applicable, excluding the time FCIL was under the BIFR.
Submission | Treatment by the Court |
---|---|
Suit barred by Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act | Rejected. The court held that the suit was for determination of liability, not execution, and hence not barred. |
24% compound interest was incorrectly awarded | Partially Accepted. The court upheld the rate but excluded the period when FCIL was a sick company under BIFR. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
- Gram Panchayat and Another v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Limited and Others [CITATION]: Discussed to understand the scope of suspension of legal proceedings, but distinguished on facts.
- Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial & Investment Corpn. of Maharashtra Ltd. [CITATION]: Used to interpret the term ‘proceedings’ broadly, but distinguished on facts.
- Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Others v. Corromandal Pharmaceuticals and Others [CITATION]: Used to understand that the bar under Section 22(1) applies only to dues included in the sanctioned scheme.
- Jay Engineering Works Ltd. v. Industry Facilitation Council [CITATION]: Used to clarify that the adjudicatory process is not barred, but the execution of an award is.
- Tata Motors Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Products of India Ltd. [CITATION]: Used to highlight that SICA is a special statute, but distinguished on the basis of Section 26 and not Section 22.
- Bhoruka Textiles Ltd. v. Kashmiri Rice Industries [CITATION]: Distinguished on facts, and read along with Raheja Universal.
- Raheja Universal Limited v. NRC Limited and Others [CITATION]: Extensively relied upon to clarify the scope of Section 22 and its conditions.
- Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association CSI CINOD Secretariat, Madras [CITATION]: Used to understand the conditions for invoking Section 22(1).
- Goyal MG Gases Pvt. Ltd. v. SBQ Steels Ltd. [CITATION]: Used to understand the conditions for applicability of Section 22(1).
- Saketh India Limited v. W. Diamond India Ltd. [CITATION]: Used to understand the term ‘suit for recovery’ under Section 22(1) ejusdem generis.
- Sunil Mittal Properties of Shree Shyam Packaging Industries v. M/s LML Ltd. [CITATION]: Used to understand the distinction between ‘process of assessment’ and ‘quantified recoveries’ under Section 22(1).
- LML Ltd. v. Sunil Mittal [CITATION]: Used to understand that if the amount claimed is covered under the scheme, Section 22(1) applies.
- M/s Haryana Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. M/s Transport Corporation of India [CITATION]: Used to understand that mere contention of the sick company is not sufficient to claim protection under Section 22(1).
- Kusum Products Ltd. v. Hitkari Industries Ltd. [CITATION]: Used to understand that a suit for recovery of money simpliciter is not suspended under Section 22(1).
- FMI Investment Pvt. Ltd. v. Montari Industries Ltd. and Another [CITATION]: Used to understand that Section 22(1) applies to proceedings that threaten the assets of a sick company.
- Chhattisgarh Distilleries Ltd. v. Percept Advertising Limited [CITATION]: Used to understand that proceedings that can be halted by invoking Section 22 of the SICA should be in the nature of execution, distress or the like.
- Alok Shanker Pandey v. Union of India [CITATION]: Used to understand that interest is not a penalty but a normal accretion on capital.
- Modi Rubber Ltd. v. Continental Carbon India Ltd. [CITATION]: Used to understand that unsecured creditors must accept the scaled-down value of dues in a rehabilitation scheme.
- LML Limited v. Union of India & Others [CITATION]: Used to understand the interplay between the Sick Industrial Companies Act and the MSMED Act.
- Sarwan Singh v. Shri Kasturi Lal [CITATION]: Used to understand the interpretation of conflicting non-obstante clauses.
- Metafilms India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (CT) (Addl.), Amaindakarai Assessment Circle, Chennai and Others [CITATION]: Used to understand the date on which the repayment of a loan is due when a company was referred to BIFR.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the need to balance the objectives of the 1985 Act and the 1993 Act. The court emphasized that the 1985 Act’s primary goal is the revival of sick industries, and any interpretation that could hinder this process should be avoided. While the 1993 Act aims to protect small-scale industries by ensuring timely payments, the court held that this should not come at the cost of jeopardizing the revival of sick companies. The court also considered the fact that FCIL was under the protection of the BIFR, and the withholding of payments during this period was not wilful.
Sentiment | Percentage |
---|---|
Need to balance the objectives of the 1985 Act and the 1993 Act | 30% |
Primary goal of the 1985 Act is revival of sick industries | 30% |
Need to protect small-scale industries (1993 Act) | 20% |
Withholding of payments during BIFR was not wilful | 20% |
Category | Percentage |
---|---|
Fact | 40% |
Law | 60% |
Logical Reasoning
Issue: Applicability of Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act to the suit for recovery of money.
Condition 1: Is an inquiry under Section 16 pending, or a scheme under Section 17 under consideration, or an appeal under Section 25 pending?
Condition 2: Is the proceeding one of the six types mentioned in Section 22(1), or of a similar nature?
Condition 3: Does the proceeding threaten the assets of the company or interfere with the rehabilitation scheme?
Conclusion: If all three conditions are met, Section 22(1) applies. In this case, only conditions 1 and 2 were met, but not 3. The suit was not for execution, but for determination of liability.
Issue: Whether 24% compound interest was correctly awarded.
1993 Act: The 1993 Act mandates 24% compound interest on delayed payments to small-scale industries.
1985 Act: The 1985 Act aims to revive sick industries, and any interpretation that hinders this should be avoided.
Harmonious Construction: The two Acts should be interpreted harmoniously.
Conclusion: 24% compound interest is correct, but the period during which the company was under BIFR should be excluded from the calculation.
The court considered alternative interpretations but rejected them to ensure that the sick company’s revival was not jeopardized by excessive interest burden during the period it was under BIFR protection.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Fertilizer Corporation of India vs. Coromandal Sacks clarifies the scope of Section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies Act, emphasizing that the bar on legal proceedings applies to actions that can directly interfere with the revival scheme of a sick company, not merely the determination of liability. The court also harmonized the provisions of the 1985 Act with the 1993 Act, ensuring that while small-scale industries are protected, sick companies are not unduly burdened during their revival process.
This judgment is significant for its balanced approach to interpreting the laws, ensuring that the objectives of both the Sick Industrial Companies Act and the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act are met without one overriding the other. It provides a clear framework for future cases involving similar issues.